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Tech Book of the Month
  • Tech Book of the Month
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June 2022 - Whistleblower: My Journey to Silicon Valley and Fight For Justice at Uber by Susan Fowler

This month we learn about the crazy culture at Uber and how it perpetrated repeated discrimination against groups of people, until someone did something about it. Then Susan Fowler - a software engineer at Uber, put pen to paper on a seminal blog post that upended Uber and the world.

Tech Themes

  1. Software Engineering Diversity. Diversity has been a challenge for technology companies, despite overwhelming rhetoric about its importance. A 2022 report by Celential.ai highlighted that only 21% of software engineers are women. More concerning, is that this percentage has been falling in recent years, with zippia estimating that the percentage of female software engineers was closer to ~31% in 2011. Susan Fowler experienced this sad statistic multiple times - when she joined Plaid, a fintech startup with 13 employees, there were only two women. After switching to the networking startup, Pubnub, Fowler found herself the only woman on the engineering team, which was made worse by her boss who was “openly, unabashedly sexist.” So Fowler was very excited when her interviewer at Uber noted: “Twenty-five percent of our engineers are women.” But that joy was short-lived. Just one year after receiving her team assignment (Site reliability engineering), her team had gone from 25% women to just 6% due to repeated harassment by team managers. Sadly, sexual harassment seems like the norm in the tech industry with 78% of female founders saying they’ve been sexually harassed or know someone else who has. The tech industry has a lot to improve to make companies more diverse with less harassment.

  2. Abuse, Burnout, and Fatigue. Software engineering can be a grind. Day in, and day out, you are typing at your computer, sometimes rarely interacting with other people. Fowler quickly figured out that Uber’s managers had a common approach to get people motivated, negative personal attacks and abuse. As Fowler noted relatively early on in her Uber journey: “I dreaded going into work, knowing that I’d be yelled at in meetings, that I’d be told I wasn’t ‘doing my job,’ that I wasn’t ‘working hard enough,’ even though I was doing everything that my managers asked of me. I wasn’t the only one who felt this way. When I told my friends in the other site reliability engineering teams what was going on, they said they had the same problems with their managers and teams, too. Almost every single one of them had started seeing a therapist for anxiety and depression related to the culture of work at uber; the engineers who had been at uber the longest all seemed to have suicidal thoughts.” Fowler was determined to escape this constant anxiety, so she applied to switch teams, only to have the transfer blocked by her manager. Her manager went so far as to imply that women couldn’t be good site reliability engineers, claiming “ Some people have things about them that are performance problems. These aren’t things about their work or the kind of work they do, but who they are.” Insane! Abuse, depression, anxiety, and burnout are sadly norms in the tech world, with 60% of tech workers reporting burnout in a team Blind survey. Tech cultures can feed on themselves with increasing hours leading to small productivity gains that lead to promotions and an ever-intensifying culture. Some gave developers have worked 24 hours straight testing games. The software engineering world needs better managers that understand how to help engineers avoid burnout.

  3. Site Reliability Engineering. Fowler worked as a Site Reliability Engineer at Uber, which is a relatively new engineering role that was popularized by Google. According to Red Hat, “SRE teams use software as a tool to manage systems, solve problems, and automate operations tasks.” Site Reliability Engineering generally manages production infrastructure and ensure that companies can meet their Service Level Agreements for service uptime. When Fowler joined Uber, she noticed that the company lacked standardization across its SRE practices. Fowler noted: “Over a thousand independent microservices, spread out across countless engineering teams, all had to work together for the Uber app to function correctly; these microservices didn’t always work together the way they needed to, and the lack of standardization was large to blame. Whenever these systems failed because they didn’t meet the basic standards of building reliable software, it meant that riders were abandoned, drivers weren’t paid, and destinations were lost mid-trip.” Fowler tackled this problem by compiling a list of architecture standards that worked for each team, and then devised a system to certify that microservices were “production-ready.” Her work helped improve the standards for software at Uber and increased their micro-service uptime.

Business Themes

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  1. Stoicism and Doing What's Right. Susan Fowler was an outsider to Silicon Valley. She grew up in poverty in a rural suburb of Phoenix. Her parents were faithful believers in Christianity, and her Dad worked as a pastor while her mother stayed at home and homeschooled her children. However, when Fowler got to high school, her Mom re-entered the workforce as a teacher, and her Dad decided to pursue a degree in education. Despite trying desperately to enter the public school system, Fowler was rebuffed and told that she wasn't competent enough to enroll in an Arizona high school. As a result, she got a job working as a nanny and studied textbooks at night with the hope of schooling herself. During this intensely lonely period of her life, she rediscovered some of her favorite books, including the Greek philosophers known as the stoics. Fowler recalls the pivotal moment of her life: "As I sat there among the books that I had been reading for the last few years, thinking about the stories that they told of great people and the great things they had done, it suddenly occurred to me: these were stories about people who had done things in their lives, not had things done to them, who had made things happen in their lives, not had things happen to them." This revelation prompted a seething desire to get a formal education and gain personal autonomy. She accomplished this by attending Arizona State, then the University of Pennsylvania, and ultimately graduating with a degree in physics. The stoic mindset was pivotal in her decision to ultimately publish the blog post that made her famous. The Stoics teach that you must do was is morally right. Fowler recalls: "I didn't know what to do. I felt, deep in my heart that writing my story and sharing it with the world was the right thing to do but the possible consequences were so awful that I couldn't believe it was something I was actually morally obligated to do...And then it hit me: I had no way of possibly knowing what the consequences of my actions would be. I had no idea what would actually happen if I wrote the blog." Fowler's philosophical growth laid the foundation for her to speak out when she saw truly abhorrent behavior, and the world is undeniably better for it.

  2. Early Culture Importance. As ride-hailing platforms exploded world-wide, Uber was a business in open defiance of the law. "Travis Kalanick and his team were operating in cities across the world without permission, unashamedly breaking and disregarding laws and regulations – all in the name of 'hustle' and 'disruption.'" The HBO series about Uber called Superpumped, an Uber cultural value, depicts this intense hustle-or-die culture. Beyond the abuse, the sexual harassment, and the HR violations, Uber filled its management ranks with corporate ladder climbers clamoring for closer positions to "TK." Fowler recalled: "Nothing was off-limits in these petty power games: projects were sabotaged, rumors were spread, employees were used as pawns." Interestingly enough, Uber had all the makings of what would be considered good diversity and inclusion practices – unconscious bias training, anti-harassment, and anti-discrimination training, employee surveys, support groups, women on the board, and women in management positions. But the company was rotten from the inside out because of its operations. "The issue wasn't that Uber needed to be more diverse and inclusive; the issue was that Uber had a culture that ignored and violated civil and employment laws." Uber had 14 cultural values, which is too many for any company. Culture is established early in companies and can be the complete unwinding of a company if not very carefully managed as the company grows.

  3. Human Resources. Nothing exemplifies Uber's broken culture more than Fowler's disturbing first day on her SRE team. As she sat down to work finishing up onboarding tasks, her new manager Jake started to slack her incessantly about his open relationship and approach to sexual relationships. Because of Susan's past dealing with the completely unjust due process at Penn, she immediately screenshotted the messages and promptly reported Jake to HR. However, after a brief meeting in a different building, she was told that this was Jake's first offense and that the company wouldn't be taking any action against him. Later, Fowler would uncover that numerous people had complained specifically about Jake and Uber had lobbied the same excuse. This inexplicable communication was just the beginning of HR nightmares at Uber – some of which violated employment law. So what were the issues with Uber's HR department? First, Uber's HR department was woefully small, with one source suggesting it was close to 10 people to manage 11,000 employees. In addition, the Head of HR reported to Ryan Graves, a co-founder and its then Head of operations, rather than CEO Travis Kalanick. This misalignment in reporting structure meant that Renee Atwood, then Head of HR, had to report challenging HR situations to Graves, whom some claimed wasn't equipped to handle the growing complexity of these situations appropriately. To handle the mounting controversies surrounding Uber after Fowler's blog post, the board hired Eric Holder, a former US Attorney General to investigate Fowler's claims. The final report is mostly internal, but the recommendations of Holder's firm Covington are public. When all was said and done, Uber fired Travis Kalanick, and replaced him with Dara Khosrowshahi, a former Expedia CEO and Allen and Co. Managing Director.

Dig Deeper

  • The Power of a Story with Susan Fowler | SXSW 2019

  • Uber's CEO one year in: The one thing I wish I had fixed sooner

  • What is Site Reliability Engineering (SRE)?

  • Culture Transformation at Uber | Anouk Geertsma (HR Director EMEA)

  • Anita Hill: Five years after the ‘Uber Blog’ helped launch #MeToo, businesses still must do more to fight sexual harassment

  • Uber’s Changes Following Scandals

tags: Uber, Diversity, Plaid, Pubnub, Travis Kalanick, Ryan Graves, Site Reliability Engineering, Red Hat, Google, Stoics, Penn, HR, Covington, Eric Holder, Dara Khosrowshahi, Allen & Co., Expedia
categories: Non-Fiction
 

November 2020 - Tape Sucks: Inside Data Domain, A Silicon Valley Growth Story by Frank Slootman

This month we read a short, under-discussed book by current Snowflake and former ServiceNow and Data Domain CEO, Frank Slootman. The book is just like Frank - direct and unafraid. Frank has had success several times in the startup world and the story of Data Domain provides a great case study of entrepreneurship. Data Domain was a data deduplication company, offering a 20:1 reduction of data backed up to tape casettes by using new disk drive technology.

Tech Themes

Data Domain’s 2008 10-K prior to being acquired

Data Domain’s 2008 10-K prior to being acquired

  1. First time CEO at a Company with No Revenue. Frank is an immigrant to the US, coming from the Netherlands shortly after graduating from the University of Rotterdam. After being rejected by IBM 10+ times, he joined Burroughs corporation, an early mainframe provider which subsequently merged with its direct competitor Sperry for $4.8B in 1986. Frank then spent some time at Compuware and moved back to the Netherlands to help it integrate the acquisition of Uniface, an early customizable report building software. After spending time there, he went to Borland software in 1997, working his way up the product management ranks but all the while being angered by time spent lobbying internally, rather than building. Frank joined Data Domain in the Spring of 2003 - when it had no customers, no revenue, and was burning cash. The initial team and VC’s were impressive - Kai Li, a computer science professor on sabbatical from Princeton, Ben Zhu, an EIR at USVP, and Brian Biles, a product leader with experience at VA Linux and Sun Microsystems. The company was financed by top-tier VC’s New Enterprise Associates and Greylock Partners, with Aneel Bhusri (Founder and current CEO of Workday) serving as initial CEO and then board chairman. This was a stacked team and Slootman knew it: “I’d bring down the average IQ of the company by joining, which felt right to me.” The Company had been around for 18 months and already burned through a significant amount of money when Frank joined. He knew he needed to raise money relatively soon after joining and put the Company’s chances bluntly: “Would this idea really come together and captivate customers? Nobody knew. We, the people on the ground floor, were perhaps, the most surprised by the extraordinary success we enjoyed.”

  2. Playing to his Strengths: Capital Efficiency. One of the big takeaways from the Innovators by Walter Issacson was that individuals or teams at the nexus of disciplines - primarily where the sciences meet the humanities, often achieved breakthrough success. The classic case study for this is Apple - Steve Jobs had an intense love of art, music, and design and Steve Wozniak was an amazing technologist. Frank has cultivated a cross-discipline strength at the intersection of Sales and Technology. This might be driven by Slootman’s background is in economics. The book has several references to economic terms, which clearly have had an impact on Frank’s thinking. Data Domain espoused capital efficiency: “We traveled alone, made few many-legged sales calls, and booked cheap flights and hotels: everybody tried to save a dime for the company.” The results showed - the business went from $800K of revenue in 2004 to $275 million by 2008, generating $75M in cash flow from operations. Frank’s capital efficiency was interesting and broke from traditional thinking - most people think to raise a round and build something. Frank took a different approach: “When you are not yet generating revenue, conservation of resource is the dominant theme.” Over time, “when your sales activity is solidly paying for itself,” the spending should shift from conservative to aggressive (like Snowflake is doing this now). The concept of sales efficiency is somewhat talked about, but given the recent fundraising environment, is often dismissed. Sales efficiency can be thought of as: “How much revenue do I generate for every $1 spent in sales and marketing?” Looking at the P&L below, we see Data Domain was highly efficient in its sales and marketing activity - the company increased revenue $150M in 2008, despite spending $115M in sales and marketing (a ratio of 1.3x). Contrast this with a company like Slack which spent $403M to acquire $230M of new revenue (a ratio of 0.6x). It gets harder to acquire customers at scale, so this efficiency is supposed to come down over time but best in class is hopefully above 1x. Frank clearly understands when to step on the gas with investing, as both ServiceNow and Snowflake have remained fairly efficient (from a sales perspective at least) while growing to a significant scale.

  3. Technology for Technology’s Sake. “Many technologies are conceived without a clear, precise notion of the intended use.” Slootman hits on a key point and one that the tech industry has struggled to grasp throughout its history. So many products and companies are established around budding technology with no use case. We’ve discussed Magic Leap’s fundraising money-pit (still might find its way), and Iridium Communications, the massive satellite telephone that required people to carry a suitcase around to use it. Gartner, the leading IT research publication (which is heavily influenced by marketing spend from companies) established the Technology Hype Cycle, complete with the “Peak of inflated expectations,” and the “Trough of Disillusionment” for categorizing technologies that fail to live up to their promise. There have been several waves that have come and gone: AR/VR, Blockchain, and most recently, Serverless. Its not so much that these technologies were wrong or not useful, its rather that they were initially described as a panacea to several or all known technology hindrances and few technologies ever live up to that hype. Its common that new innovations spur tons of development but also lots of failure, and this is Slootman’s caution to entrepreneurs. Data Domain was attacking a problem that existed already (tape storage) and the company provided what Clayton Christensen would call a sustaining innovation (something that Slootman points out). Whenever things go into “winter state”, like the internet after the dot-com bubble, or the recent Crpyto Winter which is unthawing as I write; it is time to pay attention and understand the relevance of the innovation.

Business Themes

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  1. Importance of Owning Sales. Slootman spends a considerable amount of this small book discussing sales tactics and decision making, particularly with respect to direct sales and OEM relationships. OEM deals are partnerships with other companies whereby one company will re-sell the software, hardware, or service of another company. Crowdstrike is a popular product with many OEM relationships. The Company drives a significant amount of its sales through its partner model, who re-sell on behalf of Crowdstrike. OEM partnerships with big companies present many challenges: “First of all, you get divorced from your customer because the OEM is now between you and them, making customer intimacy challenging. Plus, as the OEM becomes a large part of your business, for all intents and purposes they basically own you without paying for the privilege…Never forget that nobody wants to sell your product more than you do.” The challenges don’t end there. Slootman points out that EMC discarded their previous OEM vendor in the data deduplication space, right after acquiring Data Domain. On top of that, the typical reseller relationship happens at a 10-20% margin, degrading gross margins and hurting ability to invest. It is somewhat similar to the challenges open-source companies like MongoDB and Elastic have run into with their core software being…free. Amazon can just OEM their offering and cut them out as a partner, something they do frequently. Partner models can be sustainable, but the give and take from the big company is a tough balance to strike. Investors like organic adoption, especially recently with the rise of freemium SaaS models percolating in startups. Slootman’s point is that at some point in enterprise focused businesses, the Company must own direct sales (and relationships) with its customers to drive real efficiency. After the low cost to acquire freemium adopters buy the product, the executive team must pivot to traditional top down enterprise sales to drive a successful and enduring relationship with the customer.

  2. In the Thick of Things. Slootman has some very concise advice for CEOs: be a fighter, show some humanity, and check your ego at the door. “Running a startup reduces you to your most elementary instincts, and survival is on your mind most of the time…The CEO is the ‘Chief Combatant,’ warrior number one.” Slootman views the role of CEO as a fighter, ready to be the first to jump into the action, at all times. And this can be incredibly productive for business as well. Tony Xu, the founder and CEO of Doordash, takes time out every month to do delivery for his own company, in order to remain close to the customer and the problems of the company. Jeff Bezos famously still responds and views emails from customers at jeff@amazon.com. Being CEO also requires a willingness to put yourself out there and show your true personality. As Slootman puts it: “People can instantly finger a phony. Let them know who you really are, warts and all.” As CEO you are tasked with managing so many people and being involved in all aspects of the business, it is easy to become rigid and unemotional in everyday interactions. Harvard Business School professor and former leader at Uber distills it down to a simple phrase: “Begin With Trust.” All CEO’s have some amount of ego, driving them to want to be at the top of their organization. Slootman encourages CEO’s to be introspective, and try to recognize blind spots, so ego doesn’t drive day-to-day interactions with employees. One way to do that is simple: use the pronoun “we” when discussing the company you are leading. Though Slootman doesn’t explicitly call it out - all of these suggestions (fighting, showing empathy, getting rid of ego) are meant to build trust with employees.

  3. R-E-C-I-P-E for a Great Culture. The last fifth of the book is all focused on building culture at companies. It is the only topic Slootman stays on for more than a few chapters, so you know its important! RECIPE was an acronym created by the employees at Data Domain to describe the company’s values: Respect, Excellence, Customer, Integrity, Performance, Execution. Its interesting how simple and focused these values are. Technology has pushed its cultural delusion’s of grandeur to an extreme in recent years. The WeWork S-1 hilariously started with: “We are a community company committed to maximum global impact. Our mission is to elevate the world’s consciousness.” But none of Data Domain’s values were about changing the world to be a better place - they were about doing excellent, honest work for customers. Slootman is lasered focused on culture, and specifically views culture as an asset - calling it: “The only enduring, sustainable form of differentiation. These days, we don’t have a monopoly for very long on talent, technology, capital, or any other asset; the one thing that is unique to us is how we choose to come together as a group of people, day in and day out. How many organizations are there that make more than a halfhearted attempt at this?” Technology companies have taken different routes in establishing culture: Google and Facebook have tried to create culture by showering employees with unbelievable benefits, Netflix has focused on pure execution and transparency, and Microsoft has re-vamped its culture by adopting a Growth Mindset (has it really though?). Google originally promoted “Don’t be evil,” as part of its Code of Conduct but dropped the motto in 2018. Employees want to work for mission-driven organizations, but not all companies are really changing the world with their products, and Frank did not try to sugarcoat Data Domain’s data-duplication technology as a way to “elevate the world’s consciousness.” He created a culture driven by performance and execution - providing a useful product to businesses that needed it. The culture was so revered that post-acquisition, EMC instituted Data Domain’s performance management system. Data Domain employees were looked at strangely by longtime EMC executives, who had spent years in a big and stale company. Culture is a hard thing to replicate and a hard thing to change as we saw with the Innovator’s Dilemma. Might as well use it to help the company succeed!

Dig Deeper

  • How Data Domain Evolved in the Cloud World

  • Former Data Domain CEO Frank Slootman Gets His Old Band Back Together at ServiceNow

  • The Contentious Take-over Battle for Data Domain: Netapp vs. EMC

  • 2009 Interview with Frank Slootman After the Acquisition of Data Domain

tags: Snowflake, DoorDash, ServiceNow, WeWork, Data Domain, EMC, Netapp, Frank Slootman, Borland, IBM, Burroughs, Sperry, NEA, Greylock, Workday, Aneel Bhusri, Sun Microsystems, USVP, Uber, Netflix, Facebook, Google, Microsoft, Amazon, Jeff Bezos, Tony Xu, MongoDB, Elastic, Crowdstrike, Crypto, Gartner, Hype Cycle, Slack, Apple, Steve Jobs, Steve Wozniak, Magic Leap, batch2
categories: Non-Fiction
 

August 2020 - Venture Deals by Brad Feld and Jason Mendelson

This month we checked out an excellent book for founders, investors, and those interested in private company financings. The book hits on a lot of the key business and legal terms that aren’t discussed in typical startup books, making it useful no matter what stage of the entrepreneurial journey you are on.

Tech Themes

  1. The Rise of Founder Friendly VC. Writing on his blog, Feld Thoughts, which was the original genesis for Venture Deals, Brad Feld mentioned that: “From 2010 forward, the entire VC market shifted into a mode that many describe as ‘founder friendly.’ Investor reputation mattered at both the angel and VC level.” In the 80’s and 90’s, because there was so little competition among venture capital firms, it was common for firms to dictate terms to company founders. The VC firms were the ones with the cash, and the founders didn’t have many options to choose from. If you wanted to build a big, profitable, public company, the only way to get there was by taking venture capital money. This trend started to unwind during the internet bubble, when founders started to maintain more and more of their businesses before the IPO. In fact, as this Harvard Business Review article points out, it was actually common to fire the founder/CEO prior to a public offering in favor of more seasoned leaders. This trend was bucked by Netscape, which eschewed traditional wisdom, going public less than a year from founding, with an unprofitable business. The Netscape IPO was clearly a royal coming-together of technology history. Tracing it all the way back - George Winthrop Fairchild started IBM in 1911; in the late 50’s, Arthur Rock convinced Fairchild’s son, Sherman to fund the traitorous eight (eight employees who left competitor Shockley Semiconductor) to start Fairchild Semiconductor; Eugene Kleiner (one of the traitorous eight) starts Kleiner Perkins, a venture capital firm that eventually invested in Netscape. Kleiner Perkins would also invest in Google (frequently regarded as one of the best and riskiest startup investments ever). Google was the first internet company to go public with a dual-class share structure where the founders would own a disproportionate amount of the voting rights of the company. Marc Andreessen, the founder of Netscape, loved this idea and eventually launched his own venture capital firm called Andreessen Horowitz, which ushered in a new generation of founder-friendly investing. At one point Andreessen was even quoted saying: “It is unsafe to go public today without a dual-class share structure.” Some notable companies with dual class shares include several Andreessen companies such as Facebook, Zynga, Box, and Lyft. Recently some have questioned whether founder friendly terms have pushed too far with some major flameouts from companies with the structure including Theranos, WeWork, and Uber.

  2. How to Raise Money. Feld has several recommendations for fundraising that are important including having a target round size, demo, financial projections, and VC syndicate. Feld contends that CEOs who offer a range of varying round sizes to VC’s don’t really understand their business goals and use of proceeds. By having a concrete round size it shows that the CEO understands roughly how much money it will take to get to the next milestone or said another way, it shows the CEO understands the runway (in months) needed to build that new product or feature. It shows command of the financing and vision of the business. Feld encourages founders to provide a demo, because: “while never required, many investors respond to things we can play with, so even if you are an early stage company, a prototype or demo is desirable.” Beyond the explicit point here, the demo shows confidence in the product and at least some ability to sell, which is obviously a key aspect in eventually scaling the business. Another aspect of scaling the business is the financial model, but as Feld states, “the only thing that can be known about a pre-revenue company’s financial projections is that they are wrong.” While the numbers are meaningless for really early stage companies, for those that have a few customers it can be helpful to get a sense of long-term gross margins and aspects of the company you hope to invest in and / or change over time. Lastly, Feld gives advice for building a VC syndicate, or group of VC investors. Frequently lead investors will commit a certain dollar amount of the round, and it will be up to the founder/CEO to go find a way to build out the round. This can be incredibly challenging as detailed by Moz founder, Rand Fishkin, who thought he had a deal in hand only to see it be taken away. There are multiple bids in the VC fundraising process, one called an indication of interest, which is non-binding and normally provides a range on valuation, one called a letter of intent, which is slightly more detailed and may include legal terms of the deal such as board representation, liquidation preference, and governance terms, and then final legal documentation. A lot of time, the early bids can be withdrawn based off of poor market feedback or when a company misses its financial projections (like Moz did in its process). Understanding the process and the materials needed to complete the deal is helpful at setting expectations for founders.

  3. Warrants, SPACs, and IPOs. With SPACMania in full-swing, we wanted to dive into SPACs and see how they work. We’ve discussed SPACs before, with regards to Chamath’s Social Capital merger with Virgin Galactic. But how do traditional SPAC financings work and why is there a rush of famous people, such as LinkedIn founder Reid Hoffman, to raise them? A SPAC or Specialty Purpose Acquisition Company is a blank-check company which goes public with the goal of acquiring a business, thereby taking it public. SPACs can be focused on industry or size of company and they are most frequently led by operational leaders and / or private equity firms. The reason SPACs have been gaining in popularity is that public markets investors are seeking more risk and a few high profile SPAC deals, namely DraftKings and Nikola, have traded better than expected. Most companies that are going public today are older, more mature businesses, and the public markets have been generally favorable to somewhat suspect ventures (Nikola is an electric truck company that has never produced a single truck, but is worth $14B on hype alone). VC firms and companies see the ability to get outsized returns on their investments because so many people are clamoring to find returns above the basically 0% offered by treasury bonds. The S&P 500 P/E ratio is now at around 26x compared to a historical average around 16x, meaning the market seems to be overvalued compared to prior times. SPACs typically come with an odd structure. A unit in a SPAC normally consists of one common share of stock and one warrant, which is the ability to purchase shares for $0.01 after a SPAC merges with its target company. The founders of the SPAC also receive founder shares, normally 20% of the business. Once the target is found, SPACs will often coordinate a PIPE (Private Investment in Public Equity), where a large private investor will invest mainly primary (cash to the balance sheet) capital into the business. This has emerged as a hip, new alternative to traditional IPOs, keeping with the theme of innovation in public offerings like direct listings, however, its unclear that this really benefits the company going public. Often the merged companies are the subject of substantial dilution by the SPAC sponsors and PIPE investors, lowering the overall equity piece management maintains. However, given the somewhat high valuations companies are receiving in the public markets (Zoom at 80x+ LTM Revenue, Shopify at 59x LTM Revenue), it may be worth the dilution.

Business Themes

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  1. How VC’s Make Money. In VC, the typical fund structure includes a general partnership (GP) and limited partners (LPs). The GP is the investors at the VC firm and the limited partners are the institutional investors that provide the money for the VC firm to invest. A typical structure involves the GP investing 1% of their own money (99% comes from LPs) and then getting paid an annual 2% management fee as well as 20% carried interest, or the profit made from investments. Using the example from the book: “Start with the $100 million fund. Assume that it's a successful fund and returns 3× the capital, or $300 million. In this case, the first $100 million goes back to the LPs, and the remaining profit, or $200 million, is split 80 percent to the LPs and 20 percent to the GPs. The VC firm gets $40 million in carried interest and the LPs get the remaining $160 million. And yes, in this case everyone is very happy.” Understanding how investors make money can help the entrepreneur better understand why VC’s pressure companies. As Feld points out, sometimes VC’s are trying to raise a new fund or have invested the majority of the fund already and thus do not care as much about some investments.

  2. Growth at all costs. There has been a concerted focus in VC on the get big quick motto. Nobody better exemplifies this than Masayoshi Son and the $100B VC his firm Softbank raised a few years ago. With notable big bets on current losers like WeWork and Oyo, which are struggling during this pandemic, its unclear whether this motto remains true. Eric Paley, a Managing Partner at Founder Collective, expertly quantifies the potential downsides of a risk-it-all strategy: “Investors today have overstuffed venture funds, and lots of capital is sloshing around the startup ecosystem. As a result, young startups with strong teams, compelling products and limited traction can find themselves with tens of millions of dollars, but without much real validation of their businesses. We see venture investors eagerly investing $20 million into a promising company, valuing it at $100 million, even if the startup only has a few million in net revenue. Now the investors and the founders have to make a decision — what should determine the speed at which this hypothetical company, let’s call it “Fuego,” invests its treasure chest of money in the amazing opportunity that motivated the investors? The investors’ goal over the next roughly 24 months is for the company to become worth at least three times the post-money valuation — so $300 million would be the new target pre-money valuation for Fuego’s next financing. Imagine being a company with only a few million in sales, with a success hurdle for your next round of $300 million pre-money. Whether the startup’s model is working or not, the mantra becomes ‘go big or go home.’” This issue is key when negotiating term sheets with investors and understanding board dynamics. As Feld calls out: “The voting control issues in the early stage deals are only amplified as you wrestle with how to keep control of your board when each lead investor per round wants a board seat. Either you can increase your board size to seven, nine, or more people (which usually effectively kills a well-functioning board), or more likely the board will be dominated by investors.” As an entrepreneur, you need to be cognizant of the pressure VC firms will put on founders to grow at high rates, and this pressure is frequently applied by a board. Often late stage startups have 10 people+ on their board. UiPath, a private venture-backed startup that has raised over $1B and is valued at $10B, has 12 people on its board. With all of the different firms having their own goals, boards can become ineffective. Whenever startups are considering fundraising, it’s important to realize the person you are raising from will be an ongoing member of the company and voice on the board and will most likely push for growth.

  3. Liquidation Preference. One of the least talked about terms in venture capital among startup circles is liquidation preference. Feld describes liquidation preference as: “a certain multiple of the original investment per share is returned to the investor before the common stock receives any consideration.” Startup culture has tended to view fundraises as stamps of approval and success, but thats not always the case. As the book discusses, preference can lead to very negative outcomes for founders and employes. For example, let’s say a company at $10M in revenue raises $100 million with a 1x liquidation preference at a $400 million pre-money valuation ($500M post money). The company is pressured by its VCs to grow quickly but it has issues with product market fit and go to market; five years go by and the company is at $15M in revenue. At this point the VCs are not interested in funding any more, and the board decides to try to sell the company. A buyer offers $80 million and the board accepts it. At this point, all $80M has to go back to the original investors who had the 1x liquidation preference. All of the common stockholders and the founders, get nothing. Its not the desired outcome by any means, but its important to know. Some companies have not heeded this advice and continued to raise at massive valuations including Notion which has raised $10M at a $800 million valuation, despite being rumored to be around $15M in revenue. The company raised at a $1.6B valuation (an obvious 2x) after being rumored to be at $30M in revenue. While not taking dilution is nice as a founder, it also sets up a massive hurdle for the company and seriously cramps returns. A 3x return (which is low for VC investors) means selling the company for $4.8B, which is no small feat.

Dig Deeper

  • Feld Thoughts: Brad Feld’s Blog

  • The Ultimate Guide to Liquidation Preferences

  • Startup Boards: A deep dive by Mark Suster, VC at Upfront Ventures

  • The meeting that showed me the truth about VCs on TechCrunch

  • SPOTAK: The Six Traits Marc Lore Looks for When Hiring

tags: Uber, WeWork, Theranos, Fairchild Semiconductor, Netscape, Marc Andreessen, SPAC, Chamath Palihapitiya, Zynga, Box, Facebook, Brad Feld, Nikola, Draftkings, Zoom, Shopify', Warrants, Liquidation Preference, VC, Founder Collective, Oyo, UiPath, Notion, Softbank, batch2
categories: Non-Fiction
 

July 2020 - Innovator's Dilemma by Clayton Christensen

This month we review the technology classic, the Innovator’s Dilemma, by Clayton Christensen. The book attempts to answer the age-old question: why do dominant companies eventually fail?

Tech Themes

  1. The Actual Definition of Disruptive Technology. Disruption is a term that is frequently thrown around in Silicon Valley circles. Every startup thinks its technology is disruptive, meaning it changes how the customer currently performs a task or service. The actual definition, discussed in detail throughout the book, is relatively specific. Christensen re-emphasizes this distinction in a 2015 Harvard Business Review article: "Specifically, as incumbents focus on improving their products and services for their most demanding (and usually most profitable) customers, they exceed the needs of some segments and ignore the needs of others. Entrants that prove disruptive begin by successfully targeting those overlooked segments, gaining a foothold by delivering more-suitable functionality—frequently at a lower price. Incumbents, chasing higher profitability in more-demanding segments, tend not to respond vigorously. Entrants then move upmarket, delivering the performance that incumbents' mainstream customers require, while preserving the advantages that drove their early success. When mainstream customers start adopting the entrants' offerings in volume, disruption has occurred." The book posits that there are generally two types of innovation: sustaining and disruptive. While disruptive innovation focuses on low-end or new, small market entry, sustaining innovation merely continues markets along their already determined axes. For example, in the book, Christensen discusses the disk drive industry, mapping out the jumps which pack more memory and power into each subsequent product release. There is a slew of sustaining jumps for each disruptive jump that improves product performance for existing customers but doesn't necessarily get non-customers to become customers. It is only when new use cases emerge, like rugged disk usage and PCs arrive, that disruption occurs. Understanding the specific definition can help companies and individuals better navigate muddled tech messaging; Uber, for example, is shown to be a sustaining technology because its market already existed, and the company didn't offer lower prices or a new business model. Understanding the intricacies of the definition can help incumbents spot disruptive competitors.

  2. Value Networks. Value networks are an underappreciated and somewhat confusing topic covered in The Innovator's Dilemma's early chapters. A value network is defined as "The context within which a firm identifies and responds to customers' needs, solves problems, procures input, reacts to competitors, and strives for profit." A value network seems all-encompassing on the surface. In reality, a value network serves to simplify the lens through which an organization must make complex decisions every day. Shown as a nested product architecture, a value network attempts to show where a company interacts with other products. By distilling the product down to its most atomic components (literally computer hardware), we can see all of the considerations that impact a business. Once we have this holistic view, we can consider the decisions and tradeoffs that face an organization every day. The takeaway here is that organizations care about different levels of performance for different products. For example, when looking at cloud computing services at AWS, Azure, or GCP, we see Amazon EC2 instances, Azure VMs, and Google Cloud VMs with different operating systems, different purposes (general, compute, memory), and different sizes. General-purpose might be fine for basic enterprise applications, while gaming applications might need compute-optimized, and real-time big data analytics may need a memory-optimized VM. While it gets somewhat forgotten throughout the book, this point means that organizations focused on producing only compute-intensive machines may not be the best for memory-intensive, because the customers of the organization may not have a use for them. In the book's example, some customers (of bigger memory providers) looked at smaller memory applications and said there was no need. In reality, there was massive demand in the rugged, portable market for smaller memory disks. When approaching disruptive innovation, it's essential to recognize your organization's current value network so that you don't target new technologies at those who don't need it.

  3. Product Commoditization. Christensen spends a lot of time describing the dynamics of the disk drive industry, where companies continually supplied increasingly smaller drives with better performance. Christensen's description of commoditization is very interesting: "A product becomes a commodity within a specific market segment when the repeated changes in the basis of competition, completely play themselves out, that is, when market needs on each attribute or dimension of performance have been fully satisfied by more than one available product." At this point, products begin competing primarily on price. In the disk drive industry, companies first competed on capacity, then on size, then on reliability, and finally on price. This price war is reminiscent of the current state of the Continuous Integration / Continuous Deployment (CI/CD) market, a subsegment of DevOps software. Companies in the space, including Github, CircleCI, Gitlab, and others are now competing primarily on price to win new business. Each of the cloud providers has similar technologies native to their public cloud offerings (AWS CodePipeline and CloudFormation, GitHub Actions, Google Cloud Build). They are giving it away for free because of their scale. The building block of CI/CD software is git, an open-source version control system founded by Linux founder Linus Torvalds. With all the providers leveraging a massive open-source project, there is little room for true differentiation. Christensen even says: "It may, in fact, be the case that the product offerings of competitors in a market continue to be differentiated from each other. But differentiation loses its meaning when the features and functionality have exceeded what the market demands." Only time will tell whether these companies can pivot into burgeoning highly differentiated technologies.

Business Themes

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  1. Resources-Processes-Value (RPV) Framework. The RPV framework is a powerful lens for understanding the challenges that large businesses face. Companies have resources (people, assets, technology, product designs, brands, information, cash, relationships with customers, etc.) that can be transformed into greater value products and services. The way organizations go about converting these resources is the organization's processes. These processes can be formal (documented sales strategies, for example) or informal (culture and habitual routines). Processes are the big reasons organizations struggle to deal with emerging technologies. Because culture and habit are ingrained in the organization, the same process used to launch a mature, slow-growing market may be applied to a fast-growing, dynamic sector. Christensen puts it best: "This means the very mechanisms through which organizations create value are intrinsically inimical to change." Lastly, companies have values, or "the standards by which employees make prioritization decisions." When there is a mismatch between the resources, processes, and values of an organization and the product or market that an organization is chasing, its rare the business can be successful in competing in the disruptive market. To see this misalignment in action, Christensen describes a meeting with a CEO who had identified the disruptive change happening in the disk-drive market and had gotten a product to market to meet the growing market. In response to a publication showing the fast growth of the market, the CEO lamented to Christensen: "I know that's what they think, but they're wrong. There isn't a market. We've had that drive in our catalog for 18 months. Everyone knows we've got it, but nobody wants it." The issue was not the product or market demand, but the organization's values. As Christensen continues, "But among the employees, there was nothing about an $80 million, low-end market that solved the growth and profit problems of a multi-billion dollar company – especially when capable competitors were doing all they could to steal away the customers providing those billions. And way at the other end of the company there was nothing about supplying prototype companies of 1.8-inch drives to an automaker that solved the problem of meeting the 1994 quotas of salespeople whose contacts and expertise were based so solidly in the computer industry." The CEO cared about the product, but his team did not. The RPV framework helps evaluate large companies and the challenges they face in launching new products.

  2. How to manage through technological change. Christensen points out three primary ways of managing through disruptive technology change: 1. "Acquire a different organization whose processes and values are a close match with the new task." 2. "Try to change the processes and values of the current organization." 3. "Separate out an independent organization and develop within it the new processes and values that are required to solve the new problem." Acquisitions are a way to get out ahead of disruptive change. There are so many examples but two recent ones come to mind: Microsoft's acquisition of Github and Facebook's acquisition of Instagram. Microsoft paid a whopping $7.5B for Github in 2018 when the Github was rumored to be at roughly $200M in revenue (37.5x Revenue multiple!). Github was undoubtedly a mature business with a great product, but it didn't have a ton of enterprise adoption. Diane Greene at Google Cloud, tried to get Sundar Pichai to pay more, but he said no. Github has changed Azure's position within the market and continued its anti-Amazon strategy of pushing open-source technology. In contrast to the Github acquisition, Instagram was only 13 employees when it was acquired for $1B. Zuckerberg saw the threat the social network represented to Facebook, and today the acquisition is regularly touted as one of the best ever. Instagram was developing a social network solely based on photographs, right at the time every person suddenly had an excellent smartphone camera in their pocket. The acquisition occurred right when the market was ballooning, and Facebook capitalized on that growth. The second way of managing technological change is through changing cultural norms. This is rarely successful, because you are fighting against all of the processes and values deeply embedded in the organization. Indra Nooyi cited a desire to move faster on culture as one of her biggest regrets as a young executive: "I’d say I was a little too respectful of the heritage and culture [of PepsiCo]. You’ve got to make a break with the past. I was more patient than I should’ve been. When you know you have to make a change, at some point you have to say enough is enough. The people who have been in the company for 20-30 years pull you down. If I had to do it all over again, I might have hastened the pace of change even more." Lastly, Christensen prescribes creating an independent organization matched to the resources, processes, and values that the new market requires. Three great spin-out, spin-in examples with different flavors of this come to mind. First, Cisco developed a spin-ins practice whereby they would take members of their organization and start a new company that they would fund to develop a new process. The spin-ins worked for a time but caused major cultural issues. Second, as we've discussed, one of the key reasons AWS was born was that Chris Pinkham was in South Africa, thousands of miles away from Amazon Corporate in Seattle; this distance and that team's focus allowed it to come up with a major advance in computing. Lastly, Mastercard started Mastercard Labs a few years ago. CEO Ajay Banga told his team: "I need two commercial products in three years." He doesn't tell his CFO their budget, and he is the only person from his executive team that interacts with the business. This separation of resources, processes, and values allows those smaller organizations to be more nimble in finding emerging technology products and markets.

  3. Discovering Emerging Markets.

    The resources-processes-values framework can also show us why established firms fail to address emerging markets. Established companies rely on formal budgeting and forecasting processes whereby resources are allocated based on market estimates and revenue forecasts. Christensen highlights several important factors for tackling emerging markets, including focusing on ideas, failure, and learning. Underpinning all of these ideas is the impossibility of predicting the scale and growth rate of disruptive technologies: "Experts' forecasts will always be wrong. It is simply impossible to predict with any useful degree of precision how disruptive products will be used or how large their markets will be." Because of this challenge, relying too heavily on these estimates to underpin financial projections can cause businesses to view initial market development as a failure or not worthy of the companies time. When HP launched a new 1.3-inch disk drive, which could be embedded in PDAs, the company mandated that its revenues had to scale up to $150M within three years, in line with market estimates. That market never materialized, and the initiative was abandoned as a failed investment. Christensen argues that because disruptive technologies are threats, planning has to come after action, and thus strategic and financial planning must be discovery-based rather than execution-based. Companies should focus on learning their customer's needs and the right business model to attack the problem, rather than plan to execute their initial vision. As he puts it: "Research has shown, in fact, that the vast majority of successful new business ventures, abandoned their original business strategies when they began implementing their initial plans and learned what would and would not work." One big fan of Christensen's work is Jeff Bezos, and its easy to see why with Amazon's focus on releasing new products in this discovery manner. The pace of product releases is simply staggering (~almost one per day). Bezos even talked about this exact issue in his 2016 shareholder letter: "The senior team at Amazon is determined to keep our decision-making velocity high. Speed matters in business – plus a high-velocity decision making environment is more fun too. We don't know all the answers, but here are some thoughts. First, never use a one-size-fits-all decision-making process. Many decisions are reversible, two-way doors. Those decisions can use a light-weight process. For those, so what if you're wrong? I wrote about this in more detail in last year's letter. Second, most decisions should probably be made with somewhere around 70% of the information you wish you had. If you wait for 90%, in most cases, you're probably being slow." Amazon is one of the first large organizations to truly embrace this decision-making style, and clearly, the results speak for themselves.

Dig Deeper

  • What Jeff Bezos Tells His Executives To Read

  • Github Cuts Subscription Price by More Than Half

  • Ajay Banga Opening Address at MasterCard Innovation Forum 2014

  • Clayton Christensen Describing Disruptive Innovation

  • Why Cisco’s Spin-Ins Never Caught On

tags: Amazon, Google Cloud, Microsoft, Azure, Github, Gitlab, CircleCI, Pepsi, Jeff Bezos, Indra Nooyi, Mastercard, Ajay Banga, HP, Uber, RPV, Facebook, Instagram, Cisco, batch2
categories: Non-Fiction
 

April 2020 - Good To Great by Jim Collins

Collins’ book attempts to answer the question - Why do good companies continue to be good companies? His analysis across several different industries provides meaningful insights into strong management and strategic practices.

Tech Themes

  1. Packard’s Law. We’ve discussed Packard’s law before when analyzing the troubling acquisition history of AOL-Time Warner and Yahoo. As a reminder, Packard’s law states: “No company can consistently grow revenues faster than its ability to get enough of the right people to implement that growth and still become a great company. [And] If a company consistently grows revenue faster than its ability to get enough of the right people to implement that growth, it will not simply stagnate; it will fall.” Given Good To Great is a management focused book, I wanted to explore an example of this law manifesting itself in a recent management dilemma. Look no further than ride-sharing giant, Uber. Uber’s culture and management problems have been highly publicized. Susan Fowler’s famous blog post kicked off a series of blows that would ultimately lead to a board dispute, the departure of its CEO, and a full-on criminal investigation. Uber’s problems as a company, however, can be traced to its insistence to be the only ride-sharing service throughout the world. Uber launched several incredibly unprofitable ventures, not only a price-war with its local competitor Lyft, but also a concerted effort to get into China, India, and other locations that ultimately proved incredibly unprofitable. Uber tried to be all things transportation to every location in the world, an over-indulgence that led to the Company raising a casual $20B prior to going public. Dara Khosrowshahi, Uber’s replacement for Travis Kalanick, has concertedly sold off several business lines and shuttered other unprofitable ventures to regain financial control of this formerly money burning “logistics” pit. This unwinding has clearly benefited the business, but also limited growth, prompting the stock to drop significantly from IPO price. Dara is no stranger to facing travel challenges, he architected the spin-out of Expedia with Barry Diller, right before 9/11. Only time will tell if he can refocus the Company as it looks to run profitably. Uber pushed too far in unprofitable locations, and ran head on into Packard’s law, now having to pay the price for its brash push into unprofitable markets.

  2. Technology Accelerators. In Collins’ Good to Great framework (pictured below), technology accelerators act as a catalyst to momentum built up from disciplined people and disciplined thought. By adapting a “Pause, think, crawl, walk, run” approach to technology, meaning a slow and thoughtful transition to new technologies, companies can establish best practices for the long-term, instead of short term gains from technology faux-feature marketing. Technology faux-feature marketing, which is decoupled from actual technology has become increasingly popular in the past few years, whereby companies adopt a marketing position that is actually complete separate from their technological sophistication. Look no further than the blockchain / crypto faux-feature marketing around 2018, when Long Island iced-tea changed its name to Long Island Blockchain, which is reminiscent of companies adding “.com” to their name in the early 2000’s. Collins makes several important distinctions about technology accelerators: technology should only be a focus if it fits into a company’s hedgehog concept, technology accelerators cannot make up for poor people choices, and technology is never a primary root cause of either greatness or decline. The first two axioms make sense, just think of how many failed, custom software projects have begun and never finished; there is literally an entire wikipedia page dedicated to exactly that. The government has also reportedly been a famous dabbler in homegrown, highly customized technology. As Collins notes, technology accelerators cannot make up for bad people choices, an aspect of venture capital that is overlooked by so many. Enron is a great example of an interesting idea turned sour by terrible leadership. Beyond the accounting scandals that are discussed frequently, the culture was utterly toxic, with employees subjected to a “Performance Review Committee” whereby they were rated on a scale of 1-5 by their peers. Employees rated a 5 were fired, which meant roughly 15% of the workforce turned over every year. The New York Times reckoned Enron is still viewed as a trailblazer for the way it combined technology and energy services, but it clearly suffered from terrible leadership that even great technology couldn’t surmount. Collins’ most controversial point is arguably that technology cannot cause greatness or decline. Some would argue that technology is the primary cause of greatness for some companies like Amazon, Apple, Google, and Microsoft. The “it was just a better search engine” argument abounds discussions of early internet search engines. I think what Collins’ is getting at is that technology is malleable and can be built several different ways. Zoom and Cloudflare are great examples of this. As we’ve discussed, Zoom started over 100 years after the idea for video calling was first conceived, and several years after Cisco had purchased Webex, which begs the question, is technology the cause of greatness for Zoom? No! Zoom’s ultimate success the elegance of its simple video chat, something which had been locked up in corporate feature complexity for years. Cloudflare presents another great example. CDN businesses had existed for years when Cloudflare launched, and Cloudflare famously embedded security within the CDN, building on a trend which Akamai tried to address via M&A. Was technology the cause of greatness for Cloudflare? No! It’s way cheaper and easier to use than Akamai. Its cost structure enabled it to compete for customers that would be unprofitable to Akamai, a classic example of a sustaining technology innovation, Clayton Christensen’s Innovator’s Dilemma. This is not to say these are not technologically sophisticated companies, Zoom’s cloud ops team has kept an amazing service running 24/7 despite a massive increase in users, and Cloudflare’s Workers technology is probably the best bet to disrupt the traditional cloud providers today. But to place technology as the sole cause for greatness would be understating the companies achievements in several other areas.

  3. Build up, Breakthrough Flywheel. Jeff Bezos loves this book. Its listed in the continued reading section of prior TBOTM, The Everything Store. The build up, breakthrough flywheel is the culmination of disciplined people, disciplined thought and disciplined action. Collins’ points out that several great companies frequently appear like overnight successes; all of a sudden, the Company has created something great. But that’s rarely the case. Amazon is a great example of this; it had several detractors in the early days, and was dismissed as simply an online bookseller. Little did the world know that Jeff Bezos had ideas to pursue every product line and slowly launched one after the other in a concerted fashion. In addition, what is a better technology accelerator than AWS! AWS resulted from an internal problem of scaling compute fast enough to meet growing consumer demand for their online products. The company’s tech helped it scale so well that they thought, “Hey! Other companies would probably like this!” Apple is another classic example of a build-up, breakthrough flywheel. The Company had a massive success with the iPod, it was 40% of revenues in 2007. But what did it do? It cannablized itself and pursued the iPhone, with several different teams within the company pursuing it individually. Not only that, it created a terrible first version of an Apple phone with the Rokr, realizing that design was massively important to the phone’s success. The phone’s technology is taken for granted today, but at the time the touch screen was simply magical!

Business Themes

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  1. Level 5 Leader. The first part and probably the most important part of the buildup, breakthrough, flywheel is disciplined people. One aspect of Good to Great that inspired Collins’ other book Built to Last, is the idea that leadership, people, and culture determine the long-term future of a business, even after current leadership has moved on from the business. To set an organization up for long-term success, executives need to display level five leadership, which is a mix of personal humility and professional will. Collins’ leans in on Lee Iacocca as an example of a poor leader, who focused more on personal celebrity and left Chrysler to fail, when he departed. Level 5 leadership has something that you don’t frequently see in technology business leaders, humility. The technology industry seems littered with far more Larry Ellison and Elon Musk’s than any other industry, or maybe its just that tech CEOs tend to shout the loudest from their pedestals. One CEO that has done a great job of representing level five leadership is Shantanu Narayen, who took the reigns of Adobe in December 2007, right on the cusp of the financial crisis. Narayen, who’s been described as more of a doer than a talker, has dramatically changed Adobe’s revenue model, moving the business from a single sale license software business focused on lower ACV numbers, to an enterprise focused SaaS business. This march has been slow and pragmatic but the business has done incredibly well, 10xing since he took over. Adobe CFO, Mark Garrett, summarized it best in a 2015 McKinsey interview: “We instituted open dialogue with employees—here’s what we’re going through, here’s what it might look like—and we encouraged debate. Not everyone stayed, but those who did were committed to the cloud model.”

  2. Hedgehog Concept. The Hedgehog concept (in the picture wheel to the right) is the overlap of three questions: What are you passionate about?, What are you the best in the world at?, and What drives your economic engine? This overlap is the conclusion of Collins’ memo to Confront the Brutal Facts, something that Ben Horowitz emphasizes in March’s TBOTM. Once teams have dug into their business, they should come up with a simple way to center their focus. When companies reach outside their hedgehog concept, they get hurt. The first question, about organizational passion, manifests itself in mission and value statements. The best in the world question manifests itself through value network exercises, SWOT analyses and competitive analyses. The economic engine is typically shown as a single metric to define success in the organization. As an example, let’s walk through an example with a less well-known SaaS company: Avalara. Avalara is a provider of tax compliance software for SMBs and enterprises, allowing those businesses to outsource complex and changing tax rules to software that integrates with financial management systems to provide an accurate view of corporate taxes. Avalara’s hedgehog concept is right on their website: “We live and breathe tax compliance so you don't have to.” Its simple and effective. The also list a slightly different version in their 10-K, “Avalara’s motto is ‘Tax compliance done right.’” Avalara is the best at tax compliance software, and that is their passion; they “live and breath” tax compliance software. What drives Avalara’s economic engine? They list two metrics right at the top of their SEC filings, number of core customers and net revenue retention. Core customers are customers who have been billed more than $3,000 in the last twelve months. The growth in core customers allows Avalara to understand their base of revenue. Tax compliance software is likely low churn because filing taxes is such an onerous process, and most people don’t have the expertise to do it for their corporate taxes. They will however suffer from some tax seasonality and some customers may churn and come back after the tax period has ended for a given year. Total billings allows Avalara to account for this possibility. Avalara’s core customers have grown 32% in the last twelve months, meaning its revenue should be following a similar trajectory. Net retention allows the company to understand how customer purchasing behavior changes over time and at 113% net retention, Avalara’s overall base is buying more software from Avalara than is churning, which is a positive trend for the company. What is the company the best in the world at? Tax compliance software for SMBs. Avalara views their core customer as greater than $3,000 of trailing twelve months revenue, which means they are targeting small customers. The Company’s integrations also speak to this - Shopify, Magento, NetSuite, and Stripe are all focused on SMB and mid-market customers. Notice that neither SAP nor Oracle ERP is in that list of integrations, which are the financial management software providers that target large enterprises. This means Avalara has set up its product and cost structure to ensure long-term profitability in the SMB segment; the enterprise segment is on the horizon, but today they are focused on SMBs.

  3. Culture of Discipline. Collins describes a culture of discipline as an ability of managers to have open and honest, often confrontational conversation. The culture of discipline has to fit within a culture of freedom, allowing individuals to feel responsible for their division of the business. This culture of discipline is one of the first things to break down when a CEO leaves. Collins points on this issue with Lee Iaccoca, the former CEO of Chrysler. Lee built an intense culture of corporate favoritism, which completely unraveled after he left the business. This is also the focus of Collins’ other book, Built to Last. Companies don’t die overnight, yet it seems that way when problems begin to abound company-wide. We’ve analyzed HP’s 20 year downfall and a similar story can be shown with IBM. In 1993, IBM elected Lou Gerstner as CEO of the company. Gerstner was an outsider to technology businesses, having previously led the highly controversial RJR Nabisco, after KKR completed its buyout in 1989. He has also been credited with enacting wholesale changes to the company’s culture during his tenure. Despite the stock price increasing significantly over Gerstner’s tenure, the business lost significant market share to Microsoft, Apple and Dell. Gerstner was also the first IBM CEO to make significant income, having personally been paid hundreds of millions over his tenure. Following Gerstner, IBM elected insider Sam Palmisano to lead the Company. Sam pushed IBM into several new business lines, acquired 25 software companies, and famously sold off IBM’s PC division, which turned out to be an excellent strategic decision as PC sales and margins declined over the following ten years. Interestingly, Sam’s goal was to “leave [IBM] better than when I got there.” Sam presided over a strong run up in the stock, but yet again, severely missed the broad strategic shift toward public cloud. In 2012, Ginni Rometty was elected as new CEO. Ginni had championed IBM’s large purchase of PwC’s technology consulting business, turning IBM more into a full service organization than a technology company. Palmisano has an interesting quote in an interview with a wharton business school professor where he discusses IBM’s strategy: “The thing I learned about Lou is that other than his phenomenal analytical capability, which is almost unmatched, Lou always had the ability to put the market or the client first. So the analysis always started from the outside in. You could say that goes back to connecting with the marketplace or the customer, but the point of it was to get the company and the analysis focused on outside in, not inside out. I think when you miss these shifts, you’re inside out. If you’re outside in, you don’t miss the shifts. They’re going to hit you. Now acting on them is a different characteristic. But you can’t miss the shift if you’re outside in. If you’re inside out, it’s easy to delude yourself. So he taught me the importance of always taking the view of outside in.” Palmisano’s period of leadership introduced a myriad of organizational changes, 110+ acquisitions, and a centralization of IBM processes globally. Ginni learned from Sam that acquisitions were key toward growth, but IBM was buying into markets they didn’t fully understand, and when Ginni layered on 25 new acquisitions in her first two years, the Company had to shift from an outside-in perspective to an inside-out perspective. The way IBM had historically handled the outside-in perspective, to recognize shifts and get ahead of them, was through acquisition. But when the acquisitions occured at such a rapid pace, and in new markets, the organization got bogged down in a process of digestion. Furthermore, the centralization of processes and acquired businesses is the exact opposite of what Clayton Christensen recommends when pursuing disruptive technology. This makes it obvious why IBM was so late to the cloud game. This was a mainframe and services company, that had acquired hundreds of software businesses they didn’t really understand. Instead of building on these software platforms, they wasted years trying to put them all together into a digestible package for their customers. IBM launched their public cloud offering in June 2014, a full seven years after Microsoft, Amazon, and Google launched their services, despite providing the underlying databases and computing power for all of their enterprise customers. Gerstner established the high-pay, glamorous CEO role at IBM, which Palmisano and Ginni stepped into, with corporate jets and great expense policies. The company favored increasing revenues and profits (as a result of acquisitions) over the recognition and focus on a strategic market shift, which led to a downfall in the stock price and a declining mindshare in enterprises. Collins’ understands the importance of long term cultural leadership. “Does Palmisano think he could have done anything differently to set IBM up for success once he left? Not really. What has happened since falls to a new coach, a new team, he says.”

Dig Deeper

  • Level 5 Leadership from Darwin Smith at Kimberly Clark

  • From Good to Great … to Below Average by Steven Levitt - Unpacking underperformance from some of the companies Collins’ studied

  • The Challenges faced by new CEO Arvind Krishna

  • Overview of Cloudflare Workers

  • The Opposite of the Buildup, Breakthrough, Flywheel - the Doom Loop

tags: IBM, Apple, Microsoft, Packard's Law, HP, Uber, Barry Diller, Enron, Zoom, Cloudflare, Innovator's Dilemma, Clayton Christensen, Jeff Bezos, Amazon, Larry Ellison, Adobe, Shantanu Narayen, Avalara, Hedgehog Concept, batch2
categories: Non-Fiction
 

November 2019 - Brotopia: Breaking Up the Boys' Club of Silicon Valley by Emily Chang

This book details a number of factors that have discouraged women’s participation and promotion in the tech industry. Emily Chang gives a brief history of the circumstances that have pushed women away from the industry and then covers its current issues - weaving in great insights and actionable takeaways along the way.

Tech Themes

  1. The Antisocial Programmer. As the necessity for technological talent began to rise in the early 1960s, many existing companies were unsure how to hire the right people. To address this shortfall in know-how, companies used standard aptitude tests, like IBM’s Programmer Aptitude Test, to examine whether a candidate was capable of applying the right problem solving skills on the job. Beyond these standard aptitude tests, companies leveraged personality exams. In 1966, a large software company called System Development Corporation hired William Cannon and Dallis Perry to build a personality test that could shed light on the right personalities needed on the job. To build this personality test, Cannon and Perry profiled 1,378 programmers on a range of personality traits. Of those 1,378 profiled, only 186 were women. After compiling their findings, the final report stated: “[Programmers] dislike activities involving close personal interaction; they are generally more interested in things than people.” Furthermore, Cannon and Perry’s 82-page paper made no reference to women at all, referring to the surveyed group as men, for the entire paper. A combination of aptitude tests and Cannon-Perry’s personality test became the industry standard for recruiting, and soon companies were mistakenly focused on stereotypical antisocial programmers. Antisocial personality disorder is three times more common in men than women. Given how early the tech industry was, compared to what it is now, this decision to hire a majority of anti-social men has propagated throughout the industry, with senior leaders continually reinforcing incorrect hiring standards.

  2. Women in Computer Science. According to the book, “there was an overall peak in bachelor’s degrees awarded in computer science in the mid-1980s, and a peak in the percentage of women receiving those degrees at nearly 40 percent. And then there was a steep decline in both.” It was at this time in the mid-1980s that computer science departments began to turn away anyone who was not a pre-qualified, academic top performer. There was too much demand with a constrained supply of qualified teachers, so only the best kids were allowed into top programs. This caused students to view computer science as hyper-competitive and unwelcoming to individuals without significant experience. Today, women earn only 18% of computer science degrees – a statistic that shocks many in the industry. Researchers at NPR found that intro CS courses play a key role in this problem – with many teachers still assuming students have prior familiarity with coding. Furthermore, women are socialized in a number of ways to achieve perfection, so when brand new code is not working well, women are more likely to feel discouraged. It is imperative to encourage women to try computer science if they have interest, to combat these negative trends.

  3. PayPal and Perpetuating Cycles. After the dot-com bubble burst in the early 2000s, several newly minted millionaires did the natural thing after selling a company for millions of dollars, became a venture capitalists. One of the major success stories of the era was PayPal. Among those newly minted millionaires were the PayPal mafia: Peter Thiel, Keith Rabois, Elon Musk, Max Levchin, David Sacks, and Reid Hoffman. Thiel and Rabois have a history of suggesting a meritocratic process of hiring where only the most qualified academic candidate should land the job, not taking into account diversity of any form. Furthermore, in his book Zero to One (which we’ve discussed before), Thiel proposes startups should hire only “nerds of the same type.” The mafia began investing in several new companies, seeding friends who were likely to perpetuate the cycle of recruiting friends and hiring based on status alone. Rabois, who is currently a venture capitalist has remarked: “Once you have alignment, then I think you can have a wide swath of people, views and perspectives.” These ideas seem more like justification for hiring large groups of white males who were friends of PayPal executives than a truly “meritocratic” process, which is not the best way of building a successful, diverse organization. Roger McNamee, founder of technology private equity firm, Silver Lake, suggests: “They didn’t just perpetuate it; they turned it into a fine art. They legitimized it… The guys were born into the right part of the gene pool, they wind up at the right company, at the right moment in time, they all leave together and [go on] to work together. I give them full credit for it but calling it a meritocracy is laughable.”

Business Themes

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  1. The Women at Early Google. A lot of people know the story of Sergey Brin meeting co-founder Larry Page. But few are aware of when Sergey and Larry met Susan Wojcicki, who is now CEO of YouTube. Sergey and Larry were looking for office space, and through a mutual friend, were introduced to Susan Wojcicki, who worked in marketing at Intel at the time. Though she didn’t jump on board immediately, Susan eventually came around and was instrumental in launching two of Google’s most important products: AdWords and AdSense. Wojcicki would soon be working closely with a newly recruited, Marissa Mayer, who after graduating from Stanford with a degree in Symbolic Systems, joined Google to help build AdWords and design Google’s front-end. Wojcicki and Mayer would soon be joined by Sheryl Sandberg, who came to Google in 2001 as Vice President of Online Sales and Operations. Another now-famous early female employee was Kim Scott, author of Radical Candor, who joined the company in 2004. All of these early, powerful female leaders, with the continued urging of Larry and Sergey (who wanted to achieve a 50/50 ratio of male to female employees) helped build a strong culture of female leadership. But as the Company scaled it lost sight of its gender diversity goals – “In 2017, women accounted for 31% of employees overall, 25% of leadership roles and 20% of technical roles.” Google claims it lost touch as it scaled, when the need for hiring outpaced the ability to find qualified and diverse candidates – but that sounds like an easy cop out.

  2. Startups and Party Culture. Atari and Trilogy Software pioneered the idea of a work-hard, play-hard startup cultures. Nolan Bushnell of Atari would throw wild parties and have employees (including Steve Jobs) work late into the night, building for the company. Trilogy, a provider of sales and marketing software, extended this idea even further. It started with hiring, where, according to a former engineer, Trilogy’s ethos was: “We’re elite talent. It’s potential and talent, not experience, that has merit.” The Company regularly used complicated brain-teasers in interviews and attracted swaths of anti-social engineers with young and attractive talent recruiters. Joe Liemandt, the CEO of Trilogy, also moved the company to Austin, Texas; executives likened the tactic to marooning members of a cult. Co-founder Christy Jones remarked: “I didn’t go on vacation. We called holidays competitive advantage days because no one else was working. It was a chance to get ahead.” The Company had a strong drinking and partying culture and bares striking cult-like resemblance to WeWork, except it had a sustainable business model. Other technology companies have mixed constant alcohol and long hours, which has led to numerous assault charges at well-known startups including Uber, Zenefits, WeWork and others. Startup and party culture does not need to be so intertwined.

  3. Hiring Practices to Encourage Diverse Backgrounds. Stewart Butterfield, the founder of Flickr (sold to Yahoo for $20 million in 2005), has focused on diverse hiring efforts at his new company Slack. According to Brotopia, “In 2017, Slack reported that 43.5% of its employees were women, including 48% of managers and almost 30% of technical employees – far better numbers than any tech company in Silicon Valley.” Butterfield, who grew up on a commune in Canada, recognizes his privilege, and discusses its not insanely difficult to create a diverse environment: “As an already successful, white, male, straight – go down the list – I’m not going to have the relevant experience to determine what makes this a good workplace, so some of that is just being open but really just making it an explicit focus.” Slack’s diverse recruiting team was given explicit instructions to source candidates from underrepresented backgrounds and schools for every new role in the organization. More companies should follow Slack’s lead and adopt explicit gender and diversity goals.

Dig Deeper

  • Susan Fowler’s blog post describing terrible conditions at Uber

  • Overview of gender and diversity statistics of major technology companies

  • The Sex and Drug fueled parties of Silicon Valley VCs

  • A recap of the Google Walkout over sexual harassment allegations

  • The Tech Industry’s diversity is not improving

tags: Investing, Yahoo, Cloud Computing, Google, Facebook, Sheryl Sandberg, Susan Wojcicki, Marissa Mayer, IBM, Trilogy Software, Paypal, Peter Thiel, Keith Rabois, Zero to One, Silver Lake, Sergey Brin, Larry Page, YouTube, AdWords, AdSense, Atari, Nolan Bushnell, Steve Jobs, WeWork, Uber, Zenefits, Slack, Flickr, Stewart Butterfield, batch2
categories: Non-Fiction
 

June 2019 - Zero to One by Peter Thiel

Peter Thiel’s contrarian startup classic, Zero to One, is a great book for understanding and building startups.

Tech Themes

  1. Zero to One. As Thiel explains in the opening pages, Zero to One is the concept of creating companies that bring new technology into the world: “The single word for vertical, 0 to 1 progress is technology.” This is in contrast to startups that simply copy existing ideas or other products and tackle problems 1 to n. In Thiel’s view, the great equalizer that allows you to create such an idea is proprietary technology. This can come in many forms: Google’s search algorithms, Amazon’s massive book catalog, Apple’s improved design of the iPad or PayPal’s faster integrated Ebay payments. But generally, to capture significant value from a market; the winning technology has to be 10x better than competition. To this end, Thiel says, “Don’t disrupt.... If your company can be summed up by its opposition to already existing firms, it can’t be completely new and it’s probably not going to become a monopoly.” The true way to become a massively successful company is to build something completely new that is 10x better than the way its currently being done. This 10x better product has to be conceived over the long term, with the idea that the final incremental feature added to the product gives it that 10x lift and takes it to monopoly status.

  2. Beliefs and Contrarianism. Thiel begins the book with a thought-provoking question: “What important truth do very few people agree with you on?” To Thiel, however you answer this question indicates your courage to challenge conventional wisdom and thus your potential ability to take a novel technology from 0 to 1. Extending this idea, Thiel defines the word startup as, “the largest group of people you can convince of a plan to build a different future.” This sort of Silicon Valley contrarianism is exactly the mindset of Internet bubble entrepreneurs. Thiel continues on this thinking, with another question: “Can you control your future?” and to that question he answers with an emphatic, “Yes.” People are taught to believe that “right place, right time” or “luck” is the greatest contributor to individual success. And as discussed in Good to Great, while many CEOs and prominent executives make this claim, they often don’t believe it and use it much more as a marketing mechanism. Thiel firmly believes in the idea of self-determination, and why shouldn’t he? He’s a white male, Rhodes Scholar and Stanford Law School graduate who has now made billions of dollars. In his mind, you either believe something novel and create that future or you waste your time tackling the problems that exist today. This also conveniently mirrors Thiel’s investing focus and he even calls this out in a chapter detailing venture returns. Venture takes informed speculative bets on which technology will ultimately win out in a market – the best bets are the ones that differ so greatly from the established norm because the likelihood of landing in the monopoly position (though still small) is much greater than a Company that is recreating existing products.

  3. Looking for Secrets and Building Startups. The answers to the Thiel question posed above are secrets: knowable but undiscovered truths that exist in the world today. He then poses: “Why has so much of our society come to believe that there are no hard secrets left?” He provides a four part answer:

  • Incrementalism – the idea that you only have to hit a minimum threshold for pre-determined success and that over-achieving is frequently met with the same reward as basic achievement

  • Risk Aversion – People are more scared than ever about being wrong about a secret they believe

  • Complacency – people are fine collecting rents on things that were already established before they were involved

  • Flatness – the idea that as globalization continues, the world is viewed as one hyper competitive market for all products

Sticking on his contrarian path, Thiel emphasizes: “The best place to look for secrets is where no else is looking…What are people not allowed to talk about? What is forbidden or taboo?” This question is especially interesting in the context of the latest round of startups going public. A lot of people have argued that the newest wave of startups are tackling problems that are of lower value to society, like food delivery – focused on pleasing an increasingly on-demand, dopamine driven world. Why is that? Have we reached a local maximum in technology for a given period? While you may not completely believe Ray Kurzweil’s Law of Accelerating Returns, the pace of technological evolution has probably not hit a maximum. It could be argued that we have enjoyed a great run with mobile as a dominant computing platform (PCs before that, Mainframes before that, etc.) and that the next wave of startups tackling “important" problems could spring out of such a development.

Business Themes

  1. Monopoly profits. Thiel plainly states the overarching goal of business that is normally obfuscated by cult-like Silicon Valley startups: monopoly profits. This touches on a point that has been bouncing its way through the news media (Elizabeth Warren, Stratechery, Spotify/Apple) in recent months with Elizabeth Warren calling for a breakup of Apple, Facebook and Amazon, Spotify claiming the App Store is a monopoly, and others discussing whether these companies are even monopolies. He claims monopolies deserve their bad press and regulation, “only in a world where nothing changes.” Monopolies in a static environment act like rent collectors: “If you corner the market for something, you can jack up the price; others will have no choice but to buy from you.” This is true of many heavy regulated industries today like Utilities. It’s often the case consumers only have one or two providers to choose from at max, so governments regulate the amount utilities can increase prices each year. Thiel then explains what he calls creative monopolists, companies that “give customers more choice by adding entirely new categories of abundance to the world. Creative monopolies aren’t just good for the rest of society: they’re powerful engines for making it better.” Thiel cites a few interesting examples of “monopoly” disruption: Apple iOS outcompeting Microsoft operating systems, IBM hardware being overtaken by Microsoft software, and AT&T’s monopoly prior to being broken up. It should be noted that two of these examples actually did require government regulation – Microsoft was sued in 2001 and AT&T was forced to break up its monopoly. What’s even more interesting, is the prospect of the T-Mobile/Sprint merger being blocked because while the consolidation of the telecom industry could mean increased prices, both T-Mobile and Sprint have struggled to compete with guess who, AT&T and Verizon (who started as a merger with former AT&T company, Bell Atlantic). Whether monopolies are good or bad for society, whether its possible to call tech companies with several different business lines monopolies remains to be seen – but one things for sure – being a monopoly, tech monopoly, or creative monopoly is a great thing for your business.

  2. Prioritizing Near Term Growth at the Risk of Long Term Success. Thiel begins his chapter on Last Mover Advantage with an interesting discussion on how investors view LinkedIn’s valuation (since acquired by Microsoft but at the time was publicly traded). At the time, LinkedIn had $1B in revenue and $21M in net income, but was trading at a value of $24B (i.e. 24x LTM Revenue and 1100x+ Net Income). Why was this valued so highly? Thiel provides an interesting answer: “The overwhelming importance of future profits is counterintuitive even in Silicon Valley. For a company to be valuable it must grow and endure, but many entrepreneurs focus on short-term growth. They have an excuse: growth is easy to measure, but durability isn’t.” Thiel then continues with two great examples of short-term focus: “Rapid short-term growth at Zynga and Groupon distracted managers and investors from long-term challenges.” Zynga became famous with Farmville, but struggled to find the next big hit and Groupon posted incredibly fast growth, but couldn’t get sustained repeat customers. This focus on short-term growth is incredibly interesting given the swarm of unicorns going public this year. Both Lyft and Uber grew incredibly quickly, but as the public markets have showed, the ride-sharing business model may not be durable with each company losing billions a year. Thiel continues: “If you focus on near term growth above all else, you miss the most important question you should be asking: will this business still be around a decade from now?” To become a durable tech monopoly, Thiel cites the following important characteristics: proprietary technology, network effects, economies of scale, and branding. It’s interesting to look at these characteristics in the context of a somewhat monopoly disruptor, Zoom Video Communications. CEO Eric Yuan, who was head of engineering at Cisco’s competing WebEx product, built the Company’s proprietary tech stack with all the prior knowledge of WebEx’s issues in mind. Zoom’s software is based on a freemium model, when one user wants to video chat with another, they simply send the invite regardless of whether they have the service already – this isn’t exactly a google-esque network effect but it does increase distribution and usage. Zoom’s technology is efficiently scalable as shown by the fact that its profitable despite incredibly fast growth. Lastly, Zoom’s marketing and branding are excellent and are repeatedly lauded within the press. The question is, are these characteristics really monopoly defining? Or are they simply just good business characteristics? We will have to wait and see how Zoom fairs over the next 10 years to find out.

  3. Asymmetric Risk & VC Returns. Thiel started venture capital firm, Founders Fund in 2005 with Ken Howery (who helped start PayPal with Thiel). Thiel notes an interesting phenomena about VC returns that several entrepreneurs don’t truly understand: “Facebook the best investment in our 2005 fund, returned more than all the others combined. Palantir, the second best investment is set to return more than the sum of every investment aside from Facebook…The biggest secret in venture capital is that the best investment in a successful fund equals or outperforms the entire rest of the fund combined.” Venture capital investing, especially at the earliest stages like Seed and Series A (where Founder’s Fund invests) is a game of maximizing the chance of one or two big successes. In the past five to ten years, there has been a significant increase in venture capital investing, and with that a focus among many firms to be founder friendly. As discussed before, these founder friendly cultures have led to super-voting shares (like Snap, FB and others) and unprecedented VC rounds. Even with these changes, there is still a friction at most VC-backed companies: the supposedly value added VC board member doesn’t believe that Company XYZ will be the next Facebook or Palantir, and because of that chooses to spend as little time with them as possible. This has fueled the somewhat anti-VC movement that several entrepreneurs have adopted because as with Elon Musk at PayPal and Zip2, being abandoned by your earliest investors can be devastating.

Dig Deeper

  • Facebook Chris Hughes co-founder calls for the breakup of Facebook

  • Thiel wrote the first check into Facebook at a $5M valuation

  • An overview of the PayPal Mafia

  • A new book on scaling quickly by PayPal Mafia member Reid Hoffman

tags: Paypal, Elon, Peter Thiel, Scaling, Markets, VC, Uber, Founders Fund, Google, Apple, AT&T, Monopoly, Microsoft, Zoom, batch2
categories: Non-Fiction
 

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