February 2022 - Cable Cowboy by Mark Robichaux

This month we jump into the history of the cable industry in the US with Cable Cowboy. The book follows cable’s main character for over 30 years, John Malone, the intense, deal-addicted CEO of Telecommunications International (TCI).

Tech Themes

Repurposed Infrastructure. Repurposed infrastructure is one of the incredible drivers of technological change covered in Carlota Perez’s Technology Revolutions and Financial Capital. When a new technology wave comes along, it builds on the backs of existing infrastructure to reach a massive scale. Railroads laid the foundation for oil transport pipelines. Later, telecommunications companies used the miles and miles of cleared railroad land to hang wires to provide phone service through the US. Cable systems were initially used to pull down broadcast signals and bring them to remote places. Over time, more and more content providers like CNN, TBS, BET started to produce shows with cable distribution in mind. Cable became a bigger and bigger presence, so when the internet began to gain steam in the early 1990s, Cable was ready to play a role. It just so happened that Cable was best positioned to provide internet service to individual homes because, unlike the phone companies’ copper wiring, Cable had made extensive use of coaxial fiber which provided much faster speeds. In 1997, after an extended period of underperformance for the Cable industry, Microsoft announced a $1B investment in Comcast. The size of the deal showed the importance of cable providers in the growth of the internet.
Pipes + Content. One of the major issues surrounding TCI as they faced anti-trust scrutiny was their ownership of multiple TV channels. Malone realized that the content companies could make significant profits, especially when content was shown across multiple cable systems. TCI enjoyed the same Scale Economies Power as Netflix. Once the cable channel produces content, any way to spread the content cost over more subscribers is a no-brainer. However, these content deals were worrisome given TCI’s massive cable presence (>8,000,000 subscribers). TCI would frequently demand that channels take an equity investment to access TCI’s cable system. “In exchange for getting on TCI systems, TCI drove a tough bargain. He demanded that cable networks either allow TCI to invest in them directly, or they had to give TCI discounts on price, since TCI bought in bulk. In return for most-favored-nation-status on price, TCI gave any programmer immediate access to nearly one-fifth of all US subscribers in a single stroke.” TCI would impose its dominant position - we can either carry your channel and make an investment, or you can miss out on 8 million subscribers. Channels would frequently choose the former. Malone tried to avoid anti-trust by creating Liberty Media. This spinoff featured all of TCI’s investments in cable providers, offering a pseudo-separation from the telecom giant (although John Malone would completely control liberty).
Early, Not Wrong. Several times in history, companies or people were early to an idea before it was feasible. Webvan formed the concept of an online grocery store that could deliver fresh groceries to your house. It raised $800M before flaming out in the public markets. Later, Instacart came along and is now worth over $30B. There are many examples: Napster/Spotify, MySpace/Facebook, Pets.com/Chewy, Go Corporation/iPad, and Loudcloud/AWS. The early idea in the telecom industry was the information superhighway. We’ve discussed this before, but the idea is that you would use your tv to access the outside world, including ordering Pizza, accessing bank info, video calling friends, watching shows, and on-demand movies. The first instantiation of this idea was the QUBE, an expensive set-top box that gave users a plethora of additional interactive services. The QUBE was the launch project of a joint venture between American Express and Warner Communications to launch a cable system in the late 1970s. The QUBE was introduced in 1982 but cost way too much money to produce. With steep losses and mounting debt, Warner Amex Cable “abandoned the QUBE because it was financially infeasible.” In 1992, Malone delivered a now-famous speech on the future of the television industry, predicting that TVs would offer 500 channels to subscribers, with movies, communications, and shopping. 10 years after the QUBE’s failure, Time Warner tried to fulfill Malone’s promise by launching the Full-Service Network (FSN) with the same idea - offering a ton of services to users through a specialized hardware + software approach. This box was still insanely expensive (>$1,000 per box) because the company had to develop all hardware and software. After significant losses, the project was closed. It wasn’t until recently that TV’s evolved to what so many people thought they might become during those exciting internet boom years of the late 1990s. In this example and several above, sometimes the idea is correct, but the medium or user experience is wrong. It turned out that people used a computer and the internet to access shop, order food, or chat with friends, not the TV. In 2015, Domino’s announced that you could now order Pizza from your TV.

Business Themes

Complicated Transactions. Perhaps the craziest deal in John Malone’s years of experience in complex deal-making was his spinoff of Liberty Media. Liberty represented the content arm of TCI and held positions in famous channels like CNN and BET. Malone was intrigued at structuring a deal that would evade taxes and give himself the most potential upside. To create this “artificial” upside, Malone engineered a rights offering, whereby existing TCI shareholders could purchase the right to swap 16 shares of TCI for 1 share of Liberty. Malone set the price to swap at a ridiculously high value of TCI shares - ~valuing Liberty at $300 per share. “It seemed like such a lopsided offer: 16 shares of TCI for just 1 share of Liberty? That valued Liberty at $3000 a share, for a total market value of more than $600M by Malone’s reckoning. How could that be, analysts asked, given that Liberty posed a loss on revenue fo a mere $52M for the pro-forma nine months? No one on Wall Street expected the stock to trade up to $300 anytime soon.” The complexity of the rights offering + spinoff made the transaction opaque enough that even seasoned investors were confused about how it all worked and declined to buy the rights. This deal meant Malone would have more control of the newly separate Liberty Media. At the same time, the stock spin had such low participation that shares were initially thinly traded. Once people realized the quality of the company’s assets, the stock price shot up, along with Malone’s net worth. Even crazier, Malone took a loan from the new Liberty Media to buy shares of the company, meaning he had just created a massive amount of value by putting up hardly any capital. For a man that loved complex deals, this deal is one of his most complex and most lucrative.
Deal Maker Extraordinaire / Levered Rollups. John Malone and TCI loved deals and hated taxes. When TCI was building out cable networks, they acquired a new cable system almost every two weeks. Malone popularized using EBITDA (earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization) as a proxy for real cash flow relative to net income, which incorporates tax and interest payments. To Malone, debt could be used for acquisitions to limit paying taxes and build scale. Once banks got comfortable with EBITDA, Malone went on an acquisition tear. “From 1984 to 1987, Malone had spent nearly $3B for more than 150 cable companies, placing TCI wires into one out of nearly every five with cable in the country, a penetration that was twice that of its next largest rival.” Throughout his career, he rallied many different cable leaders to find a deal that worked for everyone. In 1986, when fellow industry titan Ted Turner ran into financial trouble, Malone reached out to Viacom leader Sumner Redstone, to avoid letting Time Inc (owner of HBO) buy Turner’s CNN. After a quick negotiation, 31 cable operators agreed to rescue Turner Broadcasting with a $550M investment, allowing Turner to maintain control and avoid a takeover. Later, Malone led an industry consortium that included TCI, Comcast, and Cox to create a high speed internet service called, At Home, in 1996. “At Home was responsible for designing the high-speed network and providing services such as e-mail, and a home page featuring news, entertainment, sports, and chat groups. Cable operators were required to upgrade their local systems to accommodate two-way transmission, as well as handle marketing, billing, and customer complaints, for which they would get 65% of the revenue.” At Home ended up buying early internet search company Excite in a famous $7.5B deal, that diluted cable owners and eventually led to bankruptcy for the combined companies. Malone’s instinct was always to try his best to work with a counterparty because he genuinely believed a deal between two competitors provided better outcomes to everyone.
Tracking Stocks. Malone popularized the use of tracking stocks, which are publicly traded companies that mirror the operating performance of the underlying asset owned by a company. John Malone loved tracking stocks because they could be used to issue equity to finance operations and give investors access to specific divisions of a conglomerate while allowing the parent to maintain full control. While tracking stocks have been out of favor (except for Liberty Media, LOL), they were once highly regarded and even featured in the original planning of AT&T’s $48B purchase of TCI in 1998. AT&T financed its TCI acquisition with debt and new AT&T stock, diluting existing shareholders. AT&T CEO Michael Armstrong had initially agreed to use tracking stocks to separate TCI’s business from the declining but cash-flowing telephone business but changed his mind after AT&T’s stock rocketed following the TCI deal announcement. Malone was angry with Armstrong’s actions, and the book includes an explanation: “heres why you should mess with it, Mike: You’ve just issued more than 400 million new shares of AT&T to buy a business that produces no earnings. It will be a huge money-loser for years, given how much you’ll spend on broadband. That’s going to sharply dilute your earnings per share, and your old shareholders like earnings. That will hurt your stock price, and then you can’t use stock to make more acquisitions, then you’re stuck. If you create a tracking stock to the performance of cable, you separate out the losses we produce and show better earnings for your main shareholders; and you can use the tracker to buy more cable interests in tax-free deals.” Tracking stocks all but faded from existence following the internet bubble and early 2000s due to their difficulty of implementation and complexity, which can confuse shareholders and cause the businesses to trade at a large discount. This all begs the question, though - which companies could use tracking stock today? Imagine an AWS tracker, a Youtube tracker, an Instagram tracker, or an Xbox tracker - all of these could allow cloud companies to attract new shareholders, do more specific tax-free mergers, and raise additional capital specific to a business unit.

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January 2022 - Seven Powers by Hamilton Helmer

This month we dove into a classic technology strategy book. The book covers seven major Powers a company can have that offer both a benefit and a barrier to competition. Helmer covers the majority of the book through the lens of different case studies including his favorite company, Netflix.

Tech Themes

Power. After years as a consultant at BCG and decades investing in the public market, Helmer distilled all successful business strategies to seven individual Powers. A Power offers a company a re-inforcing benefit while also providing a barrier to potential competition. This is the epitome of an enduring business model in Helmer's mind. Power describes a company's strength relative to a specific competitor, and Powers focus on a single business unit rather than throughout a business. This makes sense: Apple may have a scale economies Power from its iPhone install base relative to Samsung, but it may not have Power in its AppleTV originals segment relative to Netflix. The seven types of Powers are: Scale Economies, Network Economies, Counter-Positioning, Switching Costs, Branding, Cornered Resources, and Process Power.
Invention. While Powers are somewhat easy to spot (scale economies of Google's search algorithm), creating them is anything but easy. So what underlies every one of the seven Powers? Invention. Helmer pulls invention through the lens of industry Dynamics - external competitive conditions and the forward march of technology create opportunities to pursue new business models, processes, brands, and products. Companies must leverage their resources to craft Powers through trial and error, rather than an upfront conscious decision to pursue something by design. I view this almost as an extension of Clayton Christensen's Resource-Processes-Values (RPV) framework we discussed in July 2020. Companies can find a route to Power through these resources and the crafting process. For Netflix, the route was streaming, but the actual Power came from a strong push into exclusive and original content. The streaming business opened up Netflix's subscriber base, and the content decision provided the ability to amortize great content across its growing subscriber base.
Power Progressions. Powers become available at different points in business progression. This makes sense - what drives a company forward in an unpenetrated market is different from what keeps it going during steady-state - Snowflake's competitive dynamics are different than Nestle's. Helmer defines three stages to a company: Origination, Takeoff, and Stability. These stages mirror the dynamics of S-Curves, which we discussed in our July 2021 book. During the Origination stage, companies can benefit from Cornered Resources and Counter-Positioning. Helmer uses the Pixar management team as an example of Cornered Resources during the Origination phase of 3D animated movies. The company had Steve Jobs (product visionary), John Lasseter (story-teller creative), and Ed Catmull (operations and technology leader). During the early days of the industry, these were the only people that knew how to operate a digital film studio. Another Cornered Resource example might be a company finding a new oil well. Before the company starts drilling, it is the only one that can own that asset. An example of Origination Counter-Positioning might be TSMC when they first launched. At that time, it was standard industry perception that semiconductor companies had to be integrated design manufacturers (IDM) - they had to do everything in-house. TSMC was launched as solely a fabrication facility that companies could use to gain extra manufacturing capacity or try out new designs. This gave them great Counter-Positioning relative to the IDM's and they were dismissed as a non-threat. The Takeoff period offers Network Economies, Scale Economies, and Switching Cost Powers. This phase is the growth phase of businesses. Snowflake currently benefits from Switching Cost dynamics - once you use Snowflake, it's unlikely you'll want to use other data warehouse providers because that process involves data replication and additional costs. Scale economies can be seen in businesses that amortize high costs over their user base, like Amazon. Amazon invests in distribution centers at a significant scale, which improves customer experience, which helps them get more customers - the flywheel repeats, allowing Amazon to continually invest in more distribution centers, further building its scale. Network economies show in social media businesses like Bytedance/TikTok. Users make content that attracts more users; incremental users join the platform because there is so much content to "gain" by joining the platform. Like scale economies, it's almost impossible to go build a competitor because a new company would have to recruit all users from the other platform, which would cost tons of money. The Stability phase offers Branding and Process Power. Branding is hard to generate, but the advantage grows with time. Consider luxury goods providers like LVMH; the older, the more exclusive the brand, the more it's desired, and every day it gets older and becomes more desired. A business can create Process Power by refining and improving operations to such a high degree that it becomes difficult to replicate. Classic examples of Process Power are TSMC's innovative 3-5nm processes today and Toyota's Production System. Toyota has even allowed competitors to tour its factory, but no competitor has replicated its operational efficiency.

Business Themes

Sneak Attack. I've always been surprised by businesses that seemingly "come out of nowhere." In Helmer's eyes, this stems from Counter-Positioning. He tells the story of Vanguard, which was started by Jack Bogle in 1976. "You could charitably describe the reception as enthusiastic: only $11M trickled in from investors. Soon after the launch, [Noble Laureate Paul] Samuelson himself lauded the effort in his column for Newsweek, but with little result: the fund had only reached $17M by mid-1977. Vanguard's operating model depended on others for distribution, and brokers, in particular, were put off by a product that predicated on the notion that they provided no value in helping their clients choose which active funds to select." But Vanguard had something that active managers didn't: low fees and consistency. Vanguard's funds performed like the indices and cost much less than active funds. No longer were individuals underperforming the market and paying advisors to pick actively managed funds. Furthermore, Vanguard continually invested all profits back into its funds, so it looked like it wasn't making money while it grew its assets under management. It's so hard to spot these sneak attacks while they are happening. But one that might be happening right now is Cloudflare relative to AWS. Cloudflare launched its low-cost R2 service (a play on Amazon's famous S3 storage technology). Cloudflare is offering a cheaper product at a much lower cost and is leveraging its large installed base with its CDN product to get people in the door. It's unclear whether this will offer Power over AWS because it's confusing what the barrier might be other than some relating to switching costs. However, there will likely be reluctance on AWS's part to cut prices because of its scale and public company growth targets.
A New Valuation Formula. Helmer offers a very unique take on the traditional DCF valuation approach. Investors have long suggested the value of any business was equal to the present value of its future discounted cash flows. In contrast to the traditional approach of summing up a firm's cash flows and discounting it, Helmer takes a look at all of the cash flows subject to the industry in which firms compete. In this formula (shown above), M0 represents the current market size, g the discounted market growth factor, s the long-term market share of the company, and m the long-term differential margin (net profit margin over that needed to cover the cost of capital). More simply, a company is worth it's Market Scale (Mo x g) x its Power (s x m). This implies that a company is worth the portion of the industry's profits it collects over time. This formula helps consider Power progression relative to industry dynamics and company stage. In the Origination stage, an industry's profits may be small but growing very quickly. If we think that a competitor in the industry can achieve an actual Power, it will likely gain a large portion of the long-term market. Thus, watching market share dynamics unfold can tell us about the potential for a route to Power and the ability for a company to achieve a superior value to its near-term cash flows.
Collateral Damage. If companies are aware of these Powers and how other companies can achieve them, how can companies not take proactive action to avoid being on the losing end of a Power struggle? Helmer lays out what he calls Collateral Damage, or the unwillingness of a competitor to find the right path to navigating the damage caused by a competitor's Power. His point is actually very nuanced - it's not the incumbent's unwillingness to invest in the same type of solution as the competitor (although that happens). The incumbent's business gets trashed as collateral damage by the new entrant. The incumbent can respond to the challenger by investing in the new innovation. But where counter-positioning really takes hold is if the incumbent recognizes the attractiveness of the business model/innovation but is stymied from investing. Why would a business leader choose not to invest in something attractive? In the case of Vanguard competitor Fidelity, any move into passive funds could cause steep cannibalization of their revenue. So in response, a CEO might decide to just keep their existing business and "milk" all of its cash flow. In addition, how could Fidelity invest in a business that completely undermined their actively managed mutual fund business? Often CEOs will have a negative bias toward the competing business model despite the positive NPV of an investment in the new business. Just think how long it took SAP to start selling Cloud subscriptions compared to its on-premise license/maintenance model. Lastly, a CEO might not invest in the promising new business model if they are worried about job security. This is the classic example of the principal-agent problem we discussed in June. Would you invest in a new, unproven business model if you faced a declining stock price and calls for your resignation? In addition, annual CEO compensation is frequently tagged to stock price performance and growth targets. The easiest way to achieve near-term stock price appreciation and growth targets is staying with what has worked in the past (and M&A!). Its the path of least resistance! Counter-positioning and collateral damage are nuanced and difficult to spot, but the complex emotions and issues become obvious over time.

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October 2021 - Unapologetically Ambitious by Shellye Archambeau

This month we hear the story of famous technology CEO Shellye Archambeau, former leader of GRC software provider, Metricstream. Archambeau packs her memoir full of amazing stories and helpful career advice; the book is a must-read for any ambitious leader looking for how to break into Silicon Valley’s top ranks.

Tech Themes

The Art of the Pivot. When Archambeau joined Zaplet in 2003 as its new CEO, she had a frank conversation with the chairman of the board Vinod Khosla. She asked him one question: “You have a great reputation for supporting your companies, but you also have a reputation of being strong-willed and sometimes dominating. I just need to know before I answer [where I will take the job], are you hiring me to implement your strategy, or are you hiring me to be the CEO?” Vinod responded: “I would be hiring you to be the CEO, to run the company, fully responsible and accountable.” With that answer, Archambeau accepted the job and achieved her life-long goal of becoming a CEO before age forty. Archambeau had just inherited a struggling former silicon-valley darling that had raised over $100M but had failed to translate that money into meaningful sales. Zaplet’s highly configurable technology was a vital asset, but the company had not locked on to a real problem. Struggling to set a direction for the company, Archambeau spoke with board member Roger McNamee, who suggested pivoting into compliance software. In early 2004, Zaplet merged with compliance software provider MetricStream (taking its name), with Archambeau at the helm of the combined company. She wasn’t out of the woods yet. The 2008/09 financial crisis pushed MetricStream to the brink. With less than $2M in the bank, Archambeau ditched her salary, executed a layoff, and rallied her executive through the financial crisis. As banks recapitalized, they sought new compliance and risk management platforms to avoid future issues, and MetricStream was well-positioned to serve this new set of highly engaged customers. Archambeau’s first and only CEO role lasted for 14 years, as she led Metricstream to $100M in revenue and 2,000+ employees.
Taking Calculated Risks. Although Archambeau architected a successful turnaround, her career was not without challenges. After years of working her way up at IBM, Archambeau strategically chose to seek out a challenging international assignment, an essential staple of IBM’s CEOs. While working in Tokyo as VP and GM for Public Sector in Asia Pacific, Archambeau was not selected for a meeting with Lou Gerstner, IBM’s CEO. She put it bluntly: “I was ranked highly in terms of my performance - close to the top of the yearly ranking, not just in Japan, but globally. Yet I was pretty sure I wasn’t earning the salary many of my colleagues were getting.” It was then that Archambeau realized that she might need to leave IBM to achieve her goal of becoming CEO. She left IBM and became President of Blockbuster.com, as they were beginning to compete with Netflix. Blockbuster was staunch in its dismissal of Netflix, refusing to buy the streaming company when it had a chance for a measly $50M. Archambeau was unhappy with management’s flippant attitude toward a legitimate threat and left Blockbuster’s Dallas HQ after only 9 months. After this difficult work experience, Archambeau sought out work in Silicon Valley, moving to the nation’s tech hub without her family. She became Head of Sales and Marketing for Northpoint Communications. The company was fighting a losing DSL cable battle, and after a merger with Verizon fell through, the company went bankrupt. Then Archambeau became CMO of Loudcloud, Ben Horowitz’s early cloud product covered in our March 2020 book, The Hard Thing About Hard Things. But things were already blowing up at Loudcloud, and after a year, Archambeau was looking for another role following the sale of LoudCloud’s services business to EDS. At 40 years old, Archambeau had completed international assignments, managed companies across technology, internet, and telecom, and seen several mergers and bankruptcies. That experience laid the bedrock for her attitude: “After the dot-com bubble burst, I would need to double down and take greater risks, but-and this probably won’t surprise you-I had planned for this…It’s 2002, I’m almost forty, I’ve learned a great deal from Northpoint and Loudcloud, and I’m feeling ready for my chance to be a CEO.” Archambeau was always ready for the next challenge, unafraid of the risks posed - prepared to make her mark on the Tech industry.
Find the Current. Trends drive the Tech industry, and finding and riding those trends can be hugely important to creating a career. As in Archambeau’s journey, she saw the growing role of technology as an intern at IBM in the 1980s and knew the industry would thrive over time. As the internet and telecom took hold, she jumped into new and emerging businesses, unafraid of roadblocks. As she puts it: “Ultimately, when it comes to reaching your goals, the real skill lies in spotting the strongest current - in an organization, in an industry, even in the larger economy - and then positioning yourself so it propels you forward. Sail past the opportunities that lead you into the weeds and take the opportunities that will move you toward your goals.”

Business Themes

The Power of Networking. One of Archambeau’s not-so-secret strategies toward career success was networking. She is a people person and radiates energy in every conversation. Beyond this natural disposition, Archambeau took a very concerted and intentional approach toward building her network, and it shows. Archambeau crosses paths with Silicon Valley legends like Bill Campbell and Ben Horowitz throughout the book. Beyond one-to-one mentorship relationships, Archambeau joined several organizations to grow her network, including Watermark, the Committee of 200, ITSM Form, Silicon Valley Leadership Group, and more. These groups offered a robust foundation and became a strong community, empowering and inspiring her to lead!
Support and Tradeoffs. As a young college sophomore, Archambeau knew she wanted to be the breadwinner of the family. When she met her soon-to-be husband Scotty, a 38-year-old former NFL athlete, she was direct with him: “I would really like to be able to have someone stay home with the kids, especially when they are in school. But the thing is…I just don’t want it to be me.” Scotty thought patiently, “You know, Archambeau, I’ve had a lot of experiences in my life. I’ve had three different careers and you know I like working. But, I think I could see myself doing that, for you.” That was the icing on top of the cake. The two married and had two children while Archambeau worked up the ranks to become CEO. Scotty took care of the kids, Kethlyn and Kheaton, when Archambeau moved to Silicon Valley for work. She understood the tough tradeoff she was making and acknowledged that her relationship with her daughter felt more strained during Kethlyn’s teenage years. It begs the question, how comfortable are you with the tradeoffs you are making today? Moving to a new city to pursue a career that may strain family dynamics is never an easy decision. Family was always important to Archambeau, but it became front and center when Scotty was diagnosed with blood cancer in 2010. Although she was still CEO of MetricStream, things changed: “I had accumulated vacation days, I was putting off trips and experiences for ‘when the time was right’…We’re going to do things that we would have waited to do. We’re going to them now.” Family and friends became a priority - they always were!
Earning Respect. As a Black woman in Technology, Archambeau had to overcome the odds repeatedly. She recounted: “As a young African American woman, I was accustomed to earning respect. Whenever I got a promotion or a new job, I walked into it understanding that people likely would assume I was not quite qualified or not equity ready. I presumed I need to establish relationships and credibility, to develop a reputation, to prove myself.” While incredibly sad that Archambeau had to deal with this questioning, she learned how to use it to her advantage. As her family moved around the country, Archambeau faced repeated challenges: getting denied from taking advanced classes in school, getting bullied and beaten walking home from school, and starting high school with leg braces in a new city. Through these difficulties, she developed a simple methodology for getting through tough times: “Accept the circumstances, fake it ‘til you make it, control what you can, and trust that things will get better.” Archambeau took that mentality with her and earned the respect of the entire IBM Japan when she presented her introduction slides entirely in Japanese to build trust with her new co-workers. It was the first time a foreign executive had done so. Archambeau’s ability to boldly take action in face of many obstacles is impressive.

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January 2021 - Technological Revolutions and Financial Capital: The Dynamics of Bubbles and Golden Ages by Carlota Perez

This month we read Carlota Perez’s understudied book covering the history of technology breakthroughs and revolutions. This book marries the role of financing and technology breakthrough so seamlessly in an easy to digest narrative style.

Tech Themes

The 5 Technology Revolutions. Perez identifies the five major technological revolutions: The Industrial Revolution (1771-1829), The Age of Steam and Railways (1829-1873), The Age of Steel, Electricity and Heavy Engineering (1875-1918), The Age of Oil, the Automobile and Mass Production (1908-1974), and The Age of Information and Telecommunications (1971-Today). When looking back at these individual revolutions, one can recognize how powerful it is to view the world and technology in these incredibly long waves. Many of these periods lasted for over fifty years while their geographic dispersion and economic effects fully came to fruition. These new technologies fundamentally alter society - when it becomes clear that the revolution is happening, many people jump on the bandwagon. As Perez puts it, “The great clusters of talent come forth after the evolution is visible and because it is visible.” Each revolution produces a myriad of change in society. The industrial revolution popularized factory production, railways created national markets, electricity created the power to build steel buildings, oil and cars created mass markets and assembly lines, and the microprocessor and internet created amazing companies like Amazon and Airbnb.
The Phases of Technology Revolution. After a decently long gestation period during which the old revolution has permeated across the world, the new revolution normally starts with a big bang, some discovery or breakthrough (like the transistor or steam engine) that fundamentally pushed society into a new wave of innovation. Coupled with these big bangs, is re-defined infrastructure from the prior eras - as an example, the Telegraph and phone wires were created along the initial railways, as they allowed significant distance of uninterrupted space to build on. Another example is electricity - initially, homes were wired to serve lightbulbs, it was only many years later that great home appliances came into use. This initial period of application discovery is called the Irruption phase. The increasing interest in forming businesses causes a Frenzy period like the Railway Mania or the Dot-com Boom, where everyone thinks they can get rich quick by starting a business around the new revolution. As the first 20-30 years of a revolution play themselves out, there grows a strong divide between those who were part of the revolution and those who were not; there is an economic, social, and regulatory mismatch between the old guard and the new revolution. After an uprising (like the populism we have seen recently) and bubble collapse (Check your crystal ball), regulatory changes typically foster a harmonious future for the technology. Following these changes, we enter the Synergy phase, where technology can fully flourish due to accommodating and clear regulation. This Synergy phase propagates outward across all countries until even the lagging adopters have started the adoption process. At this point the cycle enters into Maturity, waiting for the next big advance to start the whole process over again.
Where are we in the cycle today? We tweeted at Carlota Perez to answer this question AND SHE RESPONDED! My question to Perez was: With the recent wave of massive, transformational innovation like the public cloud providers, and the iPhone, are we still in the Age of Information? These technological waves are often 50-60 years and yet we’ve arguably been in the same age for quite a while. This wave started in 1971, exactly 50 years ago, with Intel and the creation of the microprocessor. Are we in the Frenzy phase with record amounts of investment capital, an enormous demand for early stage companies, and new financial innovations like Affirm’s debt securitizations? Or have we not gotten to the Frenzy phase yet? Is the public cloud or the iPhone the start of a new big bang and we have overlapping revolutions for the first time ever? Obviously identifying the truly breakthrough moments in technology history is way easier after the fact, so maybe we are too new to know what really is a seminal moment. Perez’s answer, though only a few words, fully provides scope to the question. Perez suggests we are still in the installation phase (Irruption and Frenzy) of the new technology and that makes a lot of sense. Sure, internet usage is incredibly high in the US (96%) but not in other large countries. China (the world’s largest country by population) has only 63% using the internet and India (the world’s second-largest country) has only 55% of its population using the internet. Ethiopia, with a population of over 100M people only has 18% using the internet. There is still a lot of runway left for the internet to bloom! In addition, only recently have people been equipped with a powerful computing device that fits in their pocket - and low-priced phones are now making their way to all parts of the world led by firms like Chinese giant Transsion. Added to the fact that we are not fully installed with this revolution, is the rise of populism, a political movement that seeks to mobilize ordinary people who feel disregarded by the elite group. Populism has reared its ugly head across many nations like the US (Donald Trump), UK (Brexit), Brazil (Bolsonaro) and many other countries. The rise of populism is fueled by the growing dichotomy between the elites who have benefitted socially and monetarily from the revolution and those who have not. In the 1890’s, anti-railroad sentiment drove the creation of the populist party. More recently, people have become angry at tech giants (Facebook, Google, Amazon, Apple, Twitter) for unfair labor practices, psychological manipulation, and monopolistic tendencies. The recent movie, the Social Dilemma, which suggests a more humane and regulatory focused approach to social media, speaks to the need for regulation of these massive companies. It is also incredibly ironic to watch a movie about how social media is manipulating its users while streaming a movie that was recommended to me on Netflix, a company that has popularized incessant binge-watching through UX manipulation, not dissimilar to Facebook and Google’s tactics. I expect these companies to get regulated soon -and I hope that once that happens, we enter into the Synergy phase of growth and value accruing to all people.

Yes, I do. I will find the time to reply to you properly. But just quickly, I think installation was prolonged by QE &casino finance; we are at the turning point (the successful rise of populism is a sign) and maybe post-Covid we'll go into synergy.
— Carlota Perez (@CarlotaPrzPerez) January 17, 2021

Business Themes

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The role of Financial Capital in Revolutions. As the new technology revolutions play themselves out, financial capital appears right alongside technology developments, ready to mold the revolution into the phases suggested by Perez. In the irruption phase, as new technology is taking hold, financial capital that had been on the sidelines waiting out the Maturity phase of the previous revolution plows into new company formation and ideas. The financial sector tries to adopt the new technology as soon as possible (we are already seeing this with Quantum computing), so it can then espouse the benefits to everyone it talks to, setting the stage for increasing financing opportunities. Eventually, demand for financing company creation goes crazy, and you enter into a Frenzy phase. During this phase, there is a discrepancy between the value of financial capital and production capital, or money used by companies to create actual products and services. Financial capital believes in unrealistic returns on investment, funding projects that don’t make any sense. Perez notes: “In relation to the canal Mania of the 1790s, disorder and lack of coordination prevailed in investment decisions. Canals were built ‘with different widths and depths and much inefficient routing.’ According to Dan Roberts at the Financial Times, in 2001 it was estimated that only 1 to 2 percent of the fiber optic cable buried under Europe and the United States had so far been turned on.” These Frenzy phases create bubbles and further ingrain regulatory mismatch and political divide. Could we be in one now with deals getting priced at 125x revenue for tiny companies? After the institutional reckoning, the Technology revolution enters the Synergy phase where production capital has really strong returns on investment - the path of technology is somewhat known and real gains are to be made by continuing investment (especially at more reasonable asset prices). Production capital continues to go to good use until the technology revolution fully plays itself out, entering into the Maturity phase.
Casino Finance and Prolonging Bubbles. One point that Perez makes in her tweet, is that this current bubble has been prolonged by QE and casino finance. Quantitative easing is a monetary policy where the federal reserve (US’s central bank) buys government bonds issued by the treasury department to inject money into the financial ecosystem. This money at the federal reserve can purchase bank loans and assets, offering more liquidity to the financial system. This process is used to create low-interest rates, which push individuals and corporations to invest their money because the rate of interest on savings accounts is really really low. Following the financial crisis and more recently COVID-19, the Federal Reserve lowered interest rates and started quantitative easing to help the hurting economy. In Perez’s view, these actions have prolonged the Irruption and Frenzy phases because it forces more money into investment opportunities. On top of quantitative easing, governments have allowed so-called Casino Capitalism - allowing free-market ideals to shape governmental policies (like Reagan’s economic plan). Uninterrupted free markets are in theory economically efficient but can give rise to bad actors - like Enron’s manipulation of California’s energy markets after deregulation. By engaging in continual quantitative easing and deregulation, speculative markets, like collateralized loan obligations during the financial crisis, are allowed to grow. This creates a risk-taking environment that can only end in a frenzy and bubble.
Synergy Phase and Productive Capital Allocation. Capital allocation has been called the most important part of being a great investor and business leader. Think about being the CEO of Coca Cola for a second - you have thousands of competing projects, vying for budget - how do you determine which ones get the most money? In the investing world, capital allocation is measured by conviction. As George Soros’s famous quote goes: “It's not whether you're right or wrong, but how much money you make when you're right and how much you lose when you're wrong.” Clayton Christensen took the ideas of capital allocation and compared them to life investments, coming to the conclusion: “Investments in relationships with friends and family need to be made long, long before you’ll see any sign that they are paying off. If you defer investing your time and energy until you see that you need to, chances are it will already be too late.” Capital and time allocation are underappreciated concepts because they often seem abstract to the everyday humdrum of life. It is interesting to think about capital allocation within Perez’s long-term framework. The obvious approach would be to identify the stage (Irruption, Frenzy, Synergy, Maturity) and make the appropriate time/money decisions - deploy capital into the Irruption phase, pull money out at the height of the Frenzy, buy as many companies as possible at the crash/turning point, hold through most of the Synergy, and sell at Maturity to identify the next Irruption phase. Although that would be fruitful, identifying market bottoms and tops is a fool’s errand. However, according to Perez, the best returns on capital investment typically happen during the Synergy phase, where production capital (money employed by firms through investment in R&D) reigns supreme. During this time, the revolutionary applications of recently frenzied technology finally start to bear fruit. They are typically poised to succeed by an accommodating regulatory and social environment. Unsurprisingly, after the diabolic grifting financiers of the frenzy phase are exposed (see Worldcom, Great Financial Crisis, and Theranos), social pressures on regulators typically force an agreement to fix the loopholes that allowed these manipulators to take advantage of the system. After Enron, the Sarbanes-Oxley act increased disclosure requirements and oversight of auditors. After the GFC, the Dodd-Frank act mandated bank stress tests and introduced financial stability oversight. With the problems of the frenzy phase "fixed” for the time being, the social attitude toward innovation turns positive once again and the returns to production capital start to outweigh financial capital which is now reigned in under the new rules. Suffice to say, we are probably in the Frenzy phase in the technology world, with a dearth of venture opportunities, creating a massive valuation increase for early-stage companies. This will change eventually and as Warren Buffett says: “It’s only when the tide goes out that you learn who’s been swimming naked.” When the bubble does burst, regulation of big technology companies will usher in the best returns period for investors and companies alike.

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November 2020 - Tape Sucks: Inside Data Domain, A Silicon Valley Growth Story by Frank Slootman

This month we read a short, under-discussed book by current Snowflake and former ServiceNow and Data Domain CEO, Frank Slootman. The book is just like Frank - direct and unafraid. Frank has had success several times in the startup world and the story of Data Domain provides a great case study of entrepreneurship. Data Domain was a data deduplication company, offering a 20:1 reduction of data backed up to tape casettes by using new disk drive technology.

Tech Themes

Data Domain’s 2008 10-K prior to being acquired

First time CEO at a Company with No Revenue. Frank is an immigrant to the US, coming from the Netherlands shortly after graduating from the University of Rotterdam. After being rejected by IBM 10+ times, he joined Burroughs corporation, an early mainframe provider which subsequently merged with its direct competitor Sperry for $4.8B in 1986. Frank then spent some time at Compuware and moved back to the Netherlands to help it integrate the acquisition of Uniface, an early customizable report building software. After spending time there, he went to Borland software in 1997, working his way up the product management ranks but all the while being angered by time spent lobbying internally, rather than building. Frank joined Data Domain in the Spring of 2003 - when it had no customers, no revenue, and was burning cash. The initial team and VC’s were impressive - Kai Li, a computer science professor on sabbatical from Princeton, Ben Zhu, an EIR at USVP, and Brian Biles, a product leader with experience at VA Linux and Sun Microsystems. The company was financed by top-tier VC’s New Enterprise Associates and Greylock Partners, with Aneel Bhusri (Founder and current CEO of Workday) serving as initial CEO and then board chairman. This was a stacked team and Slootman knew it: “I’d bring down the average IQ of the company by joining, which felt right to me.” The Company had been around for 18 months and already burned through a significant amount of money when Frank joined. He knew he needed to raise money relatively soon after joining and put the Company’s chances bluntly: “Would this idea really come together and captivate customers? Nobody knew. We, the people on the ground floor, were perhaps, the most surprised by the extraordinary success we enjoyed.”
Playing to his Strengths: Capital Efficiency. One of the big takeaways from the Innovators by Walter Issacson was that individuals or teams at the nexus of disciplines - primarily where the sciences meet the humanities, often achieved breakthrough success. The classic case study for this is Apple - Steve Jobs had an intense love of art, music, and design and Steve Wozniak was an amazing technologist. Frank has cultivated a cross-discipline strength at the intersection of Sales and Technology. This might be driven by Slootman’s background is in economics. The book has several references to economic terms, which clearly have had an impact on Frank’s thinking. Data Domain espoused capital efficiency: “We traveled alone, made few many-legged sales calls, and booked cheap flights and hotels: everybody tried to save a dime for the company.” The results showed - the business went from $800K of revenue in 2004 to $275 million by 2008, generating $75M in cash flow from operations. Frank’s capital efficiency was interesting and broke from traditional thinking - most people think to raise a round and build something. Frank took a different approach: “When you are not yet generating revenue, conservation of resource is the dominant theme.” Over time, “when your sales activity is solidly paying for itself,” the spending should shift from conservative to aggressive (like Snowflake is doing this now). The concept of sales efficiency is somewhat talked about, but given the recent fundraising environment, is often dismissed. Sales efficiency can be thought of as: “How much revenue do I generate for every $1 spent in sales and marketing?” Looking at the P&L below, we see Data Domain was highly efficient in its sales and marketing activity - the company increased revenue $150M in 2008, despite spending $115M in sales and marketing (a ratio of 1.3x). Contrast this with a company like Slack which spent $403M to acquire $230M of new revenue (a ratio of 0.6x). It gets harder to acquire customers at scale, so this efficiency is supposed to come down over time but best in class is hopefully above 1x. Frank clearly understands when to step on the gas with investing, as both ServiceNow and Snowflake have remained fairly efficient (from a sales perspective at least) while growing to a significant scale.
Technology for Technology’s Sake. “Many technologies are conceived without a clear, precise notion of the intended use.” Slootman hits on a key point and one that the tech industry has struggled to grasp throughout its history. So many products and companies are established around budding technology with no use case. We’ve discussed Magic Leap’s fundraising money-pit (still might find its way), and Iridium Communications, the massive satellite telephone that required people to carry a suitcase around to use it. Gartner, the leading IT research publication (which is heavily influenced by marketing spend from companies) established the Technology Hype Cycle, complete with the “Peak of inflated expectations,” and the “Trough of Disillusionment” for categorizing technologies that fail to live up to their promise. There have been several waves that have come and gone: AR/VR, Blockchain, and most recently, Serverless. Its not so much that these technologies were wrong or not useful, its rather that they were initially described as a panacea to several or all known technology hindrances and few technologies ever live up to that hype. Its common that new innovations spur tons of development but also lots of failure, and this is Slootman’s caution to entrepreneurs. Data Domain was attacking a problem that existed already (tape storage) and the company provided what Clayton Christensen would call a sustaining innovation (something that Slootman points out). Whenever things go into “winter state”, like the internet after the dot-com bubble, or the recent Crpyto Winter which is unthawing as I write; it is time to pay attention and understand the relevance of the innovation.

Business Themes

Importance of Owning Sales. Slootman spends a considerable amount of this small book discussing sales tactics and decision making, particularly with respect to direct sales and OEM relationships. OEM deals are partnerships with other companies whereby one company will re-sell the software, hardware, or service of another company. Crowdstrike is a popular product with many OEM relationships. The Company drives a significant amount of its sales through its partner model, who re-sell on behalf of Crowdstrike. OEM partnerships with big companies present many challenges: “First of all, you get divorced from your customer because the OEM is now between you and them, making customer intimacy challenging. Plus, as the OEM becomes a large part of your business, for all intents and purposes they basically own you without paying for the privilege…Never forget that nobody wants to sell your product more than you do.” The challenges don’t end there. Slootman points out that EMC discarded their previous OEM vendor in the data deduplication space, right after acquiring Data Domain. On top of that, the typical reseller relationship happens at a 10-20% margin, degrading gross margins and hurting ability to invest. It is somewhat similar to the challenges open-source companies like MongoDB and Elastic have run into with their core software being…free. Amazon can just OEM their offering and cut them out as a partner, something they do frequently. Partner models can be sustainable, but the give and take from the big company is a tough balance to strike. Investors like organic adoption, especially recently with the rise of freemium SaaS models percolating in startups. Slootman’s point is that at some point in enterprise focused businesses, the Company must own direct sales (and relationships) with its customers to drive real efficiency. After the low cost to acquire freemium adopters buy the product, the executive team must pivot to traditional top down enterprise sales to drive a successful and enduring relationship with the customer.
In the Thick of Things. Slootman has some very concise advice for CEOs: be a fighter, show some humanity, and check your ego at the door. “Running a startup reduces you to your most elementary instincts, and survival is on your mind most of the time…The CEO is the ‘Chief Combatant,’ warrior number one.” Slootman views the role of CEO as a fighter, ready to be the first to jump into the action, at all times. And this can be incredibly productive for business as well. Tony Xu, the founder and CEO of Doordash, takes time out every month to do delivery for his own company, in order to remain close to the customer and the problems of the company. Jeff Bezos famously still responds and views emails from customers at jeff@amazon.com. Being CEO also requires a willingness to put yourself out there and show your true personality. As Slootman puts it: “People can instantly finger a phony. Let them know who you really are, warts and all.” As CEO you are tasked with managing so many people and being involved in all aspects of the business, it is easy to become rigid and unemotional in everyday interactions. Harvard Business School professor and former leader at Uber distills it down to a simple phrase: “Begin With Trust.” All CEO’s have some amount of ego, driving them to want to be at the top of their organization. Slootman encourages CEO’s to be introspective, and try to recognize blind spots, so ego doesn’t drive day-to-day interactions with employees. One way to do that is simple: use the pronoun “we” when discussing the company you are leading. Though Slootman doesn’t explicitly call it out - all of these suggestions (fighting, showing empathy, getting rid of ego) are meant to build trust with employees.
R-E-C-I-P-E for a Great Culture. The last fifth of the book is all focused on building culture at companies. It is the only topic Slootman stays on for more than a few chapters, so you know its important! RECIPE was an acronym created by the employees at Data Domain to describe the company’s values: Respect, Excellence, Customer, Integrity, Performance, Execution. Its interesting how simple and focused these values are. Technology has pushed its cultural delusion’s of grandeur to an extreme in recent years. The WeWork S-1 hilariously started with: “We are a community company committed to maximum global impact. Our mission is to elevate the world’s consciousness.” But none of Data Domain’s values were about changing the world to be a better place - they were about doing excellent, honest work for customers. Slootman is lasered focused on culture, and specifically views culture as an asset - calling it: “The only enduring, sustainable form of differentiation. These days, we don’t have a monopoly for very long on talent, technology, capital, or any other asset; the one thing that is unique to us is how we choose to come together as a group of people, day in and day out. How many organizations are there that make more than a halfhearted attempt at this?” Technology companies have taken different routes in establishing culture: Google and Facebook have tried to create culture by showering employees with unbelievable benefits, Netflix has focused on pure execution and transparency, and Microsoft has re-vamped its culture by adopting a Growth Mindset (has it really though?). Google originally promoted “Don’t be evil,” as part of its Code of Conduct but dropped the motto in 2018. Employees want to work for mission-driven organizations, but not all companies are really changing the world with their products, and Frank did not try to sugarcoat Data Domain’s data-duplication technology as a way to “elevate the world’s consciousness.” He created a culture driven by performance and execution - providing a useful product to businesses that needed it. The culture was so revered that post-acquisition, EMC instituted Data Domain’s performance management system. Data Domain employees were looked at strangely by longtime EMC executives, who had spent years in a big and stale company. Culture is a hard thing to replicate and a hard thing to change as we saw with the Innovator’s Dilemma. Might as well use it to help the company succeed!

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March 2020 - The Hard Thing About Hard Things by Ben Horowitz

Ben Horowitz, GP of the famous investment fund Andreessen Horowitz, addresses the not-so-pleasant aspects of being a founder/CEO during a crisis. This book provides an excellent framework for anyone going through the struggles of scaling a business and dealing with growing pains.

Tech Themes

The importance of Netscape. Now that its been relegated to history by the rise of AOL and internet explorer, its hard to believe that Netscape was ever the best web browser. Founded by Marc Andreessen, who had founded the first web browser, Mosaic (as a teenager!), Netscape would go on to achieve amazing success only to blow up in the face of competition and changes to internet infrastructure. Netscape was an incredible technology company, and as Brian McCullough shows in last month’s TBOTM, Netscape was the posterchild for the internet bubble. But for all the fanfare around Netscape’s seminal IPO, little is discussed about its massive and longstanding technological contributions. In 1995, early engineer Brendan Eich created Javascript, which still stands as the dominant front end language for the web. In the same year, the Company developed Secure Socket Layer (SSL), the most dominant basic internet security protocol (and reason for HTTPS). On top of those two fundamental technologies, Netscape also developed the internet cookie, in 1994! Netscape is normally discussed as the amazing company that ushered many of the first internet users onto the web, but its rarely lauded for its longstanding technological contributions. Ben Horowitz, author of the Hard Thing About Hard Things was an early employee and head of the server business unit for Netscape when it went public.
Executing a pivot. Famous pivots have become part of startup lore whether it be in product (Glitch (video game) —> Slack (chat)), business model (Netflix DVD rental —> Streaming), or some combo of both (Snowdevil (selling snowboards online) —> Shopify (ecommerce tech)). The pivot has been hailed as necessary tool in every entrepreneur’s toolbox. Though many are sensationalized, the pivot Ben Horowitz underwent at LoudCloud / Opsware is an underrated one. LoudCloud was a provider of web hosting services and managed services for enterprises. The Company raised a boatload ($346M) of money prior to going public in March 2001, after the internet bubble had already burst. The Company was losing a lot of money and Ben knew that the business was on its last legs. After executing a 400 person layoff, he sold the managed services part of the business to EDS, a large IT provider, for $63.5M. LoudCloud had a software tool called Opsware that it used to manage all of the complexities of the web hosting business, scaling infrastructure with demand and managing compliance in data centers. After the sale was executed, the company’s stock fell to $0.35 per share, even trading below cash, which meant the markets viewed the Company as already bankrupt. The acquisition did something very important for Ben and the Opsware team, it bought them time - the Company had enough cash on hand to execute until Q4 2001 when it had to be cash flow positive. To balance out these cash issues, Opsware purchased Tangram, Rendition Networks, and Creekpath, which were all software vendors that helped manage the software of data centers. This had two effects - slowing the burn (these were profitable companies), and building a substantial product offering for data center providers. Opsware started making sales and the stock price began to tick up, peaking the attention of strategic acquirers. Ultimately it came down to BMC Software and HP. BMC offered $13.25 per share, the Opsware board said $14, BMC countered with $13.50 and HP came in with a $14.25 offer, a 38% premium to the stock price and a total valuation of $1.6B, which the board could not refuse. The Company changed business model (services —> software), made acquisitions and successfully exited, amidst a terrible environment for tech companies post-internet bubble.
The Demise of the Great HP. Hewlett-Packard was one of the first garage-borne, silicon valley technology companies. The company was founded in Palo Alto by Bill Hewlett and Dave Packard in 1939 as a provider of test and measurement instruments. Over the next 40 years, the company moved into producing some of the best printers, scanners, calculators, logic analyzers, and computers in the world. In the 90s, HP continued to grow its product lines in the computing space, and executed a spinout of its manufacturing / non-computing device business in 1999. 1999 marks the tragic beginning of the end for HP. The first massive mistake was the acquisition of Compaq, a flailing competitor in the personal computer market, who had acquired DEC (a losing microprocessor company), a few years earlier. The acquisition was heavily debated, with Walter Hewlett, son of the founder and board director at the time, engaging in a proxy battle with then current CEO, Carly Firorina. The new HP went on to lose half of its market value and incur heavy job losses that were highly publicized. This started a string of terrible acquisitions including EDS, 3COM, Palm Inc., and Autonomy for a combined $28.8B. The Company spun into two divisions - HP Inc. and HP Enterprise in 2015 and each had their own spinouts and mergers from there (Micro Focus and DXC Technology). Today, HP Inc. sells computers and printers, and HPE sells storage, networking and server technology. What can be made of this sad tale? HP suffered from a few things. First, poor long term direction - in hindsight their acquisitions look especially terrible as a repeat series of massive bets on technology that was already being phased out due to market pressures. Second, HP had horrible corporate governance during the late 90s and 2000s - board in-fighting over acquisitions, repeat CEO fiirings over cultural issues, chairman-CEO’s with no checks, and an inability to see the outright fraud in their Autonomy acquisition. Lastly, the Company saw acquisitions and divestitures as band-aids - new CEO entrants Carly Fiorina (from AT&T), Mark Hurd (from NCR), Leo Apotheker (from SAP), and Meg Whitman (from eBay) were focused on making an impact at HP which meant big acquisitions and strategic shifts. Almost none of these panned out, and the repeated ideal shifts took a toll on the organization as the best talent moved elswehere. Its sad to see what has happened at a once-great company.

Business Themes

Ill, not sick: going public at the end of the internet bubble. Going public is supposed to be the culmination of a long entrepreneurial journey for early company employees, but according to Ben Horowitz’s experience, going public during the internet bubble pop was terrible. Loudcloud had tried to raise money privately but struggled given the terrible conditions for raising money at the beginning of 2001. Its not included in the book but the reason the Company failed to raise money was its obscene valuation and loss. The Company was valued at $1.15B in its prior funding round and could only report $6M in Net Revenue on a $107M loss. The Company sought to go public at $10 per share ($700M valuation), but after an intense and brutal roadshow that left Horowitz physically sick, they settled for $6.00 per share, a massive write-down from the previous round. The fact that the banks were even able to find investors to take on this significant risk at this point in the business cycle was a marvel. Timing can be crucial in an IPO as we saw during the internet bubble; internet “businesses” could rise 4-5x on their first trading day because of the massive and silly web landgrab in the late 90s. On the flip side, going public when investors don’t want what you’re selling is almost a death sentence. Although they both have critical business and market issues, WeWork and Casper are clear examples of the importance of timing. WeWork and Casper were late arrivals on the unicorn IPO train. Let me be clear - both have huge issues (WeWork - fundamental business model, Casper - competition/differentiation) but I could imagine these types of companies going public during a favorable time period with a relatively strong IPO. Both companies had massive losses, and investors were especially wary of losses after the failed IPOs of Lyft and Uber, which were arguably the most famous unicorns to go public at the time. Its not to say that WeWork and Casper wouldn’t have had trouble in the public markets, but during the internet bubble these companies could’ve received massive valuations and raised tons of cash instead of seeking bailouts from Softbank and reticent public market investors.
Peactime / Wartime CEO. The genesis of this book was a 2011 blog post written by Horowitz detailing Peacetime and Wartime CEO behavior. As the book and blog post describe, “Peacetime in business means those times when a company has a large advantage vs. the competition in its core market, and its market is growing. In times of peace, the company can focus on expanding the market and reinforcing the company’s strengths.” On the other hand, to describe Wartime, Horowitz uses the example of a previous TBOTM, Only the Paranoid Survive, by Andy Grove. In the early 1980’s, Grove realized his business was under serious threat as competition increased in Intel’s core business, computer memory. Grove shifted the entire organization whole-heartedly into chip manufacturing and saved the company. Horowitz outlines several opposing behaviors of Peacetime and Wartime CEOs: “Peacetime CEO knows that proper protocol leads to winning. Wartime CEO violates protocol in order to win; Peacetime CEO spends time defining the culture. Wartime CEO lets the war define the culture; Peacetime CEO strives for broad based buy in. Wartime CEO neither indulges consensus-building nor tolerates disagreements.” Horowitz concludes that executives can be a peacetime and wartime CEO after mastering each of the respective skill sets and knowing when to shift from peacetime to wartime and back. The theory is interesting to consider; at its best, it provides an excellent framework for managing times of stress (like right now with the Coronavirus). At its worst, it encourages poor CEO behavior and cut throat culture. While I do think its a helpful theory, I think its helpful to think of situations that may be an exception, as a way of testing the theory. For example, lets consider Google, as Horowitz does in his original article. He calls out that Google was likely entering in a period of wartime in 2011 and as a result transitioned CEOs away from peacetime Eric Schmidt to Google founder and wartime CEO, Larry Page. Looking back however, was it really clear that Google was entering wartime? The business continued to focus on what it was clearly best at, online search advertising, and rarely faced any competition. The Company was late to invest in cloud technology and many have criticized Google for pushing billions of dollars into incredibly unprofitable ventures because they are Larry and Sergey’s pet projects. In addition, its clear that control had been an issue for Larry all along - in 2011, it came out that Eric Schmidt’s ouster as CEO was due to a disagreement with Larry and Sergey over continuing to operate in China. On top of that, its argued that Larry and Sergey, who have controlling votes in Google, stayed on too long and hindered Sundar Pichai’s ability to effectively operate the now restructured Alphabet holding company. In short, was Google in a wartime from 2011-2019? I would argue no, it operated in its core market with virtually no competition and today most Google’s revenues come from its ad products. I think the peacetime / wartime designation is rarely so black and white, which is why it is so hard to recognize what period a Company may be in today.
Firing people. The unfortunate reality of business is that not every hire works out, and that eventually people will be fired. The Hard Thing About Hard Things is all about making difficult decisions. It lays out a framework for thinking about and executing layoffs, which is something that’s rarely discussed in the startup ecosystem until it happens. Companies mess up layoffs all the time, just look at Bird who recently laid off staff via an impersonal Zoom call. Horowitz lays out a roughly six step process for enacting layoffs and gives the hard truths about executing the 400 person layoff at LoudCloud. Two of these steps stand out because they have been frequently violated at startups: Don’t Delay and Train Your Managers. Often times, the decision to fire someone can be a months long process, continually drawn out and interrupted by different excuses. Horowitz encourages CEOs to move thoughtfully and quickly to stem leaks of potential layoffs and to not let poor performers continue to hurt the organization. The book discusses the Law of Crappy People - any level of any organization will eventually converge to the worst person on that level; benchmarked against the crappiest person at the next level. Once a CEO has made her mind up about the decision to fire someone, she should go for it. As part of executing layoffs, CEOs should train their managers, and the managers should execute the layoffs. This gives employees the opportunity to seek direct feedback about what went well and what went poorly. This aspect of the book is incredibly important for all levels of entrepreneurs and provides a great starting place for CEOs.