May 2021 - Crossing the Chasm by Geoffrey Moore

This month we take a look at a classic high-tech growth marketing book. Originally published in 1991, Crossing the Chasm became a beloved book within the tech industry although its glory seems to have faded over the years. While the book is often overly prescriptive in its suggestions, it provides several useful frameworks to address growth challenges primarily early on in a company’s history.

Tech Themes

Technology Adoption Life Cycle. The core framework of the book discusses the evolution of new technology adoption. It was an interesting micro-view of the broader phenomena described in Carlota Perez’s Technological Revolutions. In Moore’s Chasm-crossing world, there are five personas that dominate adoption: innovators, early adopters, early majority, late majority, and laggards. Innovators are technologists, happy to accept more challenging user experiences to push the boundaries of their capabilities and knowledge. Early adopters are intuitive buyers that enjoy trying new technologies but want a slightly better experience. The early majority are “wait and see” folks that want others to battle test the technology before trying it out, but don’t typically wait too long before buying. The late majority want significant reference material and usage before buying a product. Laggards simply don’t want anything to do with new technology. It is interesting to think of this adoption pattern in concert with big technology migrations of the past twenty years including: mainframes to on-premise servers to cloud computing, home phones to cell phones to iphone/android, radio to CDs to downloadable music to Spotify, and cash to check to credit/debit to mobile payments. Each of these massive migration patterns feels very aligned with this adoption model. Everyone knows someone ready to apply the latest tech, and someone who doesn’t want anything to do with it (Warren Buffett!).
Crossing the Chasm. If we accept the above as a general way products are adopted by society (obviously its much more of a mish/mash in reality), we can posit that the most important step is from the early adopters to the early majority - the spot where the bell curve (shown below) really opens up. This is what Geoffrey Moore calls Crossing the Chasm. This idea is highly reminiscent of Clay Christensen’s “not good enough” disruption pattern and Gartner’s technology hype cycle. The examples Moore uses (in 1991) are also striking: Neural networking software and desktop video conferencing. Moore lamented: “With each of these exciting, functional technologies it has been possible to establish a working system and to get innovators to adopt it. But it has not as yet been possible to carry that success over to the early adopters.” Both of these technologies have clearly crossed into the mainstream with Google’s TensorFlow machine learning library and video conferencing tools like Zoom that make it super easy to speak with anyone over video instantly. So what was the great unlock for these technologies, that made these commercially viable and successfully adopted products? Well since 1990 there have been major changes in several important underlying technologies - computer storage and data processing capabilities are almost limitless with cloud computing, network bandwidth has grown exponentially and costs have dropped, and software has greatly improved the ability to make great user experiences for customers. This is a version of not-good-enough technologies that have benefited substantially from changes in underlying inputs. The systems you could deploy in 1990 just could not have been comparable to what you can deploy today. The real question is - are there different types of adoption curves for differently technologies and do they really follow a normal distribution as Moore shows here?
Making Markets & Product Alternatives. Moore positions the book as if you were a marketing executive at a high-tech company and offers several exercises to help you identify a target market, customer, and use case. Chapter six, “Define the Battle” covers the best way to position a product within a target market. For early markets, competition comes from non-consumption, and the company has to offer a “Whole Product” that enables the user to actually derive benefit from the product. Thus, Moore recommends targeting innovators and early adopters who are technologist visionaries able to see the benefit of the product. This also mirrors Clayton Christensen’s commoditization de-commoditization framework, where new market products must offer all of the core components to a system combined into one solution; over time the axis of commoditization shifts toward the underlying components as companies differentiate by using faster and better sub-components. Positioning in these market scenarios should be focused on the contrast between your product and legacy ways of performing the task (use our software instead of pen and paper as an example). In mainstream markets, companies should position their products within the established buying criteria developed by pragmatist buyers. A market alternative serves as the incumbent, well-known provider and a product alternative is a near upstart competitor that you are clearly beating. What’s odd here is that you are constantly referring to your competitors as alternatives to your product, which seems counter-intuitive but obviously, enterprise buyers have alternatives they are considering and you need to make the case that your solution is the best. Choosing a market alternative lets you procure a budget previously used for a similar solution, and the product alternative can help differentiate your technology relative to other upstarts. Moore’s simple positioning formula has helped hundreds of companies establish their go-to-market message: “For (target customers—beachhead segment only) • Who are dissatisfied with (the current market alternative) • Our product is a (new product category) • That provides (key problem-solving capability). • Unlike (the product alternative), • We have assembled (key whole product features for your specific application).”

Business Themes

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What happened to these examples? Moore offers a number of examples of Crossing the Chasm, but what actually happened to these companies after this book was written? Clarify Software was bought in October 1999 by Nortel for $2.1B (a 16x revenue multiple) and then divested by Nortel to Amdocs in October 2001 for $200M - an epic disaster of capital allocation. Documentum was acquired by EMC in 2003 for $1.7B in stock and was later sold to OpenText in 2017 for $1.6B. 3Com Palm Pilot was a mess of acquisitions/divestitures. Palm was acquired by U.S Robotics which was acquired by 3COM in 1997 and then subsequently spun out in a 2000 IPO which saw a 94% drop. Palm stopped making PDA devices in 2008 and in 2010, HP acquired Palm for $1.2B in cash. Smartcard maker Gemplus merged with competitor Axalto in an 1.8Bn euro deal in 2005, creating Gemalto, which was later acquired by Thales in 2019 for $8.4Bn. So my three questions are: Did these companies really cross the chasm or were they just readily available success stories of their time? Do you need to be the company that leads the chasm crossing or can someone else do it to your benefit? What is the next step in the chasm journey after its crossed and why did so many of these companies fail after a time?
Whole Products. Moore leans into an idea called the Whole Product Concept which was popularized by Theodore Levitt’s 1983 book The Marketing Imagination and Bill Davidow’s (of early VC Mohr Davidow) 1986 book Marketing High Technology. Moore explains the idea: “The concept is very straightforward: There is a gap between the marketing promise made to the customer—the compelling value proposition—and the ability of the shipped product to fulfill that promise. For that gap to be overcome, the product must be augmented by a variety of services and ancillary products to become the whole product.” There are four different perceptions of the product: “1. Generic product: This is what is shipped in the box and what is covered by the purchasing contract. 2.Expected product: This is the product that the consumer thought she was buying when she bought the generic product. It is the minimum configuration of products and services necessary to have any chance of achieving the buying objective. For example, people who are buying personal computers for the first time expect to get a monitor with their purchase-how else could you use the computer?—but in fact, in most cases, it is not part of the generic product. 3.Augmented product: This is the product fleshed out to provide the maximum chance of achieving the buying objective. In the case of a personal computer, this would include a variety of products, such as software, a hard disk drive, and a printer, as well as a variety of services, such as a customer hotline, advanced training, and readily accessible service centers. 4. Potential product: This represents the product’s room for growth as more and more ancillary products come on the market and as customer-specific enhancements to the system are made. These are the product features that have maybe expected or additional to drive adoption.” Moore makes a subtle point that after a while, investments in the generic/out-of-the-box product functionality drive less and less purchase behavior, in tandem with broader market adoption. Customers want to be wooed by the latest technology and as products become similar, customers care less about what’s in the product today, and more about what’s coming. Moore emphasizes Whole Product Planning where you can see how you get to those additional features into the product over time - but Moore was also operating in an era when product decisions and development processes were on two-year+ timelines and not in the DevOps era of today, where product updates are pushed daily in some cases. In the bottoms-up/DevOps era, its become clear that finding your niche users, driving strong adoption from them, and integrating feature ideas from them as soon as possible can yield a big success.
Distribution Channels. Moore focuses on each of the potential ways a company can distribute its solutions: Direct Sales, two-tier retail, one-tier retail, internet retail, two-tier value-added reselling, national roll-ups, original equipment manufacturers (OEMs), and system integrators. As Moore puts it, “The number-one corporate objective, when crossing the chasm, is to secure a channel into the mainstream market with which the pragmatist customer will be comfortable.” These distribution types are clearly relics of technology distribution in the early 1990s. Great direct sales have produced some of the best and biggest technology companies of yesterday including IBM, Oracle, CA Technologies, SAP, and HP. What’s so fascinating about this framework is that you just need one channel to reach the pragmatist customer and in the last 10 years, that channel has become the internet for many technology products. Moore even recognizes that direct sales had produced poor customer alignment: “First, wherever vendors have been able to achieve lock-in with customers through proprietary technology, there has been the temptation to exploit the relationship through unfairly expensive maintenance agreements [Oracle did this big time] topped by charging for some new releases as if they were new products. This was one of the main forces behind the open systems rebellion that undermined so many vendors’ account control—which, in turn, decrease predictability of revenues, putting the system further in jeopardy.” So what is the strategy used by popular open-source bottoms up go-to-market motions at companies like Github, Hashicorp, Redis, Confluent and others? Its straightforward - the internet and simple APIs (normally on Github) provide the fastest channel to reach the developer end market while they are coding. When you look at Open Source scaling, it can take years and years to Cross the Chasm because most of these early open source adopters are technology innovators, however, eventually, solutions permeate into massive enterprises and make the jump. With these new go-to-market motions coming on board, driven by the internet, we’ve seen large companies grow from primarily inbound marketing tactics and less direct outbound sales. The companies named above as well as Shopify, Twilio, Monday.com and others have done a great job growing to a massive scale on the backs of their products (product-led growth) instead of a salesforce. What’s important to realize is that distribution is an abstract term and no single motion or strategy is right for every company. The next distribution channel will surprise everyone!

Dig Deeper

August 2020 - Venture Deals by Brad Feld and Jason Mendelson

This month we checked out an excellent book for founders, investors, and those interested in private company financings. The book hits on a lot of the key business and legal terms that aren’t discussed in typical startup books, making it useful no matter what stage of the entrepreneurial journey you are on.

Tech Themes

The Rise of Founder Friendly VC. Writing on his blog, Feld Thoughts, which was the original genesis for Venture Deals, Brad Feld mentioned that: “From 2010 forward, the entire VC market shifted into a mode that many describe as ‘founder friendly.’ Investor reputation mattered at both the angel and VC level.” In the 80’s and 90’s, because there was so little competition among venture capital firms, it was common for firms to dictate terms to company founders. The VC firms were the ones with the cash, and the founders didn’t have many options to choose from. If you wanted to build a big, profitable, public company, the only way to get there was by taking venture capital money. This trend started to unwind during the internet bubble, when founders started to maintain more and more of their businesses before the IPO. In fact, as this Harvard Business Review article points out, it was actually common to fire the founder/CEO prior to a public offering in favor of more seasoned leaders. This trend was bucked by Netscape, which eschewed traditional wisdom, going public less than a year from founding, with an unprofitable business. The Netscape IPO was clearly a royal coming-together of technology history. Tracing it all the way back - George Winthrop Fairchild started IBM in 1911; in the late 50’s, Arthur Rock convinced Fairchild’s son, Sherman to fund the traitorous eight (eight employees who left competitor Shockley Semiconductor) to start Fairchild Semiconductor; Eugene Kleiner (one of the traitorous eight) starts Kleiner Perkins, a venture capital firm that eventually invested in Netscape. Kleiner Perkins would also invest in Google (frequently regarded as one of the best and riskiest startup investments ever). Google was the first internet company to go public with a dual-class share structure where the founders would own a disproportionate amount of the voting rights of the company. Marc Andreessen, the founder of Netscape, loved this idea and eventually launched his own venture capital firm called Andreessen Horowitz, which ushered in a new generation of founder-friendly investing. At one point Andreessen was even quoted saying: “It is unsafe to go public today without a dual-class share structure.” Some notable companies with dual class shares include several Andreessen companies such as Facebook, Zynga, Box, and Lyft. Recently some have questioned whether founder friendly terms have pushed too far with some major flameouts from companies with the structure including Theranos, WeWork, and Uber.
How to Raise Money. Feld has several recommendations for fundraising that are important including having a target round size, demo, financial projections, and VC syndicate. Feld contends that CEOs who offer a range of varying round sizes to VC’s don’t really understand their business goals and use of proceeds. By having a concrete round size it shows that the CEO understands roughly how much money it will take to get to the next milestone or said another way, it shows the CEO understands the runway (in months) needed to build that new product or feature. It shows command of the financing and vision of the business. Feld encourages founders to provide a demo, because: “while never required, many investors respond to things we can play with, so even if you are an early stage company, a prototype or demo is desirable.” Beyond the explicit point here, the demo shows confidence in the product and at least some ability to sell, which is obviously a key aspect in eventually scaling the business. Another aspect of scaling the business is the financial model, but as Feld states, “the only thing that can be known about a pre-revenue company’s financial projections is that they are wrong.” While the numbers are meaningless for really early stage companies, for those that have a few customers it can be helpful to get a sense of long-term gross margins and aspects of the company you hope to invest in and / or change over time. Lastly, Feld gives advice for building a VC syndicate, or group of VC investors. Frequently lead investors will commit a certain dollar amount of the round, and it will be up to the founder/CEO to go find a way to build out the round. This can be incredibly challenging as detailed by Moz founder, Rand Fishkin, who thought he had a deal in hand only to see it be taken away. There are multiple bids in the VC fundraising process, one called an indication of interest, which is non-binding and normally provides a range on valuation, one called a letter of intent, which is slightly more detailed and may include legal terms of the deal such as board representation, liquidation preference, and governance terms, and then final legal documentation. A lot of time, the early bids can be withdrawn based off of poor market feedback or when a company misses its financial projections (like Moz did in its process). Understanding the process and the materials needed to complete the deal is helpful at setting expectations for founders.
Warrants, SPACs, and IPOs. With SPACMania in full-swing, we wanted to dive into SPACs and see how they work. We’ve discussed SPACs before, with regards to Chamath’s Social Capital merger with Virgin Galactic. But how do traditional SPAC financings work and why is there a rush of famous people, such as LinkedIn founder Reid Hoffman, to raise them? A SPAC or Specialty Purpose Acquisition Company is a blank-check company which goes public with the goal of acquiring a business, thereby taking it public. SPACs can be focused on industry or size of company and they are most frequently led by operational leaders and / or private equity firms. The reason SPACs have been gaining in popularity is that public markets investors are seeking more risk and a few high profile SPAC deals, namely DraftKings and Nikola, have traded better than expected. Most companies that are going public today are older, more mature businesses, and the public markets have been generally favorable to somewhat suspect ventures (Nikola is an electric truck company that has never produced a single truck, but is worth $14B on hype alone). VC firms and companies see the ability to get outsized returns on their investments because so many people are clamoring to find returns above the basically 0% offered by treasury bonds. The S&P 500 P/E ratio is now at around 26x compared to a historical average around 16x, meaning the market seems to be overvalued compared to prior times. SPACs typically come with an odd structure. A unit in a SPAC normally consists of one common share of stock and one warrant, which is the ability to purchase shares for $0.01 after a SPAC merges with its target company. The founders of the SPAC also receive founder shares, normally 20% of the business. Once the target is found, SPACs will often coordinate a PIPE (Private Investment in Public Equity), where a large private investor will invest mainly primary (cash to the balance sheet) capital into the business. This has emerged as a hip, new alternative to traditional IPOs, keeping with the theme of innovation in public offerings like direct listings, however, its unclear that this really benefits the company going public. Often the merged companies are the subject of substantial dilution by the SPAC sponsors and PIPE investors, lowering the overall equity piece management maintains. However, given the somewhat high valuations companies are receiving in the public markets (Zoom at 80x+ LTM Revenue, Shopify at 59x LTM Revenue), it may be worth the dilution.

Business Themes

How VC’s Make Money. In VC, the typical fund structure includes a general partnership (GP) and limited partners (LPs). The GP is the investors at the VC firm and the limited partners are the institutional investors that provide the money for the VC firm to invest. A typical structure involves the GP investing 1% of their own money (99% comes from LPs) and then getting paid an annual 2% management fee as well as 20% carried interest, or the profit made from investments. Using the example from the book: “Start with the $100 million fund. Assume that it's a successful fund and returns 3× the capital, or $300 million. In this case, the first $100 million goes back to the LPs, and the remaining profit, or $200 million, is split 80 percent to the LPs and 20 percent to the GPs. The VC firm gets $40 million in carried interest and the LPs get the remaining $160 million. And yes, in this case everyone is very happy.” Understanding how investors make money can help the entrepreneur better understand why VC’s pressure companies. As Feld points out, sometimes VC’s are trying to raise a new fund or have invested the majority of the fund already and thus do not care as much about some investments.
Growth at all costs. There has been a concerted focus in VC on the get big quick motto. Nobody better exemplifies this than Masayoshi Son and the $100B VC his firm Softbank raised a few years ago. With notable big bets on current losers like WeWork and Oyo, which are struggling during this pandemic, its unclear whether this motto remains true. Eric Paley, a Managing Partner at Founder Collective, expertly quantifies the potential downsides of a risk-it-all strategy: “Investors today have overstuffed venture funds, and lots of capital is sloshing around the startup ecosystem. As a result, young startups with strong teams, compelling products and limited traction can find themselves with tens of millions of dollars, but without much real validation of their businesses. We see venture investors eagerly investing $20 million into a promising company, valuing it at $100 million, even if the startup only has a few million in net revenue. Now the investors and the founders have to make a decision — what should determine the speed at which this hypothetical company, let’s call it “Fuego,” invests its treasure chest of money in the amazing opportunity that motivated the investors? The investors’ goal over the next roughly 24 months is for the company to become worth at least three times the post-money valuation — so $300 million would be the new target pre-money valuation for Fuego’s next financing. Imagine being a company with only a few million in sales, with a success hurdle for your next round of $300 million pre-money. Whether the startup’s model is working or not, the mantra becomes ‘go big or go home.’” This issue is key when negotiating term sheets with investors and understanding board dynamics. As Feld calls out: “The voting control issues in the early stage deals are only amplified as you wrestle with how to keep control of your board when each lead investor per round wants a board seat. Either you can increase your board size to seven, nine, or more people (which usually effectively kills a well-functioning board), or more likely the board will be dominated by investors.” As an entrepreneur, you need to be cognizant of the pressure VC firms will put on founders to grow at high rates, and this pressure is frequently applied by a board. Often late stage startups have 10 people+ on their board. UiPath, a private venture-backed startup that has raised over $1B and is valued at $10B, has 12 people on its board. With all of the different firms having their own goals, boards can become ineffective. Whenever startups are considering fundraising, it’s important to realize the person you are raising from will be an ongoing member of the company and voice on the board and will most likely push for growth.
Liquidation Preference. One of the least talked about terms in venture capital among startup circles is liquidation preference. Feld describes liquidation preference as: “a certain multiple of the original investment per share is returned to the investor before the common stock receives any consideration.” Startup culture has tended to view fundraises as stamps of approval and success, but thats not always the case. As the book discusses, preference can lead to very negative outcomes for founders and employes. For example, let’s say a company at $10M in revenue raises $100 million with a 1x liquidation preference at a $400 million pre-money valuation ($500M post money). The company is pressured by its VCs to grow quickly but it has issues with product market fit and go to market; five years go by and the company is at $15M in revenue. At this point the VCs are not interested in funding any more, and the board decides to try to sell the company. A buyer offers $80 million and the board accepts it. At this point, all $80M has to go back to the original investors who had the 1x liquidation preference. All of the common stockholders and the founders, get nothing. Its not the desired outcome by any means, but its important to know. Some companies have not heeded this advice and continued to raise at massive valuations including Notion which has raised $10M at a $800 million valuation, despite being rumored to be around $15M in revenue. The company raised at a $1.6B valuation (an obvious 2x) after being rumored to be at $30M in revenue. While not taking dilution is nice as a founder, it also sets up a massive hurdle for the company and seriously cramps returns. A 3x return (which is low for VC investors) means selling the company for $4.8B, which is no small feat.

Dig Deeper

April 2020 - Good To Great by Jim Collins

Collins’ book attempts to answer the question - Why do good companies continue to be good companies? His analysis across several different industries provides meaningful insights into strong management and strategic practices.

Tech Themes

Packard’s Law. We’ve discussed Packard’s law before when analyzing the troubling acquisition history of AOL-Time Warner and Yahoo. As a reminder, Packard’s law states: “No company can consistently grow revenues faster than its ability to get enough of the right people to implement that growth and still become a great company. [And] If a company consistently grows revenue faster than its ability to get enough of the right people to implement that growth, it will not simply stagnate; it will fall.” Given Good To Great is a management focused book, I wanted to explore an example of this law manifesting itself in a recent management dilemma. Look no further than ride-sharing giant, Uber. Uber’s culture and management problems have been highly publicized. Susan Fowler’s famous blog post kicked off a series of blows that would ultimately lead to a board dispute, the departure of its CEO, and a full-on criminal investigation. Uber’s problems as a company, however, can be traced to its insistence to be the only ride-sharing service throughout the world. Uber launched several incredibly unprofitable ventures, not only a price-war with its local competitor Lyft, but also a concerted effort to get into China, India, and other locations that ultimately proved incredibly unprofitable. Uber tried to be all things transportation to every location in the world, an over-indulgence that led to the Company raising a casual $20B prior to going public. Dara Khosrowshahi, Uber’s replacement for Travis Kalanick, has concertedly sold off several business lines and shuttered other unprofitable ventures to regain financial control of this formerly money burning “logistics” pit. This unwinding has clearly benefited the business, but also limited growth, prompting the stock to drop significantly from IPO price. Dara is no stranger to facing travel challenges, he architected the spin-out of Expedia with Barry Diller, right before 9/11. Only time will tell if he can refocus the Company as it looks to run profitably. Uber pushed too far in unprofitable locations, and ran head on into Packard’s law, now having to pay the price for its brash push into unprofitable markets.
Technology Accelerators. In Collins’ Good to Great framework (pictured below), technology accelerators act as a catalyst to momentum built up from disciplined people and disciplined thought. By adapting a “Pause, think, crawl, walk, run” approach to technology, meaning a slow and thoughtful transition to new technologies, companies can establish best practices for the long-term, instead of short term gains from technology faux-feature marketing. Technology faux-feature marketing, which is decoupled from actual technology has become increasingly popular in the past few years, whereby companies adopt a marketing position that is actually complete separate from their technological sophistication. Look no further than the blockchain / crypto faux-feature marketing around 2018, when Long Island iced-tea changed its name to Long Island Blockchain, which is reminiscent of companies adding “.com” to their name in the early 2000’s. Collins makes several important distinctions about technology accelerators: technology should only be a focus if it fits into a company’s hedgehog concept, technology accelerators cannot make up for poor people choices, and technology is never a primary root cause of either greatness or decline. The first two axioms make sense, just think of how many failed, custom software projects have begun and never finished; there is literally an entire wikipedia page dedicated to exactly that. The government has also reportedly been a famous dabbler in homegrown, highly customized technology. As Collins notes, technology accelerators cannot make up for bad people choices, an aspect of venture capital that is overlooked by so many. Enron is a great example of an interesting idea turned sour by terrible leadership. Beyond the accounting scandals that are discussed frequently, the culture was utterly toxic, with employees subjected to a “Performance Review Committee” whereby they were rated on a scale of 1-5 by their peers. Employees rated a 5 were fired, which meant roughly 15% of the workforce turned over every year. The New York Times reckoned Enron is still viewed as a trailblazer for the way it combined technology and energy services, but it clearly suffered from terrible leadership that even great technology couldn’t surmount. Collins’ most controversial point is arguably that technology cannot cause greatness or decline. Some would argue that technology is the primary cause of greatness for some companies like Amazon, Apple, Google, and Microsoft. The “it was just a better search engine” argument abounds discussions of early internet search engines. I think what Collins’ is getting at is that technology is malleable and can be built several different ways. Zoom and Cloudflare are great examples of this. As we’ve discussed, Zoom started over 100 years after the idea for video calling was first conceived, and several years after Cisco had purchased Webex, which begs the question, is technology the cause of greatness for Zoom? No! Zoom’s ultimate success the elegance of its simple video chat, something which had been locked up in corporate feature complexity for years. Cloudflare presents another great example. CDN businesses had existed for years when Cloudflare launched, and Cloudflare famously embedded security within the CDN, building on a trend which Akamai tried to address via M&A. Was technology the cause of greatness for Cloudflare? No! It’s way cheaper and easier to use than Akamai. Its cost structure enabled it to compete for customers that would be unprofitable to Akamai, a classic example of a sustaining technology innovation, Clayton Christensen’s Innovator’s Dilemma. This is not to say these are not technologically sophisticated companies, Zoom’s cloud ops team has kept an amazing service running 24/7 despite a massive increase in users, and Cloudflare’s Workers technology is probably the best bet to disrupt the traditional cloud providers today. But to place technology as the sole cause for greatness would be understating the companies achievements in several other areas.
Build up, Breakthrough Flywheel. Jeff Bezos loves this book. Its listed in the continued reading section of prior TBOTM, The Everything Store. The build up, breakthrough flywheel is the culmination of disciplined people, disciplined thought and disciplined action. Collins’ points out that several great companies frequently appear like overnight successes; all of a sudden, the Company has created something great. But that’s rarely the case. Amazon is a great example of this; it had several detractors in the early days, and was dismissed as simply an online bookseller. Little did the world know that Jeff Bezos had ideas to pursue every product line and slowly launched one after the other in a concerted fashion. In addition, what is a better technology accelerator than AWS! AWS resulted from an internal problem of scaling compute fast enough to meet growing consumer demand for their online products. The company’s tech helped it scale so well that they thought, “Hey! Other companies would probably like this!” Apple is another classic example of a build-up, breakthrough flywheel. The Company had a massive success with the iPod, it was 40% of revenues in 2007. But what did it do? It cannablized itself and pursued the iPhone, with several different teams within the company pursuing it individually. Not only that, it created a terrible first version of an Apple phone with the Rokr, realizing that design was massively important to the phone’s success. The phone’s technology is taken for granted today, but at the time the touch screen was simply magical!

Business Themes

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Level 5 Leader. The first part and probably the most important part of the buildup, breakthrough, flywheel is disciplined people. One aspect of Good to Great that inspired Collins’ other book Built to Last, is the idea that leadership, people, and culture determine the long-term future of a business, even after current leadership has moved on from the business. To set an organization up for long-term success, executives need to display level five leadership, which is a mix of personal humility and professional will. Collins’ leans in on Lee Iacocca as an example of a poor leader, who focused more on personal celebrity and left Chrysler to fail, when he departed. Level 5 leadership has something that you don’t frequently see in technology business leaders, humility. The technology industry seems littered with far more Larry Ellison and Elon Musk’s than any other industry, or maybe its just that tech CEOs tend to shout the loudest from their pedestals. One CEO that has done a great job of representing level five leadership is Shantanu Narayen, who took the reigns of Adobe in December 2007, right on the cusp of the financial crisis. Narayen, who’s been described as more of a doer than a talker, has dramatically changed Adobe’s revenue model, moving the business from a single sale license software business focused on lower ACV numbers, to an enterprise focused SaaS business. This march has been slow and pragmatic but the business has done incredibly well, 10xing since he took over. Adobe CFO, Mark Garrett, summarized it best in a 2015 McKinsey interview: “We instituted open dialogue with employees—here’s what we’re going through, here’s what it might look like—and we encouraged debate. Not everyone stayed, but those who did were committed to the cloud model.”
Hedgehog Concept. The Hedgehog concept (in the picture wheel to the right) is the overlap of three questions: What are you passionate about?, What are you the best in the world at?, and What drives your economic engine? This overlap is the conclusion of Collins’ memo to Confront the Brutal Facts, something that Ben Horowitz emphasizes in March’s TBOTM. Once teams have dug into their business, they should come up with a simple way to center their focus. When companies reach outside their hedgehog concept, they get hurt. The first question, about organizational passion, manifests itself in mission and value statements. The best in the world question manifests itself through value network exercises, SWOT analyses and competitive analyses. The economic engine is typically shown as a single metric to define success in the organization. As an example, let’s walk through an example with a less well-known SaaS company: Avalara. Avalara is a provider of tax compliance software for SMBs and enterprises, allowing those businesses to outsource complex and changing tax rules to software that integrates with financial management systems to provide an accurate view of corporate taxes. Avalara’s hedgehog concept is right on their website: “We live and breathe tax compliance so you don't have to.” Its simple and effective. The also list a slightly different version in their 10-K, “Avalara’s motto is ‘Tax compliance done right.’” Avalara is the best at tax compliance software, and that is their passion; they “live and breath” tax compliance software. What drives Avalara’s economic engine? They list two metrics right at the top of their SEC filings, number of core customers and net revenue retention. Core customers are customers who have been billed more than $3,000 in the last twelve months. The growth in core customers allows Avalara to understand their base of revenue. Tax compliance software is likely low churn because filing taxes is such an onerous process, and most people don’t have the expertise to do it for their corporate taxes. They will however suffer from some tax seasonality and some customers may churn and come back after the tax period has ended for a given year. Total billings allows Avalara to account for this possibility. Avalara’s core customers have grown 32% in the last twelve months, meaning its revenue should be following a similar trajectory. Net retention allows the company to understand how customer purchasing behavior changes over time and at 113% net retention, Avalara’s overall base is buying more software from Avalara than is churning, which is a positive trend for the company. What is the company the best in the world at? Tax compliance software for SMBs. Avalara views their core customer as greater than $3,000 of trailing twelve months revenue, which means they are targeting small customers. The Company’s integrations also speak to this - Shopify, Magento, NetSuite, and Stripe are all focused on SMB and mid-market customers. Notice that neither SAP nor Oracle ERP is in that list of integrations, which are the financial management software providers that target large enterprises. This means Avalara has set up its product and cost structure to ensure long-term profitability in the SMB segment; the enterprise segment is on the horizon, but today they are focused on SMBs.
Culture of Discipline. Collins describes a culture of discipline as an ability of managers to have open and honest, often confrontational conversation. The culture of discipline has to fit within a culture of freedom, allowing individuals to feel responsible for their division of the business. This culture of discipline is one of the first things to break down when a CEO leaves. Collins points on this issue with Lee Iaccoca, the former CEO of Chrysler. Lee built an intense culture of corporate favoritism, which completely unraveled after he left the business. This is also the focus of Collins’ other book, Built to Last. Companies don’t die overnight, yet it seems that way when problems begin to abound company-wide. We’ve analyzed HP’s 20 year downfall and a similar story can be shown with IBM. In 1993, IBM elected Lou Gerstner as CEO of the company. Gerstner was an outsider to technology businesses, having previously led the highly controversial RJR Nabisco, after KKR completed its buyout in 1989. He has also been credited with enacting wholesale changes to the company’s culture during his tenure. Despite the stock price increasing significantly over Gerstner’s tenure, the business lost significant market share to Microsoft, Apple and Dell. Gerstner was also the first IBM CEO to make significant income, having personally been paid hundreds of millions over his tenure. Following Gerstner, IBM elected insider Sam Palmisano to lead the Company. Sam pushed IBM into several new business lines, acquired 25 software companies, and famously sold off IBM’s PC division, which turned out to be an excellent strategic decision as PC sales and margins declined over the following ten years. Interestingly, Sam’s goal was to “leave [IBM] better than when I got there.” Sam presided over a strong run up in the stock, but yet again, severely missed the broad strategic shift toward public cloud. In 2012, Ginni Rometty was elected as new CEO. Ginni had championed IBM’s large purchase of PwC’s technology consulting business, turning IBM more into a full service organization than a technology company. Palmisano has an interesting quote in an interview with a wharton business school professor where he discusses IBM’s strategy: “The thing I learned about Lou is that other than his phenomenal analytical capability, which is almost unmatched, Lou always had the ability to put the market or the client first. So the analysis always started from the outside in. You could say that goes back to connecting with the marketplace or the customer, but the point of it was to get the company and the analysis focused on outside in, not inside out. I think when you miss these shifts, you’re inside out. If you’re outside in, you don’t miss the shifts. They’re going to hit you. Now acting on them is a different characteristic. But you can’t miss the shift if you’re outside in. If you’re inside out, it’s easy to delude yourself. So he taught me the importance of always taking the view of outside in.” Palmisano’s period of leadership introduced a myriad of organizational changes, 110+ acquisitions, and a centralization of IBM processes globally. Ginni learned from Sam that acquisitions were key toward growth, but IBM was buying into markets they didn’t fully understand, and when Ginni layered on 25 new acquisitions in her first two years, the Company had to shift from an outside-in perspective to an inside-out perspective. The way IBM had historically handled the outside-in perspective, to recognize shifts and get ahead of them, was through acquisition. But when the acquisitions occured at such a rapid pace, and in new markets, the organization got bogged down in a process of digestion. Furthermore, the centralization of processes and acquired businesses is the exact opposite of what Clayton Christensen recommends when pursuing disruptive technology. This makes it obvious why IBM was so late to the cloud game. This was a mainframe and services company, that had acquired hundreds of software businesses they didn’t really understand. Instead of building on these software platforms, they wasted years trying to put them all together into a digestible package for their customers. IBM launched their public cloud offering in June 2014, a full seven years after Microsoft, Amazon, and Google launched their services, despite providing the underlying databases and computing power for all of their enterprise customers. Gerstner established the high-pay, glamorous CEO role at IBM, which Palmisano and Ginni stepped into, with corporate jets and great expense policies. The company favored increasing revenues and profits (as a result of acquisitions) over the recognition and focus on a strategic market shift, which led to a downfall in the stock price and a declining mindshare in enterprises. Collins’ understands the importance of long term cultural leadership. “Does Palmisano think he could have done anything differently to set IBM up for success once he left? Not really. What has happened since falls to a new coach, a new team, he says.”

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December 2019 - The Moon is a Harsh Mistress by Robert A. Heinlein

This futuristic, anti-establishment thriller is one of Elon Musk’s favorite books. While Heinlein’s novel can drag on with little action, The Moon is a Harsh Mistress presents an interesting war story and predicts several technological revolutions.

Tech Themes

Mike, the self-aware computer and IBM. Mycroft Holmes, Heinlein’s self-aware, artificially intelligent computer is a friendly, funny and focused companion to Manny, Wyoh and Prof throughout the novel. Mike’s massive hardware construction is analogous to the way companies are viewing Artificial Intelligence today. Mike’s AI is more closely related to Artificial General Intelligence, which imagines a machine that can go beyond the standard Turing Test, with further abilities to plan, learn, communicate in natural language and act on objects. The 1960s were filled with predictions of futuristic robots and machines. Ideas were popularized not only in books like The Moon is a Harsh Mistress but also in films like 2001: A Space Odyssey, where the intelligent computer, HAL 9000, attempts to overthrow the crew. In 1965, Herbert Simon, a noble prize winner, exclaimed: “machines will be capable, within twenty years, of doing any work a man can do.” As surprising as it may seem today, the dominant technology company of the 1960’s was IBM, known for its System/360 model. Heinlein even mentions Thomas Watson and IBM at Mike’s introduction: “Mike was not official name; I had nicknamed him for Mycroft Holmes, in a story written by Dr. Watson before he founded IBM. This story character would just sit and think--and that's what Mike did. Mike was a fair dinkum thinkum, sharpest computer you'll ever meet.” Mike’s construction is similar to that of present day IBM Watson, who’s computer was able to win Jeopardy, but has struggled to gain traction in the market. IBM and Heinlein approached the computer development in a similar way, Heinlein foresaw a massive computer with tons of hardware linked into it: “They kept hooking hardware into him--decision-action boxes to let him boss other computers, bank on bank of additional memories, more banks of associational neural nets, another tubful of twelve-digit random numbers, a greatly augmented temporary memory. Human brain has around ten-to-the tenth neurons. By third year Mike had better than one and a half times that number of neuristors.” This is the classic IBM approach – leverage all of the hardware possible and create a massive database of query-able information. This actually does work well for information retrieval like Jeopardy, but stumbles precariously on new information and lack of data, which is why IBM has struggled with Watson applications to date.
Artificial General Intelligence. Mike is clearly equipped with artificial general intelligence (AGI); he has the ability to securely communicate in plain language, retrieve any of the world’s information, see via cameras and hear via microphones. As discussed above, Heinlein’s construction of Mike is clearly hardware focused, which makes sense considering the book was published in the sixties, before software was considered important. In contrast to the 1960s, today, AGI is primarily addressed from an algorithmic, software angle. One of the leading research institutions (excluding the massive tech companies) is OpenAI, an organization who’s mission is: “To ensure that artificial general intelligence (AGI)—by which we mean highly autonomous systems that outperform humans at most economically valuable work—benefits all of humanity.” OpenAI was started by several people including Elon Musk and Sam Altman, founder of Y Combinator, a famous startup incubator based in Silicon Valley. OpenAI just raised $1 billion from Microsoft to pursue its artificial algorithms and is likely making the most progress when it comes to AGI. The organization has released numerous modules that allow developers to explore the wide-ranging capabilities of AI, from music creation, to color modulation. But software alone is not going to be enough to achieve full AGI. OpenAI has acknowledged that the largest machine learning training runs have been run on increasingly more hardware: “Of course, the use of massive compute sometimes just exposes the shortcomings of our current algorithms.” As we discussed before (companies are building their own hardware for this purpose, link to building their own hardware), and the degradation of Moore’s Law imposes a serious threat to achieving full Artificial General Intelligence.
Deep Learning, Adam Selene, and Deep Fakes. Heinlein successfully predicted machine’s ability to create novel images. As the group plans to take the rebellion public, Mike is able to create a depiction of Adam Selene that can appear on television and be the face of the revolution: “We waited in silence. Then screen showed neutral gray with a hint of scan lines. Went black again, then a faint light filled middle and congealed into cloudy areas light and dark, ellipsoid. Not a face, but suggestion of face that one sees in cloud patterns covering Terra. It cleared a little and reminded me of pictures alleged to be ectoplasm. A ghost of a face. Suddenly firmed and we saw "Adam Selene." Was a still picture of a mature man. No background, just a face as if trimmed out of a print. Yet was, to me, "Adam Selene." Could not he anybody else.” Image generation and manipulation has long been a hot topic among AI researchers. The research frequently leverages a technique called Deep Learning, which is a play on classically used Artificial Neural Networks. A 2012 landmark paper from the University of Toronto student Ilya Sutskever, who went on to be a founder at OpenAI, applied deep learning to the problem of image classification with incredible success. Deep learning and computer vision have been inseparable ever since. One part of research focuses on a video focused image superimposition technique called Deep Fakes, which became popular earlier this year. As shown here, these videos are essentially merging existing images and footage with a changing facial structure, which is remarkable and scary at the same time. Deep fakes are gaining so much attention that even the government is focused on learning more about them. Heinlein was early to the game, imaging a computer could create a novel image. I can only imagine how he’d feel about Deep Fakes.

Business Themes

Video Conferencing. Manny and the rest of the members of the revolution communicate through encrypted phone conversations and video conferences. While this was certainly ahead of its time, video conferencing was first imagined in the late 1800s. Despite a clear demand for the technology, it took until the late 2000s arguably, to reach appoint where mass video communication was easily accessible for businesses (Zoom Video) and individuals (FaceTime, Skype, etc.) This industry has constantly evolved and there are platforms today that offer both secure chat and video such as Microsoft Teams and Cisco Webex. The entire industry is a lesson in execution. The idea was dreamed up so long ago, but it took hundreds of years and multiple product iterations to get to a de-facto standard in the market. Microsoft purchased Skype in 2011 for $8.5B, the same year that Eric Yuan founded Zoom. This wasn’t Microsoft’s first inroads into video either, in 2003, Microsoft bought Placeware and was supposed to overtake the market. But they didn’t and Webex continued to be a major industry player before getting acquired by Cisco. Over time Skype popularity has waned, and now, Microsoft Teams has a fully functioning video platform separate from Skype – something that Webex did years ago. Markets are constantly in a state of evolution, and its important to see what has worked well. Skype and Zoom both succeeded by appealing to free users, Skype initially focused on free consumers, and Zoom focused on free users within businesses. WebEx has always been enterprise focused but they had to be, because bandwidth costs were too high to support a video platform. Teams will go to market as a next-generation alternate/augmentation of Outlook; it will be interesting to see what happens going forward.
Privacy and Secure Communication. As part of the revolution’s communication, a secure, isolated message system is created whereby not only are conversations fully encrypted and undetected by authorities but also individuals are unable to speak with more than two others in their revolution tree. Today, there are significant concerns about secure communication – people want it, but they also do not. Facebook has declared that they will implement end to end encryption despite warnings from the government not to do so. Other mobile applications like Telegram and Signal promote secure messaging and are frequently used by reporters for anonymous tips. While encryption is beneficial for those messaging, it does raise concerns about who has access to what information. Should a company have access to secure messages? Should the government have access to secure messages? Apple has always stayed strong in its privacy declaration, but has had its own missteps. This is a difficult question and the solution must be well thought out, taking into account unintended consequences of sweeping regulation in any direction.
Conglomerates. LuNoHo Co is the conglomerate that the revolution utilized to build a massive catapult and embezzle funds. While Mike’s microtransaction financial fraud is interesting (“But bear in mind that an auditor must assume that machines are honest.”), the design of LuNoHo Co. which is described as part bank, part engineering firm, and part oil and gas exploitation firm, interestingly addresses the conventional business wisdom of the times. In the 1960s, coming out of World War II, conglomerates began to really take hold across many developing nations. The 1960s were a period of low interest rates, which allowed firms to perform leveraged buyouts of other companies (using low interest loans), sometimes in a completely unrelated set of industries. Activision was once part of Vivendi, a former waste management, energy, construction, water and property conglomerate. The rationale for these moves was often that a much bigger organization could centralize general costs like accounting, finance, legal and other costs that touched every aspect of the business. However, when interest rates rose in the late 70s and early 80s, several conglomerate profits fell, and the synergies promised at the outset of the deal turned out to be more difficult to realize than initially assumed. Conglomerates are incredibly popular in Asia, often times supported by the government. In 2013, McKinsey estimated: “Over the past decade, conglomerates in South Korea accounted for about 80 percent of the largest 50 companies by revenues. In India, the figure is a whopping 90 percent. Meanwhile, China’s conglomerates (excluding state-owned enterprises) represented about 40 percent of its largest 50 companies in 2010, up from less than 20 percent a decade before.” Softbank, the famous Japanese conglomerate and creator of the vision fund, was originally a shrink-wrap software distributor but now is part VC and part Telecommunications provider. We’ve discussed the current state of Chinese internet conglomerates, Alibaba and Tencent who each own several different business lines. Over the coming years, as internet access in Asia grows more pervasive and the potential for economic downturn increases, it will be interesting to see if these conglomerates break apart and focus on their core businesses.

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June 2019 - Zero to One by Peter Thiel

Peter Thiel’s contrarian startup classic, Zero to One, is a great book for understanding and building startups.

Tech Themes

Zero to One. As Thiel explains in the opening pages, Zero to One is the concept of creating companies that bring new technology into the world: “The single word for vertical, 0 to 1 progress is technology.” This is in contrast to startups that simply copy existing ideas or other products and tackle problems 1 to n. In Thiel’s view, the great equalizer that allows you to create such an idea is proprietary technology. This can come in many forms: Google’s search algorithms, Amazon’s massive book catalog, Apple’s improved design of the iPad or PayPal’s faster integrated Ebay payments. But generally, to capture significant value from a market; the winning technology has to be 10x better than competition. To this end, Thiel says, “Don’t disrupt.... If your company can be summed up by its opposition to already existing firms, it can’t be completely new and it’s probably not going to become a monopoly.” The true way to become a massively successful company is to build something completely new that is 10x better than the way its currently being done. This 10x better product has to be conceived over the long term, with the idea that the final incremental feature added to the product gives it that 10x lift and takes it to monopoly status.
Beliefs and Contrarianism. Thiel begins the book with a thought-provoking question: “What important truth do very few people agree with you on?” To Thiel, however you answer this question indicates your courage to challenge conventional wisdom and thus your potential ability to take a novel technology from 0 to 1. Extending this idea, Thiel defines the word startup as, “the largest group of people you can convince of a plan to build a different future.” This sort of Silicon Valley contrarianism is exactly the mindset of Internet bubble entrepreneurs. Thiel continues on this thinking, with another question: “Can you control your future?” and to that question he answers with an emphatic, “Yes.” People are taught to believe that “right place, right time” or “luck” is the greatest contributor to individual success. And as discussed in Good to Great, while many CEOs and prominent executives make this claim, they often don’t believe it and use it much more as a marketing mechanism. Thiel firmly believes in the idea of self-determination, and why shouldn’t he? He’s a white male, Rhodes Scholar and Stanford Law School graduate who has now made billions of dollars. In his mind, you either believe something novel and create that future or you waste your time tackling the problems that exist today. This also conveniently mirrors Thiel’s investing focus and he even calls this out in a chapter detailing venture returns. Venture takes informed speculative bets on which technology will ultimately win out in a market – the best bets are the ones that differ so greatly from the established norm because the likelihood of landing in the monopoly position (though still small) is much greater than a Company that is recreating existing products.
Looking for Secrets and Building Startups. The answers to the Thiel question posed above are secrets: knowable but undiscovered truths that exist in the world today. He then poses: “Why has so much of our society come to believe that there are no hard secrets left?” He provides a four part answer:

Incrementalism – the idea that you only have to hit a minimum threshold for pre-determined success and that over-achieving is frequently met with the same reward as basic achievement
Risk Aversion – People are more scared than ever about being wrong about a secret they believe
Complacency – people are fine collecting rents on things that were already established before they were involved
Flatness – the idea that as globalization continues, the world is viewed as one hyper competitive market for all products

Sticking on his contrarian path, Thiel emphasizes: “The best place to look for secrets is where no else is looking…What are people not allowed to talk about? What is forbidden or taboo?” This question is especially interesting in the context of the latest round of startups going public. A lot of people have argued that the newest wave of startups are tackling problems that are of lower value to society, like food delivery – focused on pleasing an increasingly on-demand, dopamine driven world. Why is that? Have we reached a local maximum in technology for a given period? While you may not completely believe Ray Kurzweil’s Law of Accelerating Returns, the pace of technological evolution has probably not hit a maximum. It could be argued that we have enjoyed a great run with mobile as a dominant computing platform (PCs before that, Mainframes before that, etc.) and that the next wave of startups tackling “important" problems could spring out of such a development.

Business Themes

Monopoly profits. Thiel plainly states the overarching goal of business that is normally obfuscated by cult-like Silicon Valley startups: monopoly profits. This touches on a point that has been bouncing its way through the news media (Elizabeth Warren, Stratechery, Spotify/Apple) in recent months with Elizabeth Warren calling for a breakup of Apple, Facebook and Amazon, Spotify claiming the App Store is a monopoly, and others discussing whether these companies are even monopolies. He claims monopolies deserve their bad press and regulation, “only in a world where nothing changes.” Monopolies in a static environment act like rent collectors: “If you corner the market for something, you can jack up the price; others will have no choice but to buy from you.” This is true of many heavy regulated industries today like Utilities. It’s often the case consumers only have one or two providers to choose from at max, so governments regulate the amount utilities can increase prices each year. Thiel then explains what he calls creative monopolists, companies that “give customers more choice by adding entirely new categories of abundance to the world. Creative monopolies aren’t just good for the rest of society: they’re powerful engines for making it better.” Thiel cites a few interesting examples of “monopoly” disruption: Apple iOS outcompeting Microsoft operating systems, IBM hardware being overtaken by Microsoft software, and AT&T’s monopoly prior to being broken up. It should be noted that two of these examples actually did require government regulation – Microsoft was sued in 2001 and AT&T was forced to break up its monopoly. What’s even more interesting, is the prospect of the T-Mobile/Sprint merger being blocked because while the consolidation of the telecom industry could mean increased prices, both T-Mobile and Sprint have struggled to compete with guess who, AT&T and Verizon (who started as a merger with former AT&T company, Bell Atlantic). Whether monopolies are good or bad for society, whether its possible to call tech companies with several different business lines monopolies remains to be seen – but one things for sure – being a monopoly, tech monopoly, or creative monopoly is a great thing for your business.
Prioritizing Near Term Growth at the Risk of Long Term Success. Thiel begins his chapter on Last Mover Advantage with an interesting discussion on how investors view LinkedIn’s valuation (since acquired by Microsoft but at the time was publicly traded). At the time, LinkedIn had $1B in revenue and $21M in net income, but was trading at a value of $24B (i.e. 24x LTM Revenue and 1100x+ Net Income). Why was this valued so highly? Thiel provides an interesting answer: “The overwhelming importance of future profits is counterintuitive even in Silicon Valley. For a company to be valuable it must grow and endure, but many entrepreneurs focus on short-term growth. They have an excuse: growth is easy to measure, but durability isn’t.” Thiel then continues with two great examples of short-term focus: “Rapid short-term growth at Zynga and Groupon distracted managers and investors from long-term challenges.” Zynga became famous with Farmville, but struggled to find the next big hit and Groupon posted incredibly fast growth, but couldn’t get sustained repeat customers. This focus on short-term growth is incredibly interesting given the swarm of unicorns going public this year. Both Lyft and Uber grew incredibly quickly, but as the public markets have showed, the ride-sharing business model may not be durable with each company losing billions a year. Thiel continues: “If you focus on near term growth above all else, you miss the most important question you should be asking: will this business still be around a decade from now?” To become a durable tech monopoly, Thiel cites the following important characteristics: proprietary technology, network effects, economies of scale, and branding. It’s interesting to look at these characteristics in the context of a somewhat monopoly disruptor, Zoom Video Communications. CEO Eric Yuan, who was head of engineering at Cisco’s competing WebEx product, built the Company’s proprietary tech stack with all the prior knowledge of WebEx’s issues in mind. Zoom’s software is based on a freemium model, when one user wants to video chat with another, they simply send the invite regardless of whether they have the service already – this isn’t exactly a google-esque network effect but it does increase distribution and usage. Zoom’s technology is efficiently scalable as shown by the fact that its profitable despite incredibly fast growth. Lastly, Zoom’s marketing and branding are excellent and are repeatedly lauded within the press. The question is, are these characteristics really monopoly defining? Or are they simply just good business characteristics? We will have to wait and see how Zoom fairs over the next 10 years to find out.
Asymmetric Risk & VC Returns. Thiel started venture capital firm, Founders Fund in 2005 with Ken Howery (who helped start PayPal with Thiel). Thiel notes an interesting phenomena about VC returns that several entrepreneurs don’t truly understand: “Facebook the best investment in our 2005 fund, returned more than all the others combined. Palantir, the second best investment is set to return more than the sum of every investment aside from Facebook…The biggest secret in venture capital is that the best investment in a successful fund equals or outperforms the entire rest of the fund combined.” Venture capital investing, especially at the earliest stages like Seed and Series A (where Founder’s Fund invests) is a game of maximizing the chance of one or two big successes. In the past five to ten years, there has been a significant increase in venture capital investing, and with that a focus among many firms to be founder friendly. As discussed before, these founder friendly cultures have led to super-voting shares (like Snap, FB and others) and unprecedented VC rounds. Even with these changes, there is still a friction at most VC-backed companies: the supposedly value added VC board member doesn’t believe that Company XYZ will be the next Facebook or Palantir, and because of that chooses to spend as little time with them as possible. This has fueled the somewhat anti-VC movement that several entrepreneurs have adopted because as with Elon Musk at PayPal and Zip2, being abandoned by your earliest investors can be devastating.