January 2022 - Seven Powers by Hamilton Helmer

This month we dove into a classic technology strategy book. The book covers seven major Powers a company can have that offer both a benefit and a barrier to competition. Helmer covers the majority of the book through the lens of different case studies including his favorite company, Netflix.

Tech Themes

Power. After years as a consultant at BCG and decades investing in the public market, Helmer distilled all successful business strategies to seven individual Powers. A Power offers a company a re-inforcing benefit while also providing a barrier to potential competition. This is the epitome of an enduring business model in Helmer's mind. Power describes a company's strength relative to a specific competitor, and Powers focus on a single business unit rather than throughout a business. This makes sense: Apple may have a scale economies Power from its iPhone install base relative to Samsung, but it may not have Power in its AppleTV originals segment relative to Netflix. The seven types of Powers are: Scale Economies, Network Economies, Counter-Positioning, Switching Costs, Branding, Cornered Resources, and Process Power.
Invention. While Powers are somewhat easy to spot (scale economies of Google's search algorithm), creating them is anything but easy. So what underlies every one of the seven Powers? Invention. Helmer pulls invention through the lens of industry Dynamics - external competitive conditions and the forward march of technology create opportunities to pursue new business models, processes, brands, and products. Companies must leverage their resources to craft Powers through trial and error, rather than an upfront conscious decision to pursue something by design. I view this almost as an extension of Clayton Christensen's Resource-Processes-Values (RPV) framework we discussed in July 2020. Companies can find a route to Power through these resources and the crafting process. For Netflix, the route was streaming, but the actual Power came from a strong push into exclusive and original content. The streaming business opened up Netflix's subscriber base, and the content decision provided the ability to amortize great content across its growing subscriber base.
Power Progressions. Powers become available at different points in business progression. This makes sense - what drives a company forward in an unpenetrated market is different from what keeps it going during steady-state - Snowflake's competitive dynamics are different than Nestle's. Helmer defines three stages to a company: Origination, Takeoff, and Stability. These stages mirror the dynamics of S-Curves, which we discussed in our July 2021 book. During the Origination stage, companies can benefit from Cornered Resources and Counter-Positioning. Helmer uses the Pixar management team as an example of Cornered Resources during the Origination phase of 3D animated movies. The company had Steve Jobs (product visionary), John Lasseter (story-teller creative), and Ed Catmull (operations and technology leader). During the early days of the industry, these were the only people that knew how to operate a digital film studio. Another Cornered Resource example might be a company finding a new oil well. Before the company starts drilling, it is the only one that can own that asset. An example of Origination Counter-Positioning might be TSMC when they first launched. At that time, it was standard industry perception that semiconductor companies had to be integrated design manufacturers (IDM) - they had to do everything in-house. TSMC was launched as solely a fabrication facility that companies could use to gain extra manufacturing capacity or try out new designs. This gave them great Counter-Positioning relative to the IDM's and they were dismissed as a non-threat. The Takeoff period offers Network Economies, Scale Economies, and Switching Cost Powers. This phase is the growth phase of businesses. Snowflake currently benefits from Switching Cost dynamics - once you use Snowflake, it's unlikely you'll want to use other data warehouse providers because that process involves data replication and additional costs. Scale economies can be seen in businesses that amortize high costs over their user base, like Amazon. Amazon invests in distribution centers at a significant scale, which improves customer experience, which helps them get more customers - the flywheel repeats, allowing Amazon to continually invest in more distribution centers, further building its scale. Network economies show in social media businesses like Bytedance/TikTok. Users make content that attracts more users; incremental users join the platform because there is so much content to "gain" by joining the platform. Like scale economies, it's almost impossible to go build a competitor because a new company would have to recruit all users from the other platform, which would cost tons of money. The Stability phase offers Branding and Process Power. Branding is hard to generate, but the advantage grows with time. Consider luxury goods providers like LVMH; the older, the more exclusive the brand, the more it's desired, and every day it gets older and becomes more desired. A business can create Process Power by refining and improving operations to such a high degree that it becomes difficult to replicate. Classic examples of Process Power are TSMC's innovative 3-5nm processes today and Toyota's Production System. Toyota has even allowed competitors to tour its factory, but no competitor has replicated its operational efficiency.

Business Themes

Sneak Attack. I've always been surprised by businesses that seemingly "come out of nowhere." In Helmer's eyes, this stems from Counter-Positioning. He tells the story of Vanguard, which was started by Jack Bogle in 1976. "You could charitably describe the reception as enthusiastic: only $11M trickled in from investors. Soon after the launch, [Noble Laureate Paul] Samuelson himself lauded the effort in his column for Newsweek, but with little result: the fund had only reached $17M by mid-1977. Vanguard's operating model depended on others for distribution, and brokers, in particular, were put off by a product that predicated on the notion that they provided no value in helping their clients choose which active funds to select." But Vanguard had something that active managers didn't: low fees and consistency. Vanguard's funds performed like the indices and cost much less than active funds. No longer were individuals underperforming the market and paying advisors to pick actively managed funds. Furthermore, Vanguard continually invested all profits back into its funds, so it looked like it wasn't making money while it grew its assets under management. It's so hard to spot these sneak attacks while they are happening. But one that might be happening right now is Cloudflare relative to AWS. Cloudflare launched its low-cost R2 service (a play on Amazon's famous S3 storage technology). Cloudflare is offering a cheaper product at a much lower cost and is leveraging its large installed base with its CDN product to get people in the door. It's unclear whether this will offer Power over AWS because it's confusing what the barrier might be other than some relating to switching costs. However, there will likely be reluctance on AWS's part to cut prices because of its scale and public company growth targets.
A New Valuation Formula. Helmer offers a very unique take on the traditional DCF valuation approach. Investors have long suggested the value of any business was equal to the present value of its future discounted cash flows. In contrast to the traditional approach of summing up a firm's cash flows and discounting it, Helmer takes a look at all of the cash flows subject to the industry in which firms compete. In this formula (shown above), M0 represents the current market size, g the discounted market growth factor, s the long-term market share of the company, and m the long-term differential margin (net profit margin over that needed to cover the cost of capital). More simply, a company is worth it's Market Scale (Mo x g) x its Power (s x m). This implies that a company is worth the portion of the industry's profits it collects over time. This formula helps consider Power progression relative to industry dynamics and company stage. In the Origination stage, an industry's profits may be small but growing very quickly. If we think that a competitor in the industry can achieve an actual Power, it will likely gain a large portion of the long-term market. Thus, watching market share dynamics unfold can tell us about the potential for a route to Power and the ability for a company to achieve a superior value to its near-term cash flows.
Collateral Damage. If companies are aware of these Powers and how other companies can achieve them, how can companies not take proactive action to avoid being on the losing end of a Power struggle? Helmer lays out what he calls Collateral Damage, or the unwillingness of a competitor to find the right path to navigating the damage caused by a competitor's Power. His point is actually very nuanced - it's not the incumbent's unwillingness to invest in the same type of solution as the competitor (although that happens). The incumbent's business gets trashed as collateral damage by the new entrant. The incumbent can respond to the challenger by investing in the new innovation. But where counter-positioning really takes hold is if the incumbent recognizes the attractiveness of the business model/innovation but is stymied from investing. Why would a business leader choose not to invest in something attractive? In the case of Vanguard competitor Fidelity, any move into passive funds could cause steep cannibalization of their revenue. So in response, a CEO might decide to just keep their existing business and "milk" all of its cash flow. In addition, how could Fidelity invest in a business that completely undermined their actively managed mutual fund business? Often CEOs will have a negative bias toward the competing business model despite the positive NPV of an investment in the new business. Just think how long it took SAP to start selling Cloud subscriptions compared to its on-premise license/maintenance model. Lastly, a CEO might not invest in the promising new business model if they are worried about job security. This is the classic example of the principal-agent problem we discussed in June. Would you invest in a new, unproven business model if you faced a declining stock price and calls for your resignation? In addition, annual CEO compensation is frequently tagged to stock price performance and growth targets. The easiest way to achieve near-term stock price appreciation and growth targets is staying with what has worked in the past (and M&A!). Its the path of least resistance! Counter-positioning and collateral damage are nuanced and difficult to spot, but the complex emotions and issues become obvious over time.

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April 2021 - Innovator's Solution by Clayton Christensen and Michael Raynor

This month we take another look at disruptive innovation in the counter piece to Clayton Christensen’s Innovator’s Dilemma, our July 2020 book. The book crystallizes the types of disruptive innovation and provides frameworks for how incumbents can introduce or combat these innovations. The book was a pleasure to read and will serve as a great reference for the future.

Tech Themes

Integration and Outsourcing. Today, technology companies rely on a variety of software tools and open source components to build their products. When you stitch all of these components together, you get the full product architecture. A great example is seen here with Gitlab, an SMB DevOps provider. They have Postgres for a relational database, Redis for caching, NGINX for request routing, Sentry for monitoring and error tracking and so on. Each of these subsystems interacts with each other to form the powerful Gitlab project. These interaction points are called interfaces. The key product development question for companies is: “Which things do I build internally and which do I outsource?” A simple answer offered by many MBA students is “Outsource everything that is not part of your core competence.” As Clayton Christensen points out, “The problem with core-competence/not-your-core-competence categorization is that what might seem to be a non-core activity today might become an absolutely critical competence to have mastered in a proprietary way in the future, and vice versa.” A great example that we’ve discussed before is IBM’s decision to go with Microsoft DOS for its Operating System and Intel for its Microprocessor. At the time, IBM thought it was making a strategic decision to outsource things that were not within its core competence but they inadvertently gave almost all of the industry profits from personal computing to Intel and Microsoft. Other competitors copied their modular approach and the whole industry slugged it out on price. The question of whether to outsource really depends on what might be important in the future. But that is difficult to predict, so the question of integration vs. outsourcing really comes down to the state of the product and market itself: is this product “not good enough” yet? If the answer is yes, then a proprietary, integrated architecture is likely needed just to make the actual product work for customers. Over time, as competitors enter the market and the fully integrated platform becomes more commoditized, the individual subsystems become increasingly important competitive drivers. So the decision to outsource or build internally must be made on the status of product and the market its attacking.
Commoditization within Stacks. The above point leads to the unbelievable idea of how companies fall into the commoditization trap. This happens from overshooting, where companies create products that are too good (which I find counter-intuitive, who thought that doing your job really well would cause customers to leave!). Christensen describes this through the lens of a salesperson “‘Why can’t they see that our product is better than the competition? They’re treating it like a commodity!’ This is evidence of overshooting…there is a performance surplus. Customers are happy to accept improved products, but unwilling to pay a premium price to get them.” At this time, the things demanded by customers flip - they are willing to pay premium prices for innovations along a new trajectory of performance, most likely speed, convenience, and customization. “The pressure of competing along this new trajectory of improvement forces a gradual evolution in product architectures, away from the interdependent, proprietary architectures that had the advantage in the not-good-enough era toward modular designs in the era of performance surplus. In a modular world, you can prosper by outsourcing or by supplying just one element.” This process of integration, to modularization and back, is super fascinating. As an example of modularization, let’s take the streaming company Confluent, the makers of the open-source software project Apache Kafka. Confluent offers a real-time communications service that allows companies to stream data (as events) rather than batching large data transfers. Their product is often a sub-system underpinning real-time applications, like providing data to traders at Citigroup. Clearly, the basis of competition in trading has pivoted over the years as more and more banking companies offer the service. Companies are prioritizing a new axis, speed, to differentiate amongst competing services, and when speed is the basis of competition, you use Confluent and Kafka to beat out the competition. Now let’s fast forward five years and assume all banks use Kafka and Confluent for their traders, the modular sub-system is thus commoditized. What happens? I’d posit that the axis would shift again, maybe towards convenience, or customization where traders want specific info displayed maybe on a mobile phone or tablet. The fundamental idea is that “Disruption and commoditization can be seen as two sides of the same coin. That’s because the process of commoditization initiates a reciprocal process of de-commoditization [somewhere else in the stack].”
The Disruptive Becomes the Disruptor. Disruption is a relative term. As we’ve discussed previously, disruption is often mischaracterized as startups enter markets and challenge incumbents. Disruption is really a focused and contextual concept whereby products that are “not good enough” by market standards enter a market with a simpler, more convenient, or less expensive product. These products and markets are often dismissed by incumbents or even ceded by market leaders as those leaders continue to move up-market to chase even bigger customers. Its fascinating to watch the disruptive become the disrupted. A great example would be department stores - initially, Macy’s offered a massive selection that couldn’t be found in any single store and customers loved it. They did this by turning inventory three times per year with 40% gross margins for a 120% return on capital invested in inventory. In the 1960s, Walmart and Kmart attacked the full-service department stores by offering a similar selection at much cheaper prices. They did this by setting up a value system whereby they could make 23% gross margins but turn inventories 5 times per year, enabling them to earn the industry golden 120% return on capital invested in inventory. Full-service department stores decided not to compete against these lower gross margin products and shifted more space to beauty and cosmetics that offered even higher gross margins (55%) than the 40% they were used to. This meant they could increase their return on capital invested in inventory and their profits while avoiding a competitive threat. This process continued with discount stores eventually pushing Macy’s out of most categories until Macy’s had nowhere to go. All of a sudden the initially disruptive department stores had become disrupted. We see this in technology markets as well. I’m not 100% this qualifies but think about Salesforce and Oracle. Marc Benioff had spent a number of years at Oracle and left to start Salesforce, which pioneered selling subscription, cloud software, on a per-seat revenue model. This meant a much cheaper option compared to traditional Oracle/Siebel CRM software. Salesforce was initially adopted by smaller customers that didn’t need the feature-rich platform offered by Oracle. Oracle dismissed Salesforce as competition even as Oracle CEO Larry Ellison seeded Salesforce and sat on Salesforce’s board. Today, Salesforce is a $200B company and briefly passed Oracle in market cap a few months ago. But now, Salesforce has raised its prices and mostly targets large enterprise buyers to hit its ambitious growth initiatives. Down-market competitors like Hubspot have come into the market with cheaper solutions and more fully integrated marketing tools to help smaller businesses that aren’t ready for a fully-featured Salesforce platform. Disruption is always contextual and it never stops.

Business Themes

Low-end-Market vs. New-Market Disruption. There are two types of established methods for disruption: Low-end-market (Down-market) and New-market. Low-end-market disruption seeks to establish performance that is “not good enough” along traditional lines, and targets overserved customers in the low-end of the mainstream market. It typically utilizes a new operating or financial approach with structurally different margins than up-market competitors. Amazon.com is a quintessential low-end market disruptor compared to traditional bookstores, offering prices so low they angered book publishers while offering unmatched convenience to customers allowing them to purchase books online. In contrast, Robinhood is a great example of a new-market disruption. Traditional discount brokerages like Charles Schwab and Fidelity had been around for a while (themselves disruptors of full-service models like Morgan Stanley Wealth Management). But Robinhood targeted a group of people that weren’t consuming in the market, namely teens and millennials, and they did it in an easy-to-use app with a much better user interface compared to Schwab and Fidelity. Robinhood also pioneered new pricing with zero-fee trading and made revenue via a new financial approach, payment for order flow (PFOF). Robinhood makes money by being a data provider to market makers - basically, large hedge funds, like Citadel, pay Robinhood for data on their transactions to help optimize customers buying and selling prices. When approaching big markets its important to ask: Is this targeted at a non-consumer today or am I competing at a structurally lower margin with a new financial model and a “not quite good enough” product? This determines whether you are providing a low-end market disruption or a new-market disruption.
Jobs To Be Done. The jobs to be done framework was one of the most important frameworks that Clayton Christensen ever introduced. Marketers typically use advertising platforms like Facebook and Google to target specific demographics with their ads. These segments are narrowly defined: “Males over 55, living in New York City, with household income above $100,000.” The issue with this categorization method is that while these are attributes that may be correlated with a product purchase, customers do not look up exactly how marketers expect them to behave and purchase the products expected by their attributes. There may be a correlation but simply targeting certain demographics does not yield a great result. The marketers need to understand why the customer is adopting the product. This is where the Jobs to Be Done framework comes in. As Christensen describes it, “Customers - people and companies - have ‘jobs’ that arise regularly and need to get done. When customers become aware of a job that they need to get done in their lives, they look around for a product or service that they can ‘hire’ to get the job done. Their thought processes originate with an awareness of needing to get something done, and then they set out to hire something or someone to do the job as effectively, conveniently, and inexpensively as possible.” Christensen zeroes in on the contextual adoption of products; it is the circumstance and not the demographics that matter most. Christensen describes ways for people to view competition and feature development through the Jobs to Be Done lens using Blackberry as an example (later disrupted by the iPhone). While the immature smartphone market was seeing feature competition from Microsoft, Motorola, and Nokia, Blackberry and its parent company RIM came out with a simple to use device that allowed for short productivity bursts when the time was available. This meant they leaned into features that competed not with other smartphone providers (like better cellular reception), but rather things that allowed for these easy “productive” sessions like email, wall street journal updates, and simple games. The Blackberry was later disrupted by the iPhone which offered more interesting applications in an easier to use package. Interestingly, the first iPhone shipped without an app store (but as a proprietary, interdependent product) and was viewed as not good enough for work purposes, allowing the Blackberry to co-exist. Management even dismissed the iPhone as a competitor initially. It wasn’t long until the iPhone caught up and eventually surpassed the Blackberry as the world’s leading mobile phone.
Brand Strategies. Companies may choose to address customers in a number of different circumstances and address a number of Jobs to Be Done. It’s important that the Company establishes specific ways of communicating the circumstance to the customer. Branding is powerful, something that Warren Buffett, Terry Smith, and Clayton Christensen have all recognized as durable growth providers. As Christensen puts it: “Brands are, at the beginning, hollow words into which marketers stuff meaning. if a brand’s meaning is positioned on a job to be done, then when the job arises in a customer’s life, he or she will remember the brand and hire the product. Customers pay significant premiums for brands that do a job well.” So what can a large corporate company do when faced with a disruptive challenger to its branding turf? It’s simple - add a word to their leading brand, targeted at the circumstance in which a customer might find themself. Think about Marriott, one of the leading hotel chains. They offer a number of hotel brands: Courtyard by Marriott for business travel, Residence Inn by Marriott for a home away from home, the Ritz Carlton for high-end luxurious stays, Marriott Vacation Club for resort destination hotels. Each brand is targeted at a different Job to Be Done and customers intuitively understand what the brands stand for based on experience or advertising. A great technology example is Amazon Web Services (AWS), the cloud computing division of Amazon.com. Amazon invented the cloud, and rather than launch with the Amazon.com brand, which might have confused their normal e-commerce customers, they created a completely new brand targeted at a different set of buyers and problems, that maintained the quality and recognition that Amazon had become known for. Another great retail example is the SNKRs app released by Nike. Nike understands that some customers are sneakerheads, and want to know the latest about all Nike shoe drops, so Nike created a distinct, branded app called SNKRS, that gives news and updates on the latest, trendiest sneakers. These buyers might not be interested in logging into the Nike app and may become angry after sifting through all of the different types of apparel offered by Nike, just to find new shoes. The SNKRS app offers a new set of consumers and an easy way to find what they are looking for (convenience), which benefits Nike’s core business. Branding is powerful, and understanding the Job to Be Done helps focus the right brand for the right job.

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January 2021 - Technological Revolutions and Financial Capital: The Dynamics of Bubbles and Golden Ages by Carlota Perez

This month we read Carlota Perez’s understudied book covering the history of technology breakthroughs and revolutions. This book marries the role of financing and technology breakthrough so seamlessly in an easy to digest narrative style.

Tech Themes

The 5 Technology Revolutions. Perez identifies the five major technological revolutions: The Industrial Revolution (1771-1829), The Age of Steam and Railways (1829-1873), The Age of Steel, Electricity and Heavy Engineering (1875-1918), The Age of Oil, the Automobile and Mass Production (1908-1974), and The Age of Information and Telecommunications (1971-Today). When looking back at these individual revolutions, one can recognize how powerful it is to view the world and technology in these incredibly long waves. Many of these periods lasted for over fifty years while their geographic dispersion and economic effects fully came to fruition. These new technologies fundamentally alter society - when it becomes clear that the revolution is happening, many people jump on the bandwagon. As Perez puts it, “The great clusters of talent come forth after the evolution is visible and because it is visible.” Each revolution produces a myriad of change in society. The industrial revolution popularized factory production, railways created national markets, electricity created the power to build steel buildings, oil and cars created mass markets and assembly lines, and the microprocessor and internet created amazing companies like Amazon and Airbnb.
The Phases of Technology Revolution. After a decently long gestation period during which the old revolution has permeated across the world, the new revolution normally starts with a big bang, some discovery or breakthrough (like the transistor or steam engine) that fundamentally pushed society into a new wave of innovation. Coupled with these big bangs, is re-defined infrastructure from the prior eras - as an example, the Telegraph and phone wires were created along the initial railways, as they allowed significant distance of uninterrupted space to build on. Another example is electricity - initially, homes were wired to serve lightbulbs, it was only many years later that great home appliances came into use. This initial period of application discovery is called the Irruption phase. The increasing interest in forming businesses causes a Frenzy period like the Railway Mania or the Dot-com Boom, where everyone thinks they can get rich quick by starting a business around the new revolution. As the first 20-30 years of a revolution play themselves out, there grows a strong divide between those who were part of the revolution and those who were not; there is an economic, social, and regulatory mismatch between the old guard and the new revolution. After an uprising (like the populism we have seen recently) and bubble collapse (Check your crystal ball), regulatory changes typically foster a harmonious future for the technology. Following these changes, we enter the Synergy phase, where technology can fully flourish due to accommodating and clear regulation. This Synergy phase propagates outward across all countries until even the lagging adopters have started the adoption process. At this point the cycle enters into Maturity, waiting for the next big advance to start the whole process over again.
Where are we in the cycle today? We tweeted at Carlota Perez to answer this question AND SHE RESPONDED! My question to Perez was: With the recent wave of massive, transformational innovation like the public cloud providers, and the iPhone, are we still in the Age of Information? These technological waves are often 50-60 years and yet we’ve arguably been in the same age for quite a while. This wave started in 1971, exactly 50 years ago, with Intel and the creation of the microprocessor. Are we in the Frenzy phase with record amounts of investment capital, an enormous demand for early stage companies, and new financial innovations like Affirm’s debt securitizations? Or have we not gotten to the Frenzy phase yet? Is the public cloud or the iPhone the start of a new big bang and we have overlapping revolutions for the first time ever? Obviously identifying the truly breakthrough moments in technology history is way easier after the fact, so maybe we are too new to know what really is a seminal moment. Perez’s answer, though only a few words, fully provides scope to the question. Perez suggests we are still in the installation phase (Irruption and Frenzy) of the new technology and that makes a lot of sense. Sure, internet usage is incredibly high in the US (96%) but not in other large countries. China (the world’s largest country by population) has only 63% using the internet and India (the world’s second-largest country) has only 55% of its population using the internet. Ethiopia, with a population of over 100M people only has 18% using the internet. There is still a lot of runway left for the internet to bloom! In addition, only recently have people been equipped with a powerful computing device that fits in their pocket - and low-priced phones are now making their way to all parts of the world led by firms like Chinese giant Transsion. Added to the fact that we are not fully installed with this revolution, is the rise of populism, a political movement that seeks to mobilize ordinary people who feel disregarded by the elite group. Populism has reared its ugly head across many nations like the US (Donald Trump), UK (Brexit), Brazil (Bolsonaro) and many other countries. The rise of populism is fueled by the growing dichotomy between the elites who have benefitted socially and monetarily from the revolution and those who have not. In the 1890’s, anti-railroad sentiment drove the creation of the populist party. More recently, people have become angry at tech giants (Facebook, Google, Amazon, Apple, Twitter) for unfair labor practices, psychological manipulation, and monopolistic tendencies. The recent movie, the Social Dilemma, which suggests a more humane and regulatory focused approach to social media, speaks to the need for regulation of these massive companies. It is also incredibly ironic to watch a movie about how social media is manipulating its users while streaming a movie that was recommended to me on Netflix, a company that has popularized incessant binge-watching through UX manipulation, not dissimilar to Facebook and Google’s tactics. I expect these companies to get regulated soon -and I hope that once that happens, we enter into the Synergy phase of growth and value accruing to all people.

Yes, I do. I will find the time to reply to you properly. But just quickly, I think installation was prolonged by QE &casino finance; we are at the turning point (the successful rise of populism is a sign) and maybe post-Covid we'll go into synergy.
— Carlota Perez (@CarlotaPrzPerez) January 17, 2021

Business Themes

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The role of Financial Capital in Revolutions. As the new technology revolutions play themselves out, financial capital appears right alongside technology developments, ready to mold the revolution into the phases suggested by Perez. In the irruption phase, as new technology is taking hold, financial capital that had been on the sidelines waiting out the Maturity phase of the previous revolution plows into new company formation and ideas. The financial sector tries to adopt the new technology as soon as possible (we are already seeing this with Quantum computing), so it can then espouse the benefits to everyone it talks to, setting the stage for increasing financing opportunities. Eventually, demand for financing company creation goes crazy, and you enter into a Frenzy phase. During this phase, there is a discrepancy between the value of financial capital and production capital, or money used by companies to create actual products and services. Financial capital believes in unrealistic returns on investment, funding projects that don’t make any sense. Perez notes: “In relation to the canal Mania of the 1790s, disorder and lack of coordination prevailed in investment decisions. Canals were built ‘with different widths and depths and much inefficient routing.’ According to Dan Roberts at the Financial Times, in 2001 it was estimated that only 1 to 2 percent of the fiber optic cable buried under Europe and the United States had so far been turned on.” These Frenzy phases create bubbles and further ingrain regulatory mismatch and political divide. Could we be in one now with deals getting priced at 125x revenue for tiny companies? After the institutional reckoning, the Technology revolution enters the Synergy phase where production capital has really strong returns on investment - the path of technology is somewhat known and real gains are to be made by continuing investment (especially at more reasonable asset prices). Production capital continues to go to good use until the technology revolution fully plays itself out, entering into the Maturity phase.
Casino Finance and Prolonging Bubbles. One point that Perez makes in her tweet, is that this current bubble has been prolonged by QE and casino finance. Quantitative easing is a monetary policy where the federal reserve (US’s central bank) buys government bonds issued by the treasury department to inject money into the financial ecosystem. This money at the federal reserve can purchase bank loans and assets, offering more liquidity to the financial system. This process is used to create low-interest rates, which push individuals and corporations to invest their money because the rate of interest on savings accounts is really really low. Following the financial crisis and more recently COVID-19, the Federal Reserve lowered interest rates and started quantitative easing to help the hurting economy. In Perez’s view, these actions have prolonged the Irruption and Frenzy phases because it forces more money into investment opportunities. On top of quantitative easing, governments have allowed so-called Casino Capitalism - allowing free-market ideals to shape governmental policies (like Reagan’s economic plan). Uninterrupted free markets are in theory economically efficient but can give rise to bad actors - like Enron’s manipulation of California’s energy markets after deregulation. By engaging in continual quantitative easing and deregulation, speculative markets, like collateralized loan obligations during the financial crisis, are allowed to grow. This creates a risk-taking environment that can only end in a frenzy and bubble.
Synergy Phase and Productive Capital Allocation. Capital allocation has been called the most important part of being a great investor and business leader. Think about being the CEO of Coca Cola for a second - you have thousands of competing projects, vying for budget - how do you determine which ones get the most money? In the investing world, capital allocation is measured by conviction. As George Soros’s famous quote goes: “It's not whether you're right or wrong, but how much money you make when you're right and how much you lose when you're wrong.” Clayton Christensen took the ideas of capital allocation and compared them to life investments, coming to the conclusion: “Investments in relationships with friends and family need to be made long, long before you’ll see any sign that they are paying off. If you defer investing your time and energy until you see that you need to, chances are it will already be too late.” Capital and time allocation are underappreciated concepts because they often seem abstract to the everyday humdrum of life. It is interesting to think about capital allocation within Perez’s long-term framework. The obvious approach would be to identify the stage (Irruption, Frenzy, Synergy, Maturity) and make the appropriate time/money decisions - deploy capital into the Irruption phase, pull money out at the height of the Frenzy, buy as many companies as possible at the crash/turning point, hold through most of the Synergy, and sell at Maturity to identify the next Irruption phase. Although that would be fruitful, identifying market bottoms and tops is a fool’s errand. However, according to Perez, the best returns on capital investment typically happen during the Synergy phase, where production capital (money employed by firms through investment in R&D) reigns supreme. During this time, the revolutionary applications of recently frenzied technology finally start to bear fruit. They are typically poised to succeed by an accommodating regulatory and social environment. Unsurprisingly, after the diabolic grifting financiers of the frenzy phase are exposed (see Worldcom, Great Financial Crisis, and Theranos), social pressures on regulators typically force an agreement to fix the loopholes that allowed these manipulators to take advantage of the system. After Enron, the Sarbanes-Oxley act increased disclosure requirements and oversight of auditors. After the GFC, the Dodd-Frank act mandated bank stress tests and introduced financial stability oversight. With the problems of the frenzy phase "fixed” for the time being, the social attitude toward innovation turns positive once again and the returns to production capital start to outweigh financial capital which is now reigned in under the new rules. Suffice to say, we are probably in the Frenzy phase in the technology world, with a dearth of venture opportunities, creating a massive valuation increase for early-stage companies. This will change eventually and as Warren Buffett says: “It’s only when the tide goes out that you learn who’s been swimming naked.” When the bubble does burst, regulation of big technology companies will usher in the best returns period for investors and companies alike.