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August 2020 - Venture Deals by Brad Feld and Jason Mendelson

This month we checked out an excellent book for founders, investors, and those interested in private company financings. The book hits on a lot of the key business and legal terms that aren’t discussed in typical startup books, making it useful no matter what stage of the entrepreneurial journey you are on.

Tech Themes

  1. The Rise of Founder Friendly VC. Writing on his blog, Feld Thoughts, which was the original genesis for Venture Deals, Brad Feld mentioned that: “From 2010 forward, the entire VC market shifted into a mode that many describe as ‘founder friendly.’ Investor reputation mattered at both the angel and VC level.” In the 80’s and 90’s, because there was so little competition among venture capital firms, it was common for firms to dictate terms to company founders. The VC firms were the ones with the cash, and the founders didn’t have many options to choose from. If you wanted to build a big, profitable, public company, the only way to get there was by taking venture capital money. This trend started to unwind during the internet bubble, when founders started to maintain more and more of their businesses before the IPO. In fact, as this Harvard Business Review article points out, it was actually common to fire the founder/CEO prior to a public offering in favor of more seasoned leaders. This trend was bucked by Netscape, which eschewed traditional wisdom, going public less than a year from founding, with an unprofitable business. The Netscape IPO was clearly a royal coming-together of technology history. Tracing it all the way back - George Winthrop Fairchild started IBM in 1911; in the late 50’s, Arthur Rock convinced Fairchild’s son, Sherman to fund the traitorous eight (eight employees who left competitor Shockley Semiconductor) to start Fairchild Semiconductor; Eugene Kleiner (one of the traitorous eight) starts Kleiner Perkins, a venture capital firm that eventually invested in Netscape. Kleiner Perkins would also invest in Google (frequently regarded as one of the best and riskiest startup investments ever). Google was the first internet company to go public with a dual-class share structure where the founders would own a disproportionate amount of the voting rights of the company. Marc Andreessen, the founder of Netscape, loved this idea and eventually launched his own venture capital firm called Andreessen Horowitz, which ushered in a new generation of founder-friendly investing. At one point Andreessen was even quoted saying: “It is unsafe to go public today without a dual-class share structure.” Some notable companies with dual class shares include several Andreessen companies such as Facebook, Zynga, Box, and Lyft. Recently some have questioned whether founder friendly terms have pushed too far with some major flameouts from companies with the structure including Theranos, WeWork, and Uber.

  2. How to Raise Money. Feld has several recommendations for fundraising that are important including having a target round size, demo, financial projections, and VC syndicate. Feld contends that CEOs who offer a range of varying round sizes to VC’s don’t really understand their business goals and use of proceeds. By having a concrete round size it shows that the CEO understands roughly how much money it will take to get to the next milestone or said another way, it shows the CEO understands the runway (in months) needed to build that new product or feature. It shows command of the financing and vision of the business. Feld encourages founders to provide a demo, because: “while never required, many investors respond to things we can play with, so even if you are an early stage company, a prototype or demo is desirable.” Beyond the explicit point here, the demo shows confidence in the product and at least some ability to sell, which is obviously a key aspect in eventually scaling the business. Another aspect of scaling the business is the financial model, but as Feld states, “the only thing that can be known about a pre-revenue company’s financial projections is that they are wrong.” While the numbers are meaningless for really early stage companies, for those that have a few customers it can be helpful to get a sense of long-term gross margins and aspects of the company you hope to invest in and / or change over time. Lastly, Feld gives advice for building a VC syndicate, or group of VC investors. Frequently lead investors will commit a certain dollar amount of the round, and it will be up to the founder/CEO to go find a way to build out the round. This can be incredibly challenging as detailed by Moz founder, Rand Fishkin, who thought he had a deal in hand only to see it be taken away. There are multiple bids in the VC fundraising process, one called an indication of interest, which is non-binding and normally provides a range on valuation, one called a letter of intent, which is slightly more detailed and may include legal terms of the deal such as board representation, liquidation preference, and governance terms, and then final legal documentation. A lot of time, the early bids can be withdrawn based off of poor market feedback or when a company misses its financial projections (like Moz did in its process). Understanding the process and the materials needed to complete the deal is helpful at setting expectations for founders.

  3. Warrants, SPACs, and IPOs. With SPACMania in full-swing, we wanted to dive into SPACs and see how they work. We’ve discussed SPACs before, with regards to Chamath’s Social Capital merger with Virgin Galactic. But how do traditional SPAC financings work and why is there a rush of famous people, such as LinkedIn founder Reid Hoffman, to raise them? A SPAC or Specialty Purpose Acquisition Company is a blank-check company which goes public with the goal of acquiring a business, thereby taking it public. SPACs can be focused on industry or size of company and they are most frequently led by operational leaders and / or private equity firms. The reason SPACs have been gaining in popularity is that public markets investors are seeking more risk and a few high profile SPAC deals, namely DraftKings and Nikola, have traded better than expected. Most companies that are going public today are older, more mature businesses, and the public markets have been generally favorable to somewhat suspect ventures (Nikola is an electric truck company that has never produced a single truck, but is worth $14B on hype alone). VC firms and companies see the ability to get outsized returns on their investments because so many people are clamoring to find returns above the basically 0% offered by treasury bonds. The S&P 500 P/E ratio is now at around 26x compared to a historical average around 16x, meaning the market seems to be overvalued compared to prior times. SPACs typically come with an odd structure. A unit in a SPAC normally consists of one common share of stock and one warrant, which is the ability to purchase shares for $0.01 after a SPAC merges with its target company. The founders of the SPAC also receive founder shares, normally 20% of the business. Once the target is found, SPACs will often coordinate a PIPE (Private Investment in Public Equity), where a large private investor will invest mainly primary (cash to the balance sheet) capital into the business. This has emerged as a hip, new alternative to traditional IPOs, keeping with the theme of innovation in public offerings like direct listings, however, its unclear that this really benefits the company going public. Often the merged companies are the subject of substantial dilution by the SPAC sponsors and PIPE investors, lowering the overall equity piece management maintains. However, given the somewhat high valuations companies are receiving in the public markets (Zoom at 80x+ LTM Revenue, Shopify at 59x LTM Revenue), it may be worth the dilution.

Business Themes

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  1. How VC’s Make Money. In VC, the typical fund structure includes a general partnership (GP) and limited partners (LPs). The GP is the investors at the VC firm and the limited partners are the institutional investors that provide the money for the VC firm to invest. A typical structure involves the GP investing 1% of their own money (99% comes from LPs) and then getting paid an annual 2% management fee as well as 20% carried interest, or the profit made from investments. Using the example from the book: “Start with the $100 million fund. Assume that it's a successful fund and returns 3× the capital, or $300 million. In this case, the first $100 million goes back to the LPs, and the remaining profit, or $200 million, is split 80 percent to the LPs and 20 percent to the GPs. The VC firm gets $40 million in carried interest and the LPs get the remaining $160 million. And yes, in this case everyone is very happy.” Understanding how investors make money can help the entrepreneur better understand why VC’s pressure companies. As Feld points out, sometimes VC’s are trying to raise a new fund or have invested the majority of the fund already and thus do not care as much about some investments.

  2. Growth at all costs. There has been a concerted focus in VC on the get big quick motto. Nobody better exemplifies this than Masayoshi Son and the $100B VC his firm Softbank raised a few years ago. With notable big bets on current losers like WeWork and Oyo, which are struggling during this pandemic, its unclear whether this motto remains true. Eric Paley, a Managing Partner at Founder Collective, expertly quantifies the potential downsides of a risk-it-all strategy: “Investors today have overstuffed venture funds, and lots of capital is sloshing around the startup ecosystem. As a result, young startups with strong teams, compelling products and limited traction can find themselves with tens of millions of dollars, but without much real validation of their businesses. We see venture investors eagerly investing $20 million into a promising company, valuing it at $100 million, even if the startup only has a few million in net revenue. Now the investors and the founders have to make a decision — what should determine the speed at which this hypothetical company, let’s call it “Fuego,” invests its treasure chest of money in the amazing opportunity that motivated the investors? The investors’ goal over the next roughly 24 months is for the company to become worth at least three times the post-money valuation — so $300 million would be the new target pre-money valuation for Fuego’s next financing. Imagine being a company with only a few million in sales, with a success hurdle for your next round of $300 million pre-money. Whether the startup’s model is working or not, the mantra becomes ‘go big or go home.’” This issue is key when negotiating term sheets with investors and understanding board dynamics. As Feld calls out: “The voting control issues in the early stage deals are only amplified as you wrestle with how to keep control of your board when each lead investor per round wants a board seat. Either you can increase your board size to seven, nine, or more people (which usually effectively kills a well-functioning board), or more likely the board will be dominated by investors.” As an entrepreneur, you need to be cognizant of the pressure VC firms will put on founders to grow at high rates, and this pressure is frequently applied by a board. Often late stage startups have 10 people+ on their board. UiPath, a private venture-backed startup that has raised over $1B and is valued at $10B, has 12 people on its board. With all of the different firms having their own goals, boards can become ineffective. Whenever startups are considering fundraising, it’s important to realize the person you are raising from will be an ongoing member of the company and voice on the board and will most likely push for growth.

  3. Liquidation Preference. One of the least talked about terms in venture capital among startup circles is liquidation preference. Feld describes liquidation preference as: “a certain multiple of the original investment per share is returned to the investor before the common stock receives any consideration.” Startup culture has tended to view fundraises as stamps of approval and success, but thats not always the case. As the book discusses, preference can lead to very negative outcomes for founders and employes. For example, let’s say a company at $10M in revenue raises $100 million with a 1x liquidation preference at a $400 million pre-money valuation ($500M post money). The company is pressured by its VCs to grow quickly but it has issues with product market fit and go to market; five years go by and the company is at $15M in revenue. At this point the VCs are not interested in funding any more, and the board decides to try to sell the company. A buyer offers $80 million and the board accepts it. At this point, all $80M has to go back to the original investors who had the 1x liquidation preference. All of the common stockholders and the founders, get nothing. Its not the desired outcome by any means, but its important to know. Some companies have not heeded this advice and continued to raise at massive valuations including Notion which has raised $10M at a $800 million valuation, despite being rumored to be around $15M in revenue. The company raised at a $1.6B valuation (an obvious 2x) after being rumored to be at $30M in revenue. While not taking dilution is nice as a founder, it also sets up a massive hurdle for the company and seriously cramps returns. A 3x return (which is low for VC investors) means selling the company for $4.8B, which is no small feat.

Dig Deeper

  • Feld Thoughts: Brad Feld’s Blog

  • The Ultimate Guide to Liquidation Preferences

  • Startup Boards: A deep dive by Mark Suster, VC at Upfront Ventures

  • The meeting that showed me the truth about VCs on TechCrunch

  • SPOTAK: The Six Traits Marc Lore Looks for When Hiring

tags: Uber, WeWork, Theranos, Fairchild Semiconductor, Netscape, Marc Andreessen, SPAC, Chamath Palihapitiya, Zynga, Box, Facebook, Brad Feld, Nikola, Draftkings, Zoom, Shopify', Warrants, Liquidation Preference, VC, Founder Collective, Oyo, UiPath, Notion, Softbank, batch2
categories: Non-Fiction
 

March 2020 - The Hard Thing About Hard Things by Ben Horowitz

Ben Horowitz, GP of the famous investment fund Andreessen Horowitz, addresses the not-so-pleasant aspects of being a founder/CEO during a crisis. This book provides an excellent framework for anyone going through the struggles of scaling a business and dealing with growing pains.

Tech Themes

  1. The importance of Netscape. Now that its been relegated to history by the rise of AOL and internet explorer, its hard to believe that Netscape was ever the best web browser. Founded by Marc Andreessen, who had founded the first web browser, Mosaic (as a teenager!), Netscape would go on to achieve amazing success only to blow up in the face of competition and changes to internet infrastructure. Netscape was an incredible technology company, and as Brian McCullough shows in last month’s TBOTM, Netscape was the posterchild for the internet bubble. But for all the fanfare around Netscape’s seminal IPO, little is discussed about its massive and longstanding technological contributions. In 1995, early engineer Brendan Eich created Javascript, which still stands as the dominant front end language for the web. In the same year, the Company developed Secure Socket Layer (SSL), the most dominant basic internet security protocol (and reason for HTTPS). On top of those two fundamental technologies, Netscape also developed the internet cookie, in 1994! Netscape is normally discussed as the amazing company that ushered many of the first internet users onto the web, but its rarely lauded for its longstanding technological contributions. Ben Horowitz, author of the Hard Thing About Hard Things was an early employee and head of the server business unit for Netscape when it went public.

  2. Executing a pivot. Famous pivots have become part of startup lore whether it be in product (Glitch (video game) —> Slack (chat)), business model (Netflix DVD rental —> Streaming), or some combo of both (Snowdevil (selling snowboards online) —> Shopify (ecommerce tech)). The pivot has been hailed as necessary tool in every entrepreneur’s toolbox. Though many are sensationalized, the pivot Ben Horowitz underwent at LoudCloud / Opsware is an underrated one. LoudCloud was a provider of web hosting services and managed services for enterprises. The Company raised a boatload ($346M) of money prior to going public in March 2001, after the internet bubble had already burst. The Company was losing a lot of money and Ben knew that the business was on its last legs. After executing a 400 person layoff, he sold the managed services part of the business to EDS, a large IT provider, for $63.5M. LoudCloud had a software tool called Opsware that it used to manage all of the complexities of the web hosting business, scaling infrastructure with demand and managing compliance in data centers. After the sale was executed, the company’s stock fell to $0.35 per share, even trading below cash, which meant the markets viewed the Company as already bankrupt. The acquisition did something very important for Ben and the Opsware team, it bought them time - the Company had enough cash on hand to execute until Q4 2001 when it had to be cash flow positive. To balance out these cash issues, Opsware purchased Tangram, Rendition Networks, and Creekpath, which were all software vendors that helped manage the software of data centers. This had two effects - slowing the burn (these were profitable companies), and building a substantial product offering for data center providers. Opsware started making sales and the stock price began to tick up, peaking the attention of strategic acquirers. Ultimately it came down to BMC Software and HP. BMC offered $13.25 per share, the Opsware board said $14, BMC countered with $13.50 and HP came in with a $14.25 offer, a 38% premium to the stock price and a total valuation of $1.6B, which the board could not refuse. The Company changed business model (services —> software), made acquisitions and successfully exited, amidst a terrible environment for tech companies post-internet bubble.

  3. The Demise of the Great HP. Hewlett-Packard was one of the first garage-borne, silicon valley technology companies. The company was founded in Palo Alto by Bill Hewlett and Dave Packard in 1939 as a provider of test and measurement instruments. Over the next 40 years, the company moved into producing some of the best printers, scanners, calculators, logic analyzers, and computers in the world. In the 90s, HP continued to grow its product lines in the computing space, and executed a spinout of its manufacturing / non-computing device business in 1999. 1999 marks the tragic beginning of the end for HP. The first massive mistake was the acquisition of Compaq, a flailing competitor in the personal computer market, who had acquired DEC (a losing microprocessor company), a few years earlier. The acquisition was heavily debated, with Walter Hewlett, son of the founder and board director at the time, engaging in a proxy battle with then current CEO, Carly Firorina. The new HP went on to lose half of its market value and incur heavy job losses that were highly publicized. This started a string of terrible acquisitions including EDS, 3COM, Palm Inc., and Autonomy for a combined $28.8B. The Company spun into two divisions - HP Inc. and HP Enterprise in 2015 and each had their own spinouts and mergers from there (Micro Focus and DXC Technology). Today, HP Inc. sells computers and printers, and HPE sells storage, networking and server technology. What can be made of this sad tale? HP suffered from a few things. First, poor long term direction - in hindsight their acquisitions look especially terrible as a repeat series of massive bets on technology that was already being phased out due to market pressures. Second, HP had horrible corporate governance during the late 90s and 2000s - board in-fighting over acquisitions, repeat CEO fiirings over cultural issues, chairman-CEO’s with no checks, and an inability to see the outright fraud in their Autonomy acquisition. Lastly, the Company saw acquisitions and divestitures as band-aids - new CEO entrants Carly Fiorina (from AT&T), Mark Hurd (from NCR), Leo Apotheker (from SAP), and Meg Whitman (from eBay) were focused on making an impact at HP which meant big acquisitions and strategic shifts. Almost none of these panned out, and the repeated ideal shifts took a toll on the organization as the best talent moved elswehere. Its sad to see what has happened at a once-great company.

Business Themes

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  1. Ill, not sick: going public at the end of the internet bubble. Going public is supposed to be the culmination of a long entrepreneurial journey for early company employees, but according to Ben Horowitz’s experience, going public during the internet bubble pop was terrible. Loudcloud had tried to raise money privately but struggled given the terrible conditions for raising money at the beginning of 2001. Its not included in the book but the reason the Company failed to raise money was its obscene valuation and loss. The Company was valued at $1.15B in its prior funding round and could only report $6M in Net Revenue on a $107M loss. The Company sought to go public at $10 per share ($700M valuation), but after an intense and brutal roadshow that left Horowitz physically sick, they settled for $6.00 per share, a massive write-down from the previous round. The fact that the banks were even able to find investors to take on this significant risk at this point in the business cycle was a marvel. Timing can be crucial in an IPO as we saw during the internet bubble; internet “businesses” could rise 4-5x on their first trading day because of the massive and silly web landgrab in the late 90s. On the flip side, going public when investors don’t want what you’re selling is almost a death sentence. Although they both have critical business and market issues, WeWork and Casper are clear examples of the importance of timing. WeWork and Casper were late arrivals on the unicorn IPO train. Let me be clear - both have huge issues (WeWork - fundamental business model, Casper - competition/differentiation) but I could imagine these types of companies going public during a favorable time period with a relatively strong IPO. Both companies had massive losses, and investors were especially wary of losses after the failed IPOs of Lyft and Uber, which were arguably the most famous unicorns to go public at the time. Its not to say that WeWork and Casper wouldn’t have had trouble in the public markets, but during the internet bubble these companies could’ve received massive valuations and raised tons of cash instead of seeking bailouts from Softbank and reticent public market investors.

  2. Peactime / Wartime CEO. The genesis of this book was a 2011 blog post written by Horowitz detailing Peacetime and Wartime CEO behavior. As the book and blog post describe, “Peacetime in business means those times when a company has a large advantage vs. the competition in its core market, and its market is growing. In times of peace, the company can focus on expanding the market and reinforcing the company’s strengths.” On the other hand, to describe Wartime, Horowitz uses the example of a previous TBOTM, Only the Paranoid Survive, by Andy Grove. In the early 1980’s, Grove realized his business was under serious threat as competition increased in Intel’s core business, computer memory. Grove shifted the entire organization whole-heartedly into chip manufacturing and saved the company. Horowitz outlines several opposing behaviors of Peacetime and Wartime CEOs: “Peacetime CEO knows that proper protocol leads to winning. Wartime CEO violates protocol in order to win; Peacetime CEO spends time defining the culture. Wartime CEO lets the war define the culture; Peacetime CEO strives for broad based buy in. Wartime CEO neither indulges consensus-building nor tolerates disagreements.” Horowitz concludes that executives can be a peacetime and wartime CEO after mastering each of the respective skill sets and knowing when to shift from peacetime to wartime and back. The theory is interesting to consider; at its best, it provides an excellent framework for managing times of stress (like right now with the Coronavirus). At its worst, it encourages poor CEO behavior and cut throat culture. While I do think its a helpful theory, I think its helpful to think of situations that may be an exception, as a way of testing the theory. For example, lets consider Google, as Horowitz does in his original article. He calls out that Google was likely entering in a period of wartime in 2011 and as a result transitioned CEOs away from peacetime Eric Schmidt to Google founder and wartime CEO, Larry Page. Looking back however, was it really clear that Google was entering wartime? The business continued to focus on what it was clearly best at, online search advertising, and rarely faced any competition. The Company was late to invest in cloud technology and many have criticized Google for pushing billions of dollars into incredibly unprofitable ventures because they are Larry and Sergey’s pet projects. In addition, its clear that control had been an issue for Larry all along - in 2011, it came out that Eric Schmidt’s ouster as CEO was due to a disagreement with Larry and Sergey over continuing to operate in China. On top of that, its argued that Larry and Sergey, who have controlling votes in Google, stayed on too long and hindered Sundar Pichai’s ability to effectively operate the now restructured Alphabet holding company. In short, was Google in a wartime from 2011-2019? I would argue no, it operated in its core market with virtually no competition and today most Google’s revenues come from its ad products. I think the peacetime / wartime designation is rarely so black and white, which is why it is so hard to recognize what period a Company may be in today.

  3. Firing people. The unfortunate reality of business is that not every hire works out, and that eventually people will be fired. The Hard Thing About Hard Things is all about making difficult decisions. It lays out a framework for thinking about and executing layoffs, which is something that’s rarely discussed in the startup ecosystem until it happens. Companies mess up layoffs all the time, just look at Bird who recently laid off staff via an impersonal Zoom call. Horowitz lays out a roughly six step process for enacting layoffs and gives the hard truths about executing the 400 person layoff at LoudCloud. Two of these steps stand out because they have been frequently violated at startups: Don’t Delay and Train Your Managers. Often times, the decision to fire someone can be a months long process, continually drawn out and interrupted by different excuses. Horowitz encourages CEOs to move thoughtfully and quickly to stem leaks of potential layoffs and to not let poor performers continue to hurt the organization. The book discusses the Law of Crappy People - any level of any organization will eventually converge to the worst person on that level; benchmarked against the crappiest person at the next level. Once a CEO has made her mind up about the decision to fire someone, she should go for it. As part of executing layoffs, CEOs should train their managers, and the managers should execute the layoffs. This gives employees the opportunity to seek direct feedback about what went well and what went poorly. This aspect of the book is incredibly important for all levels of entrepreneurs and provides a great starting place for CEOs.

Dig Deeper

  • Most drastic company pivots that worked out

  • Initial thoughts on the Opsware - HP Deal from 2007

  • A thorough history of HP’s ventures, spin-offs and acquisitions

  • Ben’s original blog post detailing the pivot from service provider to tech company

  • The First (1995-01) and Second Browser War (2004 - 2017)

tags: Apple, IBM, VC, Google, HP, Packard's Law, Amazon, Android, Internet History, Marc Andreessen, Andreessen Horowitz, Loudcloud, Opsware, BMC Software, Mark Hurd, Javascript, Shopify, Slack, Netflix, Compaq, DEC, Micro Focus, DXC Technology, Carly Firoina, Leo Apotheker, Meg Whitman, WeWork, Casper, Larry Page, Eric Schmidt, Sundar Pichai, batch2
categories: Non-Fiction
 

February 2020 - How the Internet Happened: From Netscape to the iPhone by Brian McCullough

Brian McCullough, host of the Internet History Podcast, does an excellent job of showing how the individuals adopted the internet and made it central to their lives. He follows not only the success stories but also the flame outs which provide an accurate history of a time of rapid technological change.

Tech Themes

  1. Form to Factor: Design in Mobile Devices. Apple has a long history with mobile computing, but a few hiccups in the early days are rarely addressed. These hiccups also telegraph something interesting about the technology industry as a whole - design and ease of use often trump features. In the early 90’s Apple created the Figaro, a tablet computer that weighed eight pounds and allowed for navigation through a stylus. The issue was it cost $8,000 to produce and was 3/4 of an inch thick, making it difficult to carry. In 1993, the Company launched the Newton MessagePad, which cost $699 and included a calendar, address book, to-do list and note pad. However, the form was incorrect again; the MessagePad was 7.24 in. x 4.5 in. and clunky. With this failure, Apple turned its attention away from mobile, allowing other players like RIM and Blackberry to gain leading market share. Blackberry pioneered the idea of a full keyboard on a small device and Marc Benioff, CEO of salesforce.com, even called it, “the heroin of mobile computing. I am serious. I had to stop.” IBM also tried its hand in mobile in 1992, creating the Simon Personal Communicator, which had the ability to send and receive calls, do email and fax, and sync with work files via an adapter. The issue was the design - 8 in. by 2.5 in. by 1.5 in. thick. It was a modern smartphone, but it was too big, clunky, and difficult to use. It wasn’t until the iPhone and then Android that someone really nailed the full smart phone experience. The lessons from this case study offer a unique insight into the future of VR. The company able to offer the correct form factor, at a reasonable price can gain market share quickly. Others who try to pioneer too much at a time (cough, magic leap), will struggle.

  2. How to know you’re onto something. Facebook didn’t know. On November 30, 2004, Facebook surpassed one million users after being live for only ten months. This incredible growth was truly remarkable, but Mark Zuckerberg still didn’t know facebook was a special company. Sean Parker, the founder of Napster, had been mentoring Zuckerberg the prior summer: “What was so bizarre about the way Facebook was unfolding at that point, is that Mark just didn’t totally believe in it and wanted to go and do all these other things.” Zuckerberg even showed up to a meeting at Sequoia Capital still dressed in his pajamas with a powerpoint entitled: “The Top Ten Reasons You Should Not Invest.” While this was partially a joke because Sequoia has spurned investing in Parker’s latest company, it represented how immature the whole facebook operation was, in the face of rapid growth. Facebook went on to release key features like groups, photos, and friending, but most importantly, they developed their revenue model: advertising. The quick user growth and increasing ad revenue growth got the attention of big corporations - Viacom offered $2B in cash and stock, and Yahoo offered $1B all cash. By this time, Zuckerberg realized what he had, and famously spurned several offers from Yahoo, even after users reacted negatively to the most important feature that facebook would ever release, the News Feed. In today’s world, we often see entrepreneur’s overhyping their companies, which is why Silicon Valley was in-love with dropout founders for a time, their naivite and creativity could be harnessed to create something huge in a short amount of time.

  3. Channel Partnerships: Why apple was reluctant to launch a phone. Channel partnerships often go un-discussed at startups, but they can be incredibly useful in growing distribution. Some industries, such as the Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) market thrives on channel partnership arrangements. Companies like Crowdstrike engage partners (mostly IT services firms) to sell on their behalf, lowering Crowdstrike’s customer acquisition and sales spend. This can lead to attractive unit economics, but on the flip side, partners must get paid and educated on the selling motion which takes time and money. Other channel relationships are just overly complex. In the mid 2000’s, mobile computing was a complicated industry, and companies hated dealing with old, legacy carriers and simple clunky handset providers. Apple tried the approach of working with a handset provider, Motorola, but they produced the terrible ROKR which barely worked. The ROKR was built to run on the struggling Cingular (would become AT&T) network, who was eager to do a deal with Apple in hopes of boosting usage on their network. After the failure of the ROKR, Cingular executives begged Jobs to build a phone for the network. Normally, the carriers had specifications for how phones were built for their networks, but Jobs ironed out a contract which exchanged network exclusivity for complete design control, thus Apple entered into mobile phones. The most important computing device of the 2000’s and 2010’s was built on a channel relationship.

Business Themes

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  1. AOL-Time Warner: the merger destined to fail. To fully understand the AOL-Time Warner merger, you must first understand what AOL was, what it was becoming, and why it was operating on borrowed time. AOL started as an ISP, charging customers $9.95 for five hours of dial-up internet access, with each additional hour costing $2.95. McCullough describes AOL: “AOL has often been described as training wheels for the Internet. For millions of Americans, their aol.com address was their first experience with email, and thus their first introduction to the myriad ways that networked computing could change their lives.” AOL grew through one of the first viral marketing campaigns ever; AOL put CDs into newspapers which allowed users to download AOL software and get online. The Company went public in March of 1992 and by 1996 the Company had 2.1 million subscribers, however subscribers were starting to flee to cheaper internet access. It turned out that building an ISP was relatively cheap, and the high margin cash flow business that AOL had built was suddenly threatened by a number of competitors. AOL persisted with its viral marketing strategy, and luckily many americans still had not tried the internet yet and defaulted to AOL as being the most popular. AOL continued to add subscribers and its stock price started to balloon; in 1998 alone the stock went up 593%. AOL was also inking ridiculous, heavily VC funded deals with new internet startups. Newly public Drkoop, which raised $85M in an IPO, signed a four year $89M deal to be AOL’s default provider of health content. Barnes and Noble paid $40M to be AOL’s bookselling partner. Tel-save, a long distance phone provider signed a deal worth $100M. As the internet bubble continued to grow, AOL’s CEO, Steve Case realized that many of these new startups would be unable to fufill their contractual obligations. Early web traffic reporting systems could easily be gamed, and companies frequently had no business model other than attract a certain demographic of traffic. By 1999, AOL had a market cap of $149.8B and was added to the S&P 500 index; it was bigger than both Disney and IBM. At this time, the world was shifting away from dial-up internet to modern broadband connections provided by cable companies. One AOL executive lamented: “We all knew we were living on borrowed time and had to buy something of substance by using that huge currency [AOL’s stock].” Time Warner was a massive media company, with movie studios, TV channels, magazines and online properties. On Jan 10, 2000, AOL merged with Time Warner in one of the biggest mergers in history. AOL owned 56% of the combined company. Four days later, the Dow peaked and began a downturn which would decimate hundreds of internet businesses built on foggy fundamentals. Acquisitions happen for a number of reasons, but imminent death is not normally considered by analysts or pundits. When you see acquisitions, read the press release and understand why (at least from a marketing perspective), the two companies made a deal. Was the price just astronomical (i.e. Instagram) or was their something very strategic (i.e. Microsoft-Github)? When you read the press release years later, it should indicate whether the combination actually was proved out by the market.

  2. Acquisitions in the internet bubble: why acquisitions are really just guessing. AOL-Time Warner shows the interesting conundrum in acquisitions. HP founder David Packard coined this idea somewhat in Packard’s law: “No company can consistently grow revenues faster than its ability to get enough of the right people to implement that growth and still become a great company. If a company consistently grows revenue faster than its ability to get enough of the right people to implement that growth, it will not simply stagnate; it will fall.” Author of Good to Great, Jim Collins, clarified this idea: “Great companies are more likely to die of ingestion of too much opportunity, than starvation from too little.” Acquisitions can be a significant cause of this outpacing of growth. Look no further than Yahoo, who acquired twelve companies between September 1997 and June 1999 including Mark Cuban’s Broadcast.com for $5.7B (Kara Swisher at WSJ in 1999), GeoCities for $3.6B, and Y Combinator founder Paul Graham’s Viaweb for $48M. They spent billions in stock and cash to acquire these companies! Its only fitting that two internet darlings would eventually end up in the hands of big-telecom Verizon, who would acquire AOL for $4.4B in 2015, and Yahoo for $4.5B in 2017, only to write down the combined value by $4.6B in 2018. In 2013, Yahoo would acquire Tumblr for $1.1B, only to sell it off this past year for $3M. Acquisitions can really be overwhelming for companies, and frequently they don’t work out as planned. In essence, acquisitions are guesses about future value to customers and rarely are they as clean and smart as technology executives make them seem. Some large organizations have gotten good at acquisitions - Google, Microsoft, Cisco, and Salesforce have all made meaningful acquisitions (Android, Github, AppDynamics, ExactTarget, respectively).

  3. Google and Excite: the acquisition that never happened. McCullough has an incredible quote nestled into the start of chapter six: “Pioneers of new technologies are rarely the ones who survive long enough to dominate their categories; often it is the copycat or follow-on names that are still with us to this day: Google, not AltaVista, in search; Facebook, not Friendster, in social networks.” Amazon obviously bucked this trend (he mentions that), but in search he is absolutely right! In 1996, several internet search companies went public including Excite, Lycos, Infoseek, and Yahoo. As the internet bubble grew bigger, Yahoo was the darling of the day, and by 1998, it had amassed a $100B market cap. There were tons of companies in the market including the players mentioned above and AltaVista, AskJeeves, MSN, and others. The world did not need another search engine. However, in 1998, Google founders Larry Page and Sergey Brin found a better way to do search (the PageRank algorithm) and published their famous paper: “The Anatomy of a Large-Scale Hypertextual Web Search Engine.” They then went out to these massive search engines and tried to license their technology, but no one was interested. Imagine passing on Goolge’s search engine technology. In an over-ingestion of too much opportunity, all of the search engines were trying to be like AOL and become a portal to the internet, providing various services from their homepages. From an interview in 1998, “More than a "portal" (the term analysts employ to describe Yahoo! and its rivals, which are most users' gateway to the rest of the Internet), Yahoo! is looking increasingly like an online service--like America Online (AOL) or even CompuServe before the Web.” Small companies trying to do too much (cough, uber self-driving cars, cough). Excite showed the most interest in Google’s technology and Page offered it to the Company for $1.6M in cash and stock but Excite countered at $750,000. Excite had honest interest in the technology and a deal was still on the table until it became clear that Larry wanted Excite to rip out its search technology and use Google’s instead. Unfortunately that was too big of a risk for the mature Excite company. The two companies parted ways and Google eventually became the dominant player in the industry. Google’s focus was clear from the get-go, build a great search engine. Only when it was big enough did it plunge into acquisitions and development of adjacent technologies.

Dig Deeper

  • Raymond Smith, former CEO of Bell Atlantic, describing the technology behind the internet in 1994

  • Bill Gates’ famous memo: THE INTERNET TIDAL WAVE (May 26, 1995)

  • The rise and fall of Netscape and Mosaic in one chart

  • List of all the companies made famous and infamous in the dot-com bubble

  • Pets.com S-1 (filing for IPO) showin a $62M net loss on $6M in revenue

  • Detail on Microsoft’s antitrust lawsuit

tags: Apple, IBM, Facebook, AT&T, Blackberry, Sequoia, VC, Sean Parker, Yahoo, Excite, Netscape, AOL, Time Warner, Google, Viaweb, Mark Cuban, HP, Packard's Law, Disney, Steve Case, Steve Jobs, Amazon, Drkoop, Android, Mark Zuckerberg, Crowdstrike, Motorola, Viacom, Napster, Salesforce, Marc Benioff, Internet, Internet History, batch2
categories: Non-Fiction
 

June 2019 - Zero to One by Peter Thiel

Peter Thiel’s contrarian startup classic, Zero to One, is a great book for understanding and building startups.

Tech Themes

  1. Zero to One. As Thiel explains in the opening pages, Zero to One is the concept of creating companies that bring new technology into the world: “The single word for vertical, 0 to 1 progress is technology.” This is in contrast to startups that simply copy existing ideas or other products and tackle problems 1 to n. In Thiel’s view, the great equalizer that allows you to create such an idea is proprietary technology. This can come in many forms: Google’s search algorithms, Amazon’s massive book catalog, Apple’s improved design of the iPad or PayPal’s faster integrated Ebay payments. But generally, to capture significant value from a market; the winning technology has to be 10x better than competition. To this end, Thiel says, “Don’t disrupt.... If your company can be summed up by its opposition to already existing firms, it can’t be completely new and it’s probably not going to become a monopoly.” The true way to become a massively successful company is to build something completely new that is 10x better than the way its currently being done. This 10x better product has to be conceived over the long term, with the idea that the final incremental feature added to the product gives it that 10x lift and takes it to monopoly status.

  2. Beliefs and Contrarianism. Thiel begins the book with a thought-provoking question: “What important truth do very few people agree with you on?” To Thiel, however you answer this question indicates your courage to challenge conventional wisdom and thus your potential ability to take a novel technology from 0 to 1. Extending this idea, Thiel defines the word startup as, “the largest group of people you can convince of a plan to build a different future.” This sort of Silicon Valley contrarianism is exactly the mindset of Internet bubble entrepreneurs. Thiel continues on this thinking, with another question: “Can you control your future?” and to that question he answers with an emphatic, “Yes.” People are taught to believe that “right place, right time” or “luck” is the greatest contributor to individual success. And as discussed in Good to Great, while many CEOs and prominent executives make this claim, they often don’t believe it and use it much more as a marketing mechanism. Thiel firmly believes in the idea of self-determination, and why shouldn’t he? He’s a white male, Rhodes Scholar and Stanford Law School graduate who has now made billions of dollars. In his mind, you either believe something novel and create that future or you waste your time tackling the problems that exist today. This also conveniently mirrors Thiel’s investing focus and he even calls this out in a chapter detailing venture returns. Venture takes informed speculative bets on which technology will ultimately win out in a market – the best bets are the ones that differ so greatly from the established norm because the likelihood of landing in the monopoly position (though still small) is much greater than a Company that is recreating existing products.

  3. Looking for Secrets and Building Startups. The answers to the Thiel question posed above are secrets: knowable but undiscovered truths that exist in the world today. He then poses: “Why has so much of our society come to believe that there are no hard secrets left?” He provides a four part answer:

  • Incrementalism – the idea that you only have to hit a minimum threshold for pre-determined success and that over-achieving is frequently met with the same reward as basic achievement

  • Risk Aversion – People are more scared than ever about being wrong about a secret they believe

  • Complacency – people are fine collecting rents on things that were already established before they were involved

  • Flatness – the idea that as globalization continues, the world is viewed as one hyper competitive market for all products

Sticking on his contrarian path, Thiel emphasizes: “The best place to look for secrets is where no else is looking…What are people not allowed to talk about? What is forbidden or taboo?” This question is especially interesting in the context of the latest round of startups going public. A lot of people have argued that the newest wave of startups are tackling problems that are of lower value to society, like food delivery – focused on pleasing an increasingly on-demand, dopamine driven world. Why is that? Have we reached a local maximum in technology for a given period? While you may not completely believe Ray Kurzweil’s Law of Accelerating Returns, the pace of technological evolution has probably not hit a maximum. It could be argued that we have enjoyed a great run with mobile as a dominant computing platform (PCs before that, Mainframes before that, etc.) and that the next wave of startups tackling “important" problems could spring out of such a development.

Business Themes

  1. Monopoly profits. Thiel plainly states the overarching goal of business that is normally obfuscated by cult-like Silicon Valley startups: monopoly profits. This touches on a point that has been bouncing its way through the news media (Elizabeth Warren, Stratechery, Spotify/Apple) in recent months with Elizabeth Warren calling for a breakup of Apple, Facebook and Amazon, Spotify claiming the App Store is a monopoly, and others discussing whether these companies are even monopolies. He claims monopolies deserve their bad press and regulation, “only in a world where nothing changes.” Monopolies in a static environment act like rent collectors: “If you corner the market for something, you can jack up the price; others will have no choice but to buy from you.” This is true of many heavy regulated industries today like Utilities. It’s often the case consumers only have one or two providers to choose from at max, so governments regulate the amount utilities can increase prices each year. Thiel then explains what he calls creative monopolists, companies that “give customers more choice by adding entirely new categories of abundance to the world. Creative monopolies aren’t just good for the rest of society: they’re powerful engines for making it better.” Thiel cites a few interesting examples of “monopoly” disruption: Apple iOS outcompeting Microsoft operating systems, IBM hardware being overtaken by Microsoft software, and AT&T’s monopoly prior to being broken up. It should be noted that two of these examples actually did require government regulation – Microsoft was sued in 2001 and AT&T was forced to break up its monopoly. What’s even more interesting, is the prospect of the T-Mobile/Sprint merger being blocked because while the consolidation of the telecom industry could mean increased prices, both T-Mobile and Sprint have struggled to compete with guess who, AT&T and Verizon (who started as a merger with former AT&T company, Bell Atlantic). Whether monopolies are good or bad for society, whether its possible to call tech companies with several different business lines monopolies remains to be seen – but one things for sure – being a monopoly, tech monopoly, or creative monopoly is a great thing for your business.

  2. Prioritizing Near Term Growth at the Risk of Long Term Success. Thiel begins his chapter on Last Mover Advantage with an interesting discussion on how investors view LinkedIn’s valuation (since acquired by Microsoft but at the time was publicly traded). At the time, LinkedIn had $1B in revenue and $21M in net income, but was trading at a value of $24B (i.e. 24x LTM Revenue and 1100x+ Net Income). Why was this valued so highly? Thiel provides an interesting answer: “The overwhelming importance of future profits is counterintuitive even in Silicon Valley. For a company to be valuable it must grow and endure, but many entrepreneurs focus on short-term growth. They have an excuse: growth is easy to measure, but durability isn’t.” Thiel then continues with two great examples of short-term focus: “Rapid short-term growth at Zynga and Groupon distracted managers and investors from long-term challenges.” Zynga became famous with Farmville, but struggled to find the next big hit and Groupon posted incredibly fast growth, but couldn’t get sustained repeat customers. This focus on short-term growth is incredibly interesting given the swarm of unicorns going public this year. Both Lyft and Uber grew incredibly quickly, but as the public markets have showed, the ride-sharing business model may not be durable with each company losing billions a year. Thiel continues: “If you focus on near term growth above all else, you miss the most important question you should be asking: will this business still be around a decade from now?” To become a durable tech monopoly, Thiel cites the following important characteristics: proprietary technology, network effects, economies of scale, and branding. It’s interesting to look at these characteristics in the context of a somewhat monopoly disruptor, Zoom Video Communications. CEO Eric Yuan, who was head of engineering at Cisco’s competing WebEx product, built the Company’s proprietary tech stack with all the prior knowledge of WebEx’s issues in mind. Zoom’s software is based on a freemium model, when one user wants to video chat with another, they simply send the invite regardless of whether they have the service already – this isn’t exactly a google-esque network effect but it does increase distribution and usage. Zoom’s technology is efficiently scalable as shown by the fact that its profitable despite incredibly fast growth. Lastly, Zoom’s marketing and branding are excellent and are repeatedly lauded within the press. The question is, are these characteristics really monopoly defining? Or are they simply just good business characteristics? We will have to wait and see how Zoom fairs over the next 10 years to find out.

  3. Asymmetric Risk & VC Returns. Thiel started venture capital firm, Founders Fund in 2005 with Ken Howery (who helped start PayPal with Thiel). Thiel notes an interesting phenomena about VC returns that several entrepreneurs don’t truly understand: “Facebook the best investment in our 2005 fund, returned more than all the others combined. Palantir, the second best investment is set to return more than the sum of every investment aside from Facebook…The biggest secret in venture capital is that the best investment in a successful fund equals or outperforms the entire rest of the fund combined.” Venture capital investing, especially at the earliest stages like Seed and Series A (where Founder’s Fund invests) is a game of maximizing the chance of one or two big successes. In the past five to ten years, there has been a significant increase in venture capital investing, and with that a focus among many firms to be founder friendly. As discussed before, these founder friendly cultures have led to super-voting shares (like Snap, FB and others) and unprecedented VC rounds. Even with these changes, there is still a friction at most VC-backed companies: the supposedly value added VC board member doesn’t believe that Company XYZ will be the next Facebook or Palantir, and because of that chooses to spend as little time with them as possible. This has fueled the somewhat anti-VC movement that several entrepreneurs have adopted because as with Elon Musk at PayPal and Zip2, being abandoned by your earliest investors can be devastating.

Dig Deeper

  • Facebook Chris Hughes co-founder calls for the breakup of Facebook

  • Thiel wrote the first check into Facebook at a $5M valuation

  • An overview of the PayPal Mafia

  • A new book on scaling quickly by PayPal Mafia member Reid Hoffman

tags: Paypal, Elon, Peter Thiel, Scaling, Markets, VC, Uber, Founders Fund, Google, Apple, AT&T, Monopoly, Microsoft, Zoom, batch2
categories: Non-Fiction
 

January 2019 - The Martian by Andy Weir

This an epic story of a journey to get home (SPOILER ALERT). The audiobook is incredible and I’d highly recommend it.

Tech Themes

  1. Necessity is the mother of all invention. Constraints breed creativity. In the book, Mark is repeatedly saddled with different and more challenging situations (the Hab, the Rover, communicating, etc.). With each challenge, Mark Watney is forced to come up with inventions in order to survive. It is often the constraints of a situation that create amazing products. Let’s take Dropbox for example, Drew Houston famously wrote the program because he had forgetting his thumb drive on a Chinatown bus from Boston to New York. This also carries to music - each instrument offers a set of possible actions, governed by the overall rules of music. Remember the Marty McFly guitar solo in Back to the Future, nobody was ready for the crazy 80’s solo in the 60’s. Mark Watney, Drew Houston and Jimi Hendrix leveraged available tools in innovative ways out of the necessity of their circumstances.

  2. Resource management. Cash is King and so are potatoes. Throughout the story, Mark refers to his current food circumstances and quickly calculates his estimated number of days remaining. Like Mark, founders of startups should always know when they will be out of money or how much runway they have available. In practice, startups may lose sight of this date for a number of reasons: they lack product-market fit, they scale too fast, or they raise too much money and don’t pay attention to cash contingencies.

  3. Space is hard. After Neil Armstrong and Buzz Aldrin landed on the moon in July 1969, everyone thought commercial space travel would soon arrive. While several billionaires have attempted to get to space: Jeff Bezos with Blue Origin, Richard Branson with Virgin Galactic, and Elon Musk with SpaceX, there hasn’t been a huge boom of space startups many predicted after 1969. The reason space has become a billionaire game is the lack of expected ROI and large amount of capital necessary to build a space business. Beyond that, as exhibited by Rich Purnell/Donald Glover in the Martian, the math needs to be exact and there are so many variables at play with space tech. While VCs have to return money to their investors at the end of a fund, billionaires do not: “Most investors, institutional investors, venture capital investors, or angels are looking for business opportunities that have a demonstrable probability of success.” This was the mindset for many years but recently, with the success of SpaceX and overall great market times for VCs, it has been changing. Investors are realizing these moonshot (pun intended) technologies represent massive opportunity. To that end, space funding has grown significantly in the past couple of years.

Business Themes

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  1. Internal politics. Throughout the book, there are several internal tensions between different involved parties including the Jet Propulsion Lab (JPL) and NASA. This comes to a head when Teddy Sanders (Head of NASA) makes the call over Mitch Henderson to not tell the Hermes crew that Mark Watney is still alive. While Teddy argues this is necessary to keep them focused on their mission, Mitch feels like he is lying to his crew. This gets to an interesting business questions which is, how much shared information is best within an organization? On one end of the system you have Netflix, who publishes manager salary information for anyone to view. On the other hand you have Apple, who as discussed previously had four separate teams trying to come up with an iPhone independently. Jason Lemkin argues 90% of information should be shared as a baseline, but it is probably different for different managers and companies.

  2. Positive spin PR. Especially in tech, there is a drive to spin everything as positive PR. From internal company announcements to external marketing, everything is spun to show company XYZ as the best company in the world. Throughout the book, Annie Montrose (NASA’s PR director) is forced to spin each subsequent announcement with a positive twist. She knows the veracity of the situation: “This was going to be rough and Annie knew it. Not only did she have to deliver the biggest mea culpa in NASA’s history, every second of it would be remembered forever. Every movement of her arms, intonation of her voice, and expression of her face would be seen by millions of people over and over again. Not just in the immediate press cycle, but for decades to come.” While this actually is the biggest press release of all time in the book, Tech companies like to think every announcement is like this, opting to consistently give positive remarks despite whatever challenges. As noted here, Elizabeth Holmes has had to do this positive spinning since Theranos has come under fire on some of its practices - obviously in hindsight we know how misleading these announcements were. Another example of this positive spin mentality is this 2014 Memo from Microsoft where 12,500 employees were told they were losing their jobs. The first 10 paragraphs of the letter spell out the new and innovative competitive strategy that Microsoft is undertaking to be competitive in certain domains. It isn’t until you are at paragraph 11, that you realize you may be getting fired. Be wary of PR from tech companies, a lot of it is masking bad news.

  3. Partnerships / working together. After a failed launch on an incredibly short timeline, the US is out of options to save Watney until the Chinese National Space Agency (CSNA) volunteers the Taiyang Shen, the most technologically sophisticated space probe ever designed in China, to fly on the next mission. While this action shows the value of a human life, it also represents how valuable partnerships can be. China yields a consolation prize of having an astronaut join on the mission, but loses out on its planned launch years in the making, however being swept into this global effort could bring even more funding to China’s space program for years to come. If you look at great partnerships in the history of technology you see repeating patterns: increased distribution (Zynga games/Spotify music shareable on the facebook platform), better quality (Yahoo’s search got significantly better when powered by Google), and higher market share (Intel’s partnerships with Apple and Microsoft). While some of these partnerships end up hurting one side more than another (Google/Yahoo), they yield near term success and can help build massive businesses.

Dig Deeper

  • Mars does have dust storms but they aren’t that powerful

  • The impeccable mars views were the same ones used in Lawrence of Arabia (1962)

  • Why now is the ‘Golden Period’ for space investing?

  • The real NASA tech behind Mark Watney’s gadgets

  • The need for new space laws

tags: Martian, Matt Damon, Space, Shuttle, Resources, Hab, Andy Weir, VC, PR, Partnerships, batch2
categories: Fiction
 

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