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October 2022 - Amp it Up by Frank Slootman

This month we cover our third Frank Slootman book, Amp it Up! It covers Slootman’s overall philosophy with a specific focus on achieving significant growth at scale and how companies can push the boundary of their growth potential. Frank only wrote the book because Snowflake’s CMO encouraged him to do so.

Tech Themes

  1. Expanding the TAM. One core idea that Slootman has used across both ServiceNow and Snowflake is the idea of expanding the TAM. By expanding the TAM, you lengthen your growth runway because there are more people who are capable of using your software. Slootman employed this strategy perfectly at ServiceNow. When on the IPO roadshow for the company, analysts at Gartner kept telling potential investors that ServiceNow had a small TAM of only $1.5B. An old short report of ServiceNow by Kerrisdale Capital highlights this confusion: “ The overall ITSM market size is only $1.5 billion, less than one-third of NOW's $4.7 billion market capitalization. Leading technology research firm Gartner estimates that the IT Service Management market opportunity is $1.5 billion, and is growing at a modest 7% per year. Furthermore, Gartner's research predicts that only 50% of IT organizations will move to SaaS by 2015, implying that the total market opportunity for NOW's ITSM business is less than $1 billion. Given emerging competition from other SaaS ITSM service providers, we believe that the company will have a difficult time exceeding 30% market share. At $207m of LTM revenue, NOW appears to already control 10% to 15% of the market. So even if NOW's market share rises to 30%, which we don't see happening until 2014 at the earliest, NOW's ITSM business should be generating less than $600m in revenue with limited additional growth opportunities. The result of the limited market size and increasing competition will be flattening growth over the next few years.” Kerrisdale was clearly incorrect. Market size estimates are now closer to $12-15B. Slootman and the team realized that to complete the full remediation of issues, more people in the organization needed to access ServiceNow’s tools and core ticketing system. They deliberately went function by function (network engineers, sys admins, database admins) and added specific functionality to enhance the user experience of these groups. One of these product enhancements was ServiceNow’s configuration management database or CMDB, which keeps a log of every device and its exact specifications to allow for faster triage of issues. Slootman has taken this approach to Snowflake, which started out by focusing on just the data warehousing workload but has since expanded into seven unique workloads: data warehouse, data engineering, data science, collaboration, data sharing, unistore, and cybersecurity. These workloads now bring in more people to the Snowflake platform: database administrators, data engineers, analytics engineers, data analysts, data scientists, and cybersecurity analysts. Each new set of tools added, enhances the overall value of the platform and the stickiness of the solution within the organization. This is a great roadmap for how to keep growth elevated in horizontal markets.

  2. Strategy vs. Execution. “Culture eats strategy for breakfast.” Peter Drucker, a famous consultant, and author of the Concept of the Corporation, believed that culture was far more important than strategy. Slootman agrees and even takes it one step further: “Execution has to be your number one goal. Strategy can’t be mastered until you can execute. Great execution is rarer than great strategy.” Slootman actually disagrees with Drucker on the management by objectives framework, “Another source of misalignment is management by objectives, which I have eliminated at every company i’ve joined in the last twenty years. MBOs cause employees to act as if they are running their own show, because they get compensated on their personal metrics, it is next to impossible to pull them off projects. They will be negotiating with you for relief. That is not alignment, that is every man for himself. If you need MBOs to get people to do their jobs, you may have the wrong people, the wrong managers, or both.” In Slootman’s eyes, management by objectives, which sets objectives for an entire organization that are translated into individual goals, ends up being abused by managers. Managers may rely on the objectives solely, and discount the leadership and creative thought necessary to succeed beyond an objective. “A person can do an excellent job according to objective measurement standards, but can fail miserably as a partner, subordinate, superior, or colleague. It is common for people not to be promoted for personal reasons than because of technical inadequacies.” For Slootman, superior execution comes from good judgment, and good judgment comes from bad judgment. Bad judgment is only made clear through experience, which can be the best teacher in his eyes. “New managers have to learn from and through their management chain. Organizations cannot scale and mature around inexperienced management staff.” At Data Domain, Slootman’s team finally started seeing success when they found the right leader for their contract manufacturing organization; at ServiceNow, when they found the right leader for cloud infrastructure; at Snowflake, when they found the right leader for scaling. “The organization needs innovation and discipline, or else the place will simply implode on itself. The common mistake is to rely on our innovators for discipline.” 5 dysfunctions of a team. Why execution is harder than strategy. But need to Prepare your next strategy early so you are ready when you get there.

  3. Recruiting Talent. Slootman urges leaders to recruit drivers, not passengers. “Passengers are people who don't mind simply being carried along by the company's momentum, offering little or no input, seemingly not caring much about the direction chosen by management. They are often pleasant, get along with everyone, attend meetings promptly, and generally do not stand out as troublemakers. They are often accepted into the fabric of the organization and stay there for many years. The problem is that while passengers can often diagnose and articulate a problem quite well, they have no investment in solving it. They don't do the heavy lifting. Drivers, on the other hand, get their satisfaction from making things happen, not blending in with the furniture. They feel a strong sense of ownership for their projects and teams and demand high standards from both themselves and others. They exude energy, urgency, ambition, even boldness. Faced with a challenge, they usually say, ‘Why not’ rather than ‘That’s impossible.’ These qualities make drivers massively valuable. Finding, recruiting, rewarding, and retaining them should be among your top priorities.” What I find most interesting about this philosophy is that most jobs train people to be passengers. Most CEOs prefer the calm and non-trouble making attitude of passengers over the outspokenness and aggression that sometimes comes with drivers. So what do you do when you find passengers? Its simple - get them off the bus. Although it can be intense, you need to execute by removing people first, getting the right people in, and then getting the right people in the right spots. We talked about this analogy in the Jim Collins book Good to Great. “At a struggling company, you need to change things fast by switching out people whose skills no longer fit the mission or never really did in the first place. The other advantage of moving fast is that everyone who stays on the bus will know that you are dead serious about high standards. The good ones will be energized by those standards.” The challenge with moving quickly is finding the right balance for what the organization can absorb at any given time. Moving too quickly when the organization is not ready, or moving too quickly when the plan hasn’t been set can lead to drastic consequences.

Business Themes

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  1. Turnarounds as a Training Ground. Famous football coach Bill Walsh joined the San Francisco 49ers after they were the last placed team in the NFL with a 2-14 record. The next season, Walsh’s first, the 49ers repeated the performance - 2-14 again. Walsh at one point broke down on a flight home from a crushing defeat against Miami. 16 months later, he was Super Bowl champion. Turnarounds provide an unbelievably difficult training ground for young executives. It is sink or swim, it is kill or be killed. As discussed in our last book, Bill McDermott took over the struggling SAP North America division before righting the ship and accelerating SAP to growth. Frank Slootman began his managerial career in similar situations. After stints at Burroughs Corporation in corporate planning and Comshare in product management, Frank joined Compuware as head of non-mainframe Product Management. While there, Compuware acquired the dutch company, uniface, as we touched on in the Tape Sucks book. “I jumped at the opportunity return to Amsterdam to take on the entire operation, which seemed in disarray. Colleagues warned me not to go because the place could not be saved, and they worried I’d go down with the ship. Compuware had bought uniface toward the end of its viable product software. But by now, my career had been about taking on what seemed like long odds, jobs nobody else would touch with a 10 foot pole. It was the only avenue open to me anyway and it didn’t matter how hairy these deals were. As a young person, you easily overestimate your capabilities, this is when I started learning what happens when you step into the wrong elevators. We did manage to stabilize uniface. That became a formative career experience in my mid-30s. I’d never had multiple numerous large, mission-critical customers before and hundreds of employees in my charge. I also started to develop an eye for talent which became a cornerstone of my management focus going forward.” Next, Slootman jumped to Ecosystems, a Compuware subsidiary based in silicon valley. He stabilized the struggling company, but they kept losing talent because mid-western Compuware wasn’t able to retain silicon valley employees. He then joined Borland as SVP of product operations, which had also fallen on hard times. They resurrected the brand and the business. Even by 40 years old, he was taking on problem children, and he kept getting offered CEO jobs at companies that were elevators to nowhere. Slootman interviewed over and over for CEO roles but was passed on because “you’ve never run sales.” He later commented on being passed over: “I led from the front and sold shoulder to shoulder with sales. These rejections left me with an unfavorable opinion of many venture capitalists who couldn’t recognize talent if it smacked them in the face.” Turnarounds, especially those inside big companies offer management challenges that most people don’t get to experience until its too late. For Slootman and McDermott, these were the right opportunities for their personalities and approaches at the right time of their career.

  2. Frank doesn’t believe in a Customer Success department. At Snowflake, there is no customer success department. In Slootman’s eyes: “They were happy to follow the trend set up by other companies like ours. But not me. I pulled the plug on these customer success departments in both companies, reassigning the staff back to the departments where their expertise fit best. Here’s why I was so opposed - if you have a customer success department that gives everyone else an incentive to stop worrying about how well our customers are thriving with our products and services. That sets up a disconnect that can create major problems down the road. People can become more focused on hitting the narrow goals of their silo rather than the broader and more important goal of customer satisfaction, which ultimately drives customer retention, word of mouth, profitability, and the long-term survival of the whole company. For instance, at ServiceNow, some of the customer success people grew quite dominant in the interaction with the customer and coordinated all the resources of the company for the customer’s benefit, including technical support, professional services, and even engineering. This had the effect that other departments sat back, became more passive, and felt less ownership of customer success. Customer success is the business of the entire company, not merely one department.” While this approach may work for Snowflake, it is not the norm in the SaaS world. In fact, there are entire companies like Gainsight, Totango, and ChurnZero, that help companies accelerate their Customer Success motion. Openview Venture Partners views customer success as critical for an effective product-led growth sales motion. Sales and Customer Success are important ways of generating product feedback from customers, but organizations need to make sure not to overwhelm product and engineering priorities. Often product teams don’t invest enough time in understanding the sales organization and the sales team views the product team as simply delivering on features to close deals. Leadership is necessary to help set priorities and collaboration across these departments.

  3. 5 steps to Amp it Up. Slootman outlines a five-step process for business leaders to accelerate growth and transform their organizations. The first step is to raise your standards and set ambitious goals for your company. This is followed by aligning your people and culture to support your vision, which requires careful attention to hiring, training, and communication. The third step is to sharpen your focus and prioritize the most critical areas of your business for growth. Once you have a clear focus, the fourth step is to pick up the pace and execute with speed and urgency. Finally, the fifth step is to transform your strategy by continually adapting to changes in the market and taking bold actions to stay ahead of the competition. By following these five steps, Slootman believes that business leaders can create a culture of high performance and achieve extraordinary results. Underpinning everything, is a culture of trust. Ultimately high performance cultures can be challenging and Slootman had times where former founders like Fred Luddy disagreed with his decisions. But as Slootman puts it: “In the long run, success trumps popularity. In my early days at several companies, founders openly regretted my hiring and openly complained to the board behind my back. But when companies succeed massively, as all of our companies have, founders will eventually get over it. Yes, its nice if they love you, but you can’t let yourself get rattled if they don’t. Your mission is to win, not to achieve popularity.”

Dig Deeper

  • Original Amp It Up Blog Post from 2018

  • Snowflake CEO Frank Slootman: taking ownership, increasing velocity & cultivating talent

  • The CEO Behind Software's Biggest IPO Ever | Forbes

  • Frank Slootman Is a Malcontent—That’s How He Likes It

  • The ServiceNow Story by Fred Luddy and Doug Leone

  • Knowledge12 Report: The world according to Frank Slootman

tags: Frank Slootman, Snowflake, ServiceNow, Data Domain, Sequoia, Borland, Burroughs, Compushare, ITSM, Peter Drucker, MBO, Jim Collins, Bill Walsh, Bill McDermott, SAP, Openview, Gainsight
categories: Non-Fiction
 

September 2022 - Winners Dream by Bill McDermott with Joanne Gordon

This month we hear about Bill McDermott’s meteoric rise to the CEO job at SAP and his philosophy around management. I must also acknowledge the incredible and underappreciated role that Julie McDermott and Bill’s family plays in this book. Bill moved his family from NYC to Puerto Rico to Chicago to Rochester to Connecticut to California to Philadelphia over the course of his 25-year career. Sometimes with multiple moves rather quickly. The selflessness they displayed is unfathomable.

Tech Themes

  1. Growing License Revenue at SAP. When Bill McDermott got to SAP North America, he quickly realized they were behind the game. The firm had enjoyed relatively unmatched success in its early years but was now coming into competition with one of Bill’s former employers - Siebel Systems. He saw what he viewed as lackluster standards - people were late to meetings, lacked professionalism, and moved painfully slowly on new action plans. McDermott created a new strategy around a $3B revenue target, and recruited the company’s top managers to share the plan in mini-meetings across every division. After providing the new strategy, he focused on value engineering, a way of demonstrating the ROI from implementing a company’s software. He instituted a weekly Top 20 Call, where the head of sales detailed the top 20 deals in progress, and Bill unleashed his sales intensity in helping people close deals. “What’s the business case? Have we presented it to the CEO? When is the next meeting? What, you just found out the company can’t sign because its purchasing director is on vacation? What’s your plan to backfill the loss? If someone didn’t know his next move, he wasn’t doing his job.” One of McDermott’s super-powers is maintaining a big vision while being able to slip into the micro-managing intensity of Andy Grove’s Only the Paranoid Survive and Ben Horowitz’s War-time CEO. 85% of C-Suite employees left, McDermott recruited 100 new sales employees, and in 2005, SAP America delivered $3.2B of revenue.

  2. Reinvention. McDermott is unafraid to go in new directions and take on new challenges. He had earned his stripes by taking over challenged business units in Xerox, first Puerto Rico, then Chicago, and then Xerox Business Services, their outsourcing division. Xerox at the time was suffering from a classic Innovator’s Dilemma - the XBS division was growing quickly but resulted in lower profit margins, so was not getting the love and admiration it deserved. “Instead of worrying about the value of my retirement account, I was interested in growing the business. Rather than ignoring the changing market, we should have been pouncing on it…Many people thought I was crazy to join the junior varsity team. XBS represented only 5 percent of Xerox’s overall revenues. Others even tried to block my transfer to XBS.” McDermott believed in the power of pageantry and held a massive, blow-out sales conference in San Antonio, complete with fake politicians and news style interview booths. McDermott had set a $4B revenue target for XBS and he missed the target. XBS revenue’s grew from 900m of revenue to $2B in 1997, $2.7B in 1998, $3.4B in 1999, and $3.8B in 2000, just missing the $4B revenue target by 2000. “Was I upset that we fell shy of our $4B bull’s-eye? Not one bit. The point of setting audacious goals was that we could almost hit them and still accomplish something amazing. Had we never strived so high, we never would have hit as high as we did.”

  3. Internet Bubble Comes Calling. Bill is human, like all of us, and so when the internet bubble started to take off, and he found himself on the sidelines managing an outsourcing business at struggling Xerox, he started to get the itch to get into the fray. A young startup called Techies.com had reached out asking if Bill would be their CEO. Bill considered it an interesting proposition - everything was going up and to the right and Techies could IPO as soon as next year. Techies.com was an online website for tech companies to post about job openings. After meeting everyone and interviewing for the job of CEO, Bill decides he can’t do it. “ The only thing about your company that really interests me is the money, and that’s the wrong reason to work for anyone.” Bill did get whisked away though, by another IT firm - Gartner. Bill had left Xerox for a whole 2 weeks in 1995 and joined Gartner at the urging of former Xerox executive, Follett Carter. McDermott joined Gartner in 2000, serving as President while Michael Fleisher served as CEO. He felt it was off from the first couple weeks on the job. “I saw it in the jeans and tieless shirts that even senior executives wore Mondays through Fridays. I felt it in Gartner’s small-company, New Economy culture, which shocked my corporate sensibilities.” Matters were maid worse when Julie McDermott was diagnosed with Breast Cancer. Things were tough for the year Bill was at Gartner, and he decided to move on to Siebel Systems where he worked with tech legend, Tom Siebel, founder of Siebel Systems and C3.AI. Bill would only last a year at Siebel too, burnt out after working tirelessly in the months following 9/11. In hindsight, each of these smaller steps into executive roles broadened Bill’s knowledge of the technology evolution and CRM space specifically. These would be the foundation for his job offer from SAP America in 2004.

Business Themes

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  1. Setting Ambitious Goals. Bill is no stranger to big roles and he absolutely relishes the spotlight. He has a smooth, calming, excited voice that shines through every word in the book. He is a big vision guy, but unafraid to get tactical in areas he knows well like sales. Having worked his way up from a rookie salesman at 22 to a district manager at Xerox, McDermott always took a similar approach to fixing broken organizations. When he got to his district manager role in Puerto Rico, the worst performing district in Xerox, he made it clear that things were going to change. He wanted to take Puerto Rico from the worst performing division to the best performing division in one year. He set out by asking the sales managers a simple question: “What do you need?” He slowly identified the issues holding the division back (a lack of investment, consistent expense cuts, and poor goal setting) and he fixed them. Puerto Rico became the number one sales group in Xerox. This extreme goal setting shows up multiple times in McDermott’s career. When he became head of Xerox’s outsourcing XBS division he set a $4B revenue goal. “Three billion dollars in revenue by 2000 was a more realistic goal yet still a dream target. So why not tell everyone $3B, Bill? Because my hurdle - getting my people ecstatic about selling outsourcing - was so high that I need to get everyone’s mind to a place where the dream soeemed so impossible that it was exciting to pursue. For more than a decade now, I’d watched teams rise to the expectations set for them. The more daring the target, the higher people rose.” When he got to SAP America, he proclaimed they’d be a $3B revenue business by 2005, after years of lackluster growth, “In the next three years, we are going to increase our revenue by one billion dollars. Since 1999, SAP America’s revenue had barely grown $100m, in total.” After a major operational overhaul, they achieved his goal. When he got to ServiceNow, he similarly announced a goal of $10B of annual revenue. Time will tell if he hits the goal.

  2. Big software M&A - Does it work? Bill McDermott was on the way to Hawaii when he got the call from SAP’s board about becoming Co-CEO of SAP. After the shock wore off, he quickly accepted the job, excited to lead the whole organization after he had successfully turned around SAP North America. Bill initially shared the CEO role with Jim Hagamann Snabe, a German engineer that would lead the product and engineering side of the business while Bill focused on commercial efforts. In 2014, Bill was named sole CEO, a new development for the traditional SAP that normally opted for a co-CEO model. Reflecting on it years later, Mcdermott commented in a Duke university visit in 2016, “Well, you know, when we were co-CEOs in 2010, it's what the company needed then. As you know, we were coming off the financial crisis of 2008. 2009 was a relatively slow recovery for the world, and SAP made a CEO change. And it was really important to have one office of the CEO with two friends, that really wanted to make a difference. And a lot of things needed to be done to build the company, build a strategy, do some major M&A moves, and get the company set up for growth again. And once that was done, then it became necessary to build on the vision but make much quicker decisions, move at a pace that was even beyond the pace we were moving at, which was pretty fast. And at that point, SAP needed that person that could make the call and be very, very decisive. And fortunately, things seem to be going pretty well.” McDermott launched an aggressive M&A campaign, spending $35B in acquisitions from 2010-2020. The acquisitions added about $3.4B of revenue to the company. These acquisitions were in all sorts of different areas but focused on SAP’s core areas including ERP, HCM, and Database technologies. I believe these acquisitions did two things simultaneously for SAP. Sirst it helped push a historically mainframe driven technology company into the cloud. Second, it broadened the capabilities of their core ERP offering while extending SAP into global markets, particularly strengthening its US position against ERP competitor Oracle, which had its own ERP and HCM applications. While these acquisitions worked for a time, the company is still fighting its license/maintenance past, and trying to move more aggressively to the cloud. The positive way to view these deals is Bill grew the organization, its capabilities, and its reach while using modest amounts of leverage and growing the company’s revenue and EPS. The negative way to view it is Bill went on a shopping spree of random technologies that were never fully integrated, and today saddle the company with enormous tech debt, little flexibility, and sub-par growth.

  3. The Journey: Ithaca to CEO. Bill is a strong proponent of enjoying one’s career journey over its destination. As a night MBA student at Kellogg, he learned of the C.P Cavafy poem, Ithaca, which reads: “Keep Ithaka always in your mind. Arriving there is what you’re destined for. But don’t hurry the journey at all. Better if it lasts for years, so you’re old by the time you reach the island, wealthy with all you’ve gained on the way, not expecting Ithaka to make you rich. Ithaka gave you the marvelous journey. Without her you wouldn't have set out. She has nothing left to give you now. And if you find her poor, Ithaka won’t have fooled you. Wise as you will have become, so full of experience, you’ll have understood by then what these Ithakas mean.” As he contemplated moving on from Xerox, and pushing away his dream of becoming CEO, he came back to this poem, using it as a base before writing out his core beliefs and goals. “ My personal goals included having quality time with my family; to love Julie with the enthusiasm and compassion of our wedding day; to help my son (and eventually his sibling) grow into a healthy, happy, well-adjusted adult; to love my parents and my brother and sister, always remembering my roots, and to live with passion every day. Next, I listed my career aspirations: 1. To be a winner. 2. To lead others to the doorstep of their dreams. 3. To manage a career and not the other way around. 4. To never confuse that which is most important with that which is not. 5. To earn a living commensurate with my talent, but not be ruled by the shallow shadows of money. 6. To be the ruler of my own destiny, not to slave for what someone else wants my destiny to be - in control.” Ten years later, when he was considering moving on from Siebel Systems, Bill re-wrote his goals again and realized that he wanted to be in control of his own destiny. “ I wanted my freedom back. I was ready to be a CEO.”

Dig Deeper

  • SAP’s CEO on Being the American Head of a German Multinational

  • Distinguished Speakers Series - Bill McDermott, CEO, SAP

  • The Inside View with Bill McDermott

  • Grit Podcast - Chairman & CEO ServiceNow, Bill McDermott

  • Think bold - Tough times call for tough people, says Kellogg School alum and CEO

tags: Bill McDermott, SAP, ServiceNow, Xerox, Gartner, Sybase, Siebel Systems, Andy Grove, Techies.com, Tom Siebel
categories: Non-Fiction
 

January 2022 - Seven Powers by Hamilton Helmer

This month we dove into a classic technology strategy book. The book covers seven major Powers a company can have that offer both a benefit and a barrier to competition. Helmer covers the majority of the book through the lens of different case studies including his favorite company, Netflix.

Tech Themes

  1. Power. After years as a consultant at BCG and decades investing in the public market, Helmer distilled all successful business strategies to seven individual Powers. A Power offers a company a re-inforcing benefit while also providing a barrier to potential competition. This is the epitome of an enduring business model in Helmer's mind. Power describes a company's strength relative to a specific competitor, and Powers focus on a single business unit rather than throughout a business. This makes sense: Apple may have a scale economies Power from its iPhone install base relative to Samsung, but it may not have Power in its AppleTV originals segment relative to Netflix. The seven types of Powers are: Scale Economies, Network Economies, Counter-Positioning, Switching Costs, Branding, Cornered Resources, and Process Power.

  2. Invention. While Powers are somewhat easy to spot (scale economies of Google's search algorithm), creating them is anything but easy. So what underlies every one of the seven Powers? Invention. Helmer pulls invention through the lens of industry Dynamics - external competitive conditions and the forward march of technology create opportunities to pursue new business models, processes, brands, and products. Companies must leverage their resources to craft Powers through trial and error, rather than an upfront conscious decision to pursue something by design. I view this almost as an extension of Clayton Christensen's Resource-Processes-Values (RPV) framework we discussed in July 2020. Companies can find a route to Power through these resources and the crafting process. For Netflix, the route was streaming, but the actual Power came from a strong push into exclusive and original content. The streaming business opened up Netflix's subscriber base, and the content decision provided the ability to amortize great content across its growing subscriber base.

  3. Power Progressions. Powers become available at different points in business progression. This makes sense - what drives a company forward in an unpenetrated market is different from what keeps it going during steady-state - Snowflake's competitive dynamics are different than Nestle's. Helmer defines three stages to a company: Origination, Takeoff, and Stability. These stages mirror the dynamics of S-Curves, which we discussed in our July 2021 book. During the Origination stage, companies can benefit from Cornered Resources and Counter-Positioning. Helmer uses the Pixar management team as an example of Cornered Resources during the Origination phase of 3D animated movies. The company had Steve Jobs (product visionary), John Lasseter (story-teller creative), and Ed Catmull (operations and technology leader). During the early days of the industry, these were the only people that knew how to operate a digital film studio. Another Cornered Resource example might be a company finding a new oil well. Before the company starts drilling, it is the only one that can own that asset. An example of Origination Counter-Positioning might be TSMC when they first launched. At that time, it was standard industry perception that semiconductor companies had to be integrated design manufacturers (IDM) - they had to do everything in-house. TSMC was launched as solely a fabrication facility that companies could use to gain extra manufacturing capacity or try out new designs. This gave them great Counter-Positioning relative to the IDM's and they were dismissed as a non-threat. The Takeoff period offers Network Economies, Scale Economies, and Switching Cost Powers. This phase is the growth phase of businesses. Snowflake currently benefits from Switching Cost dynamics - once you use Snowflake, it's unlikely you'll want to use other data warehouse providers because that process involves data replication and additional costs. Scale economies can be seen in businesses that amortize high costs over their user base, like Amazon. Amazon invests in distribution centers at a significant scale, which improves customer experience, which helps them get more customers - the flywheel repeats, allowing Amazon to continually invest in more distribution centers, further building its scale. Network economies show in social media businesses like Bytedance/TikTok. Users make content that attracts more users; incremental users join the platform because there is so much content to "gain" by joining the platform. Like scale economies, it's almost impossible to go build a competitor because a new company would have to recruit all users from the other platform, which would cost tons of money. The Stability phase offers Branding and Process Power. Branding is hard to generate, but the advantage grows with time. Consider luxury goods providers like LVMH; the older, the more exclusive the brand, the more it's desired, and every day it gets older and becomes more desired. A business can create Process Power by refining and improving operations to such a high degree that it becomes difficult to replicate. Classic examples of Process Power are TSMC's innovative 3-5nm processes today and Toyota's Production System. Toyota has even allowed competitors to tour its factory, but no competitor has replicated its operational efficiency.

Business Themes

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  1. Sneak Attack. I've always been surprised by businesses that seemingly "come out of nowhere." In Helmer's eyes, this stems from Counter-Positioning. He tells the story of Vanguard, which was started by Jack Bogle in 1976. "You could charitably describe the reception as enthusiastic: only $11M trickled in from investors. Soon after the launch, [Noble Laureate Paul] Samuelson himself lauded the effort in his column for Newsweek, but with little result: the fund had only reached $17M by mid-1977. Vanguard's operating model depended on others for distribution, and brokers, in particular, were put off by a product that predicated on the notion that they provided no value in helping their clients choose which active funds to select." But Vanguard had something that active managers didn't: low fees and consistency. Vanguard's funds performed like the indices and cost much less than active funds. No longer were individuals underperforming the market and paying advisors to pick actively managed funds. Furthermore, Vanguard continually invested all profits back into its funds, so it looked like it wasn't making money while it grew its assets under management. It's so hard to spot these sneak attacks while they are happening. But one that might be happening right now is Cloudflare relative to AWS. Cloudflare launched its low-cost R2 service (a play on Amazon's famous S3 storage technology). Cloudflare is offering a cheaper product at a much lower cost and is leveraging its large installed base with its CDN product to get people in the door. It's unclear whether this will offer Power over AWS because it's confusing what the barrier might be other than some relating to switching costs. However, there will likely be reluctance on AWS's part to cut prices because of its scale and public company growth targets.

  2. A New Valuation Formula. Helmer offers a very unique take on the traditional DCF valuation approach. Investors have long suggested the value of any business was equal to the present value of its future discounted cash flows. In contrast to the traditional approach of summing up a firm's cash flows and discounting it, Helmer takes a look at all of the cash flows subject to the industry in which firms compete. In this formula (shown above), M0 represents the current market size, g the discounted market growth factor, s the long-term market share of the company, and m the long-term differential margin (net profit margin over that needed to cover the cost of capital). More simply, a company is worth it's Market Scale (Mo x g) x its Power (s x m). This implies that a company is worth the portion of the industry's profits it collects over time. This formula helps consider Power progression relative to industry dynamics and company stage. In the Origination stage, an industry's profits may be small but growing very quickly. If we think that a competitor in the industry can achieve an actual Power, it will likely gain a large portion of the long-term market. Thus, watching market share dynamics unfold can tell us about the potential for a route to Power and the ability for a company to achieve a superior value to its near-term cash flows.

  3. Collateral Damage. If companies are aware of these Powers and how other companies can achieve them, how can companies not take proactive action to avoid being on the losing end of a Power struggle? Helmer lays out what he calls Collateral Damage, or the unwillingness of a competitor to find the right path to navigating the damage caused by a competitor's Power. His point is actually very nuanced - it's not the incumbent's unwillingness to invest in the same type of solution as the competitor (although that happens). The incumbent's business gets trashed as collateral damage by the new entrant. The incumbent can respond to the challenger by investing in the new innovation. But where counter-positioning really takes hold is if the incumbent recognizes the attractiveness of the business model/innovation but is stymied from investing. Why would a business leader choose not to invest in something attractive? In the case of Vanguard competitor Fidelity, any move into passive funds could cause steep cannibalization of their revenue. So in response, a CEO might decide to just keep their existing business and "milk" all of its cash flow. In addition, how could Fidelity invest in a business that completely undermined their actively managed mutual fund business? Often CEOs will have a negative bias toward the competing business model despite the positive NPV of an investment in the new business. Just think how long it took SAP to start selling Cloud subscriptions compared to its on-premise license/maintenance model. Lastly, a CEO might not invest in the promising new business model if they are worried about job security. This is the classic example of the principal-agent problem we discussed in June. Would you invest in a new, unproven business model if you faced a declining stock price and calls for your resignation? In addition, annual CEO compensation is frequently tagged to stock price performance and growth targets. The easiest way to achieve near-term stock price appreciation and growth targets is staying with what has worked in the past (and M&A!). Its the path of least resistance! Counter-positioning and collateral damage are nuanced and difficult to spot, but the complex emotions and issues become obvious over time.

Dig Deeper

  • The 7 Powers with Hamilton Helmer & Jeff Lawson (CEO of Twilio)

  • Hamilton Helmer Discusses 7Powers with Acquired Podcast

  • Vanguard Founder Jack Bogle's '90s Interview Shows His Investing Philosophy

  • Bernard Arnault, Chairman and CEO of LVMH | The Brave Ones

  • S-curves in Innovation

tags: Hamilton Helmer, 7 Powers, Reed Hastings, Netflix, SAP, Snowflake, Amazon, TSMC, Tiktok, Bytedance, BCG, iPhone, Apple, LVMH, Google, Clayton Christensen, S-Curve, Steve Jobs, John Lasseter, Ed Catmull, Toyota, Vanguard, Fidelity, Cloudflare
categories: Non-Fiction
 

May 2021 - Crossing the Chasm by Geoffrey Moore

This month we take a look at a classic high-tech growth marketing book. Originally published in 1991, Crossing the Chasm became a beloved book within the tech industry although its glory seems to have faded over the years. While the book is often overly prescriptive in its suggestions, it provides several useful frameworks to address growth challenges primarily early on in a company’s history.

Tech Themes

  1. Technology Adoption Life Cycle. The core framework of the book discusses the evolution of new technology adoption. It was an interesting micro-view of the broader phenomena described in Carlota Perez’s Technological Revolutions. In Moore’s Chasm-crossing world, there are five personas that dominate adoption: innovators, early adopters, early majority, late majority, and laggards. Innovators are technologists, happy to accept more challenging user experiences to push the boundaries of their capabilities and knowledge. Early adopters are intuitive buyers that enjoy trying new technologies but want a slightly better experience. The early majority are “wait and see” folks that want others to battle test the technology before trying it out, but don’t typically wait too long before buying. The late majority want significant reference material and usage before buying a product. Laggards simply don’t want anything to do with new technology. It is interesting to think of this adoption pattern in concert with big technology migrations of the past twenty years including: mainframes to on-premise servers to cloud computing, home phones to cell phones to iphone/android, radio to CDs to downloadable music to Spotify, and cash to check to credit/debit to mobile payments. Each of these massive migration patterns feels very aligned with this adoption model. Everyone knows someone ready to apply the latest tech, and someone who doesn’t want anything to do with it (Warren Buffett!).

  2. Crossing the Chasm. If we accept the above as a general way products are adopted by society (obviously its much more of a mish/mash in reality), we can posit that the most important step is from the early adopters to the early majority - the spot where the bell curve (shown below) really opens up. This is what Geoffrey Moore calls Crossing the Chasm. This idea is highly reminiscent of Clay Christensen’s “not good enough” disruption pattern and Gartner’s technology hype cycle. The examples Moore uses (in 1991) are also striking: Neural networking software and desktop video conferencing. Moore lamented: “With each of these exciting, functional technologies it has been possible to establish a working system and to get innovators to adopt it. But it has not as yet been possible to carry that success over to the early adopters.” Both of these technologies have clearly crossed into the mainstream with Google’s TensorFlow machine learning library and video conferencing tools like Zoom that make it super easy to speak with anyone over video instantly. So what was the great unlock for these technologies, that made these commercially viable and successfully adopted products? Well since 1990 there have been major changes in several important underlying technologies - computer storage and data processing capabilities are almost limitless with cloud computing, network bandwidth has grown exponentially and costs have dropped, and software has greatly improved the ability to make great user experiences for customers. This is a version of not-good-enough technologies that have benefited substantially from changes in underlying inputs. The systems you could deploy in 1990 just could not have been comparable to what you can deploy today. The real question is - are there different types of adoption curves for differently technologies and do they really follow a normal distribution as Moore shows here?

  3. Making Markets & Product Alternatives. Moore positions the book as if you were a marketing executive at a high-tech company and offers several exercises to help you identify a target market, customer, and use case. Chapter six, “Define the Battle” covers the best way to position a product within a target market. For early markets, competition comes from non-consumption, and the company has to offer a “Whole Product” that enables the user to actually derive benefit from the product. Thus, Moore recommends targeting innovators and early adopters who are technologist visionaries able to see the benefit of the product. This also mirrors Clayton Christensen’s commoditization de-commoditization framework, where new market products must offer all of the core components to a system combined into one solution; over time the axis of commoditization shifts toward the underlying components as companies differentiate by using faster and better sub-components. Positioning in these market scenarios should be focused on the contrast between your product and legacy ways of performing the task (use our software instead of pen and paper as an example). In mainstream markets, companies should position their products within the established buying criteria developed by pragmatist buyers. A market alternative serves as the incumbent, well-known provider and a product alternative is a near upstart competitor that you are clearly beating. What’s odd here is that you are constantly referring to your competitors as alternatives to your product, which seems counter-intuitive but obviously, enterprise buyers have alternatives they are considering and you need to make the case that your solution is the best. Choosing a market alternative lets you procure a budget previously used for a similar solution, and the product alternative can help differentiate your technology relative to other upstarts. Moore’s simple positioning formula has helped hundreds of companies establish their go-to-market message: “For (target customers—beachhead segment only) • Who are dissatisfied with (the current market alternative) • Our product is a (new product category) • That provides (key problem-solving capability). • Unlike (the product alternative), • We have assembled (key whole product features for your specific application).”

Business Themes

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  1. What happened to these examples? Moore offers a number of examples of Crossing the Chasm, but what actually happened to these companies after this book was written? Clarify Software was bought in October 1999 by Nortel for $2.1B (a 16x revenue multiple) and then divested by Nortel to Amdocs in October 2001 for $200M - an epic disaster of capital allocation. Documentum was acquired by EMC in 2003 for $1.7B in stock and was later sold to OpenText in 2017 for $1.6B. 3Com Palm Pilot was a mess of acquisitions/divestitures. Palm was acquired by U.S Robotics which was acquired by 3COM in 1997 and then subsequently spun out in a 2000 IPO which saw a 94% drop. Palm stopped making PDA devices in 2008 and in 2010, HP acquired Palm for $1.2B in cash. Smartcard maker Gemplus merged with competitor Axalto in an 1.8Bn euro deal in 2005, creating Gemalto, which was later acquired by Thales in 2019 for $8.4Bn. So my three questions are: Did these companies really cross the chasm or were they just readily available success stories of their time? Do you need to be the company that leads the chasm crossing or can someone else do it to your benefit? What is the next step in the chasm journey after its crossed and why did so many of these companies fail after a time?

  2. Whole Products. Moore leans into an idea called the Whole Product Concept which was popularized by Theodore Levitt’s 1983 book The Marketing Imagination and Bill Davidow’s (of early VC Mohr Davidow) 1986 book Marketing High Technology. Moore explains the idea: “The concept is very straightforward: There is a gap between the marketing promise made to the customer—the compelling value proposition—and the ability of the shipped product to fulfill that promise. For that gap to be overcome, the product must be augmented by a variety of services and ancillary products to become the whole product.” There are four different perceptions of the product: “1. Generic product: This is what is shipped in the box and what is covered by the purchasing contract. 2.Expected product: This is the product that the consumer thought she was buying when she bought the generic product. It is the minimum configuration of products and services necessary to have any chance of achieving the buying objective. For example, people who are buying personal computers for the first time expect to get a monitor with their purchase-how else could you use the computer?—but in fact, in most cases, it is not part of the generic product. 3.Augmented product: This is the product fleshed out to provide the maximum chance of achieving the buying objective. In the case of a personal computer, this would include a variety of products, such as software, a hard disk drive, and a printer, as well as a variety of services, such as a customer hotline, advanced training, and readily accessible service centers. 4. Potential product: This represents the product’s room for growth as more and more ancillary products come on the market and as customer-specific enhancements to the system are made. These are the product features that have maybe expected or additional to drive adoption.” Moore makes a subtle point that after a while, investments in the generic/out-of-the-box product functionality drive less and less purchase behavior, in tandem with broader market adoption. Customers want to be wooed by the latest technology and as products become similar, customers care less about what’s in the product today, and more about what’s coming. Moore emphasizes Whole Product Planning where you can see how you get to those additional features into the product over time - but Moore was also operating in an era when product decisions and development processes were on two-year+ timelines and not in the DevOps era of today, where product updates are pushed daily in some cases. In the bottoms-up/DevOps era, its become clear that finding your niche users, driving strong adoption from them, and integrating feature ideas from them as soon as possible can yield a big success.

  3. Distribution Channels. Moore focuses on each of the potential ways a company can distribute its solutions: Direct Sales, two-tier retail, one-tier retail, internet retail, two-tier value-added reselling, national roll-ups, original equipment manufacturers (OEMs), and system integrators. As Moore puts it, “The number-one corporate objective, when crossing the chasm, is to secure a channel into the mainstream market with which the pragmatist customer will be comfortable.” These distribution types are clearly relics of technology distribution in the early 1990s. Great direct sales have produced some of the best and biggest technology companies of yesterday including IBM, Oracle, CA Technologies, SAP, and HP. What’s so fascinating about this framework is that you just need one channel to reach the pragmatist customer and in the last 10 years, that channel has become the internet for many technology products. Moore even recognizes that direct sales had produced poor customer alignment: “First, wherever vendors have been able to achieve lock-in with customers through proprietary technology, there has been the temptation to exploit the relationship through unfairly expensive maintenance agreements [Oracle did this big time] topped by charging for some new releases as if they were new products. This was one of the main forces behind the open systems rebellion that undermined so many vendors’ account control—which, in turn, decrease predictability of revenues, putting the system further in jeopardy.” So what is the strategy used by popular open-source bottoms up go-to-market motions at companies like Github, Hashicorp, Redis, Confluent and others? Its straightforward - the internet and simple APIs (normally on Github) provide the fastest channel to reach the developer end market while they are coding. When you look at Open Source scaling, it can take years and years to Cross the Chasm because most of these early open source adopters are technology innovators, however, eventually, solutions permeate into massive enterprises and make the jump. With these new go-to-market motions coming on board, driven by the internet, we’ve seen large companies grow from primarily inbound marketing tactics and less direct outbound sales. The companies named above as well as Shopify, Twilio, Monday.com and others have done a great job growing to a massive scale on the backs of their products (product-led growth) instead of a salesforce. What’s important to realize is that distribution is an abstract term and no single motion or strategy is right for every company. The next distribution channel will surprise everyone!

Dig Deeper

  • How the sales team behind Monday is changing the way workplaces collaborate

  • An Overview of the Technology Adoption Lifecycle

  • A Brief History of the Cloud at NDC Conference

  • Frank Slootman (Snowflake) and Geoffrey Moore Discuss Disruptive Innovations and the Future of Tech

  • Growth, Sales, and a New Era of B2B by Martin Casado (GP at Andreessen Horowitz)

  • Strata 2014: Geoffrey Moore, "Crossing the Chasm: What's New, What's Not"

tags: Crossing the Chasm, Github, Hashicorp, Redis, Monday.com, Confluent, Open Source, Snowflake, Shopify, Twilio, Geoffrey Moore, Gartner, TensorFlow, Google, Clayton Christensen, Zoom, nORTEL, Amdocs, OpenText, EMC, HP, CA, IBM, Oracle, SAP, Gemalto, DevOps
categories: Non-Fiction
 

February 2019 - Cloud: Seven Clear Business Models by Timothy Chou

While this book is relatively old for internet standards, it illuminates the early transition to SaaS (Software as a Service) from traditional software license and maintenance models. Timothy Chou, current Head of IoT at the Alchemist Accelerator, former Head of On Demand Applications at Oracle, and a lecturer at Stanford, details seven different business models for selling software and the pros/cons of each.

Tech Themes

  1. The rise of SaaS. Software-as-a-Service (SaaS) is an application that can be accessed through a web browser and is managed and hosted by a third-party (likely a public cloud - Google, Microsoft, or AWS). Let’s flash back to the 90’s, a time when software was sold in shrink-wrapped boxes as perpetual licenses. What this meant was you owned whatever version of the software you purchased, in perpetuity. Most of the time you would pay a maintenance cost (normally 20% of the overall license value) to receive basic upkeep services to the software and get minor bugs fixed. However, when the new version 2.0 came out, you would have to pay another big license fee, re-install the software and go through the hassle of upgrading all existing systems. On the backs of increased internet adoption, SaaS allowed companies to deliver a standard product, over the internet, typically at lower price point to end users. This meant smaller companies like salesforce (at the time) could compete with giants like Siebel Systems (acquired by Oracle for $5.85Bn in 2005) because companies could now purchase the software in an on-demand, by-user fashion without going to the store, at a much lower price point.

  2. How cloud empowers SaaS. As an extension, standardization of product means you can aptly define the necessary computing resources - thereby also standardizing your costs. At the same time that SaaS was gaining momentum, the three mega public cloud players emerged, starting with Amazon (in 2006), then Google and eventually Microsoft. This allowed companies to host software in the cloud and not on their own servers (infrastructure that was hard to manage internally). So instead of racking (pun intended) up costs with an internal infrastructure team managing complex hardware - you could offload your workloads to the cloud. Infrastructure as a service (IaaS) was born. Because SaaS is delivered over the internet at lower prices, the cloud became an integral part of scaling SaaS businesses. As the number of users grew on your SaaS platform, you simply purchased more computing space on the cloud to handle those additional users. Instead of spending big amounts of money on complex infrastructural costs/decisions, a company could now focus entirely on its product and go-to-market strategy, enabling it to reach scale much more quickly.

  3. The titans of enterprise software. Software has absolutely changed in the last 20 years and will likely continue to evolve as more specialized products and services become available. That being said, the perennial software acquirers will continue to be perennial software acquirers. At the beginning of his book, Chou highlights fifteen companies that had gone public since 1999: Concur (IPO: 1999, acquired by SAP for $8.3B in 2014), Webex (IPO: 2002, acquired by Cisco in for $3.2B in 2007), Kintera (IPO: 2003, acquired by Blackbaud for $46M in 2008), Salesforce.com (IPO: 2004), RightNow Technologies (IPO: 2004, acquired by Oracle for $1.5B in 2011), Websidestory (IPO: 2004, acquired by Omniture in 2008 for $394M), Kenexa (IPO: 2005, acquired by IBM for $1.3B in 2012), Taleo (IPO: 2005, acquired for $1.9B by Oracle in 2012), DealerTrack (IPO 2005, acquired by Cox Automotive in 2015 for $4.0B), Vocus (IPO: 2005, acquired by GTCR in 2014 for $446M), Omniture (IPO: 2006, acquired by Adobe for $1.8B in 2009), Constant Contact (IPO: 2007, acquired by Endurance International for $1B in 2015), SuccessFactors (IPO: 2007, acquired by SAP for $3.4B in 2011), NetSuite (IPO 2007: acquired by Oracle for $9.3B in 2016) and Opentable (IPO: 2009, acquired by Priceline for $2.6B in 2015). Oracle, IBM, Cisco and SAP have been some of the most active serial acquirers in tech history and this trend is only continuing. Interestingly enough, Salesforce.com is now in a similar position. What it shows is that if you can come to dominate a horizontal application - CRM (salesforce), ERP (SAP/Oracle), or Infrastructure (Google/Amazon/Microsoft) you can build a massive moat that allows you to become the serial acquirer in that space. You then have first and highest dibs at every target in your industry because you can underwrite an acquisition to the highest strategic multiple. Look for these acquirers to continue to make big deals when it can further lock in their market dominant position especially when you see their core business slow.

    Business Themes

Here we see the “Cash Gap” in the subscription model - customer acquisition expenses are incurred upfront but are recouped over time.

Here we see the “Cash Gap” in the subscription model - customer acquisition expenses are incurred upfront but are recouped over time.

  1. The misaligned incentives of traditional license/maintenance model. Software was traditionally sold as perpetual licenses, where a user could access that version of the software forever. Because users were paying to use something forever, the typical price point was very high for any given enterprise software license. This meant that large software upgrades were made at the the most senior levels of management and were large investments from a dollars and time perspective. On top of that initial license came the 20% support costs paid annually to receive patch updates. At the software vendor, this structure created interesting incentives. First, product updates were usually focused on break-fix and not new, “game-changing” upgrades because supporting multiple, separate versions of the software (especially, pre-IaaS) was incredibly costly. This slowed the pace of innovation at those large software providers (turning them into serial acquirers). Second, the sales team became focused on selling customers on new releases directly after they signed the initial deal. This happened because once you made that initial purchase, you owned that version forever; what better way to get more money off of you than introduce a new feature and re-sell you the whole system again. Salespeople were also incredibly focused on closing deals in a certain quarter because any single deal could make or break not only their quarterly sales quota, but also the Company’s revenue targets. If one big deal slipped from Q4 to Q1 the following year, a Company may have to report lower growth numbers to the stock market driving the stock price down. Third, once you made the initial purchase, the software vendor would direct all problems and product inquiries to customer support who were typically overburdened by requests. Additionally, the maintenance/support costs were built into the initial contract so you may end up contractually obligated to pay for support for a product that you don’t like and cannot change. The Company viewed it as: “You’ve already purchased the software, so why should I waste time ensuring you have a great experience with it - unless you are looking to buy the next version, I’m going to spend my time selling to new leads.” These incentives limited product changes/upgrades, focused salespeople completely on new leads, and hurt customer experience, all at the benefit of the Company over the user.

  2. What are CAC and LTV? CAC or customer acquisition costs are key to understand for any type of software business. As HubSpot and distinguished SaaS investor, David Skok notes, its typically measured as, “the entire cost of sales and marketing over a given period, including salaries and other headcount related expenses, and divide it by the number of customers that you acquired in that period.” Once the software sales model shifted from license/maintenance to SaaS, instead of hard-to-predict, big new license sales, companies started to receive monthly recurring payments. Enterprise software contracts are typically year-long, which means that once a customer signs the Company will know exactly how much revenue it should plan to receive over the coming year. Furthermore, with recurring subscriptions, as long as the customer was happy, the Company could be reasonably assured that customer would renew. This idea led to the concept of Lifetime Value of a customer or LTV. LTV is the total amount of revenue a customer will pay the Company until it churns or cancels the subscription. The logic followed that if you could acquire a customer (CAC) for less than the lifetime value of the customer (LTV), over time you would make money on that individual customer. Typically, investors view a 3:1 LTV to CAC ratio as viable for a healthy SaaS company.

Dig Deeper

  • Bill Gates 1995 memo on the state of early internet competition: The Internet Tidal Wave

  • Andy Jassey on how Amazon Web Services got started

  • Why CAC can be a Startup Killer?

  • How CAC is different for different types of software

  • Basic SaaS Economics by David Skok

tags: Cloud Computing, SaaS, License, Maintenance, Business Models, software, Salesforce, SAP, Oracle, Cisco, IaaS, batch2
categories: Non-Fiction
 

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