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Tech Book of the Month
  • Tech Book of the Month
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August 2023 - Capital Returns by Edward Chancellor

We dive into an investing book that covers the capital cycle. In summary, the best time to invest in a sector is actually when capital is leaving or has left.

Tech Themes

  1. Amazon. Marathon understands that the world moves in cycles. During the internet bubble of the late 1990s the company refused to invest in a lot of speculative internet companies. “At the time, we were unable to justify the valuations of any of these companies, nor identify any which could safely say would still be going strong in years to come.” In August of 2007, however, several years after the internet bubble burst, they noticed Amazon again. Amazon’s stock had rebounded well from the lows of 2001 and was roughly flat from its May 1999 valuation. Sales had grown 10x since 1999 and while they recognized it had a tarnished reputation from the internet bubble, it was actually a very good business with a negative working capital cycle. On top of this, the reason the stock hadn’t performed well in the past few years was because they were investing in two new long-term growth levers, Amazon Web Services and Fulfillment by Amazon. I’m sure Marathon underestimated the potential for these businesses but we can look back now and know how exceptional and genius these margin lowering investments were at the time.

  2. Semis. Nothing paints a more clear picture of cyclicality than semiconductors. Now we can debate whether AI and Nvidia have moved us permanently out of a cycle but up until 2023, Semiconductors was considered cyclical. As Marathon notes: “Driven by Moore’s law, the semiconductor sector has achieved sustained and dramatic performance increases over the last 30years, greatly benefiting productivity and the overall economy. Unfortunately, investors have not done so well. Since inception in 1994, the Philadelphia Semiconductor Index has underperformed the Nasdaq by around 200 percentage point, and exhibited greater volatility…In good times, prices pick up, companies increase capacity, and new entrants appear, generally from different parts of Asia (Japan in the 1970s, Korea in 1980s, Taiwan in the mid1990s, and China more recently). Excess capital entering at cyclical peaks has led to relatively poor aggregate industry returns.” As Fabricated Knowledge points out the 1980s had two brutal Semiconductor cycles. First, in 1981, the industry experienced severe overcapacity, leading to declining prices while inflation ravaged through many businesses. Then in 1985, the US semiconductor business declined significantly. “1985 was a traumatic moment for Intel and the semiconductor industry. Intel had one of the largest layoffs in its history. National Semi had a 17% decrease in revenue but moved from an operating profit of $59 million to an operating loss of -$117 million. Even Texas Instruments had a brutal period of layoffs, as revenue shrank 14% and profits went negative”. The culprit was Japanese imports. Low-end chips had declined significantly in price, as Japan flexed its labor cost advantage. All of the domestic US chip manufacturers complained (National Semiconductor, Texas Instruments, Micron, and Intel), leading to the 1986 US-Japan Semiconductor Agreement, effectively capping Japanese market share at 20%. Now, this was a time when semiconductor manufacturing wasn’t easy, but easier than today, because it focused mainly on more commoditized memories. 1985 is an interesting example of the capital cycle compounding when geographic expansion overlaps with product overcapacity (as we had in the US). Marathon actually preferred Analog Devices, when it published its thesis in February 2013, highlighting the complex production process of analog chips (physical) vs. digital, the complex engineering required to build analog chips, and the low-cost nature of the product. “These factors - a differentiated product and company specific “sticky” intellectual capital - reduce market contestability….Pricing power is further aided by the fact that an analog semiconductor chip typically plays a very important role in a product for example, the air-bag crash sensor) but represents a very small proportion of the cost of materials. The average selling price for Linear Technology’s products is under $2.” Analog Devices would acquire Linear in 2017 for $14.8B, a nice coda to Marathon’s Analog/Linear dual pitch.

  3. Why do we have cycles? If everyone is playing the same business game and aware that markets come and go, why do we have cycles at all. Wouldn’t efficient markets pull us away from getting too hyped when the market is up and too sour when the market is down? Wrong. Chancellor gives a number of reasons why we have a capital cycle: Overconfidence, Competition Neglect, Inside View, Extrapolation, Skewed Incentives, Prisoner’s Dilemma, and Limits to Arbitrage. Overconfidence is somewhat straightforward - managers and investors look at companies and believe they are infallible. When times are booming, managers will want to participate in the boom, increasing investment to match “demand.” In these decisions, they often don’t consider what their competitors are doing, but rather focus on themselves. Competition neglect takes hold as managers enjoy watching their stock tick up and their face be splattered across “Best CEO in America” lists. Inside View is a bit more nuanced, but Michael Mauboussin and Daniel Kahneman have written extensively on it. As Kahneman laid out in Thinking, Fast & Slow: “A remarkable aspect of your mental life is that you are rarely stumped … The normal state of your mind is that you have intuitive feelings and opinions about almost everything that comes your way. You like or dislike people long before you know much about them; you trust or distrust strangers without knowing why; you feel that an enterprise is bound to succeed without analyzing it.” When you take the inside view, you rely exclusively on your own experience, rather than other similar situations. Instead, you should take the outside view and assume your problem/opportunity/case is not unique. Extrapolation is an extremely common driver of cycles, and can be seen all across the investing world after the recent COVID peak. Peloton, for example, massively over-ordered inventory extrapolating out pandemic related demand trends. Skewed incentives can include near-term EPS targets (encourages buybacks, M&A), market share preservation (encourages overinvestment), low cost of capital (buy something with cheap debt), analyst expectations, and champion bias (you’ve decided to do something and its no longer attractive, but you do it anyway because you got people excited about it). The Prisoner’s Dilemma is also a form of market share preservation/expansion, when your competitor may be acting much more aggressively and you have to decide whether its worth the fight. Limits to Arbitrage is almost an extension of career risk, in that, when everyone owns an overvalued market, you may actually hurt your firm by actively withholding even if it makes investment sense. That’s why many firms need to maintain a low tracking error against indexes, which can naturally result in concentrations in the same stocks.

Business Themes

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  1. Capital Cycle. The capital cycle has four stages: 1. New entrants attracted by prospect of high returns: investor optimistic 2. Rising competition causes returns to fall below cost of capital: share price underperforms 3. Business investment declines, industry consolidation, firms exit: investors pessimistic 4. Improving supply side causes returns to rise above the cost of capital: share price outperforms. The capital cycle reveals how competitive forces and investment behavior create predictable patterns in industries over time. Picture it as a self-reinforcing loop where success breeds excess, and pain eventually leads to gain. Stage 1: The Siren Song - High returns in an industry attract capital like moths to a flame. Investors, seeing strong profits and growth, eagerly fund expansions and new entrants. Optimism reigns and valuations soar as everyone wants a piece of the apparent opportunity. Stage 2: Reality Bites - As new capacity comes online, competition intensifies. Prices fall as supply outpaces demand. Returns dip below the cost of capital, but capacity keeps coming – many projects started in good times are hard to stop. Share prices begin to reflect the deteriorating reality. Stage 3: The Great Cleansing - Pain finally drives action. Capital expenditure is slashed. Weaker players exit or get acquired. The industry consolidates as survivors battle for market share. Investors, now scarred, want nothing to do with the sector. Capacity starts to rationalize. Stage 4: Phoenix Rising - The supply-side healing during the downturn slowly improves industry economics. With fewer competitors and more disciplined capacity, returns rise above the cost of capital. Share prices recover as improved profitability becomes evident. But this very success plants the seeds for the next cycle. The genius of understanding this pattern is that it's perpetual - human nature and institutional incentives ensure it repeats. The key is recognizing which stage an industry is in, and having the courage to be contrarian when others are either too optimistic or too pessimistic.

  2. 7 signs of a bubble. Nothing gets people going more than Swedish Banking in the 2008-09 financial crisis. Marathon called out its Seven Deadly Sins of banking in November 2009, utilizing Handelsbanken as a positive reference, highlighting how they avoided the many pitfalls that laid waste to their peers. 1. Imprudent Asset-Liability mismatches on the balance sheet. If this sounds familiar, its because its the exact sin that took down Silicon Valley Bank earlier this year. As Greg Brown lays out here: “Like many banks, SVB’s liabilities were largely in the form of demand deposits; as such, these liabilities tend to be short term and far less sensitive to interest rate movement. By contrast, SVB’s assets took the form of more long-term bonds, such as U.S. Treasury securities and mortgage-backed securities. These assets tend to have a much longer maturity – the majority of SVB’s assets matured in 10 years or more – and as a result their prices are much more sensitive to interest rate changes. The mismatch, then, should be obvious: SVB was taking in cash via short-term demand deposits and investing these funds in longer-term financial instruments.” 2. Supporting asset-liability mismatches by clients. Here, Chancellor calls out foreign currency lending, whereby certain European banks would offer mortgages to Hungarians in swiss francs, to buy houses in Hungary. Not only were these banks taking on currency risk, they were exposing their customers to it and many didn’t hedge the risk out appropriately. 3. Lending to “Can’t Pay, Won’t Pay” types. The financial crisis was filled with banks lending to subprime borrowers. 4. Reaching for growth in unfamiliar areas. As Marathon calls out, “A number of European banks have lost billions investing in US subprime CDOs, having foolishly relied on “experts” who told them these were riskless AAA rated credits.” 5. Engaging in off-balance sheet lending. Many European banks maintained "Structured Investment Vehicles” that were off-balance sheet funds holding CDOs and MBSs. At one point, it got so bad that Citigroup tried the friendship approach: “The news comes as a group of banks in the U.S. led by Citigroup Inc. are working to set up a $100 billion fund aimed at preventing SIVs from dumping assets in a fire sale that could trigger a wider fallout.” These SIVs held substantial risk but were relatively unknown to many investors. 6. Getting sucked into virtuous/vicious cycle dynamics. As many European banks looked for expansion, they turned to lending into the Baltic states. As more lenders got comfortable lending, GDP began to grow meaningfully, which attracted more aggressive lending. More banks got suckered into lending in the area to not miss out on the growth, not realizing that the growth was almost entirely debt fueled. 7. Relying on the rearview mirror. Marathon points out how risk models tend to fail when the recent past has been glamorous. “In its 2007 annual report, Merrill Lunch reported a total risk exposure - based on ‘a 95 percent confidence interval and a one day holding period’ - of $157m. A year later, the Thundering Herd stumbled into a $30B loss!”

  3. Investing Countercyclically. Björn Wahlroos exemplified exceptional capital allocation skills as CEO of Sampo, a Finnish financial services group. His most notable moves included perfectly timing the sale of Nokia shares before their collapse, transforming Sampo's property & casualty insurance business into the highly profitable "If" venture, selling the company's Finnish retail banking business to Danske Bank at peak valuations just before the 2008 financial crisis, and then using that capital to build a significant stake in Nordea at deeply discounted prices. He also showed remarkable foresight by reducing equity exposure before the 2008 crisis and deploying capital into distressed commercial credit, generating €1.5 billion in gains. Several other CEOs have demonstrated similar capital allocation prowess. Henry Singleton at Teledyne was legendary for his counter-cyclical approach to capital allocation. He issued shares when valuations were high in the 1960s to fund acquisitions, then spent the 1970s and early 1980s buying back over 90% of Teledyne's shares at much lower prices, generating exceptional returns for shareholders. As we saw in Cable Cowboy, John Malone at TCI (later Liberty Media) was masterful at using financial engineering and tax-efficient structures to build value. He pioneered the use of spin-offs, tracking stocks, and complex deal structures to maximize shareholder returns while minimizing tax impacts. Tom Murphy at Capital Cities demonstrated exceptional discipline in acquiring media assets only when prices were attractive. His most famous move was purchasing ABC in 1985, then selling the combined company to Disney a decade later for a massive profit. Warren Buffett at Berkshire Hathaway has shown remarkable skill in capital allocation across multiple decades, particularly in knowing when to hold cash and when to deploy it aggressively during times of market stress, such as during the 2008 financial crisis when he made highly profitable investments in companies like Goldman Sachs and Bank of America. Jamie Dimon at JPMorgan Chase has also proven to be an astute capital allocator, particularly during crises. He guided JPMorgan through the 2008 financial crisis while acquiring Bear Stearns and Washington Mutual at fire-sale prices, significantly strengthening the bank's competitive position. D. Scott Patterson has shown excellent capital allocation skills at FirstService. He began leading FirstService following the spin-off of Colliers in 2015, and has compounded EBITDA in the high teens via strategic property management acquistions coupled with large platforms like First OnSite and recently Roofing Corp of America. Another great capital allocator is Brad Jacobs. He has a storied career building rollups like United Waste Systems (acquired by Waste Services for $2.5B), United Rentals (now a $56B public company), XPO logistics which he separated into three public companies (XPO, GXO, RXO), and now QXO, his latest endeavor into the building products space. These leaders share common traits with Wahlroos: patience during bull markets, aggression during downturns, and the discipline to ignore market sentiment in favor of fundamental value. They demonstrate that superior capital allocation, while rare, can create enormous shareholder value over time.

    Dig Deeper

  • Handelsbanken: A Budgetless Banking Pioneer

  • ECB has created 'toxic environment' for banking, says Sampo & UPM chairman Bjorn Wahlroos

  • Edward Chancellor part 1: ‘intelligent contrarians’ should follow the capital cycle

  • Charlie Munger: Investing in Semiconductor Industry 2023

  • Amazon founder and CEO Jeff Bezos delivers graduation speech at Princeton University

tags: Amazon, Jeff Bezos, National Semiconductor, Intel, Moore's Law, Texas Instruments, Micron, Analog Devices, Michael Mauboussin, Daniel Kahneman, Peloton, Handelsbanken, Bjorn Wahlroos, Sampo, Henry Singleton, Teledyne, John Malone, D. Scott Patterson, Jamie Dimon, Tom Murphy, Warren Buffett, Brad Jacobs
categories: Non-Fiction
 

April 2022 - Ask Your Developer by Jeff Lawson

This month we check out Jeff Lawson’s new book about API’s. Jeff was a founder and the first CTO at Stubhub, an early hire at AWS, and started Twilio in 2008. He has a very interesting perspective on the software ecosystem as it stands today and what it looks like in the future!

Tech Themes

  1. Start with the Problem, Not the Solution. Lawson repeats a mantra throughout the book related to developers: "Start with the problem, not the solution." This is something that Jeff learned as an early hire at AWS in 2004. Before AWS, Lawson had founded and sold a note-taking service to an internet flame out, co-founded Stubhub as its first CTO, and worked at an extreme sports retailer. His experience across four startups has guided him to a maniacal focus on the customer, and he wants that focus to extend to developers. If you tell developers the exact specification for something and give no context, they will fail to deliver great code. Beginning with the problem and the customer's specific description allows developers to use their creativity to solve the issue at hand. The key is to tell developers the business problem and how the issue works, let them talk to the customer, and help them understand it. That way, developers can use their imaginative, creative problem-solving abilities.

  2. Experiment to Innovate. Experimentation is at the root of invention, which drives business performance over the long term. Jeff calls on the story of the Wright Brothers to illustrate this point. The Wright Brothers were not the first to try to build a flying vehicle. When they achieved flight, they beat out a much better-funded competitor by simply doing something the other person wouldn't do – crash. The Wright brothers would make incremental changes to their flying machine, see what worked, fly it, crash it, and update the design again. The other competitor, Samuel Pierpont Langley, spent heavily on his "aerodome" machine (~$2m in today's dollars) and tried to build the exact specs of a flying machine but didn't run these quick and fast (and somewhat calamitous) experiments. This process of continual experimentation and innovation is the hallmark of a great product organization. Lawson loves the lean startup and its idea of innovation accounting. In innovation accounting, teams document exact experiments, set expectations, hypotheses, target goals, and then detail what happens in the experiment. Think of this as a lab notebook for product experimentation. When doing these experiments, they must have a business focus rather than just a technical ramification. Jeff always asks: "What will this help our customers do?" when evaluating experimentation and innovation. Agile - features, deadlines, quality, certainty - choose 3.

  3. Big Ideas Start Small. In 1986, famous computer scientist Fred Brooks, published a paper called No Silver Bullet, detailing how to manage software teams. Brooks contends that adding more developers and spending more money seldom gets a project to completion faster – normally, it does the opposite. Why is this? New people on the team need time to ramp up and get familiar with the code-base, so they are low productivity at the start. Additionally, developers on the project take a lot of time explaining the code base to new developers joining late. Lawson uses the example of GE Digital to show the issues of overinvesting when starting. Jeff Immelt started as CEO of GE in 2001, and later proclaimed in 2014 that GE would launch a new software/IoT division that would be a meaningful part of their future business. GE invested tons of money into the venture and put experienced leaders on the project; however, it generated minimal profit years later. Despite acquisitions like ServiceMax (later divested), the company spent hundreds of millions with hardly any return. Lawson believes the correct approach would be to invest in 100 small product teams with $1m each, and then as those ideas grow, add more $. This idea of planting seeds and seeing which ones flower and then investing more is the right way to do it, if you can. Start small and slowly gather steam until it makes sense to step on the gas.

Business Themes

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  1. Software Infrastructure is Cheap. Software infrastructure has improved dramatically over the last fifteen years. In 2007, if you wanted to start a business, you had to buy servers, configure them, and manage your databases, networking equipment, security, compliance, and privacy. Today that is all handled by the cloud hyperscalers. Furthermore, new infrastructure providers sprouted as the cloud grew that could offer even better, specialized performance. On top of core cloud services like storage and compute, new companies like Datadog, Snowflake, Redis, Github, all make it easy to startup infrastructure for your software business. On top of that, creative tools are just as good. Lawson calls to mind the story of Lil Nas X, the now-famous rapper, who bought a beat online for $30, remixed it and launched it. That beat became "Old Town Road," which went 15x platinum and is now rated 490th on the list of best songs of all time. The startup costs for a new musician, software company, or consumer brand are very low because the infrastructure is so good.

  2. Organization Setup. Amazon has heavily influenced Lawson and Twilio, including Bezos's idea of two-pizza teams. The origin story of two pizza teams comes from a time at Amazon when teams were getting bigger and bigger, and people were becoming more removed from the customer. Slowly, many people throughout the company had almost no insight into the customer and their issues. Jeff introduced cutting his organization into two-pizza teams, i.e. two pizzas could reasonably feed the team. Lawson has adopted this in spades, with Twilio housing over 150 two-pizza teams. Every team has a core customer, whether internal or external. If you are on the platform infrastructure team, your customer may be internal developers who leverage the infrastructure team's development pipelines. If you are on the Voice team, your customer may be actual end customers building applications with Twilio's API-based voice solution. When these teams get large (beyond two pizzas), there is a somewhat natural process of mitosis, where the team splits into two. To do this, the teams detangle their respective codebases and modularize their service so other teams within the company can access it. They then set up collaboration contacts with their closely related teams; internally, everyone monitors how much they use each other microservice across the company. This monitoring allows companies to see where they may need to deploy more resources or create a new division.

  3. Hospitality. Many companies claim to be customer-focused, but few are. Amazon always leaves an empty chair in conference rooms to symbolize the customer in every meeting. Jeff Lawson and Twilio extended this idea – he asked customers for their shoes (the old adage: "walk a mile in someone's shoes") and then hung them throughout Twilio's office. Jeff is intensely focused on the customer and likens his approach to the one famous restauranteur Danny Meyer takes to his restaurants. Danny focuses on this idea of hospitality. In Danny's mind, hospitality goes beyond just focusing on the customer; it makes the customer feel like they are on the business side. While it may be hard to imagine this, everyone knows this feeling when someone goes out of their way to ensure that you have a positive experience. Meyer extends this to an idea about a gatekeeper vs. an agent. A gatekeeper makes it feel like they sit in between you and the product; they remove you from whats happening and make you feel like you are being pushed to do things. In contrast, an agent is a proactive member of an organization that tries to build a team-like atmosphere between the company and the individual customer. Beyond the customer focus, Jeff extends this to developers – developers want autonomy, mastery, and purpose. They want a mission that resonates with them, the freedom to choose how they approach development, and the ability to learn from the best around them. The idea of hospitality exists among all stakeholders of a business but, most importantly, employees and customers.

Dig Deeper

  • Twilio's Jeff Lawson on Building Software with Superpowers

  • The Golden Rule of Hospitality | Tony Robbins Interviews Danny Meyer

  • #SIGNALConf 2021 Keynote

  • How the Wright Brothers Did the 'Impossible'

  • Webinar: How to Focus on the Problem, Not the Solution by Spotify PM, Cindy Chen

tags: Jeff Lawson, Twilio, AWS, Amazon, Jeff Bezos, Stubhub, Wright Brothers, Samuel Pierpont Langley, Innovation Accounting, No Silver Bullet, Fred Brooks, GE, Jeff Immelt, ServiceMax, Lil Nas X, Two Pizza Teams, APIs, Danny Meyer
categories: Non-Fiction
 

March 2022 - Invent and Wander by Jeff Bezos

This month we go back to tech giant Amazon and review all of Jeff Bezos’s letters to shareholders. This book describes Amazon’s journey from e-commerce to cloud to everything in a quick and fascinating read!

Tech Themes

  1. The Customer Focus. These shareholder letters clearly show that Amazon fell in love with its customer and then sought to hammer out traditional operational challenges like cycle times, fulfillment times, and distribution capacity. In the 2008 letter, Bezos calls out: "We have strong conviction that customers value low prices, vast selection, and fast, convenient delivery and that these needs will remain stable over time. It is difficult for us to imagine that ten years from now, customers will want higher prices, less selection, or slower delivery." When a business is so clearly focused on delivering the best customer experience, with completely obvious drivers, its no wonder they succeeded. The entirety of the 2003 letter, entitled "What's good for customers is good for shareholders" is devoted to this idea. The customer is "divinely discontented" and will be very loyal until there is a slightly better service. If you continue to offer lower prices on items, more selection of things to buy, and faster delivery - customers will continue to be happy. Those tenants are not static - you can continually lower prices, add more items, and build more fulfillment centers (while getting faster) to keep customers happy. This learning curve continues in your favor - higher volumes mean cheaper to buy, lower prices means more customers, more items mean more new customers, higher volumes and more selection force the service operations to adjust to ship more. The flywheel continues all for the customer!

  2. Power of Invention. Throughout the shareholder letters, Bezos refers to the power of invention. From the 2018 letter: "We wanted to create a culture of builders - people who are curious, explorers. They like to invent. Even when they're experts, they are "fresh" with a beginner's mind. They see the way we do things as just the way we do things now. A builder's mentality helps us approach big, hard-to-solve opportunities with a humble conviction that success can come through iteration: invent, launch, reinvent, relaunch, start over, rinse, repeat, again and again." Bezos sees invention as the ruthless process of trying and failing repeatedly. The importance of invention was also highlighted in our January book 7 Powers, with Hamilton Helmer calling the idea critical to building more and future S curves. Invention is preceded by wandering and taking big bets - the hunch and the boldness. Bezos understands that the stakes for invention have to grow, too: "As a company grows, everything needs to scale, including the size of your failed experiments. If the size of your failures isn't growing, you're not going to be inventing at a size that can actually move the needle." Once you make these decisions, you have to be ready to watch the business scale, which sounds easy but requires constant attention to customer demand and value. Amazon's penchant for bold bets may inform Andy Jassy's recent decision to spend $10B making a competitor to Elon Musk/SpaceX's Starlink internet service. This decision is a big, bold bet on the future - we'll see if he is right in time.

  3. Long-Term Focus. Bezos always preached trading off the short-term gain for the long-term relationship. This mindset shows up everywhere at Amazon - selling an item below cost to drive more volumes and give consumers better prices, allowing negative reviews on sites when it means that Amazon may sell fewer products, and providing Prime with ever-faster and free delivery shipments. The list goes on and on - all aspects focused on building a long-term moat and relationship with the customer. However it's important to note that not every decision pans out, and it's critical to recognize when things are going sideways; sometimes, you get an unmistakable punch in the mouth to figure that out. Bezos's 2000 shareholder letter started with, "Ouch. It's been a brutal year for many in the capital markets and certainly for Amazon.com shareholders. As of this writing, our shares are down more than 80 percent from when I wrote you last year." It then went on to highlight something that I didn't see in any other shareholder letter, a mistake: "In retrospect, we significantly underestimated how much time would be available to enter these categories and underestimated how difficult it would be for a single category e-commerce companies to achieve the scale necessary to succeed…With a long enough financing runway, pets.com and living.com may have been able to acquire enough customers to achieve the needed scale. But when the capital markets closed the door on financing internet companies, these companies simply had no choice but to close their doors. As painful as that was, the alternative - investing more of our own capital in these companies to keep them afloat- would have been an even bigger mistake." During the mid to late 90s, Amazon was on an M&A and investment tear, and it wasn't until the bubble crashed that they looked back and realized their mistake. Still, optimizing for the long term means admitting those mistakes and changing Amazon's behavior to improve the business. When thinking long-term, the company continued to operate amazingly well.

Business Themes

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  1. Free Cash Flow per Share. Despite historical rhetoric that Bezos forewent profits in favor of growth, his annual shareholder letters continually reinforce the value of upfront cash flows to Amazon's business model. If Amazon could receive cash upfront and manage its working capital cycle (days in inventory + days AR - days AP), it could scale its operations without requiring tons of cash. He valued the free cash flow per share metric so intensely that he spent an entire shareholder letter (2004) walking through an example of how earnings can differ from cash flow in businesses that invest in infrastructure. This maniacal focus on a financial metric is an excellent reminder that Bezos was a hedge fund portfolio manager before starting Amazon. These multiple personas: the hedge fund manager, the operator, the inventor, the engineer - all make Bezos a different type of character and CEO. He clearly understood financials and modeling, something that can seem notoriously absent from public technology CEOs today.

  2. A 1,000 run home-run. Odds and sports have always captivated Warren Buffett, and he frequently liked to use Ted Williams's approach to hitting as a metaphor for investing. Bezos elaborates on this idea in his 2014 Letter (3 Big Ideas): "We all know that if you swing for the fences, you're going to strike out a lot, but you're also going to hit some home runs. The difference between baseball and business, however, is that baseball has a truncated outcome distribution. When you swing, no matter how well you connect with the ball, the most runs you can get is four. In business, every once in a while, when you step up to the plate, you can score one thousand runs. This long-tailed distribution of returns is why its important to be bold. Big winners pay for so many experiments." AWS is certainly a case of a 1,000 run home-run. The company incubated the business and first wrote about it in 2006 when they had 240,000 registered developers. By 2015, AWS had 1,000,000 customers, and is now at a $74B+ run-rate. This idea also calls to mind Monish Pabrai's Spawners idea - or the idea that great companies can spawn entirely new massive drivers for their business - Google with Waymo, Amazon with AWS, Apple with the iPhone. These new businesses require a lot of care and experimentation to get right, but they are 1,000 home runs, and taking bold bets is important to realizing them.

  3. High Standards. How does Amazon achieve all that it does? While its culture has been called into question a few times, it's clear that Amazon has high expectations for its employees. The 2017 letter addresses this idea, diving into whether high standards are intrinsic/teachable and universal/domain-specific. Bezos believes that standards are teachable and driven by the environment while high standards tend to be domain-specific - high standards in one area do not mean you have high standards in another. This discussion of standards also calls back to Amazon's 2012 letter entitled "Internally Driven," where Bezos argues that he wants proactive employees. To identify and build a high standards culture, you need to recognize what high standards look like; then, you must have realistic expectations for how hard it should be or how long it will take. He illustrates this with a simple vignette on perfect handstands: "She decided to start her journey by taking a handstand workshop at her yoga studio. She then practiced for a while but wasn't getting the results she wanted. So, she hired a handstand coach. Yes, I know what you're thinking, but evidently this is an actual thing that exists. In the very first lesson, the coach gave her some wonderful advice. 'Most people,' he said, 'think that if they work hard, they should be able to master a handstand in about two weeks. The reality is that it takes about six months of daily practice. If you think you should be able to do it in two weeks, you're just going to end up quitting.' Unrealistic beliefs on scope – often hidden and undiscussed – kill high standards." Companies can develop high standards with clear scope and corresponding challenge recognition.

Dig Deeper

  • Jeff Bezo’s Regret Minimization Framework

  • Andy Jassy on Figuring Out What's Next for Amazon

  • Amazon’s Annual Reports and Shareholder Letters

  • Elements of Amazon’s Day 1 Culture

  • AWS re:Invent 2021 Keynote

tags: Jeff Bezos, Amazon, AWS, Invention, 7 Powers, Elon Musk, SpaceX, Andy Jassy, Hamilton Helmer, Prime, Working Capital, Warren Buffett, Ted Williams, Monish Pabrai, Spawners, High Standards
categories: Non-Fiction
 

December 2021 - Trillion Dollar Coach: The Leadership Playbook of Silicon Valley's Bill Campbell by Eric Schmidt, Jonathan Rosenberg, and Alan Eagle

This month we read a book about famous CEO and executive coach, Bill Campbell. Bill had an unusual background for a silicon valley legend: he was a losing college football coach at Columbia. Despite a late start to his technology career, Bill’s timeless leadership principles and focus on people are helpful for any leader at any size company.

Tech Themes

  1. Product First. After a short time at Kodak, Bill realized the criticality of supporting product and engineering. As a football coach, he was not intimately familiar with the intricacies of photographic film. Still, Campbell understood that the engineers ultimately determined the company's fate. After a few months at Kodak, Bill did something that no one else ever thought of - he went into the engineering lab and started talking to the engineers. He told them that Fuji was hot on Kodak's heels and that the company should try to make a new type of film that might thwart some competitive pressure. The engineers were excited to hear feedback on their products and learn more about other aspects of the business. After a few months of gestation, the engineering team produced a new type of film: "This was not how things worked at Kodak. Marketing guys didn't go talk to engineers, especially the engineers in the research lab. But Bill didn't know that, or if he did, he didn't particularly care. So he went over to the building that housed the labs, introduced himself around, and challenged them to come up with something better than Fuji's latest. That challenge helped start the ball rolling on the film that eventually launched as Kodacolor 200, a major product for Kodak and a film that was empirically better than Fuji's. Score one for the marketing guy and his team!" Campbell understood that product was the heart of any technology company, and he sought to empower product leaders whenever he had a chance.

  2. Silicon Valley Moments. Sometimes you look back at a person's career and wonder how they managed to be at the center of several critical points in tech history. Bill was a magnet to big moments. After six unsuccessful years as coach of Columbia's football team, Bill joined an ad agency and eventually made his way to the marketing department at Kodak. At the time, Kodak was a blockbuster success and lauded as one of the top companies in the world. However, the writing was on the wall, film was getting cheaper and cheaper, and digital was on the rise. After a few years, Bill was recruited to Apple by John Sculley. Bill joined in 1983 as VP of Marketing, just two years before Steve Jobs would famously leave the company. Bill was incessant that management try to keep Jobs. Steve would not forget his loyalty, and upon his return, Jobs named Campbell a director of Apple in 1997. Bill became CEO of Claris, an Apple software division that functioned as a separate company. In 1990, when Apple signaled it would not spin Claris off into a separate company, Bill left with the rest of management. After a stint at Intuit, Bill became a CEO coach to several Silicon Valley luminaries, including Eric Schmidt, Steve Jobs, Shellye Archambeau, Brad Smith, John Donahoe, Sheryl Sandberg, Jeff Bezos, and more. Bill helped recruit Sandberg and current CFO Ruth Porat to Google. Bill was a serial networker who stood at the center of silicon valley.

  3. Failure and Success. Following his departure from Claris/Apple, Bill founded Go Corporation, one of the first mobile computers. The company raised a ton of venture capital for the time ($75m) before an eventual fire-sale to AT&T. The idea of a mobile computer was compelling, but the company faced stiff competition from Microsoft and Apple's Newton. Beyond competition, the original handheld devices lacked very basic features (easy internet, storage, network and email capabilities) that would be eventually be included in Apple's iPhone. Sales across the industry were a disappointment, and AT&T eventually shut down the acquired Go Corp. After the failure of Go. Corporation, Bill was unsure what to do. John Doerr, the famous leader of Kleiner Perkins, introduced Bill to Intuit founder Scott Cook. Cook was considering retirement and looking for a replacement. Bill met with Cook, but Cook remained unimpressed. It was only after a second meeting where Bill shared his philosophy on management and his focus on people that Cook considered Campbell for the job. Bill joined Intuit as CEO and went on to lead the company until 1998, after which he became Chairman of the board, a position he held until 2016. Within a year of Campbell joining, Microsoft agreed to purchase the company for $1.5b. However, the Justice Department raised flags about the acquisition, and Microsoft called off the deal in 1995. Campbell continued to lead the company to almost $600M of revenue. When he retired from the board in 2016, the company was worth $30B.

Business Themes

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  1. Your People Make You a Leader. Campbell believed that people were the most crucial ingredient in any successful business. Leadership, therefore, was of utmost importance to Bill. Campbell lived by a maxim passed by former colleague Donna Dubinsky: "If you're a great manager, your people will make you a leader. They acclaim that, not you." In an exchange with a struggling leader, Bill added to this wisdom: "You have demanded respect, rather than having it accrue to you. You need to project humility, a selflessness, that projects that you care about the company and about people." The humility Campbell speaks about is what John Collins called Level 5 leadership (covered in our April 2020 book, Good to Great). Research has shown that humble leaders can lead to higher performing teams, better flexibility, and better collaboration.

  2. Teams Need Coaches. Campbell loved to build community. Every year he would plan a trip to the super bowl, where he would find a bar and set down roots. He'd get to know the employees, and after a few days, he was a regular at the bar. He understood how important it was to build teams and establish a community that engendered trust and psychological safety. Every team needs a good coach, and Campbell understood how to motivate individuals, give authentic feedback, and handle interpersonal conflicts. "Bill Campbell was a coach of teams. He built them, shaped them, put the right players in the right positions (and removed the wrong players from the wrong positions), cheered them on, and kicked them in their collective butt when they were underperforming. He knew, as he often said, that 'you can't get anything done without a team.'" After a former colleague left to set up a new private equity firm, Bill checked out the website and called him up to tell him it sucked. As part of this feedback style, Bill always prioritized feedback in the moment: "An important component of providing candid feedback is not to wait. 'A coach coaches in the moment,' Scott Cook says. 'It's more real and more authentic, but so many leaders shy away from that.' Many managers wait until performance reviews to provide feedback, which is often too little, too late."

  3. Get the Little Things Right. Campbell understood that every interaction was a chance to connect, help, and coach. As a result, he thought deeply about maximizing the value out of every meeting: "Bill took great care in preparing for one-on-one meetings. Remember, he believed the most important thing a manager does is to help people be more effective and to grow and develop, and the 1:1 is the best opportunity to accomplish that." Meetings with Campbell frequently started with family and life discussions and would move back and forth between business and the meaning of life - deep sessions that made people think, reconsider what they were doing and come back energized for more. He also was not shy about addressing issues and problems: "There was one situation we had a few years ago where two different product leaders were arguing about which team should manage a particular group of products. For a while, this was treated as a technical discussion, where data and logic would eventually determine which way to go. But that didn't happen, the problem festered, and tensions rose. Who was in control? This is when Bill got involved. There had to be a difficult meeting where one exec would win and the other would lose. Bill made the meeting happen; he spotted a fundamental tension that was not getting resolved and forced the issue. He didn't have a clear opinion on how to resolve the matter, on which team the product belonged, he simply knew we had to decide one way or another, now. It was one of the most heated meetings we've had, but it had to happen." Bill extended this practice to email where he perfected concise and effective team communication. On top of 1:1's, meetings, and emails, Campbell stayed on top of messages: ""Later, when he was coach to people all over the valley, he spent evenings returning the calls of people who had left messages throughout the day. When you left Bill a voice mail, you always got a call back." Bill was a master of communication and a coach to everyone he met.

Dig Deeper

  • Intuit founder Scott Cook on Bill Campbell

  • A Conversation between Brad Smith (Intuit CEO) and Bill Campbell

  • A Bill Campbell Reading List

  • Silicon Valley mourns its ‘coach,’ former Intuit CEO Bill Campbell

  • CHM Live | Trillion Dollar Coach: The Leadership Playbook of Silicon Valley’s Bill Campbell

tags: Intuit, Google, ServiceNow, Eric Schmidt, Jonathan Rosenberg, Alan Eagle, Columbia, Bill Campbell, Shellye Archambeau, John Donahoe, Jeff Bezos, Steve Jobs, Go Corporation, Football, Kodak, Fuji, Apple, Claris, Sheryl Sandberg, Brad Smith, Ruth Porat, AT&T, John Doerr, Microsoft, Donna Dubinsky, John Collins, Leadership
categories: Non-Fiction
 

November 2020 - Tape Sucks: Inside Data Domain, A Silicon Valley Growth Story by Frank Slootman

This month we read a short, under-discussed book by current Snowflake and former ServiceNow and Data Domain CEO, Frank Slootman. The book is just like Frank - direct and unafraid. Frank has had success several times in the startup world and the story of Data Domain provides a great case study of entrepreneurship. Data Domain was a data deduplication company, offering a 20:1 reduction of data backed up to tape casettes by using new disk drive technology.

Tech Themes

Data Domain’s 2008 10-K prior to being acquired

Data Domain’s 2008 10-K prior to being acquired

  1. First time CEO at a Company with No Revenue. Frank is an immigrant to the US, coming from the Netherlands shortly after graduating from the University of Rotterdam. After being rejected by IBM 10+ times, he joined Burroughs corporation, an early mainframe provider which subsequently merged with its direct competitor Sperry for $4.8B in 1986. Frank then spent some time at Compuware and moved back to the Netherlands to help it integrate the acquisition of Uniface, an early customizable report building software. After spending time there, he went to Borland software in 1997, working his way up the product management ranks but all the while being angered by time spent lobbying internally, rather than building. Frank joined Data Domain in the Spring of 2003 - when it had no customers, no revenue, and was burning cash. The initial team and VC’s were impressive - Kai Li, a computer science professor on sabbatical from Princeton, Ben Zhu, an EIR at USVP, and Brian Biles, a product leader with experience at VA Linux and Sun Microsystems. The company was financed by top-tier VC’s New Enterprise Associates and Greylock Partners, with Aneel Bhusri (Founder and current CEO of Workday) serving as initial CEO and then board chairman. This was a stacked team and Slootman knew it: “I’d bring down the average IQ of the company by joining, which felt right to me.” The Company had been around for 18 months and already burned through a significant amount of money when Frank joined. He knew he needed to raise money relatively soon after joining and put the Company’s chances bluntly: “Would this idea really come together and captivate customers? Nobody knew. We, the people on the ground floor, were perhaps, the most surprised by the extraordinary success we enjoyed.”

  2. Playing to his Strengths: Capital Efficiency. One of the big takeaways from the Innovators by Walter Issacson was that individuals or teams at the nexus of disciplines - primarily where the sciences meet the humanities, often achieved breakthrough success. The classic case study for this is Apple - Steve Jobs had an intense love of art, music, and design and Steve Wozniak was an amazing technologist. Frank has cultivated a cross-discipline strength at the intersection of Sales and Technology. This might be driven by Slootman’s background is in economics. The book has several references to economic terms, which clearly have had an impact on Frank’s thinking. Data Domain espoused capital efficiency: “We traveled alone, made few many-legged sales calls, and booked cheap flights and hotels: everybody tried to save a dime for the company.” The results showed - the business went from $800K of revenue in 2004 to $275 million by 2008, generating $75M in cash flow from operations. Frank’s capital efficiency was interesting and broke from traditional thinking - most people think to raise a round and build something. Frank took a different approach: “When you are not yet generating revenue, conservation of resource is the dominant theme.” Over time, “when your sales activity is solidly paying for itself,” the spending should shift from conservative to aggressive (like Snowflake is doing this now). The concept of sales efficiency is somewhat talked about, but given the recent fundraising environment, is often dismissed. Sales efficiency can be thought of as: “How much revenue do I generate for every $1 spent in sales and marketing?” Looking at the P&L below, we see Data Domain was highly efficient in its sales and marketing activity - the company increased revenue $150M in 2008, despite spending $115M in sales and marketing (a ratio of 1.3x). Contrast this with a company like Slack which spent $403M to acquire $230M of new revenue (a ratio of 0.6x). It gets harder to acquire customers at scale, so this efficiency is supposed to come down over time but best in class is hopefully above 1x. Frank clearly understands when to step on the gas with investing, as both ServiceNow and Snowflake have remained fairly efficient (from a sales perspective at least) while growing to a significant scale.

  3. Technology for Technology’s Sake. “Many technologies are conceived without a clear, precise notion of the intended use.” Slootman hits on a key point and one that the tech industry has struggled to grasp throughout its history. So many products and companies are established around budding technology with no use case. We’ve discussed Magic Leap’s fundraising money-pit (still might find its way), and Iridium Communications, the massive satellite telephone that required people to carry a suitcase around to use it. Gartner, the leading IT research publication (which is heavily influenced by marketing spend from companies) established the Technology Hype Cycle, complete with the “Peak of inflated expectations,” and the “Trough of Disillusionment” for categorizing technologies that fail to live up to their promise. There have been several waves that have come and gone: AR/VR, Blockchain, and most recently, Serverless. Its not so much that these technologies were wrong or not useful, its rather that they were initially described as a panacea to several or all known technology hindrances and few technologies ever live up to that hype. Its common that new innovations spur tons of development but also lots of failure, and this is Slootman’s caution to entrepreneurs. Data Domain was attacking a problem that existed already (tape storage) and the company provided what Clayton Christensen would call a sustaining innovation (something that Slootman points out). Whenever things go into “winter state”, like the internet after the dot-com bubble, or the recent Crpyto Winter which is unthawing as I write; it is time to pay attention and understand the relevance of the innovation.

Business Themes

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  1. Importance of Owning Sales. Slootman spends a considerable amount of this small book discussing sales tactics and decision making, particularly with respect to direct sales and OEM relationships. OEM deals are partnerships with other companies whereby one company will re-sell the software, hardware, or service of another company. Crowdstrike is a popular product with many OEM relationships. The Company drives a significant amount of its sales through its partner model, who re-sell on behalf of Crowdstrike. OEM partnerships with big companies present many challenges: “First of all, you get divorced from your customer because the OEM is now between you and them, making customer intimacy challenging. Plus, as the OEM becomes a large part of your business, for all intents and purposes they basically own you without paying for the privilege…Never forget that nobody wants to sell your product more than you do.” The challenges don’t end there. Slootman points out that EMC discarded their previous OEM vendor in the data deduplication space, right after acquiring Data Domain. On top of that, the typical reseller relationship happens at a 10-20% margin, degrading gross margins and hurting ability to invest. It is somewhat similar to the challenges open-source companies like MongoDB and Elastic have run into with their core software being…free. Amazon can just OEM their offering and cut them out as a partner, something they do frequently. Partner models can be sustainable, but the give and take from the big company is a tough balance to strike. Investors like organic adoption, especially recently with the rise of freemium SaaS models percolating in startups. Slootman’s point is that at some point in enterprise focused businesses, the Company must own direct sales (and relationships) with its customers to drive real efficiency. After the low cost to acquire freemium adopters buy the product, the executive team must pivot to traditional top down enterprise sales to drive a successful and enduring relationship with the customer.

  2. In the Thick of Things. Slootman has some very concise advice for CEOs: be a fighter, show some humanity, and check your ego at the door. “Running a startup reduces you to your most elementary instincts, and survival is on your mind most of the time…The CEO is the ‘Chief Combatant,’ warrior number one.” Slootman views the role of CEO as a fighter, ready to be the first to jump into the action, at all times. And this can be incredibly productive for business as well. Tony Xu, the founder and CEO of Doordash, takes time out every month to do delivery for his own company, in order to remain close to the customer and the problems of the company. Jeff Bezos famously still responds and views emails from customers at jeff@amazon.com. Being CEO also requires a willingness to put yourself out there and show your true personality. As Slootman puts it: “People can instantly finger a phony. Let them know who you really are, warts and all.” As CEO you are tasked with managing so many people and being involved in all aspects of the business, it is easy to become rigid and unemotional in everyday interactions. Harvard Business School professor and former leader at Uber distills it down to a simple phrase: “Begin With Trust.” All CEO’s have some amount of ego, driving them to want to be at the top of their organization. Slootman encourages CEO’s to be introspective, and try to recognize blind spots, so ego doesn’t drive day-to-day interactions with employees. One way to do that is simple: use the pronoun “we” when discussing the company you are leading. Though Slootman doesn’t explicitly call it out - all of these suggestions (fighting, showing empathy, getting rid of ego) are meant to build trust with employees.

  3. R-E-C-I-P-E for a Great Culture. The last fifth of the book is all focused on building culture at companies. It is the only topic Slootman stays on for more than a few chapters, so you know its important! RECIPE was an acronym created by the employees at Data Domain to describe the company’s values: Respect, Excellence, Customer, Integrity, Performance, Execution. Its interesting how simple and focused these values are. Technology has pushed its cultural delusion’s of grandeur to an extreme in recent years. The WeWork S-1 hilariously started with: “We are a community company committed to maximum global impact. Our mission is to elevate the world’s consciousness.” But none of Data Domain’s values were about changing the world to be a better place - they were about doing excellent, honest work for customers. Slootman is lasered focused on culture, and specifically views culture as an asset - calling it: “The only enduring, sustainable form of differentiation. These days, we don’t have a monopoly for very long on talent, technology, capital, or any other asset; the one thing that is unique to us is how we choose to come together as a group of people, day in and day out. How many organizations are there that make more than a halfhearted attempt at this?” Technology companies have taken different routes in establishing culture: Google and Facebook have tried to create culture by showering employees with unbelievable benefits, Netflix has focused on pure execution and transparency, and Microsoft has re-vamped its culture by adopting a Growth Mindset (has it really though?). Google originally promoted “Don’t be evil,” as part of its Code of Conduct but dropped the motto in 2018. Employees want to work for mission-driven organizations, but not all companies are really changing the world with their products, and Frank did not try to sugarcoat Data Domain’s data-duplication technology as a way to “elevate the world’s consciousness.” He created a culture driven by performance and execution - providing a useful product to businesses that needed it. The culture was so revered that post-acquisition, EMC instituted Data Domain’s performance management system. Data Domain employees were looked at strangely by longtime EMC executives, who had spent years in a big and stale company. Culture is a hard thing to replicate and a hard thing to change as we saw with the Innovator’s Dilemma. Might as well use it to help the company succeed!

Dig Deeper

  • How Data Domain Evolved in the Cloud World

  • Former Data Domain CEO Frank Slootman Gets His Old Band Back Together at ServiceNow

  • The Contentious Take-over Battle for Data Domain: Netapp vs. EMC

  • 2009 Interview with Frank Slootman After the Acquisition of Data Domain

tags: Snowflake, DoorDash, ServiceNow, WeWork, Data Domain, EMC, Netapp, Frank Slootman, Borland, IBM, Burroughs, Sperry, NEA, Greylock, Workday, Aneel Bhusri, Sun Microsystems, USVP, Uber, Netflix, Facebook, Google, Microsoft, Amazon, Jeff Bezos, Tony Xu, MongoDB, Elastic, Crowdstrike, Crypto, Gartner, Hype Cycle, Slack, Apple, Steve Jobs, Steve Wozniak, Magic Leap, batch2
categories: Non-Fiction
 

July 2020 - Innovator's Dilemma by Clayton Christensen

This month we review the technology classic, the Innovator’s Dilemma, by Clayton Christensen. The book attempts to answer the age-old question: why do dominant companies eventually fail?

Tech Themes

  1. The Actual Definition of Disruptive Technology. Disruption is a term that is frequently thrown around in Silicon Valley circles. Every startup thinks its technology is disruptive, meaning it changes how the customer currently performs a task or service. The actual definition, discussed in detail throughout the book, is relatively specific. Christensen re-emphasizes this distinction in a 2015 Harvard Business Review article: "Specifically, as incumbents focus on improving their products and services for their most demanding (and usually most profitable) customers, they exceed the needs of some segments and ignore the needs of others. Entrants that prove disruptive begin by successfully targeting those overlooked segments, gaining a foothold by delivering more-suitable functionality—frequently at a lower price. Incumbents, chasing higher profitability in more-demanding segments, tend not to respond vigorously. Entrants then move upmarket, delivering the performance that incumbents' mainstream customers require, while preserving the advantages that drove their early success. When mainstream customers start adopting the entrants' offerings in volume, disruption has occurred." The book posits that there are generally two types of innovation: sustaining and disruptive. While disruptive innovation focuses on low-end or new, small market entry, sustaining innovation merely continues markets along their already determined axes. For example, in the book, Christensen discusses the disk drive industry, mapping out the jumps which pack more memory and power into each subsequent product release. There is a slew of sustaining jumps for each disruptive jump that improves product performance for existing customers but doesn't necessarily get non-customers to become customers. It is only when new use cases emerge, like rugged disk usage and PCs arrive, that disruption occurs. Understanding the specific definition can help companies and individuals better navigate muddled tech messaging; Uber, for example, is shown to be a sustaining technology because its market already existed, and the company didn't offer lower prices or a new business model. Understanding the intricacies of the definition can help incumbents spot disruptive competitors.

  2. Value Networks. Value networks are an underappreciated and somewhat confusing topic covered in The Innovator's Dilemma's early chapters. A value network is defined as "The context within which a firm identifies and responds to customers' needs, solves problems, procures input, reacts to competitors, and strives for profit." A value network seems all-encompassing on the surface. In reality, a value network serves to simplify the lens through which an organization must make complex decisions every day. Shown as a nested product architecture, a value network attempts to show where a company interacts with other products. By distilling the product down to its most atomic components (literally computer hardware), we can see all of the considerations that impact a business. Once we have this holistic view, we can consider the decisions and tradeoffs that face an organization every day. The takeaway here is that organizations care about different levels of performance for different products. For example, when looking at cloud computing services at AWS, Azure, or GCP, we see Amazon EC2 instances, Azure VMs, and Google Cloud VMs with different operating systems, different purposes (general, compute, memory), and different sizes. General-purpose might be fine for basic enterprise applications, while gaming applications might need compute-optimized, and real-time big data analytics may need a memory-optimized VM. While it gets somewhat forgotten throughout the book, this point means that organizations focused on producing only compute-intensive machines may not be the best for memory-intensive, because the customers of the organization may not have a use for them. In the book's example, some customers (of bigger memory providers) looked at smaller memory applications and said there was no need. In reality, there was massive demand in the rugged, portable market for smaller memory disks. When approaching disruptive innovation, it's essential to recognize your organization's current value network so that you don't target new technologies at those who don't need it.

  3. Product Commoditization. Christensen spends a lot of time describing the dynamics of the disk drive industry, where companies continually supplied increasingly smaller drives with better performance. Christensen's description of commoditization is very interesting: "A product becomes a commodity within a specific market segment when the repeated changes in the basis of competition, completely play themselves out, that is, when market needs on each attribute or dimension of performance have been fully satisfied by more than one available product." At this point, products begin competing primarily on price. In the disk drive industry, companies first competed on capacity, then on size, then on reliability, and finally on price. This price war is reminiscent of the current state of the Continuous Integration / Continuous Deployment (CI/CD) market, a subsegment of DevOps software. Companies in the space, including Github, CircleCI, Gitlab, and others are now competing primarily on price to win new business. Each of the cloud providers has similar technologies native to their public cloud offerings (AWS CodePipeline and CloudFormation, GitHub Actions, Google Cloud Build). They are giving it away for free because of their scale. The building block of CI/CD software is git, an open-source version control system founded by Linux founder Linus Torvalds. With all the providers leveraging a massive open-source project, there is little room for true differentiation. Christensen even says: "It may, in fact, be the case that the product offerings of competitors in a market continue to be differentiated from each other. But differentiation loses its meaning when the features and functionality have exceeded what the market demands." Only time will tell whether these companies can pivot into burgeoning highly differentiated technologies.

Business Themes

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  1. Resources-Processes-Value (RPV) Framework. The RPV framework is a powerful lens for understanding the challenges that large businesses face. Companies have resources (people, assets, technology, product designs, brands, information, cash, relationships with customers, etc.) that can be transformed into greater value products and services. The way organizations go about converting these resources is the organization's processes. These processes can be formal (documented sales strategies, for example) or informal (culture and habitual routines). Processes are the big reasons organizations struggle to deal with emerging technologies. Because culture and habit are ingrained in the organization, the same process used to launch a mature, slow-growing market may be applied to a fast-growing, dynamic sector. Christensen puts it best: "This means the very mechanisms through which organizations create value are intrinsically inimical to change." Lastly, companies have values, or "the standards by which employees make prioritization decisions." When there is a mismatch between the resources, processes, and values of an organization and the product or market that an organization is chasing, its rare the business can be successful in competing in the disruptive market. To see this misalignment in action, Christensen describes a meeting with a CEO who had identified the disruptive change happening in the disk-drive market and had gotten a product to market to meet the growing market. In response to a publication showing the fast growth of the market, the CEO lamented to Christensen: "I know that's what they think, but they're wrong. There isn't a market. We've had that drive in our catalog for 18 months. Everyone knows we've got it, but nobody wants it." The issue was not the product or market demand, but the organization's values. As Christensen continues, "But among the employees, there was nothing about an $80 million, low-end market that solved the growth and profit problems of a multi-billion dollar company – especially when capable competitors were doing all they could to steal away the customers providing those billions. And way at the other end of the company there was nothing about supplying prototype companies of 1.8-inch drives to an automaker that solved the problem of meeting the 1994 quotas of salespeople whose contacts and expertise were based so solidly in the computer industry." The CEO cared about the product, but his team did not. The RPV framework helps evaluate large companies and the challenges they face in launching new products.

  2. How to manage through technological change. Christensen points out three primary ways of managing through disruptive technology change: 1. "Acquire a different organization whose processes and values are a close match with the new task." 2. "Try to change the processes and values of the current organization." 3. "Separate out an independent organization and develop within it the new processes and values that are required to solve the new problem." Acquisitions are a way to get out ahead of disruptive change. There are so many examples but two recent ones come to mind: Microsoft's acquisition of Github and Facebook's acquisition of Instagram. Microsoft paid a whopping $7.5B for Github in 2018 when the Github was rumored to be at roughly $200M in revenue (37.5x Revenue multiple!). Github was undoubtedly a mature business with a great product, but it didn't have a ton of enterprise adoption. Diane Greene at Google Cloud, tried to get Sundar Pichai to pay more, but he said no. Github has changed Azure's position within the market and continued its anti-Amazon strategy of pushing open-source technology. In contrast to the Github acquisition, Instagram was only 13 employees when it was acquired for $1B. Zuckerberg saw the threat the social network represented to Facebook, and today the acquisition is regularly touted as one of the best ever. Instagram was developing a social network solely based on photographs, right at the time every person suddenly had an excellent smartphone camera in their pocket. The acquisition occurred right when the market was ballooning, and Facebook capitalized on that growth. The second way of managing technological change is through changing cultural norms. This is rarely successful, because you are fighting against all of the processes and values deeply embedded in the organization. Indra Nooyi cited a desire to move faster on culture as one of her biggest regrets as a young executive: "I’d say I was a little too respectful of the heritage and culture [of PepsiCo]. You’ve got to make a break with the past. I was more patient than I should’ve been. When you know you have to make a change, at some point you have to say enough is enough. The people who have been in the company for 20-30 years pull you down. If I had to do it all over again, I might have hastened the pace of change even more." Lastly, Christensen prescribes creating an independent organization matched to the resources, processes, and values that the new market requires. Three great spin-out, spin-in examples with different flavors of this come to mind. First, Cisco developed a spin-ins practice whereby they would take members of their organization and start a new company that they would fund to develop a new process. The spin-ins worked for a time but caused major cultural issues. Second, as we've discussed, one of the key reasons AWS was born was that Chris Pinkham was in South Africa, thousands of miles away from Amazon Corporate in Seattle; this distance and that team's focus allowed it to come up with a major advance in computing. Lastly, Mastercard started Mastercard Labs a few years ago. CEO Ajay Banga told his team: "I need two commercial products in three years." He doesn't tell his CFO their budget, and he is the only person from his executive team that interacts with the business. This separation of resources, processes, and values allows those smaller organizations to be more nimble in finding emerging technology products and markets.

  3. Discovering Emerging Markets.

    The resources-processes-values framework can also show us why established firms fail to address emerging markets. Established companies rely on formal budgeting and forecasting processes whereby resources are allocated based on market estimates and revenue forecasts. Christensen highlights several important factors for tackling emerging markets, including focusing on ideas, failure, and learning. Underpinning all of these ideas is the impossibility of predicting the scale and growth rate of disruptive technologies: "Experts' forecasts will always be wrong. It is simply impossible to predict with any useful degree of precision how disruptive products will be used or how large their markets will be." Because of this challenge, relying too heavily on these estimates to underpin financial projections can cause businesses to view initial market development as a failure or not worthy of the companies time. When HP launched a new 1.3-inch disk drive, which could be embedded in PDAs, the company mandated that its revenues had to scale up to $150M within three years, in line with market estimates. That market never materialized, and the initiative was abandoned as a failed investment. Christensen argues that because disruptive technologies are threats, planning has to come after action, and thus strategic and financial planning must be discovery-based rather than execution-based. Companies should focus on learning their customer's needs and the right business model to attack the problem, rather than plan to execute their initial vision. As he puts it: "Research has shown, in fact, that the vast majority of successful new business ventures, abandoned their original business strategies when they began implementing their initial plans and learned what would and would not work." One big fan of Christensen's work is Jeff Bezos, and its easy to see why with Amazon's focus on releasing new products in this discovery manner. The pace of product releases is simply staggering (~almost one per day). Bezos even talked about this exact issue in his 2016 shareholder letter: "The senior team at Amazon is determined to keep our decision-making velocity high. Speed matters in business – plus a high-velocity decision making environment is more fun too. We don't know all the answers, but here are some thoughts. First, never use a one-size-fits-all decision-making process. Many decisions are reversible, two-way doors. Those decisions can use a light-weight process. For those, so what if you're wrong? I wrote about this in more detail in last year's letter. Second, most decisions should probably be made with somewhere around 70% of the information you wish you had. If you wait for 90%, in most cases, you're probably being slow." Amazon is one of the first large organizations to truly embrace this decision-making style, and clearly, the results speak for themselves.

Dig Deeper

  • What Jeff Bezos Tells His Executives To Read

  • Github Cuts Subscription Price by More Than Half

  • Ajay Banga Opening Address at MasterCard Innovation Forum 2014

  • Clayton Christensen Describing Disruptive Innovation

  • Why Cisco’s Spin-Ins Never Caught On

tags: Amazon, Google Cloud, Microsoft, Azure, Github, Gitlab, CircleCI, Pepsi, Jeff Bezos, Indra Nooyi, Mastercard, Ajay Banga, HP, Uber, RPV, Facebook, Instagram, Cisco, batch2
categories: Non-Fiction
 

April 2020 - Good To Great by Jim Collins

Collins’ book attempts to answer the question - Why do good companies continue to be good companies? His analysis across several different industries provides meaningful insights into strong management and strategic practices.

Tech Themes

  1. Packard’s Law. We’ve discussed Packard’s law before when analyzing the troubling acquisition history of AOL-Time Warner and Yahoo. As a reminder, Packard’s law states: “No company can consistently grow revenues faster than its ability to get enough of the right people to implement that growth and still become a great company. [And] If a company consistently grows revenue faster than its ability to get enough of the right people to implement that growth, it will not simply stagnate; it will fall.” Given Good To Great is a management focused book, I wanted to explore an example of this law manifesting itself in a recent management dilemma. Look no further than ride-sharing giant, Uber. Uber’s culture and management problems have been highly publicized. Susan Fowler’s famous blog post kicked off a series of blows that would ultimately lead to a board dispute, the departure of its CEO, and a full-on criminal investigation. Uber’s problems as a company, however, can be traced to its insistence to be the only ride-sharing service throughout the world. Uber launched several incredibly unprofitable ventures, not only a price-war with its local competitor Lyft, but also a concerted effort to get into China, India, and other locations that ultimately proved incredibly unprofitable. Uber tried to be all things transportation to every location in the world, an over-indulgence that led to the Company raising a casual $20B prior to going public. Dara Khosrowshahi, Uber’s replacement for Travis Kalanick, has concertedly sold off several business lines and shuttered other unprofitable ventures to regain financial control of this formerly money burning “logistics” pit. This unwinding has clearly benefited the business, but also limited growth, prompting the stock to drop significantly from IPO price. Dara is no stranger to facing travel challenges, he architected the spin-out of Expedia with Barry Diller, right before 9/11. Only time will tell if he can refocus the Company as it looks to run profitably. Uber pushed too far in unprofitable locations, and ran head on into Packard’s law, now having to pay the price for its brash push into unprofitable markets.

  2. Technology Accelerators. In Collins’ Good to Great framework (pictured below), technology accelerators act as a catalyst to momentum built up from disciplined people and disciplined thought. By adapting a “Pause, think, crawl, walk, run” approach to technology, meaning a slow and thoughtful transition to new technologies, companies can establish best practices for the long-term, instead of short term gains from technology faux-feature marketing. Technology faux-feature marketing, which is decoupled from actual technology has become increasingly popular in the past few years, whereby companies adopt a marketing position that is actually complete separate from their technological sophistication. Look no further than the blockchain / crypto faux-feature marketing around 2018, when Long Island iced-tea changed its name to Long Island Blockchain, which is reminiscent of companies adding “.com” to their name in the early 2000’s. Collins makes several important distinctions about technology accelerators: technology should only be a focus if it fits into a company’s hedgehog concept, technology accelerators cannot make up for poor people choices, and technology is never a primary root cause of either greatness or decline. The first two axioms make sense, just think of how many failed, custom software projects have begun and never finished; there is literally an entire wikipedia page dedicated to exactly that. The government has also reportedly been a famous dabbler in homegrown, highly customized technology. As Collins notes, technology accelerators cannot make up for bad people choices, an aspect of venture capital that is overlooked by so many. Enron is a great example of an interesting idea turned sour by terrible leadership. Beyond the accounting scandals that are discussed frequently, the culture was utterly toxic, with employees subjected to a “Performance Review Committee” whereby they were rated on a scale of 1-5 by their peers. Employees rated a 5 were fired, which meant roughly 15% of the workforce turned over every year. The New York Times reckoned Enron is still viewed as a trailblazer for the way it combined technology and energy services, but it clearly suffered from terrible leadership that even great technology couldn’t surmount. Collins’ most controversial point is arguably that technology cannot cause greatness or decline. Some would argue that technology is the primary cause of greatness for some companies like Amazon, Apple, Google, and Microsoft. The “it was just a better search engine” argument abounds discussions of early internet search engines. I think what Collins’ is getting at is that technology is malleable and can be built several different ways. Zoom and Cloudflare are great examples of this. As we’ve discussed, Zoom started over 100 years after the idea for video calling was first conceived, and several years after Cisco had purchased Webex, which begs the question, is technology the cause of greatness for Zoom? No! Zoom’s ultimate success the elegance of its simple video chat, something which had been locked up in corporate feature complexity for years. Cloudflare presents another great example. CDN businesses had existed for years when Cloudflare launched, and Cloudflare famously embedded security within the CDN, building on a trend which Akamai tried to address via M&A. Was technology the cause of greatness for Cloudflare? No! It’s way cheaper and easier to use than Akamai. Its cost structure enabled it to compete for customers that would be unprofitable to Akamai, a classic example of a sustaining technology innovation, Clayton Christensen’s Innovator’s Dilemma. This is not to say these are not technologically sophisticated companies, Zoom’s cloud ops team has kept an amazing service running 24/7 despite a massive increase in users, and Cloudflare’s Workers technology is probably the best bet to disrupt the traditional cloud providers today. But to place technology as the sole cause for greatness would be understating the companies achievements in several other areas.

  3. Build up, Breakthrough Flywheel. Jeff Bezos loves this book. Its listed in the continued reading section of prior TBOTM, The Everything Store. The build up, breakthrough flywheel is the culmination of disciplined people, disciplined thought and disciplined action. Collins’ points out that several great companies frequently appear like overnight successes; all of a sudden, the Company has created something great. But that’s rarely the case. Amazon is a great example of this; it had several detractors in the early days, and was dismissed as simply an online bookseller. Little did the world know that Jeff Bezos had ideas to pursue every product line and slowly launched one after the other in a concerted fashion. In addition, what is a better technology accelerator than AWS! AWS resulted from an internal problem of scaling compute fast enough to meet growing consumer demand for their online products. The company’s tech helped it scale so well that they thought, “Hey! Other companies would probably like this!” Apple is another classic example of a build-up, breakthrough flywheel. The Company had a massive success with the iPod, it was 40% of revenues in 2007. But what did it do? It cannablized itself and pursued the iPhone, with several different teams within the company pursuing it individually. Not only that, it created a terrible first version of an Apple phone with the Rokr, realizing that design was massively important to the phone’s success. The phone’s technology is taken for granted today, but at the time the touch screen was simply magical!

Business Themes

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  1. Level 5 Leader. The first part and probably the most important part of the buildup, breakthrough, flywheel is disciplined people. One aspect of Good to Great that inspired Collins’ other book Built to Last, is the idea that leadership, people, and culture determine the long-term future of a business, even after current leadership has moved on from the business. To set an organization up for long-term success, executives need to display level five leadership, which is a mix of personal humility and professional will. Collins’ leans in on Lee Iacocca as an example of a poor leader, who focused more on personal celebrity and left Chrysler to fail, when he departed. Level 5 leadership has something that you don’t frequently see in technology business leaders, humility. The technology industry seems littered with far more Larry Ellison and Elon Musk’s than any other industry, or maybe its just that tech CEOs tend to shout the loudest from their pedestals. One CEO that has done a great job of representing level five leadership is Shantanu Narayen, who took the reigns of Adobe in December 2007, right on the cusp of the financial crisis. Narayen, who’s been described as more of a doer than a talker, has dramatically changed Adobe’s revenue model, moving the business from a single sale license software business focused on lower ACV numbers, to an enterprise focused SaaS business. This march has been slow and pragmatic but the business has done incredibly well, 10xing since he took over. Adobe CFO, Mark Garrett, summarized it best in a 2015 McKinsey interview: “We instituted open dialogue with employees—here’s what we’re going through, here’s what it might look like—and we encouraged debate. Not everyone stayed, but those who did were committed to the cloud model.”

  2. Hedgehog Concept. The Hedgehog concept (in the picture wheel to the right) is the overlap of three questions: What are you passionate about?, What are you the best in the world at?, and What drives your economic engine? This overlap is the conclusion of Collins’ memo to Confront the Brutal Facts, something that Ben Horowitz emphasizes in March’s TBOTM. Once teams have dug into their business, they should come up with a simple way to center their focus. When companies reach outside their hedgehog concept, they get hurt. The first question, about organizational passion, manifests itself in mission and value statements. The best in the world question manifests itself through value network exercises, SWOT analyses and competitive analyses. The economic engine is typically shown as a single metric to define success in the organization. As an example, let’s walk through an example with a less well-known SaaS company: Avalara. Avalara is a provider of tax compliance software for SMBs and enterprises, allowing those businesses to outsource complex and changing tax rules to software that integrates with financial management systems to provide an accurate view of corporate taxes. Avalara’s hedgehog concept is right on their website: “We live and breathe tax compliance so you don't have to.” Its simple and effective. The also list a slightly different version in their 10-K, “Avalara’s motto is ‘Tax compliance done right.’” Avalara is the best at tax compliance software, and that is their passion; they “live and breath” tax compliance software. What drives Avalara’s economic engine? They list two metrics right at the top of their SEC filings, number of core customers and net revenue retention. Core customers are customers who have been billed more than $3,000 in the last twelve months. The growth in core customers allows Avalara to understand their base of revenue. Tax compliance software is likely low churn because filing taxes is such an onerous process, and most people don’t have the expertise to do it for their corporate taxes. They will however suffer from some tax seasonality and some customers may churn and come back after the tax period has ended for a given year. Total billings allows Avalara to account for this possibility. Avalara’s core customers have grown 32% in the last twelve months, meaning its revenue should be following a similar trajectory. Net retention allows the company to understand how customer purchasing behavior changes over time and at 113% net retention, Avalara’s overall base is buying more software from Avalara than is churning, which is a positive trend for the company. What is the company the best in the world at? Tax compliance software for SMBs. Avalara views their core customer as greater than $3,000 of trailing twelve months revenue, which means they are targeting small customers. The Company’s integrations also speak to this - Shopify, Magento, NetSuite, and Stripe are all focused on SMB and mid-market customers. Notice that neither SAP nor Oracle ERP is in that list of integrations, which are the financial management software providers that target large enterprises. This means Avalara has set up its product and cost structure to ensure long-term profitability in the SMB segment; the enterprise segment is on the horizon, but today they are focused on SMBs.

  3. Culture of Discipline. Collins describes a culture of discipline as an ability of managers to have open and honest, often confrontational conversation. The culture of discipline has to fit within a culture of freedom, allowing individuals to feel responsible for their division of the business. This culture of discipline is one of the first things to break down when a CEO leaves. Collins points on this issue with Lee Iaccoca, the former CEO of Chrysler. Lee built an intense culture of corporate favoritism, which completely unraveled after he left the business. This is also the focus of Collins’ other book, Built to Last. Companies don’t die overnight, yet it seems that way when problems begin to abound company-wide. We’ve analyzed HP’s 20 year downfall and a similar story can be shown with IBM. In 1993, IBM elected Lou Gerstner as CEO of the company. Gerstner was an outsider to technology businesses, having previously led the highly controversial RJR Nabisco, after KKR completed its buyout in 1989. He has also been credited with enacting wholesale changes to the company’s culture during his tenure. Despite the stock price increasing significantly over Gerstner’s tenure, the business lost significant market share to Microsoft, Apple and Dell. Gerstner was also the first IBM CEO to make significant income, having personally been paid hundreds of millions over his tenure. Following Gerstner, IBM elected insider Sam Palmisano to lead the Company. Sam pushed IBM into several new business lines, acquired 25 software companies, and famously sold off IBM’s PC division, which turned out to be an excellent strategic decision as PC sales and margins declined over the following ten years. Interestingly, Sam’s goal was to “leave [IBM] better than when I got there.” Sam presided over a strong run up in the stock, but yet again, severely missed the broad strategic shift toward public cloud. In 2012, Ginni Rometty was elected as new CEO. Ginni had championed IBM’s large purchase of PwC’s technology consulting business, turning IBM more into a full service organization than a technology company. Palmisano has an interesting quote in an interview with a wharton business school professor where he discusses IBM’s strategy: “The thing I learned about Lou is that other than his phenomenal analytical capability, which is almost unmatched, Lou always had the ability to put the market or the client first. So the analysis always started from the outside in. You could say that goes back to connecting with the marketplace or the customer, but the point of it was to get the company and the analysis focused on outside in, not inside out. I think when you miss these shifts, you’re inside out. If you’re outside in, you don’t miss the shifts. They’re going to hit you. Now acting on them is a different characteristic. But you can’t miss the shift if you’re outside in. If you’re inside out, it’s easy to delude yourself. So he taught me the importance of always taking the view of outside in.” Palmisano’s period of leadership introduced a myriad of organizational changes, 110+ acquisitions, and a centralization of IBM processes globally. Ginni learned from Sam that acquisitions were key toward growth, but IBM was buying into markets they didn’t fully understand, and when Ginni layered on 25 new acquisitions in her first two years, the Company had to shift from an outside-in perspective to an inside-out perspective. The way IBM had historically handled the outside-in perspective, to recognize shifts and get ahead of them, was through acquisition. But when the acquisitions occured at such a rapid pace, and in new markets, the organization got bogged down in a process of digestion. Furthermore, the centralization of processes and acquired businesses is the exact opposite of what Clayton Christensen recommends when pursuing disruptive technology. This makes it obvious why IBM was so late to the cloud game. This was a mainframe and services company, that had acquired hundreds of software businesses they didn’t really understand. Instead of building on these software platforms, they wasted years trying to put them all together into a digestible package for their customers. IBM launched their public cloud offering in June 2014, a full seven years after Microsoft, Amazon, and Google launched their services, despite providing the underlying databases and computing power for all of their enterprise customers. Gerstner established the high-pay, glamorous CEO role at IBM, which Palmisano and Ginni stepped into, with corporate jets and great expense policies. The company favored increasing revenues and profits (as a result of acquisitions) over the recognition and focus on a strategic market shift, which led to a downfall in the stock price and a declining mindshare in enterprises. Collins’ understands the importance of long term cultural leadership. “Does Palmisano think he could have done anything differently to set IBM up for success once he left? Not really. What has happened since falls to a new coach, a new team, he says.”

Dig Deeper

  • Level 5 Leadership from Darwin Smith at Kimberly Clark

  • From Good to Great … to Below Average by Steven Levitt - Unpacking underperformance from some of the companies Collins’ studied

  • The Challenges faced by new CEO Arvind Krishna

  • Overview of Cloudflare Workers

  • The Opposite of the Buildup, Breakthrough, Flywheel - the Doom Loop

tags: IBM, Apple, Microsoft, Packard's Law, HP, Uber, Barry Diller, Enron, Zoom, Cloudflare, Innovator's Dilemma, Clayton Christensen, Jeff Bezos, Amazon, Larry Ellison, Adobe, Shantanu Narayen, Avalara, Hedgehog Concept, batch2
categories: Non-Fiction
 

May 2019 - The Everything Store: Jeff Bezos and the Age of Amazon by Brad Stone

This book is a great deep dive on the history of Amazon and how it became the global powerhouse that it is today.

Tech Themes

  1. The Birth of AWS. We’ve looked at the software transition from on premise, license maintenance software to SaaS hosted in the cloud, but let’s dive deep into how the cloud came to be. The first ideas of AWS go back to 2002 when Bezos met with O’Reilly Media, a book publisher who in order to compete with Amazon, had created a way to scrape the latest book rankings off Amazon’s website. O’Reilly suggested creating a set of tools to let developers access Amazon’s rankings, and in 2003 Amazon launched Amazon Web Services (AWS) to create commerce API’s for third parties. Around this time, Amazon had centralized its IT computing resources in a separate building with hardware professionals operating and maintaining the infrastructure for the entire company. While parts of the infrastructure had improved, Amazon was struggling internally to provision and scale its computing resources. In 2004, Chris Pinkham, head of the infrastructure division, relocated to South Africa to open up Amazon’s first office in Cape Town. His first order of business was to figure out the best way to provision resources internally to allow developers to work on all types of applications on Amazon’s servers. Chris elected to use Xen, a computer that sits on top of infrastructure and acts as a controller to allow multiple projects access the same hardware. This led to the development of Elastic Compute Cloud (EC2). During this time, another group within Amazon was working on solving the problem of storing the millions of gigabytes of data Amazon had created. This team was led by Alan Atlas, who could not escape Bezos’ laser focus: “It would always start out fun and happy, with Jeff’s laugh rebounding against the walls. Then something would happen and the meeting would go south and you would fear for your life. I literally thought I’d get fired after everyone one of those meetings.” In March 2006, Amazon launched the Simple Storage Service (S3), and then a few months later launched EC2. Solving internal problems can lead to incredibly successful companies; Slack, for example, originally started as a game development company but couldn’t get the product off the ground and eventually pivoted into the messaging giant that it is today: “Tiny Speck, the company behind Glitch, will continue. We have developed some unique messaging technology with applications outside of the gaming world and a smaller core team will be working to develop new products.”

  2. A9. In the early 2000s, Google arrived on the scene and began to sit in between Amazon and potential sales. Around this time, Amazon’s core business was struggling and a New York Times article even called for Bezos to resign. Google was siphoning off Amazon’s engineers and Bezos knew he had to take big strategic bets in order to ward off Google’s advances. To do that, he hired Udi Manber, a former Yahoo executive with a PhD in computer science who had written the authoritative textbook on Algorithms. In 2003, Udi set up shop in Palo Alto in a new Amazon subsidiary called A9 (shorthand for Algorithms). The new subsidiary’s sole goal was to create a web search engine that could rival Google’s. While A9.com never completely took off, the new development center did improve Amazon’s website search and created Clickriver, the beginning of Amazon’s advertising business, which minted $10B in revenue last year. Udi eventually became VP of Engineering for all of Google’s search products and then its Youtube Division. A9 still exists to tackle Amazon’s biggest supply chain math problems.

  3. Innovation, Lab126 and the Kindle. In 2004, Bezos called Steve Kessel into his office and moved him from his current role as head of Amazon’s successful online books business, to run Amazon Digital, a small and not yet successful part of Amazon. This would become a repeating pattern in Kessel’s career who now finds himself head of all of Amazon’s physical locations, including its Whole Foods subsidiary. Bezos gave Kessel an incredibly abstract goal, “Your job is to kill your own business. I want you to proceed as if your goal is to put everyone selling physical books out of a job.” Bezos wanted Kessel to create a digital reading device. Kessel spent the next few months meeting with executives at Apple and Palm (make of then famous Palm Pilots) to understand the current challenges in creating such a device. Kessel eventually settled into an empty room at A9 and launched Lab126 (1 stands for a, 26 for z – an ode to Bezos’s goal to sell every book A-Z), a new subsidiary of Amazon. After a long development process and several supply chain issues, the Company launched the Kindle in 2007.

    Business Themes

  4. Something to prove: Jeff Bezos’s Childhood. What do Jeff Bezos, Steve Jobs, Elon Musk and Larry Ellison (founder of Oracle) all have in common? They all had somewhat troubled upbringings. Jobs and Ellison were famously put up for adoption at young ages. Musk’s parents divorced and Elon endured several years of an embattled relationship with his father. Jeff Bezos was born Jeffrey Preston Jorgenson, on January 12, 1964. Ted Jorgenson, Bezos’s biological father, married his mother, Jackie Gise after Gise became pregnant at age sixteen. The couple had a troubled relationship and Ted was immature and an inattentive father. The couple divorced in 1965. Jacklyn eventually met Miguel Bezos, a Cuban immigrant college student, while she was working the late shift at the Bank of New Mexico’s accounting department. Miguel and Jacklyn were married in 1968 and Jeffrey Jorgenson became Jeffrey Bezos. Several books have theorized the maniacal drive of these entrepreneurs relates back to ultimately prove self-worth after being rejected by loved ones at a young age.

  5. Anti-Competitive Amazon & the Story of Quidsi. Amazon has an internal group dubbed Competitive Intelligence, that’s sole job is to research the products and services of competitors and present results to Jeff Bezos so he can strategically address any places where they may be losing to the competition. In the late 2000s, Competitive Intelligence began tracking a company known as Quidsi, famous for its site Diapers.com, which provided discount baby products that could be purchased on a recurring subscription basis. Quidsi had grown quickly because it had customized its distribution system for baby products. In 2009, competitive intelligence reached out to Quidsi founder, Marc Lore (founder of Jet.com and currently the head of Walmart e-commerce) saying it was looking to invest in the category. After rebuffing the offer, Quidsi soon noticed that Amazon was pricing its baby products 30% cheaper in every category; the company even tried dropping prices lower only to see Amazon pages reset to even lower prices. After a few months, Quidsi knew they couldn’t remain in a price battle for long and launched a sale of the company. Walmart agreed in principle to acquire the business for $900M but upon further diligence reduced its bid, which prompted Lore to call Amazon. Lore and his executive team went to meet with Amazon, and during the meeting, Amazon launched Amazon Mom, which gave 30% discounts on all baby products and allowed participants to purchase products on a recurring basis. At one point, Amazon’s prices dipped so low it was on track to lose $100M in three months in the diapers category alone. Amazon submitted a $540M bid for Quidsi and subsequently entered into an exclusivity period with the Company. As the end to exclusivity grew nearer, Walmart submitted a new bid at $600M, but the Amazon team threatened full on price war if Quidsi went with Walmart, so on November 8, 2010, Quidsi was acquired by Amazon for $540M. One month after the acquisition, Amazon stopped the Amazon Mom program and raised all of its prices back to normal levels. The Federal Trade Commission reviewed the deal for four months (longer than usual), but ultimately allowed the acquisition because it did not create a monopoly in the sale of baby products. Quidsi was ultimately shut down by Amazon in 2017, because it was unable to operate it profitably.

  6. The demanding Jeff Bezos and six page memos. At Amazon, nobody uses powerpoint presentations. Instead, employees write out six page narratives in prose. Bezos believes this helps create clear and concise thinking that gets lost in flashy powerpoint slides. Whenever someone wants to launch new initiative or project, they have to submit a six page memo framed as if a customer might be hearing it for the first time. Each meeting begins with the group reading the document and the discussion begins from there. At times, especially around the release of AWS, these documents grew increasingly complex in length and size given the products being described did not already exist. Bezos often responds intensely to these memos, with bad responses including: “Are you just lazy or incompetent?” and “If I hear that idea again, I’m gonna have to kill myself” and “This document was clearly written by the B team. Can someone get me the A team document? I don’t want to waste my time with the B team document.” Its no wonder Amazon is such a terrible place to work.

Dig Deeper

  • How Amazon took the opposite approach that apple took to pricing EC2 and S3

  • The failed Amazon Fire Phone and taking big bets

  • The S Team - Amazon’s intense executives

  • The little-known deal that saved Amazon from the dot-com crash

  • Mary Meeker, Amazon and the internet bubble: Amazon.bomb: How the internet's biggest success story turned sour

  • Customer Centric: Amazon Celebrates 20 Years Of Stupendous Growth As 'Earth's Most Customer-Centric Company

tags: Amazon, Cloud Computing, e-Commerce, Scaling, Seattle, Brad Stone, Jeff Bezos, Elon Musk, Steve Jobs, Mary Meeker, EC2, S3, IaaS, batch2
categories: Non-Fiction
 

April 2019 - Only the Paranoid Survive by Andrew S. Grove

This book details how to manage a company through complex industry change. It is incredibly prescient and a great management book.

Tech Themes

  1. The decoupling of hardware and software. In the early days of personal computers (1980s) the hardware and software were both provided by the same company. This is complete vertical alignment, similar to what we’ve discussed before with Apple. The major providers of the day were IBM, Digital Equipment Corporation (DEC - Acquired by Compaq which was acquired by HP), Sperry Univac and Wang. When you bought a PC, the sales and distribution, application software, operating system, and chips were all handled by the same Company. This created extreme vendor lock-in because each PC had different and complicated ways of operating. Customers typically stayed with the same vendor for years to avoid the headache of learning the new system. Over time, driven by the increases in memory efficiency, and the rise of Intel (where Andy Grove was employee #3), the PC industry began to shift to a horizontal model. In this model, retail stores (Micro Center, Best Buy, etc.) provided sales and distribution, dedicated software companies provided applications (Apple at the time, Microsoft, Mosaic, etc.), Intel provided the chips, and Microsoft provided the operating system (MS-DOS, then Windows). This decoupling produced a more customized computer for significantly lower cost and became the dominant model for purchasing going forward. Dell computers were the first to really capitalize on this trend.

  2. Microprocessors and memory chips. Intel started in 1968 and was the first to market with a microchip that could be used to store computer memory. Demand was strong because it was the first of its kind, and Intel significantly ramped up production to satisfy that demand. By the early eighties, it was a computer powerhouse and the name Intel was synonymous with computer memory. In the mid-eighties, Japanese memory producers began to appear on the scene and could produce higher-quality chips at a cheaper cost. At first, Intel saw these producers as a healthy backup plan when demand exceeded Intel’s supply, but over time it became clear they were losing market share. Intel saw this commoditization and decided to pivot out of the memory business and into the newer, less-competitive microprocessor business. The microprocessor (or CPU) handles the execution of tasks within the computer, while memories simply store the byproduct of that execution. As memory became easier to produce, the cost dropped dramatically and business became more competitive with producers consistently undercutting each other to win business. On the other hand, microprocessors became increasingly important as the internet grew, applications became more complex and computer speed became a top-selling point.

  3. Mainframes to PCs. IBM had become the biggest technology company in the world on the backs of mainframes: massive, powerful, inflexible, and expensive mega-computers. As the computing industry began to shift to PCs and move away from a vertical alignment to a horizontal one, IBM was caught flat-footed. In 1981, IBM chose Intel to provide the microprocessor for their PC, which led to Intel becoming the most widely accepted supplier of microprocessors. The industry followed volume - manufacturers focused on producing on top of Intel architecture, developers focused on developing on the best operating system (Microsoft Windows) and over time Intel and Microsoft encroached on IBM’s turf. Grove’s reasoning for this is simple: “IBM was composed of a group of people who had won time and time again, decade after decade, in the battle among vertical computer players. So when the industry changed, they attempted to use the same type of thinking regarding product development and competitiveness that had worked so well in the past.” Just because the company has been successful before, it doesn’t mean it will be successful again when change occurs.

The six forces acting on a business at any time. When one becomes outsized, it can represent a strategic inflection point to the business.

The six forces acting on a business at any time. When one becomes outsized, it can represent a strategic inflection point to the business.

Business Themes

  1. Strategic Inflection Points and 10x forces. A strategic inflection point is a fundamental shift in a business, due to industry dynamics. Examples of well known shifts include: mainframes to PCs, vertical computer production to horizontal production, on-premise hardware to the cloud, shrink-wrapped software to SaaS, and physical retail to e-commerce. These strategic inflection points are caused by 10x forces, which represent the underlying shift in the technology or demand that has caused the inflection point. Deriving from the Porter five forces model, these forces can affect your current competitors, complementors, customers, suppliers, potential competitors and substitutes. For Intel, the 10x force came from their Japanese competitors which could produce better quality memories at a substantially lower cost. Recognizing these inflection points can be difficult, and takes place over time in stages. Grove describes it best: “First, there is a troubling sense that something is different. Things don’t work the way they used to. Customers’ attitudes toward you are different. The trade shows seem weird. Then there is a growing dissonance between what your company thinks it is doing and what is actually happening inside the bowels of the organization. Such misalignment between corporate statements and operational actions hints at more than the normal chaos that you have learned to live with. Eventually, a new framework, a new set of understandings, a new set of actions emerges…working your way through a strategic inflection point is like venturing into what i call the valley of death.”

  2. The bottoms up, top-down way to “Let chaos reign.” The way to respond to a strategic inflection point comes through experimentation. As Grove says, “Loosen up the level of control that your organization normally is accustomed to. Let people try different techniques, review different products. Only stepping out of the old ruts will bring new insights.” This idea was also recently discussed by Jeff Bezos in his annual shareholder letter - he likened this idea to wandering: “Sometimes (often actually) in business, you do know where you’re going, and when you do, you can be efficient. Put in place a plan and execute. In contrast, wandering in business is not efficient … but it’s also not random. It’s guided – by hunch, gut, intuition, curiosity, and powered by a deep conviction that the prize for customers is big enough that it’s worth being a little messy and tangential to find our way there. Wandering is an essential counter-balance to efficiency. You need to employ both. The outsized discoveries – the “non-linear” ones – are highly likely to require wandering.” When faced with mounting evidence that things are changing, begin the process of strategic wandering. This needs to be coupled with bottom-up actions from middle managers who are exposed to the underlying industry/technology change on a day to day basis. Strategic wandering reinforced with the buy-in and action of middle management can produce major advances as was the case with Amazon Web Services.

  3. Traversing the valley of death. The first task in traversing through a strategic inflection point is to create a clear, explainable, mental image of what the business looks like on the other side. This becomes your new focus and the Company’s mantra. For Intel, in 1986, it was, “Intel, the microcomputer company.” This phrase did two things: it broke the previous synonymy of Intel with ‘memory’ and signaled internally a new focus on microprocessors. Next, the Company should redeploy its best resources to its biggest problems, including the CEO. Grove described this process as, “going back to school.” He met with managers and engineers and grilled them with questions to fully understand the state and potential of the inflection point. Once the new direction is decided, the company should focus all of its efforts in one direction without hedging. While it may feel comfortable to hedge, it signals an unclear direction and can be incredibly expensive.

Dig Deeper

  • Mapping strategic inflection points to product lifecycles

  • Review of grocery strategic inflection points by Coca-cola

  • Strategic inflection point for Kimberly Clark in the paper industry: “Sell the Mills”

  • Andy Grove survived the Nazi and Communist regimes of Hungary

  • Is Facebook at a strategic inflection point?

tags: Andy Grove, Intel, Chips, hardware, Amazon, Jeff Bezos, Strategic inflection point, 10x force, software, batch2
categories: Non-Fiction
 

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