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April 2019 - Only the Paranoid Survive by Andrew S. Grove

This book details how to manage a company through complex industry change. It is incredibly prescient and a great management book.

Tech Themes

  1. The decoupling of hardware and software. In the early days of personal computers (1980s) the hardware and software were both provided by the same company. This is complete vertical alignment, similar to what we’ve discussed before with Apple. The major providers of the day were IBM, Digital Equipment Corporation (DEC - Acquired by Compaq which was acquired by HP), Sperry Univac and Wang. When you bought a PC, the sales and distribution, application software, operating system, and chips were all handled by the same Company. This created extreme vendor lock-in because each PC had different and complicated ways of operating. Customers typically stayed with the same vendor for years to avoid the headache of learning the new system. Over time, driven by the increases in memory efficiency, and the rise of Intel (where Andy Grove was employee #3), the PC industry began to shift to a horizontal model. In this model, retail stores (Micro Center, Best Buy, etc.) provided sales and distribution, dedicated software companies provided applications (Apple at the time, Microsoft, Mosaic, etc.), Intel provided the chips, and Microsoft provided the operating system (MS-DOS, then Windows). This decoupling produced a more customized computer for significantly lower cost and became the dominant model for purchasing going forward. Dell computers were the first to really capitalize on this trend.

  2. Microprocessors and memory chips. Intel started in 1968 and was the first to market with a microchip that could be used to store computer memory. Demand was strong because it was the first of its kind, and Intel significantly ramped up production to satisfy that demand. By the early eighties, it was a computer powerhouse and the name Intel was synonymous with computer memory. In the mid-eighties, Japanese memory producers began to appear on the scene and could produce higher-quality chips at a cheaper cost. At first, Intel saw these producers as a healthy backup plan when demand exceeded Intel’s supply, but over time it became clear they were losing market share. Intel saw this commoditization and decided to pivot out of the memory business and into the newer, less-competitive microprocessor business. The microprocessor (or CPU) handles the execution of tasks within the computer, while memories simply store the byproduct of that execution. As memory became easier to produce, the cost dropped dramatically and business became more competitive with producers consistently undercutting each other to win business. On the other hand, microprocessors became increasingly important as the internet grew, applications became more complex and computer speed became a top-selling point.

  3. Mainframes to PCs. IBM had become the biggest technology company in the world on the backs of mainframes: massive, powerful, inflexible, and expensive mega-computers. As the computing industry began to shift to PCs and move away from a vertical alignment to a horizontal one, IBM was caught flat-footed. In 1981, IBM chose Intel to provide the microprocessor for their PC, which led to Intel becoming the most widely accepted supplier of microprocessors. The industry followed volume - manufacturers focused on producing on top of Intel architecture, developers focused on developing on the best operating system (Microsoft Windows) and over time Intel and Microsoft encroached on IBM’s turf. Grove’s reasoning for this is simple: “IBM was composed of a group of people who had won time and time again, decade after decade, in the battle among vertical computer players. So when the industry changed, they attempted to use the same type of thinking regarding product development and competitiveness that had worked so well in the past.” Just because the company has been successful before, it doesn’t mean it will be successful again when change occurs.

The six forces acting on a business at any time. When one becomes outsized, it can represent a strategic inflection point to the business.

The six forces acting on a business at any time. When one becomes outsized, it can represent a strategic inflection point to the business.

Business Themes

  1. Strategic Inflection Points and 10x forces. A strategic inflection point is a fundamental shift in a business, due to industry dynamics. Examples of well known shifts include: mainframes to PCs, vertical computer production to horizontal production, on-premise hardware to the cloud, shrink-wrapped software to SaaS, and physical retail to e-commerce. These strategic inflection points are caused by 10x forces, which represent the underlying shift in the technology or demand that has caused the inflection point. Deriving from the Porter five forces model, these forces can affect your current competitors, complementors, customers, suppliers, potential competitors and substitutes. For Intel, the 10x force came from their Japanese competitors which could produce better quality memories at a substantially lower cost. Recognizing these inflection points can be difficult, and takes place over time in stages. Grove describes it best: “First, there is a troubling sense that something is different. Things don’t work the way they used to. Customers’ attitudes toward you are different. The trade shows seem weird. Then there is a growing dissonance between what your company thinks it is doing and what is actually happening inside the bowels of the organization. Such misalignment between corporate statements and operational actions hints at more than the normal chaos that you have learned to live with. Eventually, a new framework, a new set of understandings, a new set of actions emerges…working your way through a strategic inflection point is like venturing into what i call the valley of death.”

  2. The bottoms up, top-down way to “Let chaos reign.” The way to respond to a strategic inflection point comes through experimentation. As Grove says, “Loosen up the level of control that your organization normally is accustomed to. Let people try different techniques, review different products. Only stepping out of the old ruts will bring new insights.” This idea was also recently discussed by Jeff Bezos in his annual shareholder letter - he likened this idea to wandering: “Sometimes (often actually) in business, you do know where you’re going, and when you do, you can be efficient. Put in place a plan and execute. In contrast, wandering in business is not efficient … but it’s also not random. It’s guided – by hunch, gut, intuition, curiosity, and powered by a deep conviction that the prize for customers is big enough that it’s worth being a little messy and tangential to find our way there. Wandering is an essential counter-balance to efficiency. You need to employ both. The outsized discoveries – the “non-linear” ones – are highly likely to require wandering.” When faced with mounting evidence that things are changing, begin the process of strategic wandering. This needs to be coupled with bottom-up actions from middle managers who are exposed to the underlying industry/technology change on a day to day basis. Strategic wandering reinforced with the buy-in and action of middle management can produce major advances as was the case with Amazon Web Services.

  3. Traversing the valley of death. The first task in traversing through a strategic inflection point is to create a clear, explainable, mental image of what the business looks like on the other side. This becomes your new focus and the Company’s mantra. For Intel, in 1986, it was, “Intel, the microcomputer company.” This phrase did two things: it broke the previous synonymy of Intel with ‘memory’ and signaled internally a new focus on microprocessors. Next, the Company should redeploy its best resources to its biggest problems, including the CEO. Grove described this process as, “going back to school.” He met with managers and engineers and grilled them with questions to fully understand the state and potential of the inflection point. Once the new direction is decided, the company should focus all of its efforts in one direction without hedging. While it may feel comfortable to hedge, it signals an unclear direction and can be incredibly expensive.

Dig Deeper

  • Mapping strategic inflection points to product lifecycles

  • Review of grocery strategic inflection points by Coca-cola

  • Strategic inflection point for Kimberly Clark in the paper industry: “Sell the Mills”

  • Andy Grove survived the Nazi and Communist regimes of Hungary

  • Is Facebook at a strategic inflection point?

tags: Andy Grove, Intel, Chips, hardware, Amazon, Jeff Bezos, Strategic inflection point, 10x force, software, batch2
categories: Non-Fiction
 

February 2019 - Cloud: Seven Clear Business Models by Timothy Chou

While this book is relatively old for internet standards, it illuminates the early transition to SaaS (Software as a Service) from traditional software license and maintenance models. Timothy Chou, current Head of IoT at the Alchemist Accelerator, former Head of On Demand Applications at Oracle, and a lecturer at Stanford, details seven different business models for selling software and the pros/cons of each.

Tech Themes

  1. The rise of SaaS. Software-as-a-Service (SaaS) is an application that can be accessed through a web browser and is managed and hosted by a third-party (likely a public cloud - Google, Microsoft, or AWS). Let’s flash back to the 90’s, a time when software was sold in shrink-wrapped boxes as perpetual licenses. What this meant was you owned whatever version of the software you purchased, in perpetuity. Most of the time you would pay a maintenance cost (normally 20% of the overall license value) to receive basic upkeep services to the software and get minor bugs fixed. However, when the new version 2.0 came out, you would have to pay another big license fee, re-install the software and go through the hassle of upgrading all existing systems. On the backs of increased internet adoption, SaaS allowed companies to deliver a standard product, over the internet, typically at lower price point to end users. This meant smaller companies like salesforce (at the time) could compete with giants like Siebel Systems (acquired by Oracle for $5.85Bn in 2005) because companies could now purchase the software in an on-demand, by-user fashion without going to the store, at a much lower price point.

  2. How cloud empowers SaaS. As an extension, standardization of product means you can aptly define the necessary computing resources - thereby also standardizing your costs. At the same time that SaaS was gaining momentum, the three mega public cloud players emerged, starting with Amazon (in 2006), then Google and eventually Microsoft. This allowed companies to host software in the cloud and not on their own servers (infrastructure that was hard to manage internally). So instead of racking (pun intended) up costs with an internal infrastructure team managing complex hardware - you could offload your workloads to the cloud. Infrastructure as a service (IaaS) was born. Because SaaS is delivered over the internet at lower prices, the cloud became an integral part of scaling SaaS businesses. As the number of users grew on your SaaS platform, you simply purchased more computing space on the cloud to handle those additional users. Instead of spending big amounts of money on complex infrastructural costs/decisions, a company could now focus entirely on its product and go-to-market strategy, enabling it to reach scale much more quickly.

  3. The titans of enterprise software. Software has absolutely changed in the last 20 years and will likely continue to evolve as more specialized products and services become available. That being said, the perennial software acquirers will continue to be perennial software acquirers. At the beginning of his book, Chou highlights fifteen companies that had gone public since 1999: Concur (IPO: 1999, acquired by SAP for $8.3B in 2014), Webex (IPO: 2002, acquired by Cisco in for $3.2B in 2007), Kintera (IPO: 2003, acquired by Blackbaud for $46M in 2008), Salesforce.com (IPO: 2004), RightNow Technologies (IPO: 2004, acquired by Oracle for $1.5B in 2011), Websidestory (IPO: 2004, acquired by Omniture in 2008 for $394M), Kenexa (IPO: 2005, acquired by IBM for $1.3B in 2012), Taleo (IPO: 2005, acquired for $1.9B by Oracle in 2012), DealerTrack (IPO 2005, acquired by Cox Automotive in 2015 for $4.0B), Vocus (IPO: 2005, acquired by GTCR in 2014 for $446M), Omniture (IPO: 2006, acquired by Adobe for $1.8B in 2009), Constant Contact (IPO: 2007, acquired by Endurance International for $1B in 2015), SuccessFactors (IPO: 2007, acquired by SAP for $3.4B in 2011), NetSuite (IPO 2007: acquired by Oracle for $9.3B in 2016) and Opentable (IPO: 2009, acquired by Priceline for $2.6B in 2015). Oracle, IBM, Cisco and SAP have been some of the most active serial acquirers in tech history and this trend is only continuing. Interestingly enough, Salesforce.com is now in a similar position. What it shows is that if you can come to dominate a horizontal application - CRM (salesforce), ERP (SAP/Oracle), or Infrastructure (Google/Amazon/Microsoft) you can build a massive moat that allows you to become the serial acquirer in that space. You then have first and highest dibs at every target in your industry because you can underwrite an acquisition to the highest strategic multiple. Look for these acquirers to continue to make big deals when it can further lock in their market dominant position especially when you see their core business slow.

    Business Themes

Here we see the “Cash Gap” in the subscription model - customer acquisition expenses are incurred upfront but are recouped over time.

Here we see the “Cash Gap” in the subscription model - customer acquisition expenses are incurred upfront but are recouped over time.

  1. The misaligned incentives of traditional license/maintenance model. Software was traditionally sold as perpetual licenses, where a user could access that version of the software forever. Because users were paying to use something forever, the typical price point was very high for any given enterprise software license. This meant that large software upgrades were made at the the most senior levels of management and were large investments from a dollars and time perspective. On top of that initial license came the 20% support costs paid annually to receive patch updates. At the software vendor, this structure created interesting incentives. First, product updates were usually focused on break-fix and not new, “game-changing” upgrades because supporting multiple, separate versions of the software (especially, pre-IaaS) was incredibly costly. This slowed the pace of innovation at those large software providers (turning them into serial acquirers). Second, the sales team became focused on selling customers on new releases directly after they signed the initial deal. This happened because once you made that initial purchase, you owned that version forever; what better way to get more money off of you than introduce a new feature and re-sell you the whole system again. Salespeople were also incredibly focused on closing deals in a certain quarter because any single deal could make or break not only their quarterly sales quota, but also the Company’s revenue targets. If one big deal slipped from Q4 to Q1 the following year, a Company may have to report lower growth numbers to the stock market driving the stock price down. Third, once you made the initial purchase, the software vendor would direct all problems and product inquiries to customer support who were typically overburdened by requests. Additionally, the maintenance/support costs were built into the initial contract so you may end up contractually obligated to pay for support for a product that you don’t like and cannot change. The Company viewed it as: “You’ve already purchased the software, so why should I waste time ensuring you have a great experience with it - unless you are looking to buy the next version, I’m going to spend my time selling to new leads.” These incentives limited product changes/upgrades, focused salespeople completely on new leads, and hurt customer experience, all at the benefit of the Company over the user.

  2. What are CAC and LTV? CAC or customer acquisition costs are key to understand for any type of software business. As HubSpot and distinguished SaaS investor, David Skok notes, its typically measured as, “the entire cost of sales and marketing over a given period, including salaries and other headcount related expenses, and divide it by the number of customers that you acquired in that period.” Once the software sales model shifted from license/maintenance to SaaS, instead of hard-to-predict, big new license sales, companies started to receive monthly recurring payments. Enterprise software contracts are typically year-long, which means that once a customer signs the Company will know exactly how much revenue it should plan to receive over the coming year. Furthermore, with recurring subscriptions, as long as the customer was happy, the Company could be reasonably assured that customer would renew. This idea led to the concept of Lifetime Value of a customer or LTV. LTV is the total amount of revenue a customer will pay the Company until it churns or cancels the subscription. The logic followed that if you could acquire a customer (CAC) for less than the lifetime value of the customer (LTV), over time you would make money on that individual customer. Typically, investors view a 3:1 LTV to CAC ratio as viable for a healthy SaaS company.

Dig Deeper

  • Bill Gates 1995 memo on the state of early internet competition: The Internet Tidal Wave

  • Andy Jassey on how Amazon Web Services got started

  • Why CAC can be a Startup Killer?

  • How CAC is different for different types of software

  • Basic SaaS Economics by David Skok

tags: Cloud Computing, SaaS, License, Maintenance, Business Models, software, Salesforce, SAP, Oracle, Cisco, IaaS, batch2
categories: Non-Fiction
 

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