• Tech Book of the Month
  • Archive
  • Recommend a Book
  • Choose The Next Book
  • Sign Up
  • About
  • Search
Tech Book of the Month
  • Tech Book of the Month
  • Archive
  • Recommend a Book
  • Choose The Next Book
  • Sign Up
  • About
  • Search

May 2022 - Play Nice, But Win by Michael Dell and James Kaplan

This month we dive into the history of Dell Computer Corporation, one of the biggest PC and server companies in the world! Michael Dell gives a first-hand perspective of all of Dell’s big successes and failures throughout the years and his intense battle with Carl Icahn, over the biggest management buyout in history.

Tech Themes

  1. Be a Tinkerer. When he was in seventh grade, Michael Dell begged his parents to buy an Apple II computer (which costs ~$5,000 in today's dollars). Immediately after the computer arrived, he took the entire thing apart to see exactly how the system worked. After diving deep into each component, Dell started attending Apple user groups. During one, he met a young and tattered Steve Jobs. Dell began tutoring people on the Apple II's components and how they could get the most out of it. When IBM entered the market in 1980 with the 5150 computer, he did the same thing - took it apart, and examined the components. He realized that almost everything IBM made came from other companies (not IBM) and that the total value of its components was well below the IBM price tag. From this simple insight, he had a business. He started fixing up a couple of computers for local business people in Austin. Dell's machines cost less and delivered more performance. The company got so big (50k - 80k revenue per month) that during his freshman year at UT Austin, Dell decided to drop out, much to his parent's dismay. On May 3rd, 1984, Dell incorporated his company and never returned to school.

  2. Lower Prices and Better Service - a Powerful Combination. Dell Computer Corporation was the original DTC business. Rather than selling in big box retail stores, Dell carried out orders via mail request. When the internet became prominent in the late 90s, Dell started taking orders online. After his insight that the cost of components was significantly lower than the selling price, he flew to the far east to meet his suppliers. He started placing big deals and getting better and better prices. This strategy is the classic low-end disruption pattern that we learned about in Clayton Christensen's, The Innovator's Dilemma – a lowered-priced competitor that offers better service, customizability starts to crush the competition. Christensen is important to note that the internet itself was a sustaining innovation to Dell, but very disruptive to the market as a whole: "Usually, the technology simply is an enabler of the disruptive business model. For example, is the Internet a disruptive technology? You can't say that. If you bring it to Dell, it's a sustaining technology to what Dell's business model was in 1996. It made their processes work better; it helped them meet Dell's customers' needs at lower cost. But when you bring the very same Internet to Compaq, it is very disruptive [to the company's then dealer-only sales model]. So how do we treat that? We praise [CEO Michael] Dell, and we fire Eckhard Pfeiffer [Compaq's former CEO]. In reality, those two managers are probably equally competent." If competitors lowered prices, Dell could find better components and continually lower prices. Dell's strategy led to many departures from the personal PC market – IBM left, HP acquired Compaq in a disastrous deal for HP, and many others never made it back.

  3. Layoffs, Crises, and Opportunities. Dell IPO'd in 1988 and joined the Fortune 500 in 1991 as they hit $800m in sales for the year. So you would think the company would be humming when it hit $2B in sales in 1993, right? Wrong. Everything was breaking. When a company scales that quickly, it doesn't have time to create processes and systems. Personnel issues began to happen more frequently. As Dell recalls, the head of sales had a drinking problem, and the head of HR had a stripper girlfriend on the payroll. The company was late to market with notebooks, and it had to institute a recall on its notebooks which could catch fire in some instances. During that time, Dell hired Bain to do an internal report about how it should change its processes for its new scale – Kevin Rollins of the Bain team knew the business super well and thought incredibly strategically. After the Bain assignment, Rollins joined the company as Vice-chairman, ultimately becoming CEO for a brief period in 2004. One of his first recommendations was to cease its experiment selling through department stores and to stay DTC-focused. During the internet bubble, Dell faced another crisis – its stock had risen precipitously for many years, but once the bubble burst, in a matter of months, it fell from $50 to $17 a share. The company missed its earnings estimates for five quarters in a row and had to do two layoffs – one with 1,700 people and another with 4,000. During this time, an internal poll showed that 50% of Dell team members would leave if another company paid them the same rate. Dell realized that the values statement he had written in 1988 was no longer resonating and needed updating – he refreshed the value statement and focused the company on its role in the global IT economy. Dell understands that you should never waste a great crisis, and always find the opportunity for growth and improvement when things aren't going well.

Business Themes

Business+Model+Traditional+Model_+DELL+Direct+Model_+Suppliers.jpeg
Dell-EMC-Merger.png
  1. Carl Icahn and Dell. No one in business represents a corporate nemesis quite like Carl Icahn. Icahn was born in Rockaway, NY, and earned his tuition money at Princeton playing poker against the rich kids. Icahn is an activist investor and popularized the field of activist investing with some big, bold battles against companies in the early 1980s. Icahn got his start in 1968 by purchasing a seat on the New York Stock Exchange. He completed his first major takeover attempt in 1978, and the rest was history. Icahn takes an intense stance against companies, typically around big mergers, acquisitions, or divestitures. He 1) buys up a lot of shares, like 5-10% of a company, 2) accuses the company and usually the management of incompetence or a lousy strategy 3) argues for some action - a sale of a division, a change in management, a special dividend 4) sues the company in a variety of ways around shareholder negligence 5) sends letters to shareholders and the company detailing his findings/claims 6) puts up a new slate of board members at the company 7) waits to profit or gets paid to go away (also called greenmail). Icahn used these exact tactics when he took on Michael Dell. Icahn issued several scathing letters about Dell, criticizing the company's poor performance, highlighting Michael Dell's obvious conflicts of interest as CEO, and demanding the special committee evaluate the deal fairly. Icahn normally makes money when he gets involved, and he is essentially a gnat that doesn't go away until he makes money one way or another. After the fight, Icahn still made a profit of 10s of millions, and his fight with Dell was just beginning.

  2. Take Privates and Transformation. Michael Dell had thought a couple of times about taking the company private when he was approached by Egon Durban of Silver Lake Partners, a large tech private equity firm. Dell and Zender went on a walk in Hawaii and worked out what a transaction might be. The issue with Dell at that time was that the PC market was under siege. People thought tablets were the future, and their questions found confirmation in the PC market's declining volumes. Dell had spent $14B on an acquisition spree, acquiring a string of enterprise software companies, including Quest Software, SonicWall, Boomi, Secureworks, and more, as it redirected its strategy. But these companies had yet to kick into gear, and most of Dell's business was still PCs and servers. The stock price had fallen about 45% since Michael Dell had rejoined as CEO in 2007. Dell had thought about taking the company private a couple of other times, but now seemed like a great time - they needed to transform, and fast. Enacting a transformation in the public markets is tough because wall street focuses on quarter-to-quarter metrics over long-term vision. He first considered the idea in June 2012 when talking with the then largest shareholder Southeastern Asset Management. After letting the idea percolate, Dell held discussions with Silver Lake and KKR. Silver Lake and Dell submitted a bid at $12.70, then $12.90, then $13.25, then $13.60, then $13.65. On February 4th, 2013, the special committee accepted Silver Lake's offer. On March 5th, Carl Icahn entered the fray, saying he owned about $1b of shares. Icahn submitted a half proposal suggesting the company pay a one-time special dividend, he would acquire a substantial part of the stock and it would remain public, under different leadership. On July 18th, the special committee delayed a vote on the acquisition because it became clear that Dell couldn't get enough of the "majority of the minority" votes needed to close the acquisition. A few weeks later, Silver Lake and Dell raised their bid to $13.75 (the original asking price of the committee), and the committee agreed to remove the voting standard, allowing the SL/Dell combo to win the deal. After various lawsuits, Icahn gave up in September 2013, when it became clear he had no strategy to convince shareholders to his side. It was an absolute whirlwind of a deal process, and Dell escaped with his company.

  3. Big Deals. After Dell went private, Michael Dell and Egon Durban started scouring the world for enticing tech acquisitions. They closed on a small $1.4B storage acquisition, which reaffirmed Michael Dell's interest in the storage market. After the deal, Dell reconsidered something that almost happened in 2008/09 – a merger with EMC. EMC was the premier enterprise storage company with a dominant market share. On top of that, EMC owned VMware, a software company that had successfully virtualized the x86 architecture so servers could run multiple operating systems simultaneously. Throughout 2008 and 2009, Dell and EMC had deeply considered a merger – to the point that its boards held joint discussions about integration plans and deal price. The boards scrapped the deal during the financial crisis, and in the ensuing years, EMC grew and grew. By 2014 it was a $59B public company and the largest company in Massachusetts. In mid-2014, Dell started to consider the idea. He pondered the strategic and competitive implications of the deal everywhere he went. Little did he know that he was already late to the party – it later came out that both HP and Cisco had looked at acquiring EMC in 2013. HP got down to the wire, with the deal being championed by Meg Whitman, as a way to move past the Autonomy debacle and board room in-fighting. HP had a handshake agreement to merge with EMC in a 1:1 deal, but at the last minute, HP re-traded and demanded a more advantageous split (i.e. HP would own 55% of the combined company) and EMC said no. When EMC then turned to Dell, Whitman slammed the deal. While the only remaining competitor of size was Dell, there was still a question of how they could finance the deal, especially as a private company. Dell's ultimate package was a pretty crazy mix of considerations: Dell issued a tracking stock related specifically to Dell's business, it then took out some $40b in loans against its newly acquired VMWare equity and the cash flow of Dell's underlying business, Michael Dell and Silver lake also put in an additional $5B of equity capital. After Silver Lake and Dell determined the financing structure, Dell faced a grueling interrogation session in front of the EMC board as final approval for the deal. The deal was announced on October 12th, 2015, and it closed a year later. By all measures, it appears the deal was a success – the company has undergone a complete transformation – shedding some acquired assets, spinning off VMWare, and going public again by acquiring its own tracking stock. Michael Dell took some huge risks - taking his company private and completing the biggest tech merger in history. It seems to have paid off handsomely.

Dig Deeper

  • Michael Dell, Dell Technologies | Dell Technologies World 2022

  • Steve Jobs hammers Michael Dell (1997)

  • Michael Dell interview - 7/23/1991

  • Background of the Merger - the full SEC timeline of the EMC-Dell Merger

  • Carl Icahn's First Ever Interview | 1985

tags: Michael Dell, Dell, Carl Icahn, Apple, Steve Jobs, HP, Cisco, Meg Whitman, IBM, Austin, DTC, Clayton Christensen, Innovator's Dilemma, Compaq, Kevin Rollins, Bain, Internet History, Activist, Silver Lake, Quest Software, SonicWall, Secureworks, Egon Durban, KKR, Southeastern Asset Management, EMC, Joe Tucci, VMware
categories: Non-Fiction
 

March 2020 - The Hard Thing About Hard Things by Ben Horowitz

Ben Horowitz, GP of the famous investment fund Andreessen Horowitz, addresses the not-so-pleasant aspects of being a founder/CEO during a crisis. This book provides an excellent framework for anyone going through the struggles of scaling a business and dealing with growing pains.

Tech Themes

  1. The importance of Netscape. Now that its been relegated to history by the rise of AOL and internet explorer, its hard to believe that Netscape was ever the best web browser. Founded by Marc Andreessen, who had founded the first web browser, Mosaic (as a teenager!), Netscape would go on to achieve amazing success only to blow up in the face of competition and changes to internet infrastructure. Netscape was an incredible technology company, and as Brian McCullough shows in last month’s TBOTM, Netscape was the posterchild for the internet bubble. But for all the fanfare around Netscape’s seminal IPO, little is discussed about its massive and longstanding technological contributions. In 1995, early engineer Brendan Eich created Javascript, which still stands as the dominant front end language for the web. In the same year, the Company developed Secure Socket Layer (SSL), the most dominant basic internet security protocol (and reason for HTTPS). On top of those two fundamental technologies, Netscape also developed the internet cookie, in 1994! Netscape is normally discussed as the amazing company that ushered many of the first internet users onto the web, but its rarely lauded for its longstanding technological contributions. Ben Horowitz, author of the Hard Thing About Hard Things was an early employee and head of the server business unit for Netscape when it went public.

  2. Executing a pivot. Famous pivots have become part of startup lore whether it be in product (Glitch (video game) —> Slack (chat)), business model (Netflix DVD rental —> Streaming), or some combo of both (Snowdevil (selling snowboards online) —> Shopify (ecommerce tech)). The pivot has been hailed as necessary tool in every entrepreneur’s toolbox. Though many are sensationalized, the pivot Ben Horowitz underwent at LoudCloud / Opsware is an underrated one. LoudCloud was a provider of web hosting services and managed services for enterprises. The Company raised a boatload ($346M) of money prior to going public in March 2001, after the internet bubble had already burst. The Company was losing a lot of money and Ben knew that the business was on its last legs. After executing a 400 person layoff, he sold the managed services part of the business to EDS, a large IT provider, for $63.5M. LoudCloud had a software tool called Opsware that it used to manage all of the complexities of the web hosting business, scaling infrastructure with demand and managing compliance in data centers. After the sale was executed, the company’s stock fell to $0.35 per share, even trading below cash, which meant the markets viewed the Company as already bankrupt. The acquisition did something very important for Ben and the Opsware team, it bought them time - the Company had enough cash on hand to execute until Q4 2001 when it had to be cash flow positive. To balance out these cash issues, Opsware purchased Tangram, Rendition Networks, and Creekpath, which were all software vendors that helped manage the software of data centers. This had two effects - slowing the burn (these were profitable companies), and building a substantial product offering for data center providers. Opsware started making sales and the stock price began to tick up, peaking the attention of strategic acquirers. Ultimately it came down to BMC Software and HP. BMC offered $13.25 per share, the Opsware board said $14, BMC countered with $13.50 and HP came in with a $14.25 offer, a 38% premium to the stock price and a total valuation of $1.6B, which the board could not refuse. The Company changed business model (services —> software), made acquisitions and successfully exited, amidst a terrible environment for tech companies post-internet bubble.

  3. The Demise of the Great HP. Hewlett-Packard was one of the first garage-borne, silicon valley technology companies. The company was founded in Palo Alto by Bill Hewlett and Dave Packard in 1939 as a provider of test and measurement instruments. Over the next 40 years, the company moved into producing some of the best printers, scanners, calculators, logic analyzers, and computers in the world. In the 90s, HP continued to grow its product lines in the computing space, and executed a spinout of its manufacturing / non-computing device business in 1999. 1999 marks the tragic beginning of the end for HP. The first massive mistake was the acquisition of Compaq, a flailing competitor in the personal computer market, who had acquired DEC (a losing microprocessor company), a few years earlier. The acquisition was heavily debated, with Walter Hewlett, son of the founder and board director at the time, engaging in a proxy battle with then current CEO, Carly Firorina. The new HP went on to lose half of its market value and incur heavy job losses that were highly publicized. This started a string of terrible acquisitions including EDS, 3COM, Palm Inc., and Autonomy for a combined $28.8B. The Company spun into two divisions - HP Inc. and HP Enterprise in 2015 and each had their own spinouts and mergers from there (Micro Focus and DXC Technology). Today, HP Inc. sells computers and printers, and HPE sells storage, networking and server technology. What can be made of this sad tale? HP suffered from a few things. First, poor long term direction - in hindsight their acquisitions look especially terrible as a repeat series of massive bets on technology that was already being phased out due to market pressures. Second, HP had horrible corporate governance during the late 90s and 2000s - board in-fighting over acquisitions, repeat CEO fiirings over cultural issues, chairman-CEO’s with no checks, and an inability to see the outright fraud in their Autonomy acquisition. Lastly, the Company saw acquisitions and divestitures as band-aids - new CEO entrants Carly Fiorina (from AT&T), Mark Hurd (from NCR), Leo Apotheker (from SAP), and Meg Whitman (from eBay) were focused on making an impact at HP which meant big acquisitions and strategic shifts. Almost none of these panned out, and the repeated ideal shifts took a toll on the organization as the best talent moved elswehere. Its sad to see what has happened at a once-great company.

Business Themes

51DydLyUcrL.jpg
MarcA_Cover.jpg
  1. Ill, not sick: going public at the end of the internet bubble. Going public is supposed to be the culmination of a long entrepreneurial journey for early company employees, but according to Ben Horowitz’s experience, going public during the internet bubble pop was terrible. Loudcloud had tried to raise money privately but struggled given the terrible conditions for raising money at the beginning of 2001. Its not included in the book but the reason the Company failed to raise money was its obscene valuation and loss. The Company was valued at $1.15B in its prior funding round and could only report $6M in Net Revenue on a $107M loss. The Company sought to go public at $10 per share ($700M valuation), but after an intense and brutal roadshow that left Horowitz physically sick, they settled for $6.00 per share, a massive write-down from the previous round. The fact that the banks were even able to find investors to take on this significant risk at this point in the business cycle was a marvel. Timing can be crucial in an IPO as we saw during the internet bubble; internet “businesses” could rise 4-5x on their first trading day because of the massive and silly web landgrab in the late 90s. On the flip side, going public when investors don’t want what you’re selling is almost a death sentence. Although they both have critical business and market issues, WeWork and Casper are clear examples of the importance of timing. WeWork and Casper were late arrivals on the unicorn IPO train. Let me be clear - both have huge issues (WeWork - fundamental business model, Casper - competition/differentiation) but I could imagine these types of companies going public during a favorable time period with a relatively strong IPO. Both companies had massive losses, and investors were especially wary of losses after the failed IPOs of Lyft and Uber, which were arguably the most famous unicorns to go public at the time. Its not to say that WeWork and Casper wouldn’t have had trouble in the public markets, but during the internet bubble these companies could’ve received massive valuations and raised tons of cash instead of seeking bailouts from Softbank and reticent public market investors.

  2. Peactime / Wartime CEO. The genesis of this book was a 2011 blog post written by Horowitz detailing Peacetime and Wartime CEO behavior. As the book and blog post describe, “Peacetime in business means those times when a company has a large advantage vs. the competition in its core market, and its market is growing. In times of peace, the company can focus on expanding the market and reinforcing the company’s strengths.” On the other hand, to describe Wartime, Horowitz uses the example of a previous TBOTM, Only the Paranoid Survive, by Andy Grove. In the early 1980’s, Grove realized his business was under serious threat as competition increased in Intel’s core business, computer memory. Grove shifted the entire organization whole-heartedly into chip manufacturing and saved the company. Horowitz outlines several opposing behaviors of Peacetime and Wartime CEOs: “Peacetime CEO knows that proper protocol leads to winning. Wartime CEO violates protocol in order to win; Peacetime CEO spends time defining the culture. Wartime CEO lets the war define the culture; Peacetime CEO strives for broad based buy in. Wartime CEO neither indulges consensus-building nor tolerates disagreements.” Horowitz concludes that executives can be a peacetime and wartime CEO after mastering each of the respective skill sets and knowing when to shift from peacetime to wartime and back. The theory is interesting to consider; at its best, it provides an excellent framework for managing times of stress (like right now with the Coronavirus). At its worst, it encourages poor CEO behavior and cut throat culture. While I do think its a helpful theory, I think its helpful to think of situations that may be an exception, as a way of testing the theory. For example, lets consider Google, as Horowitz does in his original article. He calls out that Google was likely entering in a period of wartime in 2011 and as a result transitioned CEOs away from peacetime Eric Schmidt to Google founder and wartime CEO, Larry Page. Looking back however, was it really clear that Google was entering wartime? The business continued to focus on what it was clearly best at, online search advertising, and rarely faced any competition. The Company was late to invest in cloud technology and many have criticized Google for pushing billions of dollars into incredibly unprofitable ventures because they are Larry and Sergey’s pet projects. In addition, its clear that control had been an issue for Larry all along - in 2011, it came out that Eric Schmidt’s ouster as CEO was due to a disagreement with Larry and Sergey over continuing to operate in China. On top of that, its argued that Larry and Sergey, who have controlling votes in Google, stayed on too long and hindered Sundar Pichai’s ability to effectively operate the now restructured Alphabet holding company. In short, was Google in a wartime from 2011-2019? I would argue no, it operated in its core market with virtually no competition and today most Google’s revenues come from its ad products. I think the peacetime / wartime designation is rarely so black and white, which is why it is so hard to recognize what period a Company may be in today.

  3. Firing people. The unfortunate reality of business is that not every hire works out, and that eventually people will be fired. The Hard Thing About Hard Things is all about making difficult decisions. It lays out a framework for thinking about and executing layoffs, which is something that’s rarely discussed in the startup ecosystem until it happens. Companies mess up layoffs all the time, just look at Bird who recently laid off staff via an impersonal Zoom call. Horowitz lays out a roughly six step process for enacting layoffs and gives the hard truths about executing the 400 person layoff at LoudCloud. Two of these steps stand out because they have been frequently violated at startups: Don’t Delay and Train Your Managers. Often times, the decision to fire someone can be a months long process, continually drawn out and interrupted by different excuses. Horowitz encourages CEOs to move thoughtfully and quickly to stem leaks of potential layoffs and to not let poor performers continue to hurt the organization. The book discusses the Law of Crappy People - any level of any organization will eventually converge to the worst person on that level; benchmarked against the crappiest person at the next level. Once a CEO has made her mind up about the decision to fire someone, she should go for it. As part of executing layoffs, CEOs should train their managers, and the managers should execute the layoffs. This gives employees the opportunity to seek direct feedback about what went well and what went poorly. This aspect of the book is incredibly important for all levels of entrepreneurs and provides a great starting place for CEOs.

Dig Deeper

  • Most drastic company pivots that worked out

  • Initial thoughts on the Opsware - HP Deal from 2007

  • A thorough history of HP’s ventures, spin-offs and acquisitions

  • Ben’s original blog post detailing the pivot from service provider to tech company

  • The First (1995-01) and Second Browser War (2004 - 2017)

tags: Apple, IBM, VC, Google, HP, Packard's Law, Amazon, Android, Internet History, Marc Andreessen, Andreessen Horowitz, Loudcloud, Opsware, BMC Software, Mark Hurd, Javascript, Shopify, Slack, Netflix, Compaq, DEC, Micro Focus, DXC Technology, Carly Firoina, Leo Apotheker, Meg Whitman, WeWork, Casper, Larry Page, Eric Schmidt, Sundar Pichai, batch2
categories: Non-Fiction
 

February 2020 - How the Internet Happened: From Netscape to the iPhone by Brian McCullough

Brian McCullough, host of the Internet History Podcast, does an excellent job of showing how the individuals adopted the internet and made it central to their lives. He follows not only the success stories but also the flame outs which provide an accurate history of a time of rapid technological change.

Tech Themes

  1. Form to Factor: Design in Mobile Devices. Apple has a long history with mobile computing, but a few hiccups in the early days are rarely addressed. These hiccups also telegraph something interesting about the technology industry as a whole - design and ease of use often trump features. In the early 90’s Apple created the Figaro, a tablet computer that weighed eight pounds and allowed for navigation through a stylus. The issue was it cost $8,000 to produce and was 3/4 of an inch thick, making it difficult to carry. In 1993, the Company launched the Newton MessagePad, which cost $699 and included a calendar, address book, to-do list and note pad. However, the form was incorrect again; the MessagePad was 7.24 in. x 4.5 in. and clunky. With this failure, Apple turned its attention away from mobile, allowing other players like RIM and Blackberry to gain leading market share. Blackberry pioneered the idea of a full keyboard on a small device and Marc Benioff, CEO of salesforce.com, even called it, “the heroin of mobile computing. I am serious. I had to stop.” IBM also tried its hand in mobile in 1992, creating the Simon Personal Communicator, which had the ability to send and receive calls, do email and fax, and sync with work files via an adapter. The issue was the design - 8 in. by 2.5 in. by 1.5 in. thick. It was a modern smartphone, but it was too big, clunky, and difficult to use. It wasn’t until the iPhone and then Android that someone really nailed the full smart phone experience. The lessons from this case study offer a unique insight into the future of VR. The company able to offer the correct form factor, at a reasonable price can gain market share quickly. Others who try to pioneer too much at a time (cough, magic leap), will struggle.

  2. How to know you’re onto something. Facebook didn’t know. On November 30, 2004, Facebook surpassed one million users after being live for only ten months. This incredible growth was truly remarkable, but Mark Zuckerberg still didn’t know facebook was a special company. Sean Parker, the founder of Napster, had been mentoring Zuckerberg the prior summer: “What was so bizarre about the way Facebook was unfolding at that point, is that Mark just didn’t totally believe in it and wanted to go and do all these other things.” Zuckerberg even showed up to a meeting at Sequoia Capital still dressed in his pajamas with a powerpoint entitled: “The Top Ten Reasons You Should Not Invest.” While this was partially a joke because Sequoia has spurned investing in Parker’s latest company, it represented how immature the whole facebook operation was, in the face of rapid growth. Facebook went on to release key features like groups, photos, and friending, but most importantly, they developed their revenue model: advertising. The quick user growth and increasing ad revenue growth got the attention of big corporations - Viacom offered $2B in cash and stock, and Yahoo offered $1B all cash. By this time, Zuckerberg realized what he had, and famously spurned several offers from Yahoo, even after users reacted negatively to the most important feature that facebook would ever release, the News Feed. In today’s world, we often see entrepreneur’s overhyping their companies, which is why Silicon Valley was in-love with dropout founders for a time, their naivite and creativity could be harnessed to create something huge in a short amount of time.

  3. Channel Partnerships: Why apple was reluctant to launch a phone. Channel partnerships often go un-discussed at startups, but they can be incredibly useful in growing distribution. Some industries, such as the Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) market thrives on channel partnership arrangements. Companies like Crowdstrike engage partners (mostly IT services firms) to sell on their behalf, lowering Crowdstrike’s customer acquisition and sales spend. This can lead to attractive unit economics, but on the flip side, partners must get paid and educated on the selling motion which takes time and money. Other channel relationships are just overly complex. In the mid 2000’s, mobile computing was a complicated industry, and companies hated dealing with old, legacy carriers and simple clunky handset providers. Apple tried the approach of working with a handset provider, Motorola, but they produced the terrible ROKR which barely worked. The ROKR was built to run on the struggling Cingular (would become AT&T) network, who was eager to do a deal with Apple in hopes of boosting usage on their network. After the failure of the ROKR, Cingular executives begged Jobs to build a phone for the network. Normally, the carriers had specifications for how phones were built for their networks, but Jobs ironed out a contract which exchanged network exclusivity for complete design control, thus Apple entered into mobile phones. The most important computing device of the 2000’s and 2010’s was built on a channel relationship.

Business Themes

caseaoltimewarner.jpg
timewarner_aol_facts1.jpg
  1. AOL-Time Warner: the merger destined to fail. To fully understand the AOL-Time Warner merger, you must first understand what AOL was, what it was becoming, and why it was operating on borrowed time. AOL started as an ISP, charging customers $9.95 for five hours of dial-up internet access, with each additional hour costing $2.95. McCullough describes AOL: “AOL has often been described as training wheels for the Internet. For millions of Americans, their aol.com address was their first experience with email, and thus their first introduction to the myriad ways that networked computing could change their lives.” AOL grew through one of the first viral marketing campaigns ever; AOL put CDs into newspapers which allowed users to download AOL software and get online. The Company went public in March of 1992 and by 1996 the Company had 2.1 million subscribers, however subscribers were starting to flee to cheaper internet access. It turned out that building an ISP was relatively cheap, and the high margin cash flow business that AOL had built was suddenly threatened by a number of competitors. AOL persisted with its viral marketing strategy, and luckily many americans still had not tried the internet yet and defaulted to AOL as being the most popular. AOL continued to add subscribers and its stock price started to balloon; in 1998 alone the stock went up 593%. AOL was also inking ridiculous, heavily VC funded deals with new internet startups. Newly public Drkoop, which raised $85M in an IPO, signed a four year $89M deal to be AOL’s default provider of health content. Barnes and Noble paid $40M to be AOL’s bookselling partner. Tel-save, a long distance phone provider signed a deal worth $100M. As the internet bubble continued to grow, AOL’s CEO, Steve Case realized that many of these new startups would be unable to fufill their contractual obligations. Early web traffic reporting systems could easily be gamed, and companies frequently had no business model other than attract a certain demographic of traffic. By 1999, AOL had a market cap of $149.8B and was added to the S&P 500 index; it was bigger than both Disney and IBM. At this time, the world was shifting away from dial-up internet to modern broadband connections provided by cable companies. One AOL executive lamented: “We all knew we were living on borrowed time and had to buy something of substance by using that huge currency [AOL’s stock].” Time Warner was a massive media company, with movie studios, TV channels, magazines and online properties. On Jan 10, 2000, AOL merged with Time Warner in one of the biggest mergers in history. AOL owned 56% of the combined company. Four days later, the Dow peaked and began a downturn which would decimate hundreds of internet businesses built on foggy fundamentals. Acquisitions happen for a number of reasons, but imminent death is not normally considered by analysts or pundits. When you see acquisitions, read the press release and understand why (at least from a marketing perspective), the two companies made a deal. Was the price just astronomical (i.e. Instagram) or was their something very strategic (i.e. Microsoft-Github)? When you read the press release years later, it should indicate whether the combination actually was proved out by the market.

  2. Acquisitions in the internet bubble: why acquisitions are really just guessing. AOL-Time Warner shows the interesting conundrum in acquisitions. HP founder David Packard coined this idea somewhat in Packard’s law: “No company can consistently grow revenues faster than its ability to get enough of the right people to implement that growth and still become a great company. If a company consistently grows revenue faster than its ability to get enough of the right people to implement that growth, it will not simply stagnate; it will fall.” Author of Good to Great, Jim Collins, clarified this idea: “Great companies are more likely to die of ingestion of too much opportunity, than starvation from too little.” Acquisitions can be a significant cause of this outpacing of growth. Look no further than Yahoo, who acquired twelve companies between September 1997 and June 1999 including Mark Cuban’s Broadcast.com for $5.7B (Kara Swisher at WSJ in 1999), GeoCities for $3.6B, and Y Combinator founder Paul Graham’s Viaweb for $48M. They spent billions in stock and cash to acquire these companies! Its only fitting that two internet darlings would eventually end up in the hands of big-telecom Verizon, who would acquire AOL for $4.4B in 2015, and Yahoo for $4.5B in 2017, only to write down the combined value by $4.6B in 2018. In 2013, Yahoo would acquire Tumblr for $1.1B, only to sell it off this past year for $3M. Acquisitions can really be overwhelming for companies, and frequently they don’t work out as planned. In essence, acquisitions are guesses about future value to customers and rarely are they as clean and smart as technology executives make them seem. Some large organizations have gotten good at acquisitions - Google, Microsoft, Cisco, and Salesforce have all made meaningful acquisitions (Android, Github, AppDynamics, ExactTarget, respectively).

  3. Google and Excite: the acquisition that never happened. McCullough has an incredible quote nestled into the start of chapter six: “Pioneers of new technologies are rarely the ones who survive long enough to dominate their categories; often it is the copycat or follow-on names that are still with us to this day: Google, not AltaVista, in search; Facebook, not Friendster, in social networks.” Amazon obviously bucked this trend (he mentions that), but in search he is absolutely right! In 1996, several internet search companies went public including Excite, Lycos, Infoseek, and Yahoo. As the internet bubble grew bigger, Yahoo was the darling of the day, and by 1998, it had amassed a $100B market cap. There were tons of companies in the market including the players mentioned above and AltaVista, AskJeeves, MSN, and others. The world did not need another search engine. However, in 1998, Google founders Larry Page and Sergey Brin found a better way to do search (the PageRank algorithm) and published their famous paper: “The Anatomy of a Large-Scale Hypertextual Web Search Engine.” They then went out to these massive search engines and tried to license their technology, but no one was interested. Imagine passing on Goolge’s search engine technology. In an over-ingestion of too much opportunity, all of the search engines were trying to be like AOL and become a portal to the internet, providing various services from their homepages. From an interview in 1998, “More than a "portal" (the term analysts employ to describe Yahoo! and its rivals, which are most users' gateway to the rest of the Internet), Yahoo! is looking increasingly like an online service--like America Online (AOL) or even CompuServe before the Web.” Small companies trying to do too much (cough, uber self-driving cars, cough). Excite showed the most interest in Google’s technology and Page offered it to the Company for $1.6M in cash and stock but Excite countered at $750,000. Excite had honest interest in the technology and a deal was still on the table until it became clear that Larry wanted Excite to rip out its search technology and use Google’s instead. Unfortunately that was too big of a risk for the mature Excite company. The two companies parted ways and Google eventually became the dominant player in the industry. Google’s focus was clear from the get-go, build a great search engine. Only when it was big enough did it plunge into acquisitions and development of adjacent technologies.

Dig Deeper

  • Raymond Smith, former CEO of Bell Atlantic, describing the technology behind the internet in 1994

  • Bill Gates’ famous memo: THE INTERNET TIDAL WAVE (May 26, 1995)

  • The rise and fall of Netscape and Mosaic in one chart

  • List of all the companies made famous and infamous in the dot-com bubble

  • Pets.com S-1 (filing for IPO) showin a $62M net loss on $6M in revenue

  • Detail on Microsoft’s antitrust lawsuit

tags: Apple, IBM, Facebook, AT&T, Blackberry, Sequoia, VC, Sean Parker, Yahoo, Excite, Netscape, AOL, Time Warner, Google, Viaweb, Mark Cuban, HP, Packard's Law, Disney, Steve Case, Steve Jobs, Amazon, Drkoop, Android, Mark Zuckerberg, Crowdstrike, Motorola, Viacom, Napster, Salesforce, Marc Benioff, Internet, Internet History, batch2
categories: Non-Fiction
 

About Contact Us | Recommend a Book Disclaimer