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April 2021 - Innovator's Solution by Clayton Christensen and Michael Raynor

This month we take another look at disruptive innovation in the counter piece to Clayton Christensen’s Innovator’s Dilemma, our July 2020 book. The book crystallizes the types of disruptive innovation and provides frameworks for how incumbents can introduce or combat these innovations. The book was a pleasure to read and will serve as a great reference for the future.

Tech Themes

  1. Integration and Outsourcing. Today, technology companies rely on a variety of software tools and open source components to build their products. When you stitch all of these components together, you get the full product architecture. A great example is seen here with Gitlab, an SMB DevOps provider. They have Postgres for a relational database, Redis for caching, NGINX for request routing, Sentry for monitoring and error tracking and so on. Each of these subsystems interacts with each other to form the powerful Gitlab project. These interaction points are called interfaces. The key product development question for companies is: “Which things do I build internally and which do I outsource?” A simple answer offered by many MBA students is “Outsource everything that is not part of your core competence.” As Clayton Christensen points out, “The problem with core-competence/not-your-core-competence categorization is that what might seem to be a non-core activity today might become an absolutely critical competence to have mastered in a proprietary way in the future, and vice versa.” A great example that we’ve discussed before is IBM’s decision to go with Microsoft DOS for its Operating System and Intel for its Microprocessor. At the time, IBM thought it was making a strategic decision to outsource things that were not within its core competence but they inadvertently gave almost all of the industry profits from personal computing to Intel and Microsoft. Other competitors copied their modular approach and the whole industry slugged it out on price. The question of whether to outsource really depends on what might be important in the future. But that is difficult to predict, so the question of integration vs. outsourcing really comes down to the state of the product and market itself: is this product “not good enough” yet? If the answer is yes, then a proprietary, integrated architecture is likely needed just to make the actual product work for customers. Over time, as competitors enter the market and the fully integrated platform becomes more commoditized, the individual subsystems become increasingly important competitive drivers. So the decision to outsource or build internally must be made on the status of product and the market its attacking.

  2. Commoditization within Stacks. The above point leads to the unbelievable idea of how companies fall into the commoditization trap. This happens from overshooting, where companies create products that are too good (which I find counter-intuitive, who thought that doing your job really well would cause customers to leave!). Christensen describes this through the lens of a salesperson “‘Why can’t they see that our product is better than the competition? They’re treating it like a commodity!’ This is evidence of overshooting…there is a performance surplus. Customers are happy to accept improved products, but unwilling to pay a premium price to get them.” At this time, the things demanded by customers flip - they are willing to pay premium prices for innovations along a new trajectory of performance, most likely speed, convenience, and customization. “The pressure of competing along this new trajectory of improvement forces a gradual evolution in product architectures, away from the interdependent, proprietary architectures that had the advantage in the not-good-enough era toward modular designs in the era of performance surplus. In a modular world, you can prosper by outsourcing or by supplying just one element.” This process of integration, to modularization and back, is super fascinating. As an example of modularization, let’s take the streaming company Confluent, the makers of the open-source software project Apache Kafka. Confluent offers a real-time communications service that allows companies to stream data (as events) rather than batching large data transfers. Their product is often a sub-system underpinning real-time applications, like providing data to traders at Citigroup. Clearly, the basis of competition in trading has pivoted over the years as more and more banking companies offer the service. Companies are prioritizing a new axis, speed, to differentiate amongst competing services, and when speed is the basis of competition, you use Confluent and Kafka to beat out the competition. Now let’s fast forward five years and assume all banks use Kafka and Confluent for their traders, the modular sub-system is thus commoditized. What happens? I’d posit that the axis would shift again, maybe towards convenience, or customization where traders want specific info displayed maybe on a mobile phone or tablet. The fundamental idea is that “Disruption and commoditization can be seen as two sides of the same coin. That’s because the process of commoditization initiates a reciprocal process of de-commoditization [somewhere else in the stack].”

  3. The Disruptive Becomes the Disruptor. Disruption is a relative term. As we’ve discussed previously, disruption is often mischaracterized as startups enter markets and challenge incumbents. Disruption is really a focused and contextual concept whereby products that are “not good enough” by market standards enter a market with a simpler, more convenient, or less expensive product. These products and markets are often dismissed by incumbents or even ceded by market leaders as those leaders continue to move up-market to chase even bigger customers. Its fascinating to watch the disruptive become the disrupted. A great example would be department stores - initially, Macy’s offered a massive selection that couldn’t be found in any single store and customers loved it. They did this by turning inventory three times per year with 40% gross margins for a 120% return on capital invested in inventory. In the 1960s, Walmart and Kmart attacked the full-service department stores by offering a similar selection at much cheaper prices. They did this by setting up a value system whereby they could make 23% gross margins but turn inventories 5 times per year, enabling them to earn the industry golden 120% return on capital invested in inventory. Full-service department stores decided not to compete against these lower gross margin products and shifted more space to beauty and cosmetics that offered even higher gross margins (55%) than the 40% they were used to. This meant they could increase their return on capital invested in inventory and their profits while avoiding a competitive threat. This process continued with discount stores eventually pushing Macy’s out of most categories until Macy’s had nowhere to go. All of a sudden the initially disruptive department stores had become disrupted. We see this in technology markets as well. I’m not 100% this qualifies but think about Salesforce and Oracle. Marc Benioff had spent a number of years at Oracle and left to start Salesforce, which pioneered selling subscription, cloud software, on a per-seat revenue model. This meant a much cheaper option compared to traditional Oracle/Siebel CRM software. Salesforce was initially adopted by smaller customers that didn’t need the feature-rich platform offered by Oracle. Oracle dismissed Salesforce as competition even as Oracle CEO Larry Ellison seeded Salesforce and sat on Salesforce’s board. Today, Salesforce is a $200B company and briefly passed Oracle in market cap a few months ago. But now, Salesforce has raised its prices and mostly targets large enterprise buyers to hit its ambitious growth initiatives. Down-market competitors like Hubspot have come into the market with cheaper solutions and more fully integrated marketing tools to help smaller businesses that aren’t ready for a fully-featured Salesforce platform. Disruption is always contextual and it never stops.

Business Themes

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  1. Low-end-Market vs. New-Market Disruption. There are two types of established methods for disruption: Low-end-market (Down-market) and New-market. Low-end-market disruption seeks to establish performance that is “not good enough” along traditional lines, and targets overserved customers in the low-end of the mainstream market. It typically utilizes a new operating or financial approach with structurally different margins than up-market competitors. Amazon.com is a quintessential low-end market disruptor compared to traditional bookstores, offering prices so low they angered book publishers while offering unmatched convenience to customers allowing them to purchase books online. In contrast, Robinhood is a great example of a new-market disruption. Traditional discount brokerages like Charles Schwab and Fidelity had been around for a while (themselves disruptors of full-service models like Morgan Stanley Wealth Management). But Robinhood targeted a group of people that weren’t consuming in the market, namely teens and millennials, and they did it in an easy-to-use app with a much better user interface compared to Schwab and Fidelity. Robinhood also pioneered new pricing with zero-fee trading and made revenue via a new financial approach, payment for order flow (PFOF). Robinhood makes money by being a data provider to market makers - basically, large hedge funds, like Citadel, pay Robinhood for data on their transactions to help optimize customers buying and selling prices. When approaching big markets its important to ask: Is this targeted at a non-consumer today or am I competing at a structurally lower margin with a new financial model and a “not quite good enough” product? This determines whether you are providing a low-end market disruption or a new-market disruption.

  2. Jobs To Be Done. The jobs to be done framework was one of the most important frameworks that Clayton Christensen ever introduced. Marketers typically use advertising platforms like Facebook and Google to target specific demographics with their ads. These segments are narrowly defined: “Males over 55, living in New York City, with household income above $100,000.” The issue with this categorization method is that while these are attributes that may be correlated with a product purchase, customers do not look up exactly how marketers expect them to behave and purchase the products expected by their attributes. There may be a correlation but simply targeting certain demographics does not yield a great result. The marketers need to understand why the customer is adopting the product. This is where the Jobs to Be Done framework comes in. As Christensen describes it, “Customers - people and companies - have ‘jobs’ that arise regularly and need to get done. When customers become aware of a job that they need to get done in their lives, they look around for a product or service that they can ‘hire’ to get the job done. Their thought processes originate with an awareness of needing to get something done, and then they set out to hire something or someone to do the job as effectively, conveniently, and inexpensively as possible.” Christensen zeroes in on the contextual adoption of products; it is the circumstance and not the demographics that matter most. Christensen describes ways for people to view competition and feature development through the Jobs to Be Done lens using Blackberry as an example (later disrupted by the iPhone). While the immature smartphone market was seeing feature competition from Microsoft, Motorola, and Nokia, Blackberry and its parent company RIM came out with a simple to use device that allowed for short productivity bursts when the time was available. This meant they leaned into features that competed not with other smartphone providers (like better cellular reception), but rather things that allowed for these easy “productive” sessions like email, wall street journal updates, and simple games. The Blackberry was later disrupted by the iPhone which offered more interesting applications in an easier to use package. Interestingly, the first iPhone shipped without an app store (but as a proprietary, interdependent product) and was viewed as not good enough for work purposes, allowing the Blackberry to co-exist. Management even dismissed the iPhone as a competitor initially. It wasn’t long until the iPhone caught up and eventually surpassed the Blackberry as the world’s leading mobile phone.

  3. Brand Strategies. Companies may choose to address customers in a number of different circumstances and address a number of Jobs to Be Done. It’s important that the Company establishes specific ways of communicating the circumstance to the customer. Branding is powerful, something that Warren Buffett, Terry Smith, and Clayton Christensen have all recognized as durable growth providers. As Christensen puts it: “Brands are, at the beginning, hollow words into which marketers stuff meaning. if a brand’s meaning is positioned on a job to be done, then when the job arises in a customer’s life, he or she will remember the brand and hire the product. Customers pay significant premiums for brands that do a job well.” So what can a large corporate company do when faced with a disruptive challenger to its branding turf? It’s simple - add a word to their leading brand, targeted at the circumstance in which a customer might find themself. Think about Marriott, one of the leading hotel chains. They offer a number of hotel brands: Courtyard by Marriott for business travel, Residence Inn by Marriott for a home away from home, the Ritz Carlton for high-end luxurious stays, Marriott Vacation Club for resort destination hotels. Each brand is targeted at a different Job to Be Done and customers intuitively understand what the brands stand for based on experience or advertising. A great technology example is Amazon Web Services (AWS), the cloud computing division of Amazon.com. Amazon invented the cloud, and rather than launch with the Amazon.com brand, which might have confused their normal e-commerce customers, they created a completely new brand targeted at a different set of buyers and problems, that maintained the quality and recognition that Amazon had become known for. Another great retail example is the SNKRs app released by Nike. Nike understands that some customers are sneakerheads, and want to know the latest about all Nike shoe drops, so Nike created a distinct, branded app called SNKRS, that gives news and updates on the latest, trendiest sneakers. These buyers might not be interested in logging into the Nike app and may become angry after sifting through all of the different types of apparel offered by Nike, just to find new shoes. The SNKRS app offers a new set of consumers and an easy way to find what they are looking for (convenience), which benefits Nike’s core business. Branding is powerful, and understanding the Job to Be Done helps focus the right brand for the right job.

Dig Deeper

  • Clayton Christensen’s Overview on Disruptive Innovation

  • Jobs to Be Done: 4 Real-World Examples

  • A Peek Inside Marriott’s Marketing Strategy & Why It Works So Well

  • The Rise and Fall of Blackberry

  • Payment for Order Flow Overview

  • How Commoditization Happens

tags: Clayton Christensen, AWS, Nike, Amazon, Marriott, Warren Buffett, Terry Smith, Blackberry, RIM, Microsoft, Motorola, iPhone, Facebook, Google, Robinhood, Citadel, Schwab, Fidelity, Morgan Stanley, Oracle, Salesforce, Walmart, Macy's, Kmart, Confluent, Kafka, Citigroup, Intel, Gitlab, Redis
categories: Non-Fiction
 

February 2020 - How the Internet Happened: From Netscape to the iPhone by Brian McCullough

Brian McCullough, host of the Internet History Podcast, does an excellent job of showing how the individuals adopted the internet and made it central to their lives. He follows not only the success stories but also the flame outs which provide an accurate history of a time of rapid technological change.

Tech Themes

  1. Form to Factor: Design in Mobile Devices. Apple has a long history with mobile computing, but a few hiccups in the early days are rarely addressed. These hiccups also telegraph something interesting about the technology industry as a whole - design and ease of use often trump features. In the early 90’s Apple created the Figaro, a tablet computer that weighed eight pounds and allowed for navigation through a stylus. The issue was it cost $8,000 to produce and was 3/4 of an inch thick, making it difficult to carry. In 1993, the Company launched the Newton MessagePad, which cost $699 and included a calendar, address book, to-do list and note pad. However, the form was incorrect again; the MessagePad was 7.24 in. x 4.5 in. and clunky. With this failure, Apple turned its attention away from mobile, allowing other players like RIM and Blackberry to gain leading market share. Blackberry pioneered the idea of a full keyboard on a small device and Marc Benioff, CEO of salesforce.com, even called it, “the heroin of mobile computing. I am serious. I had to stop.” IBM also tried its hand in mobile in 1992, creating the Simon Personal Communicator, which had the ability to send and receive calls, do email and fax, and sync with work files via an adapter. The issue was the design - 8 in. by 2.5 in. by 1.5 in. thick. It was a modern smartphone, but it was too big, clunky, and difficult to use. It wasn’t until the iPhone and then Android that someone really nailed the full smart phone experience. The lessons from this case study offer a unique insight into the future of VR. The company able to offer the correct form factor, at a reasonable price can gain market share quickly. Others who try to pioneer too much at a time (cough, magic leap), will struggle.

  2. How to know you’re onto something. Facebook didn’t know. On November 30, 2004, Facebook surpassed one million users after being live for only ten months. This incredible growth was truly remarkable, but Mark Zuckerberg still didn’t know facebook was a special company. Sean Parker, the founder of Napster, had been mentoring Zuckerberg the prior summer: “What was so bizarre about the way Facebook was unfolding at that point, is that Mark just didn’t totally believe in it and wanted to go and do all these other things.” Zuckerberg even showed up to a meeting at Sequoia Capital still dressed in his pajamas with a powerpoint entitled: “The Top Ten Reasons You Should Not Invest.” While this was partially a joke because Sequoia has spurned investing in Parker’s latest company, it represented how immature the whole facebook operation was, in the face of rapid growth. Facebook went on to release key features like groups, photos, and friending, but most importantly, they developed their revenue model: advertising. The quick user growth and increasing ad revenue growth got the attention of big corporations - Viacom offered $2B in cash and stock, and Yahoo offered $1B all cash. By this time, Zuckerberg realized what he had, and famously spurned several offers from Yahoo, even after users reacted negatively to the most important feature that facebook would ever release, the News Feed. In today’s world, we often see entrepreneur’s overhyping their companies, which is why Silicon Valley was in-love with dropout founders for a time, their naivite and creativity could be harnessed to create something huge in a short amount of time.

  3. Channel Partnerships: Why apple was reluctant to launch a phone. Channel partnerships often go un-discussed at startups, but they can be incredibly useful in growing distribution. Some industries, such as the Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) market thrives on channel partnership arrangements. Companies like Crowdstrike engage partners (mostly IT services firms) to sell on their behalf, lowering Crowdstrike’s customer acquisition and sales spend. This can lead to attractive unit economics, but on the flip side, partners must get paid and educated on the selling motion which takes time and money. Other channel relationships are just overly complex. In the mid 2000’s, mobile computing was a complicated industry, and companies hated dealing with old, legacy carriers and simple clunky handset providers. Apple tried the approach of working with a handset provider, Motorola, but they produced the terrible ROKR which barely worked. The ROKR was built to run on the struggling Cingular (would become AT&T) network, who was eager to do a deal with Apple in hopes of boosting usage on their network. After the failure of the ROKR, Cingular executives begged Jobs to build a phone for the network. Normally, the carriers had specifications for how phones were built for their networks, but Jobs ironed out a contract which exchanged network exclusivity for complete design control, thus Apple entered into mobile phones. The most important computing device of the 2000’s and 2010’s was built on a channel relationship.

Business Themes

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  1. AOL-Time Warner: the merger destined to fail. To fully understand the AOL-Time Warner merger, you must first understand what AOL was, what it was becoming, and why it was operating on borrowed time. AOL started as an ISP, charging customers $9.95 for five hours of dial-up internet access, with each additional hour costing $2.95. McCullough describes AOL: “AOL has often been described as training wheels for the Internet. For millions of Americans, their aol.com address was their first experience with email, and thus their first introduction to the myriad ways that networked computing could change their lives.” AOL grew through one of the first viral marketing campaigns ever; AOL put CDs into newspapers which allowed users to download AOL software and get online. The Company went public in March of 1992 and by 1996 the Company had 2.1 million subscribers, however subscribers were starting to flee to cheaper internet access. It turned out that building an ISP was relatively cheap, and the high margin cash flow business that AOL had built was suddenly threatened by a number of competitors. AOL persisted with its viral marketing strategy, and luckily many americans still had not tried the internet yet and defaulted to AOL as being the most popular. AOL continued to add subscribers and its stock price started to balloon; in 1998 alone the stock went up 593%. AOL was also inking ridiculous, heavily VC funded deals with new internet startups. Newly public Drkoop, which raised $85M in an IPO, signed a four year $89M deal to be AOL’s default provider of health content. Barnes and Noble paid $40M to be AOL’s bookselling partner. Tel-save, a long distance phone provider signed a deal worth $100M. As the internet bubble continued to grow, AOL’s CEO, Steve Case realized that many of these new startups would be unable to fufill their contractual obligations. Early web traffic reporting systems could easily be gamed, and companies frequently had no business model other than attract a certain demographic of traffic. By 1999, AOL had a market cap of $149.8B and was added to the S&P 500 index; it was bigger than both Disney and IBM. At this time, the world was shifting away from dial-up internet to modern broadband connections provided by cable companies. One AOL executive lamented: “We all knew we were living on borrowed time and had to buy something of substance by using that huge currency [AOL’s stock].” Time Warner was a massive media company, with movie studios, TV channels, magazines and online properties. On Jan 10, 2000, AOL merged with Time Warner in one of the biggest mergers in history. AOL owned 56% of the combined company. Four days later, the Dow peaked and began a downturn which would decimate hundreds of internet businesses built on foggy fundamentals. Acquisitions happen for a number of reasons, but imminent death is not normally considered by analysts or pundits. When you see acquisitions, read the press release and understand why (at least from a marketing perspective), the two companies made a deal. Was the price just astronomical (i.e. Instagram) or was their something very strategic (i.e. Microsoft-Github)? When you read the press release years later, it should indicate whether the combination actually was proved out by the market.

  2. Acquisitions in the internet bubble: why acquisitions are really just guessing. AOL-Time Warner shows the interesting conundrum in acquisitions. HP founder David Packard coined this idea somewhat in Packard’s law: “No company can consistently grow revenues faster than its ability to get enough of the right people to implement that growth and still become a great company. If a company consistently grows revenue faster than its ability to get enough of the right people to implement that growth, it will not simply stagnate; it will fall.” Author of Good to Great, Jim Collins, clarified this idea: “Great companies are more likely to die of ingestion of too much opportunity, than starvation from too little.” Acquisitions can be a significant cause of this outpacing of growth. Look no further than Yahoo, who acquired twelve companies between September 1997 and June 1999 including Mark Cuban’s Broadcast.com for $5.7B (Kara Swisher at WSJ in 1999), GeoCities for $3.6B, and Y Combinator founder Paul Graham’s Viaweb for $48M. They spent billions in stock and cash to acquire these companies! Its only fitting that two internet darlings would eventually end up in the hands of big-telecom Verizon, who would acquire AOL for $4.4B in 2015, and Yahoo for $4.5B in 2017, only to write down the combined value by $4.6B in 2018. In 2013, Yahoo would acquire Tumblr for $1.1B, only to sell it off this past year for $3M. Acquisitions can really be overwhelming for companies, and frequently they don’t work out as planned. In essence, acquisitions are guesses about future value to customers and rarely are they as clean and smart as technology executives make them seem. Some large organizations have gotten good at acquisitions - Google, Microsoft, Cisco, and Salesforce have all made meaningful acquisitions (Android, Github, AppDynamics, ExactTarget, respectively).

  3. Google and Excite: the acquisition that never happened. McCullough has an incredible quote nestled into the start of chapter six: “Pioneers of new technologies are rarely the ones who survive long enough to dominate their categories; often it is the copycat or follow-on names that are still with us to this day: Google, not AltaVista, in search; Facebook, not Friendster, in social networks.” Amazon obviously bucked this trend (he mentions that), but in search he is absolutely right! In 1996, several internet search companies went public including Excite, Lycos, Infoseek, and Yahoo. As the internet bubble grew bigger, Yahoo was the darling of the day, and by 1998, it had amassed a $100B market cap. There were tons of companies in the market including the players mentioned above and AltaVista, AskJeeves, MSN, and others. The world did not need another search engine. However, in 1998, Google founders Larry Page and Sergey Brin found a better way to do search (the PageRank algorithm) and published their famous paper: “The Anatomy of a Large-Scale Hypertextual Web Search Engine.” They then went out to these massive search engines and tried to license their technology, but no one was interested. Imagine passing on Goolge’s search engine technology. In an over-ingestion of too much opportunity, all of the search engines were trying to be like AOL and become a portal to the internet, providing various services from their homepages. From an interview in 1998, “More than a "portal" (the term analysts employ to describe Yahoo! and its rivals, which are most users' gateway to the rest of the Internet), Yahoo! is looking increasingly like an online service--like America Online (AOL) or even CompuServe before the Web.” Small companies trying to do too much (cough, uber self-driving cars, cough). Excite showed the most interest in Google’s technology and Page offered it to the Company for $1.6M in cash and stock but Excite countered at $750,000. Excite had honest interest in the technology and a deal was still on the table until it became clear that Larry wanted Excite to rip out its search technology and use Google’s instead. Unfortunately that was too big of a risk for the mature Excite company. The two companies parted ways and Google eventually became the dominant player in the industry. Google’s focus was clear from the get-go, build a great search engine. Only when it was big enough did it plunge into acquisitions and development of adjacent technologies.

Dig Deeper

  • Raymond Smith, former CEO of Bell Atlantic, describing the technology behind the internet in 1994

  • Bill Gates’ famous memo: THE INTERNET TIDAL WAVE (May 26, 1995)

  • The rise and fall of Netscape and Mosaic in one chart

  • List of all the companies made famous and infamous in the dot-com bubble

  • Pets.com S-1 (filing for IPO) showin a $62M net loss on $6M in revenue

  • Detail on Microsoft’s antitrust lawsuit

tags: Apple, IBM, Facebook, AT&T, Blackberry, Sequoia, VC, Sean Parker, Yahoo, Excite, Netscape, AOL, Time Warner, Google, Viaweb, Mark Cuban, HP, Packard's Law, Disney, Steve Case, Steve Jobs, Amazon, Drkoop, Android, Mark Zuckerberg, Crowdstrike, Motorola, Viacom, Napster, Salesforce, Marc Benioff, Internet, Internet History, batch2
categories: Non-Fiction
 

February 2019 - Cloud: Seven Clear Business Models by Timothy Chou

While this book is relatively old for internet standards, it illuminates the early transition to SaaS (Software as a Service) from traditional software license and maintenance models. Timothy Chou, current Head of IoT at the Alchemist Accelerator, former Head of On Demand Applications at Oracle, and a lecturer at Stanford, details seven different business models for selling software and the pros/cons of each.

Tech Themes

  1. The rise of SaaS. Software-as-a-Service (SaaS) is an application that can be accessed through a web browser and is managed and hosted by a third-party (likely a public cloud - Google, Microsoft, or AWS). Let’s flash back to the 90’s, a time when software was sold in shrink-wrapped boxes as perpetual licenses. What this meant was you owned whatever version of the software you purchased, in perpetuity. Most of the time you would pay a maintenance cost (normally 20% of the overall license value) to receive basic upkeep services to the software and get minor bugs fixed. However, when the new version 2.0 came out, you would have to pay another big license fee, re-install the software and go through the hassle of upgrading all existing systems. On the backs of increased internet adoption, SaaS allowed companies to deliver a standard product, over the internet, typically at lower price point to end users. This meant smaller companies like salesforce (at the time) could compete with giants like Siebel Systems (acquired by Oracle for $5.85Bn in 2005) because companies could now purchase the software in an on-demand, by-user fashion without going to the store, at a much lower price point.

  2. How cloud empowers SaaS. As an extension, standardization of product means you can aptly define the necessary computing resources - thereby also standardizing your costs. At the same time that SaaS was gaining momentum, the three mega public cloud players emerged, starting with Amazon (in 2006), then Google and eventually Microsoft. This allowed companies to host software in the cloud and not on their own servers (infrastructure that was hard to manage internally). So instead of racking (pun intended) up costs with an internal infrastructure team managing complex hardware - you could offload your workloads to the cloud. Infrastructure as a service (IaaS) was born. Because SaaS is delivered over the internet at lower prices, the cloud became an integral part of scaling SaaS businesses. As the number of users grew on your SaaS platform, you simply purchased more computing space on the cloud to handle those additional users. Instead of spending big amounts of money on complex infrastructural costs/decisions, a company could now focus entirely on its product and go-to-market strategy, enabling it to reach scale much more quickly.

  3. The titans of enterprise software. Software has absolutely changed in the last 20 years and will likely continue to evolve as more specialized products and services become available. That being said, the perennial software acquirers will continue to be perennial software acquirers. At the beginning of his book, Chou highlights fifteen companies that had gone public since 1999: Concur (IPO: 1999, acquired by SAP for $8.3B in 2014), Webex (IPO: 2002, acquired by Cisco in for $3.2B in 2007), Kintera (IPO: 2003, acquired by Blackbaud for $46M in 2008), Salesforce.com (IPO: 2004), RightNow Technologies (IPO: 2004, acquired by Oracle for $1.5B in 2011), Websidestory (IPO: 2004, acquired by Omniture in 2008 for $394M), Kenexa (IPO: 2005, acquired by IBM for $1.3B in 2012), Taleo (IPO: 2005, acquired for $1.9B by Oracle in 2012), DealerTrack (IPO 2005, acquired by Cox Automotive in 2015 for $4.0B), Vocus (IPO: 2005, acquired by GTCR in 2014 for $446M), Omniture (IPO: 2006, acquired by Adobe for $1.8B in 2009), Constant Contact (IPO: 2007, acquired by Endurance International for $1B in 2015), SuccessFactors (IPO: 2007, acquired by SAP for $3.4B in 2011), NetSuite (IPO 2007: acquired by Oracle for $9.3B in 2016) and Opentable (IPO: 2009, acquired by Priceline for $2.6B in 2015). Oracle, IBM, Cisco and SAP have been some of the most active serial acquirers in tech history and this trend is only continuing. Interestingly enough, Salesforce.com is now in a similar position. What it shows is that if you can come to dominate a horizontal application - CRM (salesforce), ERP (SAP/Oracle), or Infrastructure (Google/Amazon/Microsoft) you can build a massive moat that allows you to become the serial acquirer in that space. You then have first and highest dibs at every target in your industry because you can underwrite an acquisition to the highest strategic multiple. Look for these acquirers to continue to make big deals when it can further lock in their market dominant position especially when you see their core business slow.

    Business Themes

Here we see the “Cash Gap” in the subscription model - customer acquisition expenses are incurred upfront but are recouped over time.

Here we see the “Cash Gap” in the subscription model - customer acquisition expenses are incurred upfront but are recouped over time.

  1. The misaligned incentives of traditional license/maintenance model. Software was traditionally sold as perpetual licenses, where a user could access that version of the software forever. Because users were paying to use something forever, the typical price point was very high for any given enterprise software license. This meant that large software upgrades were made at the the most senior levels of management and were large investments from a dollars and time perspective. On top of that initial license came the 20% support costs paid annually to receive patch updates. At the software vendor, this structure created interesting incentives. First, product updates were usually focused on break-fix and not new, “game-changing” upgrades because supporting multiple, separate versions of the software (especially, pre-IaaS) was incredibly costly. This slowed the pace of innovation at those large software providers (turning them into serial acquirers). Second, the sales team became focused on selling customers on new releases directly after they signed the initial deal. This happened because once you made that initial purchase, you owned that version forever; what better way to get more money off of you than introduce a new feature and re-sell you the whole system again. Salespeople were also incredibly focused on closing deals in a certain quarter because any single deal could make or break not only their quarterly sales quota, but also the Company’s revenue targets. If one big deal slipped from Q4 to Q1 the following year, a Company may have to report lower growth numbers to the stock market driving the stock price down. Third, once you made the initial purchase, the software vendor would direct all problems and product inquiries to customer support who were typically overburdened by requests. Additionally, the maintenance/support costs were built into the initial contract so you may end up contractually obligated to pay for support for a product that you don’t like and cannot change. The Company viewed it as: “You’ve already purchased the software, so why should I waste time ensuring you have a great experience with it - unless you are looking to buy the next version, I’m going to spend my time selling to new leads.” These incentives limited product changes/upgrades, focused salespeople completely on new leads, and hurt customer experience, all at the benefit of the Company over the user.

  2. What are CAC and LTV? CAC or customer acquisition costs are key to understand for any type of software business. As HubSpot and distinguished SaaS investor, David Skok notes, its typically measured as, “the entire cost of sales and marketing over a given period, including salaries and other headcount related expenses, and divide it by the number of customers that you acquired in that period.” Once the software sales model shifted from license/maintenance to SaaS, instead of hard-to-predict, big new license sales, companies started to receive monthly recurring payments. Enterprise software contracts are typically year-long, which means that once a customer signs the Company will know exactly how much revenue it should plan to receive over the coming year. Furthermore, with recurring subscriptions, as long as the customer was happy, the Company could be reasonably assured that customer would renew. This idea led to the concept of Lifetime Value of a customer or LTV. LTV is the total amount of revenue a customer will pay the Company until it churns or cancels the subscription. The logic followed that if you could acquire a customer (CAC) for less than the lifetime value of the customer (LTV), over time you would make money on that individual customer. Typically, investors view a 3:1 LTV to CAC ratio as viable for a healthy SaaS company.

Dig Deeper

  • Bill Gates 1995 memo on the state of early internet competition: The Internet Tidal Wave

  • Andy Jassey on how Amazon Web Services got started

  • Why CAC can be a Startup Killer?

  • How CAC is different for different types of software

  • Basic SaaS Economics by David Skok

tags: Cloud Computing, SaaS, License, Maintenance, Business Models, software, Salesforce, SAP, Oracle, Cisco, IaaS, batch2
categories: Non-Fiction
 

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