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Tech Book of the Month
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July 2023 - The Myth of Capitalism by Jonathan Tepper with Denise Hearn

We learn about the fun history of many monopolies and anti-trust! While I can’t recommend this book because its long and poorly written, it does reasonably critique aspects of antitrust and monopoly formation. Its repetitive and so aggressively one-sided that it loses credibility. The fact that the author used to advise and now runs a hedge fund that owns monopoly businesses tells you all you need to know.

Tech Themes

  1. Consumer Welfare. Tepper’s fundamental argument is that since the 1980s, driven by Regan’s deregulation push, the government has allowed corporate mergers and abuses of market power, leading to more market concentration, higher prices, greater inequality, worse worker conditions, and stymied innovation. Influenced by the Chicago School’s free market ideas and Robert Bork’s popular 1978 book Antitrust Paradox, the standard for antitrust enforcement morphed from breaking up market-abusing companies to “consumer welfare.” With this shift, antitrust enforcement became: “Does this harm the consumer?” A lot of things do not harm consumers. Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, Inc. (1979) is widely regarded as one of the first antitrust cases that shifted the Rule of reason towards consumer welfare. CBS had sued Broadcast Music, alleging that blanket licenses constituted price fixing. Broadcast Music represented copyright holders and would grant licenses to media companies to use artist’s music on air. These deals were negotiated on behalf of many artists, and did not allow CBS to negotiate for selected works. The court sided with BMI because the blanket license process was simpler, lowered transaction costs by reducing the number of negotiations, and allowed broadcasters greater access to works. They even admitted that the blanket license may be a form of price setting, but concluded that it didn’t necessarily harm consumers and was more efficient, so they allowed it. The consumer welfare ideology has recently come under fire around the big tech companies - Apple, Microsoft, Google, Meta, and Amazon. Lina Khan, Commissioner of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) wrote a powerful and aptly titled article, Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox, highlighting why in her view consumer welfare was not a strong enough stance on antitrust. “This Note argues that the current framework in antitrust—specifically its pegging competition to “consumer welfare,” defined as short-term price effects—is unequipped to capture the architecture of market power in the modern economy.” The note argues that Amazon’s willingness to offer unsustainably low prices and their role as a marketplace platform and a seller on that marketplace allow it crush competition. Google is currently being sued by the Department of Justice over illegal monopolization of adtech and its dominance in the search engine market. The government is attempting to shift antitrust back to a more aggressive approach regarding monopolistic behavior. From a consumer welfare perspective, there is no doubt that all of these companies have created situations that benefit consumers (“free” services, low prices) and hurt competition. The question is: “Is it illegal?”

  2. The ACTs - Sherman and Clayton. The Sherman Antitrust Act, passed in 1890, was the first major federal law aimed at curbing monopolies and promoting competition. The late 19th century, often referred to as the Gilded Age, saw the rise of powerful industrialists like J.P. Morgan, John D. Rockefeller, and Cornelius Vanderbilt, whose massive corporations threatened to dominate key sectors of the economy. Public outcry over the potential for these monopolies to stifle competition and exploit consumers led to the passage of the Sherman Act. Senator John Sherman, intended the law to protect the public from the negative consequences of concentrated economic power. The Sherman Act broadly prohibited anticompetitive agreements and monopolization, empowering the government to break up monopolies and prevent practices that restrained trade. However, the Sherman Act's broad language left it open to interpretation, and its early enforcement was inconsistent. President Theodore Roosevelt, a proponent of trust-busting, used the Sherman Act to challenge powerful monopolies, such as the Northern Securities Company, a railroad conglomerate controlled by J.P. Morgan. The Supreme Court's decision in the Standard Oil case in 1911 further shaped the interpretation of the Sherman Act, establishing the "rule of reason" as the standard for evaluating antitrust violations. This meant that not all restraints of trade were illegal, only those that were deemed "unreasonable" in their impact on competition. The Clayton Antitrust Act, passed in 1914, was designed to strengthen and clarify the Sherman Act. It specifically targeted practices not explicitly covered by the Sherman Act, such as mergers and acquisitions that could lessen competition, price discrimination, and interlocking directorates. The Clayton Act also sought to protect labor unions, which had been subject to antitrust prosecution under the Sherman Act. The passage of these acts led to a wave of significant antitrust cases. Prominent examples include: United States v. American Tobacco Co. (1911): This case resulted in the breakup of the American Tobacco Company, a dominant force in the tobacco industry, demonstrating the government's commitment to using antitrust laws to dismantle powerful monopolies. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc. (1948): This case challenged the vertical integration of the film industry, where major studios controlled production, distribution, and exhibition. The court's decision led to significant changes in the industry's structure. United States v. AT&T Co. (1982): This landmark case resulted in the breakup of AT&T, a telecommunications giant, into smaller, regional companies. This case marked a major victory for antitrust enforcement and had a lasting impact on the telecommunications industry.

  3. Microsoft. The Microsoft antitrust case, initiated in October 1998, saw the U.S. government accusing Microsoft of abusing its monopoly power in the personal computer operating systems market. The government, represented by David Boies (yes, Theranos David Boies), argued that Microsoft, led by Bill Gates, had engaged in anti-competitive practices to stifle competition, particularly in the web browser market. Gates was famously deposed and shockingly (not really) came away from the deposition looking like an asshole. The government alleged that Microsoft violated the Sherman Act by: Bundling its Internet Explorer (IE) web browser with its Windows operating system, thereby hindering competing browsers like Netscape Navigator, manipulating application programming interfaces to favor IE, and enforcing restrictive licensing agreements with original equipment manufacturers, compelling them to include IE with Windows. Judge Thomas Jackson presided over the case at the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. In 1999, he ruled in favor of the government, finding that Microsoft held a monopoly and had acted to maintain it. He ordered Microsoft to be split into two units, one for operating systems and the other for software components. Microsoft appealed the decision. The Appeals Court overturned the breakup order, partly due to Judge Jackson's inappropriate discussions with the media. While upholding the finding of Microsoft's monopolistic practices, the court deemed traditional antitrust analysis unsuitable for software issues. The case was remanded to Judge Colleen Kollar-Kotelly, and ultimately, a settlement was reached in 2001. The settlement mandated Microsoft to share its application programming interfaces with third-party companies and grant a panel access to its systems for compliance monitoring. However, it did not require Microsoft to change its code or bar future software bundling with Windows. This led to criticism that the settlement was inadequate in curbing Microsoft's anti-competitive behavior. History doesn’t repeat itself, but it does rhyme and Microsoft is doing the exact same bundling strategy again with its Teams app.

Business Themes

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  1. Monopoly Markets. Tepper lays out all of the markets that he believes are monopoly, duopoly, or oligopoly markets. Cable/high speed internet (Comcast, Verizon, AT&T, Charter (Spectrum)) - pretty much the same, Computer Operating Systems (Microsoft) - pretty much the same but iOS and Linux are probably bigger, Social Networks (Facebook with 75% share). Since then Tiktok, Twitter, Pinterest, and Snap have all put a small dent in Facebook’s share. Search (Google), Milk (Dean Foods), Railroads (BNSF, NSC, CSX, Union Pacific, Kansas City Southern), Seeds (Bayer/Monsanto, Syngenta/ChemChina, Dow/DuPont), Microprocessors (Intel 80%, AMD 20%), Funeral Homes (Service Corporation International) all join the monopoly club. The duopoly club consists of Payment Systems (Visa, Mastercard), Beer (AB Inbev, Heineken), Phone Operating Systems (iOS, Android), Online Advertising (Google, Facebook), Kidney Dialysis (DaVita), and Glasses (Luxottica). The oligopoly club is Credit Reporting Bureaus (Transunion, Experian, FICO), Tax Preparation (H&R Block, Intuit), Airlines (American, Delta, United, Southwest, Alaska), Phone Companies (Verizon, Sprint, T-Mobile, AT&T), Banks (JP Morgan Chase, Bank of America, Citigroup, Wells Fargo), Health Insurance (UnitedHealthcare, Centene, Humana, Aetna), Medical Care (HCA, Encompass, Ascension, Universal Health), Group Purchasing Organizations (Vizient, Premier, HealthTrust, Intaler), Pharmacy Benefit Managers (Express Scripts, CVS Caremark, Optum/UnitedHealthcare), Drug Wholesalers (Cencora, McKesson, Cardinal Health), Agriculture (ADM, Bunge, Cargill, Louis Dreyfus), Media (Walt Disney, Time Warner, CBS, Viacom, NBC Universal, News Corp), Title Insurance (Fidelity National, First American, Stewart, and Old Republic). Since the book was published in 2018, there has been even more consolidation - Canadian Pacific bought Kansas City Southern for $31B, Essilor merged with Luxottica in 2018 in a $49B deal, Sprint merged with T-Mobile in a $26B deal, and CBS and Viacom merged in a $30B deal. Tepper’s anger towards lackadaisical enforcement of antitrust is palpable. He encourages greater antitrust speed and transparency, the unwinding of now clear market consolidating mergers, and the breakup of local monopolies.

  2. Conglomeration and De-Conglomeration. Market Concentration. The conglomerate boom, primarily occurring in the 1960s, saw a surge in the formation of large corporations encompassing diverse, often unrelated businesses. This era was fueled by low interest rates and a fluctuating stock market, creating favorable conditions for leveraged buyouts. A key driver of this trend was the Celler-Kefauver Act of 1950, which, by prohibiting companies from acquiring their competitors or suppliers, pushed them towards diversification through acquiring businesses in unrelated fields. The prevailing motive was to achieve rapid growth, even if it meant prioritizing revenue growth over profit growth. Conglomerates were seen as a means to mitigate risk through diversification and achieve operational economies of scale. Many conglomerates formed that operated across completely different industries: Gulf and Western (Paramount Pictures, Simon & Schuster, Sega, Madison Square Garden), ITT (Telephone companies, Avis, Wonder Bread, Hartford Insurance, and Sheraton), and Henry Singleton’s Teledyne. However, the conglomerate era ultimately waned. The government took a more proactive approach to acquisitions in the late 1960s, curbing the aggressive approaches. The FTC sued Proctor & Gamble over its potential acquisition of Clorox and merger guidelines were revised in 1968, setting out more rules against market share and concentration. Rising interest rates in the 1970s strained these sprawling enterprises, forcing them to divest many of their acquisitions. The belief in the inherent efficiency of conglomerates was challenged as businesses increasingly favored specialization over sprawling, unwieldy structures. The concept of synergy, once touted as a key advantage of conglomerates, came under scrutiny. Ultimately, the conglomerate era was marked by performance dilution, value erosion, and the realization that strong performance in one business did not guarantee success in unrelated sectors.

  3. Industry Concentration. A central pillar to Tepper’s argument that the capitalism game isn’t being played fairly or appropriately, is that rising industry concentration is worrisome and indicative of a broken market system. He uses the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) to discuss levels of industry concentration. According to the Antitrust Division at the DOJ: “The HHI is calculated by squaring the market share of each firm competing in the market and then summing the resulting numbers. For example, for a market consisting of four firms with shares of 30, 30, 20, and 20 percent, the HHI is 2,600 (302 + 302 + 202 + 202 = 2,600). The agencies generally consider markets in which the HHI is between 1,000 and 1,800 points to be moderately concentrated, and consider markets in which the HHI is in excess of 1,800 points to be highly concentrated.” The HHI index is relatively straightforward to calculate. It can be a quick test to see if a potential merger creates a more significantly concentrated market. However, it still falls prey to some issues. For example, market definitions are extremely important in antitrust cases and a poorly or narrowly defined market can cause the HHI to look overly concentrated. In the ongoing Kroger-Albertson’s Merger case, the FTC is proposing a somewhat narrow definition of supermarkets, which excludes large supermarket players like Walmart, Costco, Aldi, and Whole Foods. If Whole Foods isn’t a super market, I’m not sure what is. And sure, maybe they narrowly define the market because Kroger and Albertsons serve a particular niche where substitutes are not easily available. Whole Foods may be more expensive, Aldi may have limited assortment, and Costco portion sizes may be too big. However, if you have a market that has Kroger, Walmart, Costco, Aldi, and Whole Foods serving a reasonable size population, I can almost guarantee the prices are likely to remain competitive. In some cases, high industry concentration does not mean monopolistic behavior. However, it can lead to monopolistic or monopsonistic behavior including: higher prices, lower worker’s wages, lower growth, and greater inequality.

    Dig Deeper

  • Microsoft Volume II: The Complete History and Strategy of the Ballmer Years

  • Lecture Antitrust 1 Rise of Standard Oil | Walter Isaacson

  • Anti-Monopoly Timeline

  • How Xerox Lost Half its Market Share

  • (Anti)Trust Issues: Harvard Law Bulletin

tags: Ronald Regan, Robert Bork, Broadcast Music, CBS, Apple, Microsoft, Google, Meta, Amazon, Lina Khan, Sherman Act, Clayton Act, JP Morgan Chase, John D. Rockefeller, Vanderbilt, Theodore Roosevelt, Standard Oil, American Tobacco, Paramount, AT&T, Bill Gates, David Boies, Netscape, Gulf & Western, ITT, Henry Singleton, Teledyne, Proctor & Gamble, Clorox, Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, Kroger, Albertsons, Costco, Whole Foods, Aldi
categories: Non-Fiction
 

August 2020 - Venture Deals by Brad Feld and Jason Mendelson

This month we checked out an excellent book for founders, investors, and those interested in private company financings. The book hits on a lot of the key business and legal terms that aren’t discussed in typical startup books, making it useful no matter what stage of the entrepreneurial journey you are on.

Tech Themes

  1. The Rise of Founder Friendly VC. Writing on his blog, Feld Thoughts, which was the original genesis for Venture Deals, Brad Feld mentioned that: “From 2010 forward, the entire VC market shifted into a mode that many describe as ‘founder friendly.’ Investor reputation mattered at both the angel and VC level.” In the 80’s and 90’s, because there was so little competition among venture capital firms, it was common for firms to dictate terms to company founders. The VC firms were the ones with the cash, and the founders didn’t have many options to choose from. If you wanted to build a big, profitable, public company, the only way to get there was by taking venture capital money. This trend started to unwind during the internet bubble, when founders started to maintain more and more of their businesses before the IPO. In fact, as this Harvard Business Review article points out, it was actually common to fire the founder/CEO prior to a public offering in favor of more seasoned leaders. This trend was bucked by Netscape, which eschewed traditional wisdom, going public less than a year from founding, with an unprofitable business. The Netscape IPO was clearly a royal coming-together of technology history. Tracing it all the way back - George Winthrop Fairchild started IBM in 1911; in the late 50’s, Arthur Rock convinced Fairchild’s son, Sherman to fund the traitorous eight (eight employees who left competitor Shockley Semiconductor) to start Fairchild Semiconductor; Eugene Kleiner (one of the traitorous eight) starts Kleiner Perkins, a venture capital firm that eventually invested in Netscape. Kleiner Perkins would also invest in Google (frequently regarded as one of the best and riskiest startup investments ever). Google was the first internet company to go public with a dual-class share structure where the founders would own a disproportionate amount of the voting rights of the company. Marc Andreessen, the founder of Netscape, loved this idea and eventually launched his own venture capital firm called Andreessen Horowitz, which ushered in a new generation of founder-friendly investing. At one point Andreessen was even quoted saying: “It is unsafe to go public today without a dual-class share structure.” Some notable companies with dual class shares include several Andreessen companies such as Facebook, Zynga, Box, and Lyft. Recently some have questioned whether founder friendly terms have pushed too far with some major flameouts from companies with the structure including Theranos, WeWork, and Uber.

  2. How to Raise Money. Feld has several recommendations for fundraising that are important including having a target round size, demo, financial projections, and VC syndicate. Feld contends that CEOs who offer a range of varying round sizes to VC’s don’t really understand their business goals and use of proceeds. By having a concrete round size it shows that the CEO understands roughly how much money it will take to get to the next milestone or said another way, it shows the CEO understands the runway (in months) needed to build that new product or feature. It shows command of the financing and vision of the business. Feld encourages founders to provide a demo, because: “while never required, many investors respond to things we can play with, so even if you are an early stage company, a prototype or demo is desirable.” Beyond the explicit point here, the demo shows confidence in the product and at least some ability to sell, which is obviously a key aspect in eventually scaling the business. Another aspect of scaling the business is the financial model, but as Feld states, “the only thing that can be known about a pre-revenue company’s financial projections is that they are wrong.” While the numbers are meaningless for really early stage companies, for those that have a few customers it can be helpful to get a sense of long-term gross margins and aspects of the company you hope to invest in and / or change over time. Lastly, Feld gives advice for building a VC syndicate, or group of VC investors. Frequently lead investors will commit a certain dollar amount of the round, and it will be up to the founder/CEO to go find a way to build out the round. This can be incredibly challenging as detailed by Moz founder, Rand Fishkin, who thought he had a deal in hand only to see it be taken away. There are multiple bids in the VC fundraising process, one called an indication of interest, which is non-binding and normally provides a range on valuation, one called a letter of intent, which is slightly more detailed and may include legal terms of the deal such as board representation, liquidation preference, and governance terms, and then final legal documentation. A lot of time, the early bids can be withdrawn based off of poor market feedback or when a company misses its financial projections (like Moz did in its process). Understanding the process and the materials needed to complete the deal is helpful at setting expectations for founders.

  3. Warrants, SPACs, and IPOs. With SPACMania in full-swing, we wanted to dive into SPACs and see how they work. We’ve discussed SPACs before, with regards to Chamath’s Social Capital merger with Virgin Galactic. But how do traditional SPAC financings work and why is there a rush of famous people, such as LinkedIn founder Reid Hoffman, to raise them? A SPAC or Specialty Purpose Acquisition Company is a blank-check company which goes public with the goal of acquiring a business, thereby taking it public. SPACs can be focused on industry or size of company and they are most frequently led by operational leaders and / or private equity firms. The reason SPACs have been gaining in popularity is that public markets investors are seeking more risk and a few high profile SPAC deals, namely DraftKings and Nikola, have traded better than expected. Most companies that are going public today are older, more mature businesses, and the public markets have been generally favorable to somewhat suspect ventures (Nikola is an electric truck company that has never produced a single truck, but is worth $14B on hype alone). VC firms and companies see the ability to get outsized returns on their investments because so many people are clamoring to find returns above the basically 0% offered by treasury bonds. The S&P 500 P/E ratio is now at around 26x compared to a historical average around 16x, meaning the market seems to be overvalued compared to prior times. SPACs typically come with an odd structure. A unit in a SPAC normally consists of one common share of stock and one warrant, which is the ability to purchase shares for $0.01 after a SPAC merges with its target company. The founders of the SPAC also receive founder shares, normally 20% of the business. Once the target is found, SPACs will often coordinate a PIPE (Private Investment in Public Equity), where a large private investor will invest mainly primary (cash to the balance sheet) capital into the business. This has emerged as a hip, new alternative to traditional IPOs, keeping with the theme of innovation in public offerings like direct listings, however, its unclear that this really benefits the company going public. Often the merged companies are the subject of substantial dilution by the SPAC sponsors and PIPE investors, lowering the overall equity piece management maintains. However, given the somewhat high valuations companies are receiving in the public markets (Zoom at 80x+ LTM Revenue, Shopify at 59x LTM Revenue), it may be worth the dilution.

Business Themes

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  1. How VC’s Make Money. In VC, the typical fund structure includes a general partnership (GP) and limited partners (LPs). The GP is the investors at the VC firm and the limited partners are the institutional investors that provide the money for the VC firm to invest. A typical structure involves the GP investing 1% of their own money (99% comes from LPs) and then getting paid an annual 2% management fee as well as 20% carried interest, or the profit made from investments. Using the example from the book: “Start with the $100 million fund. Assume that it's a successful fund and returns 3× the capital, or $300 million. In this case, the first $100 million goes back to the LPs, and the remaining profit, or $200 million, is split 80 percent to the LPs and 20 percent to the GPs. The VC firm gets $40 million in carried interest and the LPs get the remaining $160 million. And yes, in this case everyone is very happy.” Understanding how investors make money can help the entrepreneur better understand why VC’s pressure companies. As Feld points out, sometimes VC’s are trying to raise a new fund or have invested the majority of the fund already and thus do not care as much about some investments.

  2. Growth at all costs. There has been a concerted focus in VC on the get big quick motto. Nobody better exemplifies this than Masayoshi Son and the $100B VC his firm Softbank raised a few years ago. With notable big bets on current losers like WeWork and Oyo, which are struggling during this pandemic, its unclear whether this motto remains true. Eric Paley, a Managing Partner at Founder Collective, expertly quantifies the potential downsides of a risk-it-all strategy: “Investors today have overstuffed venture funds, and lots of capital is sloshing around the startup ecosystem. As a result, young startups with strong teams, compelling products and limited traction can find themselves with tens of millions of dollars, but without much real validation of their businesses. We see venture investors eagerly investing $20 million into a promising company, valuing it at $100 million, even if the startup only has a few million in net revenue. Now the investors and the founders have to make a decision — what should determine the speed at which this hypothetical company, let’s call it “Fuego,” invests its treasure chest of money in the amazing opportunity that motivated the investors? The investors’ goal over the next roughly 24 months is for the company to become worth at least three times the post-money valuation — so $300 million would be the new target pre-money valuation for Fuego’s next financing. Imagine being a company with only a few million in sales, with a success hurdle for your next round of $300 million pre-money. Whether the startup’s model is working or not, the mantra becomes ‘go big or go home.’” This issue is key when negotiating term sheets with investors and understanding board dynamics. As Feld calls out: “The voting control issues in the early stage deals are only amplified as you wrestle with how to keep control of your board when each lead investor per round wants a board seat. Either you can increase your board size to seven, nine, or more people (which usually effectively kills a well-functioning board), or more likely the board will be dominated by investors.” As an entrepreneur, you need to be cognizant of the pressure VC firms will put on founders to grow at high rates, and this pressure is frequently applied by a board. Often late stage startups have 10 people+ on their board. UiPath, a private venture-backed startup that has raised over $1B and is valued at $10B, has 12 people on its board. With all of the different firms having their own goals, boards can become ineffective. Whenever startups are considering fundraising, it’s important to realize the person you are raising from will be an ongoing member of the company and voice on the board and will most likely push for growth.

  3. Liquidation Preference. One of the least talked about terms in venture capital among startup circles is liquidation preference. Feld describes liquidation preference as: “a certain multiple of the original investment per share is returned to the investor before the common stock receives any consideration.” Startup culture has tended to view fundraises as stamps of approval and success, but thats not always the case. As the book discusses, preference can lead to very negative outcomes for founders and employes. For example, let’s say a company at $10M in revenue raises $100 million with a 1x liquidation preference at a $400 million pre-money valuation ($500M post money). The company is pressured by its VCs to grow quickly but it has issues with product market fit and go to market; five years go by and the company is at $15M in revenue. At this point the VCs are not interested in funding any more, and the board decides to try to sell the company. A buyer offers $80 million and the board accepts it. At this point, all $80M has to go back to the original investors who had the 1x liquidation preference. All of the common stockholders and the founders, get nothing. Its not the desired outcome by any means, but its important to know. Some companies have not heeded this advice and continued to raise at massive valuations including Notion which has raised $10M at a $800 million valuation, despite being rumored to be around $15M in revenue. The company raised at a $1.6B valuation (an obvious 2x) after being rumored to be at $30M in revenue. While not taking dilution is nice as a founder, it also sets up a massive hurdle for the company and seriously cramps returns. A 3x return (which is low for VC investors) means selling the company for $4.8B, which is no small feat.

Dig Deeper

  • Feld Thoughts: Brad Feld’s Blog

  • The Ultimate Guide to Liquidation Preferences

  • Startup Boards: A deep dive by Mark Suster, VC at Upfront Ventures

  • The meeting that showed me the truth about VCs on TechCrunch

  • SPOTAK: The Six Traits Marc Lore Looks for When Hiring

tags: Uber, WeWork, Theranos, Fairchild Semiconductor, Netscape, Marc Andreessen, SPAC, Chamath Palihapitiya, Zynga, Box, Facebook, Brad Feld, Nikola, Draftkings, Zoom, Shopify', Warrants, Liquidation Preference, VC, Founder Collective, Oyo, UiPath, Notion, Softbank, batch2
categories: Non-Fiction
 

February 2020 - How the Internet Happened: From Netscape to the iPhone by Brian McCullough

Brian McCullough, host of the Internet History Podcast, does an excellent job of showing how the individuals adopted the internet and made it central to their lives. He follows not only the success stories but also the flame outs which provide an accurate history of a time of rapid technological change.

Tech Themes

  1. Form to Factor: Design in Mobile Devices. Apple has a long history with mobile computing, but a few hiccups in the early days are rarely addressed. These hiccups also telegraph something interesting about the technology industry as a whole - design and ease of use often trump features. In the early 90’s Apple created the Figaro, a tablet computer that weighed eight pounds and allowed for navigation through a stylus. The issue was it cost $8,000 to produce and was 3/4 of an inch thick, making it difficult to carry. In 1993, the Company launched the Newton MessagePad, which cost $699 and included a calendar, address book, to-do list and note pad. However, the form was incorrect again; the MessagePad was 7.24 in. x 4.5 in. and clunky. With this failure, Apple turned its attention away from mobile, allowing other players like RIM and Blackberry to gain leading market share. Blackberry pioneered the idea of a full keyboard on a small device and Marc Benioff, CEO of salesforce.com, even called it, “the heroin of mobile computing. I am serious. I had to stop.” IBM also tried its hand in mobile in 1992, creating the Simon Personal Communicator, which had the ability to send and receive calls, do email and fax, and sync with work files via an adapter. The issue was the design - 8 in. by 2.5 in. by 1.5 in. thick. It was a modern smartphone, but it was too big, clunky, and difficult to use. It wasn’t until the iPhone and then Android that someone really nailed the full smart phone experience. The lessons from this case study offer a unique insight into the future of VR. The company able to offer the correct form factor, at a reasonable price can gain market share quickly. Others who try to pioneer too much at a time (cough, magic leap), will struggle.

  2. How to know you’re onto something. Facebook didn’t know. On November 30, 2004, Facebook surpassed one million users after being live for only ten months. This incredible growth was truly remarkable, but Mark Zuckerberg still didn’t know facebook was a special company. Sean Parker, the founder of Napster, had been mentoring Zuckerberg the prior summer: “What was so bizarre about the way Facebook was unfolding at that point, is that Mark just didn’t totally believe in it and wanted to go and do all these other things.” Zuckerberg even showed up to a meeting at Sequoia Capital still dressed in his pajamas with a powerpoint entitled: “The Top Ten Reasons You Should Not Invest.” While this was partially a joke because Sequoia has spurned investing in Parker’s latest company, it represented how immature the whole facebook operation was, in the face of rapid growth. Facebook went on to release key features like groups, photos, and friending, but most importantly, they developed their revenue model: advertising. The quick user growth and increasing ad revenue growth got the attention of big corporations - Viacom offered $2B in cash and stock, and Yahoo offered $1B all cash. By this time, Zuckerberg realized what he had, and famously spurned several offers from Yahoo, even after users reacted negatively to the most important feature that facebook would ever release, the News Feed. In today’s world, we often see entrepreneur’s overhyping their companies, which is why Silicon Valley was in-love with dropout founders for a time, their naivite and creativity could be harnessed to create something huge in a short amount of time.

  3. Channel Partnerships: Why apple was reluctant to launch a phone. Channel partnerships often go un-discussed at startups, but they can be incredibly useful in growing distribution. Some industries, such as the Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) market thrives on channel partnership arrangements. Companies like Crowdstrike engage partners (mostly IT services firms) to sell on their behalf, lowering Crowdstrike’s customer acquisition and sales spend. This can lead to attractive unit economics, but on the flip side, partners must get paid and educated on the selling motion which takes time and money. Other channel relationships are just overly complex. In the mid 2000’s, mobile computing was a complicated industry, and companies hated dealing with old, legacy carriers and simple clunky handset providers. Apple tried the approach of working with a handset provider, Motorola, but they produced the terrible ROKR which barely worked. The ROKR was built to run on the struggling Cingular (would become AT&T) network, who was eager to do a deal with Apple in hopes of boosting usage on their network. After the failure of the ROKR, Cingular executives begged Jobs to build a phone for the network. Normally, the carriers had specifications for how phones were built for their networks, but Jobs ironed out a contract which exchanged network exclusivity for complete design control, thus Apple entered into mobile phones. The most important computing device of the 2000’s and 2010’s was built on a channel relationship.

Business Themes

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  1. AOL-Time Warner: the merger destined to fail. To fully understand the AOL-Time Warner merger, you must first understand what AOL was, what it was becoming, and why it was operating on borrowed time. AOL started as an ISP, charging customers $9.95 for five hours of dial-up internet access, with each additional hour costing $2.95. McCullough describes AOL: “AOL has often been described as training wheels for the Internet. For millions of Americans, their aol.com address was their first experience with email, and thus their first introduction to the myriad ways that networked computing could change their lives.” AOL grew through one of the first viral marketing campaigns ever; AOL put CDs into newspapers which allowed users to download AOL software and get online. The Company went public in March of 1992 and by 1996 the Company had 2.1 million subscribers, however subscribers were starting to flee to cheaper internet access. It turned out that building an ISP was relatively cheap, and the high margin cash flow business that AOL had built was suddenly threatened by a number of competitors. AOL persisted with its viral marketing strategy, and luckily many americans still had not tried the internet yet and defaulted to AOL as being the most popular. AOL continued to add subscribers and its stock price started to balloon; in 1998 alone the stock went up 593%. AOL was also inking ridiculous, heavily VC funded deals with new internet startups. Newly public Drkoop, which raised $85M in an IPO, signed a four year $89M deal to be AOL’s default provider of health content. Barnes and Noble paid $40M to be AOL’s bookselling partner. Tel-save, a long distance phone provider signed a deal worth $100M. As the internet bubble continued to grow, AOL’s CEO, Steve Case realized that many of these new startups would be unable to fufill their contractual obligations. Early web traffic reporting systems could easily be gamed, and companies frequently had no business model other than attract a certain demographic of traffic. By 1999, AOL had a market cap of $149.8B and was added to the S&P 500 index; it was bigger than both Disney and IBM. At this time, the world was shifting away from dial-up internet to modern broadband connections provided by cable companies. One AOL executive lamented: “We all knew we were living on borrowed time and had to buy something of substance by using that huge currency [AOL’s stock].” Time Warner was a massive media company, with movie studios, TV channels, magazines and online properties. On Jan 10, 2000, AOL merged with Time Warner in one of the biggest mergers in history. AOL owned 56% of the combined company. Four days later, the Dow peaked and began a downturn which would decimate hundreds of internet businesses built on foggy fundamentals. Acquisitions happen for a number of reasons, but imminent death is not normally considered by analysts or pundits. When you see acquisitions, read the press release and understand why (at least from a marketing perspective), the two companies made a deal. Was the price just astronomical (i.e. Instagram) or was their something very strategic (i.e. Microsoft-Github)? When you read the press release years later, it should indicate whether the combination actually was proved out by the market.

  2. Acquisitions in the internet bubble: why acquisitions are really just guessing. AOL-Time Warner shows the interesting conundrum in acquisitions. HP founder David Packard coined this idea somewhat in Packard’s law: “No company can consistently grow revenues faster than its ability to get enough of the right people to implement that growth and still become a great company. If a company consistently grows revenue faster than its ability to get enough of the right people to implement that growth, it will not simply stagnate; it will fall.” Author of Good to Great, Jim Collins, clarified this idea: “Great companies are more likely to die of ingestion of too much opportunity, than starvation from too little.” Acquisitions can be a significant cause of this outpacing of growth. Look no further than Yahoo, who acquired twelve companies between September 1997 and June 1999 including Mark Cuban’s Broadcast.com for $5.7B (Kara Swisher at WSJ in 1999), GeoCities for $3.6B, and Y Combinator founder Paul Graham’s Viaweb for $48M. They spent billions in stock and cash to acquire these companies! Its only fitting that two internet darlings would eventually end up in the hands of big-telecom Verizon, who would acquire AOL for $4.4B in 2015, and Yahoo for $4.5B in 2017, only to write down the combined value by $4.6B in 2018. In 2013, Yahoo would acquire Tumblr for $1.1B, only to sell it off this past year for $3M. Acquisitions can really be overwhelming for companies, and frequently they don’t work out as planned. In essence, acquisitions are guesses about future value to customers and rarely are they as clean and smart as technology executives make them seem. Some large organizations have gotten good at acquisitions - Google, Microsoft, Cisco, and Salesforce have all made meaningful acquisitions (Android, Github, AppDynamics, ExactTarget, respectively).

  3. Google and Excite: the acquisition that never happened. McCullough has an incredible quote nestled into the start of chapter six: “Pioneers of new technologies are rarely the ones who survive long enough to dominate their categories; often it is the copycat or follow-on names that are still with us to this day: Google, not AltaVista, in search; Facebook, not Friendster, in social networks.” Amazon obviously bucked this trend (he mentions that), but in search he is absolutely right! In 1996, several internet search companies went public including Excite, Lycos, Infoseek, and Yahoo. As the internet bubble grew bigger, Yahoo was the darling of the day, and by 1998, it had amassed a $100B market cap. There were tons of companies in the market including the players mentioned above and AltaVista, AskJeeves, MSN, and others. The world did not need another search engine. However, in 1998, Google founders Larry Page and Sergey Brin found a better way to do search (the PageRank algorithm) and published their famous paper: “The Anatomy of a Large-Scale Hypertextual Web Search Engine.” They then went out to these massive search engines and tried to license their technology, but no one was interested. Imagine passing on Goolge’s search engine technology. In an over-ingestion of too much opportunity, all of the search engines were trying to be like AOL and become a portal to the internet, providing various services from their homepages. From an interview in 1998, “More than a "portal" (the term analysts employ to describe Yahoo! and its rivals, which are most users' gateway to the rest of the Internet), Yahoo! is looking increasingly like an online service--like America Online (AOL) or even CompuServe before the Web.” Small companies trying to do too much (cough, uber self-driving cars, cough). Excite showed the most interest in Google’s technology and Page offered it to the Company for $1.6M in cash and stock but Excite countered at $750,000. Excite had honest interest in the technology and a deal was still on the table until it became clear that Larry wanted Excite to rip out its search technology and use Google’s instead. Unfortunately that was too big of a risk for the mature Excite company. The two companies parted ways and Google eventually became the dominant player in the industry. Google’s focus was clear from the get-go, build a great search engine. Only when it was big enough did it plunge into acquisitions and development of adjacent technologies.

Dig Deeper

  • Raymond Smith, former CEO of Bell Atlantic, describing the technology behind the internet in 1994

  • Bill Gates’ famous memo: THE INTERNET TIDAL WAVE (May 26, 1995)

  • The rise and fall of Netscape and Mosaic in one chart

  • List of all the companies made famous and infamous in the dot-com bubble

  • Pets.com S-1 (filing for IPO) showin a $62M net loss on $6M in revenue

  • Detail on Microsoft’s antitrust lawsuit

tags: Apple, IBM, Facebook, AT&T, Blackberry, Sequoia, VC, Sean Parker, Yahoo, Excite, Netscape, AOL, Time Warner, Google, Viaweb, Mark Cuban, HP, Packard's Law, Disney, Steve Case, Steve Jobs, Amazon, Drkoop, Android, Mark Zuckerberg, Crowdstrike, Motorola, Viacom, Napster, Salesforce, Marc Benioff, Internet, Internet History, batch2
categories: Non-Fiction
 

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