August 2021 - Hit Refresh by Satya Nadella, with Greg Shaw and Jill Tracie Nichols

This month we look at how Satya Nadella reignited Microsoft’s fire and attacked new spaces with a growth mindset. The book is loaded with excellent management philosophy and complex Microsoft history.

Tech Themes

Bing: The Other Search Engine. After starting at Microsoft as an engineer and rising through the ranks to lead Microsoft Dynamics (its CRM product), Nadella was handpicked to lead the re-launch of a brand new search engine, Microsoft Bing. Bing was one of Microsoft’s first “born-in-the-cloud” businesses and Nadella quickly recognized four core areas of focus: distributed systems, consumer product design, understanding the economics, of two-sided marketplaces, and AI. Microsoft had a troubled history with search engines and wanted to go big quickly, submitting an offer to buy Yahoo for $45B in February of 2008. Microsoft was rebuffed and thus Nadella found himself launching Search Checkpoint #1 in September of 2008 ahead of a June 2009 Bing launch. What are the odds that Microsoft’s future CEO would have early cloud, distributed systems, and advanced AI leadership experience? It was an almost prescient combination!
Red Dog to Azure. Microsoft started working on the cloud two years after Amazon launched AWS. In 2008, veteran software architects Ray Ozzie and Dave Cutler created a secret team inside Microsoft known as Red Dog, which was focused on building a cloud infrastructure product. Red Dog was stationed under Microsoft’s Servers and Tools business unit (STB), with products such as Windows Server and Microsoft’s powerful RDBMS, SQL Server. In 2010, Microsoft CEO Steve Ballmer asked Nadella to lead the STB business unit and set the vision for their then single-digit millions cloud infrastructure business. It was a precarious situation: “The server and tools business was at the peak of its commercial success and yet it was missing the future. The organizing was deeply divided over the importance of the cloud business. There was constant tension between diverging forces.” How did Nadella resolve this tension? It was simple - he made choices and rallied his team around those decisions. He focused the team on hybrid cloud, data, and ML capabilities where Microsoft could take advantage of its on-premise, large enterprise heritage while providing an on-ramp for customers eager to make the shift to the cloud. Microsoft has since surged to an estimated 20% worldwide market share making it one of the biggest and fastest-growing products in the world!
Re-Mixed Reality. Microsoft’s gaming portfolio is impressive: Xbox, Mojang (aka Minecraft), Zenimax Media (Maker of Fallout, Wolfenstein, and DOOM). Microsoft also owns the Hololens, a virtual reality headset that competes with Facebook’s Oculus. Many believe the future computing generations will take place in virtual reality, augmented, or mixed reality. Nadella doesn’t mince words - he believes that the future will not be in virtual reality (as Facebook is betting) but rather in mixed reality, a combination of augmented reality (AR) and virtual reality, where the user experiences an augmented experience but still maintains some semblance of the outside world. Nadella lays out the benefits: “HoloLens provides access to mixed reality in which the users can navigate both their current location - interact with people in the same room - and a remote environment while also manipulating holograms and other digital objects.” Virtual reality blocks out the outside world, but that can be an overwhelming experience and impractical particularly for enterprise users of AR/VR/MR technologies. One of the big users of the HoloLens is the US Army, which recently signed a rumored $22B deal with Microsoft. It is still early days, but the future needs a new medium of computing and it might just be mixed reality!

Business Themes

Leading with Empathy. Satya Nadella’s life changed with the birth of his son. “The arrival of our son, Zain, in August 1996 had been a watershed moment in Anu’s and my life together. His suffering from asphyxia in utero had changed our lives in ways we had not anticipated. We came to understand life as something that cannot always be solved in the manner we want. Instead, we had to learn to cope. When Zain came home from the intensive care unit, Anu internalized this understanding immediately. There were multiple therapies to be administered to him every day, not to mention quite a few surgeries he needed that called for strenuous follow-up care after nerve-racking ICU stays…My son’s condition requires that I draw daily upon the very same passion for ideas and empathy that I learned from my parents.” Nadella reiterates the importance of empathy throughout the book, and rightly so, empathy is viewed as the most important leadership skill, according to recent research. How does one increase empathy? It’s actually quite simple - talk to people! Satya understands this: “It is impossible to be an empathetic leader sitting in an office behind a computer screen all day. An empathetic leader needs to be out in the world, meeting people where they live, and seeing how the technology we create affects their daily activities.” Leadership requires empathy - hopefully, we see more of it from big technology soon!
Frenemies. One of the first things that Satya Nadella did after taking over the CEO role from Steve Ballmer in 2014 was reach out to Tim Cook. Apple and Microsoft had always had a love-hate relationship. In 1997, Microsoft saved Apple shortly after Steve Jobs returned by investing $150M in the company so that Apple could stave off potential bankruptcy. However, in 2014, Nadella called on Apple: “I decided we needed to get Office everywhere, including iOS and Android…I wanted unambiguously to declare, both internally and externally, that the strategy would be to center our innovation agenda around users’ needs and not simply their device.” Microsoft had tried to become a phone company with Windows Mobile in 2000, tried again with Windows Phone in 2010, and tried even harder at Windows Phone in 2013 with a $7.2B acquisition of Nokia’s mobile phone unit. Although Nadella voted ‘No’ on the deal before becoming CEO, he was forced to manage the company through a total write-off of the acquisition and the elimination of eighteen thousand jobs. So how could Nadella catch up to the mobile wave? “For me, partnerships - particularly with competitors - have to be about strengthening a company’s core businesses, which ultimately centers on creating additional value for the customer…We have to face reality. When we have a great product like Bing, Office, or Cortana but someone else has created a strong market position with their service or device, we can’t just sit on the sidelines. We have to find smart ways to partners so that our products can become available on each other's popular platforms.” Nobody knows platforms like Microsoft; Bill Gates wrote the definition of a platform: “A platform is when the economic value of everybody that uses it, exceeds the value of the company that creates it.” Nadella got over his predecessor’s worry and hatred of the competition to bring Microsoft’s software to other platforms to strengthen both of their leadership positions.
Regulation and Technology. Nadella devotes an entire chapter to the idea of trust in the digital age. Using three case studies - North Korea’s attack on Sony’s servers, Edward Snowden’s leaked documents (that were held on Microsoft’s servers), and the FBI’s lawsuit against Apple to unlock an iPhone that might contain criminal information - Nadella calls for increased(!) regulation, particularly around digital technology. Satya uses a simple equation for trust: “Empathy + Shared values + Safety and Reliability = Trust over time.” Don’t you love it when a company that the government sued over anti-trust practices calls on the government to develop better laws! You’d love it even more if you saw how they used the same tactics to launch Microsoft Teams! Regulation in technology has been a hot topic recently, and Nadella is right to call on the government to create new laws for our digital world: “We do not believe that courts should seek to resolve issues of twenty-first-century technology relying on law that was written in the era of the adding machine.” He goes further to suggest potential remedies, including an efficient system for government access to corporate data, stronger privacy protections, globalized digital evidence sharing, and transparency of corporate and government data. I imagine the trend will be toward more regulation, especially with the passage of recent data laws like GDPR or CCPA, but I’m not sure we will see any real sweeping changes.

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March 2020 - The Hard Thing About Hard Things by Ben Horowitz

Ben Horowitz, GP of the famous investment fund Andreessen Horowitz, addresses the not-so-pleasant aspects of being a founder/CEO during a crisis. This book provides an excellent framework for anyone going through the struggles of scaling a business and dealing with growing pains.

Tech Themes

The importance of Netscape. Now that its been relegated to history by the rise of AOL and internet explorer, its hard to believe that Netscape was ever the best web browser. Founded by Marc Andreessen, who had founded the first web browser, Mosaic (as a teenager!), Netscape would go on to achieve amazing success only to blow up in the face of competition and changes to internet infrastructure. Netscape was an incredible technology company, and as Brian McCullough shows in last month’s TBOTM, Netscape was the posterchild for the internet bubble. But for all the fanfare around Netscape’s seminal IPO, little is discussed about its massive and longstanding technological contributions. In 1995, early engineer Brendan Eich created Javascript, which still stands as the dominant front end language for the web. In the same year, the Company developed Secure Socket Layer (SSL), the most dominant basic internet security protocol (and reason for HTTPS). On top of those two fundamental technologies, Netscape also developed the internet cookie, in 1994! Netscape is normally discussed as the amazing company that ushered many of the first internet users onto the web, but its rarely lauded for its longstanding technological contributions. Ben Horowitz, author of the Hard Thing About Hard Things was an early employee and head of the server business unit for Netscape when it went public.
Executing a pivot. Famous pivots have become part of startup lore whether it be in product (Glitch (video game) —> Slack (chat)), business model (Netflix DVD rental —> Streaming), or some combo of both (Snowdevil (selling snowboards online) —> Shopify (ecommerce tech)). The pivot has been hailed as necessary tool in every entrepreneur’s toolbox. Though many are sensationalized, the pivot Ben Horowitz underwent at LoudCloud / Opsware is an underrated one. LoudCloud was a provider of web hosting services and managed services for enterprises. The Company raised a boatload ($346M) of money prior to going public in March 2001, after the internet bubble had already burst. The Company was losing a lot of money and Ben knew that the business was on its last legs. After executing a 400 person layoff, he sold the managed services part of the business to EDS, a large IT provider, for $63.5M. LoudCloud had a software tool called Opsware that it used to manage all of the complexities of the web hosting business, scaling infrastructure with demand and managing compliance in data centers. After the sale was executed, the company’s stock fell to $0.35 per share, even trading below cash, which meant the markets viewed the Company as already bankrupt. The acquisition did something very important for Ben and the Opsware team, it bought them time - the Company had enough cash on hand to execute until Q4 2001 when it had to be cash flow positive. To balance out these cash issues, Opsware purchased Tangram, Rendition Networks, and Creekpath, which were all software vendors that helped manage the software of data centers. This had two effects - slowing the burn (these were profitable companies), and building a substantial product offering for data center providers. Opsware started making sales and the stock price began to tick up, peaking the attention of strategic acquirers. Ultimately it came down to BMC Software and HP. BMC offered $13.25 per share, the Opsware board said $14, BMC countered with $13.50 and HP came in with a $14.25 offer, a 38% premium to the stock price and a total valuation of $1.6B, which the board could not refuse. The Company changed business model (services —> software), made acquisitions and successfully exited, amidst a terrible environment for tech companies post-internet bubble.
The Demise of the Great HP. Hewlett-Packard was one of the first garage-borne, silicon valley technology companies. The company was founded in Palo Alto by Bill Hewlett and Dave Packard in 1939 as a provider of test and measurement instruments. Over the next 40 years, the company moved into producing some of the best printers, scanners, calculators, logic analyzers, and computers in the world. In the 90s, HP continued to grow its product lines in the computing space, and executed a spinout of its manufacturing / non-computing device business in 1999. 1999 marks the tragic beginning of the end for HP. The first massive mistake was the acquisition of Compaq, a flailing competitor in the personal computer market, who had acquired DEC (a losing microprocessor company), a few years earlier. The acquisition was heavily debated, with Walter Hewlett, son of the founder and board director at the time, engaging in a proxy battle with then current CEO, Carly Firorina. The new HP went on to lose half of its market value and incur heavy job losses that were highly publicized. This started a string of terrible acquisitions including EDS, 3COM, Palm Inc., and Autonomy for a combined $28.8B. The Company spun into two divisions - HP Inc. and HP Enterprise in 2015 and each had their own spinouts and mergers from there (Micro Focus and DXC Technology). Today, HP Inc. sells computers and printers, and HPE sells storage, networking and server technology. What can be made of this sad tale? HP suffered from a few things. First, poor long term direction - in hindsight their acquisitions look especially terrible as a repeat series of massive bets on technology that was already being phased out due to market pressures. Second, HP had horrible corporate governance during the late 90s and 2000s - board in-fighting over acquisitions, repeat CEO fiirings over cultural issues, chairman-CEO’s with no checks, and an inability to see the outright fraud in their Autonomy acquisition. Lastly, the Company saw acquisitions and divestitures as band-aids - new CEO entrants Carly Fiorina (from AT&T), Mark Hurd (from NCR), Leo Apotheker (from SAP), and Meg Whitman (from eBay) were focused on making an impact at HP which meant big acquisitions and strategic shifts. Almost none of these panned out, and the repeated ideal shifts took a toll on the organization as the best talent moved elswehere. Its sad to see what has happened at a once-great company.

Business Themes

Ill, not sick: going public at the end of the internet bubble. Going public is supposed to be the culmination of a long entrepreneurial journey for early company employees, but according to Ben Horowitz’s experience, going public during the internet bubble pop was terrible. Loudcloud had tried to raise money privately but struggled given the terrible conditions for raising money at the beginning of 2001. Its not included in the book but the reason the Company failed to raise money was its obscene valuation and loss. The Company was valued at $1.15B in its prior funding round and could only report $6M in Net Revenue on a $107M loss. The Company sought to go public at $10 per share ($700M valuation), but after an intense and brutal roadshow that left Horowitz physically sick, they settled for $6.00 per share, a massive write-down from the previous round. The fact that the banks were even able to find investors to take on this significant risk at this point in the business cycle was a marvel. Timing can be crucial in an IPO as we saw during the internet bubble; internet “businesses” could rise 4-5x on their first trading day because of the massive and silly web landgrab in the late 90s. On the flip side, going public when investors don’t want what you’re selling is almost a death sentence. Although they both have critical business and market issues, WeWork and Casper are clear examples of the importance of timing. WeWork and Casper were late arrivals on the unicorn IPO train. Let me be clear - both have huge issues (WeWork - fundamental business model, Casper - competition/differentiation) but I could imagine these types of companies going public during a favorable time period with a relatively strong IPO. Both companies had massive losses, and investors were especially wary of losses after the failed IPOs of Lyft and Uber, which were arguably the most famous unicorns to go public at the time. Its not to say that WeWork and Casper wouldn’t have had trouble in the public markets, but during the internet bubble these companies could’ve received massive valuations and raised tons of cash instead of seeking bailouts from Softbank and reticent public market investors.
Peactime / Wartime CEO. The genesis of this book was a 2011 blog post written by Horowitz detailing Peacetime and Wartime CEO behavior. As the book and blog post describe, “Peacetime in business means those times when a company has a large advantage vs. the competition in its core market, and its market is growing. In times of peace, the company can focus on expanding the market and reinforcing the company’s strengths.” On the other hand, to describe Wartime, Horowitz uses the example of a previous TBOTM, Only the Paranoid Survive, by Andy Grove. In the early 1980’s, Grove realized his business was under serious threat as competition increased in Intel’s core business, computer memory. Grove shifted the entire organization whole-heartedly into chip manufacturing and saved the company. Horowitz outlines several opposing behaviors of Peacetime and Wartime CEOs: “Peacetime CEO knows that proper protocol leads to winning. Wartime CEO violates protocol in order to win; Peacetime CEO spends time defining the culture. Wartime CEO lets the war define the culture; Peacetime CEO strives for broad based buy in. Wartime CEO neither indulges consensus-building nor tolerates disagreements.” Horowitz concludes that executives can be a peacetime and wartime CEO after mastering each of the respective skill sets and knowing when to shift from peacetime to wartime and back. The theory is interesting to consider; at its best, it provides an excellent framework for managing times of stress (like right now with the Coronavirus). At its worst, it encourages poor CEO behavior and cut throat culture. While I do think its a helpful theory, I think its helpful to think of situations that may be an exception, as a way of testing the theory. For example, lets consider Google, as Horowitz does in his original article. He calls out that Google was likely entering in a period of wartime in 2011 and as a result transitioned CEOs away from peacetime Eric Schmidt to Google founder and wartime CEO, Larry Page. Looking back however, was it really clear that Google was entering wartime? The business continued to focus on what it was clearly best at, online search advertising, and rarely faced any competition. The Company was late to invest in cloud technology and many have criticized Google for pushing billions of dollars into incredibly unprofitable ventures because they are Larry and Sergey’s pet projects. In addition, its clear that control had been an issue for Larry all along - in 2011, it came out that Eric Schmidt’s ouster as CEO was due to a disagreement with Larry and Sergey over continuing to operate in China. On top of that, its argued that Larry and Sergey, who have controlling votes in Google, stayed on too long and hindered Sundar Pichai’s ability to effectively operate the now restructured Alphabet holding company. In short, was Google in a wartime from 2011-2019? I would argue no, it operated in its core market with virtually no competition and today most Google’s revenues come from its ad products. I think the peacetime / wartime designation is rarely so black and white, which is why it is so hard to recognize what period a Company may be in today.
Firing people. The unfortunate reality of business is that not every hire works out, and that eventually people will be fired. The Hard Thing About Hard Things is all about making difficult decisions. It lays out a framework for thinking about and executing layoffs, which is something that’s rarely discussed in the startup ecosystem until it happens. Companies mess up layoffs all the time, just look at Bird who recently laid off staff via an impersonal Zoom call. Horowitz lays out a roughly six step process for enacting layoffs and gives the hard truths about executing the 400 person layoff at LoudCloud. Two of these steps stand out because they have been frequently violated at startups: Don’t Delay and Train Your Managers. Often times, the decision to fire someone can be a months long process, continually drawn out and interrupted by different excuses. Horowitz encourages CEOs to move thoughtfully and quickly to stem leaks of potential layoffs and to not let poor performers continue to hurt the organization. The book discusses the Law of Crappy People - any level of any organization will eventually converge to the worst person on that level; benchmarked against the crappiest person at the next level. Once a CEO has made her mind up about the decision to fire someone, she should go for it. As part of executing layoffs, CEOs should train their managers, and the managers should execute the layoffs. This gives employees the opportunity to seek direct feedback about what went well and what went poorly. This aspect of the book is incredibly important for all levels of entrepreneurs and provides a great starting place for CEOs.

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February 2020 - How the Internet Happened: From Netscape to the iPhone by Brian McCullough

Brian McCullough, host of the Internet History Podcast, does an excellent job of showing how the individuals adopted the internet and made it central to their lives. He follows not only the success stories but also the flame outs which provide an accurate history of a time of rapid technological change.

Tech Themes

Form to Factor: Design in Mobile Devices. Apple has a long history with mobile computing, but a few hiccups in the early days are rarely addressed. These hiccups also telegraph something interesting about the technology industry as a whole - design and ease of use often trump features. In the early 90’s Apple created the Figaro, a tablet computer that weighed eight pounds and allowed for navigation through a stylus. The issue was it cost $8,000 to produce and was 3/4 of an inch thick, making it difficult to carry. In 1993, the Company launched the Newton MessagePad, which cost $699 and included a calendar, address book, to-do list and note pad. However, the form was incorrect again; the MessagePad was 7.24 in. x 4.5 in. and clunky. With this failure, Apple turned its attention away from mobile, allowing other players like RIM and Blackberry to gain leading market share. Blackberry pioneered the idea of a full keyboard on a small device and Marc Benioff, CEO of salesforce.com, even called it, “the heroin of mobile computing. I am serious. I had to stop.” IBM also tried its hand in mobile in 1992, creating the Simon Personal Communicator, which had the ability to send and receive calls, do email and fax, and sync with work files via an adapter. The issue was the design - 8 in. by 2.5 in. by 1.5 in. thick. It was a modern smartphone, but it was too big, clunky, and difficult to use. It wasn’t until the iPhone and then Android that someone really nailed the full smart phone experience. The lessons from this case study offer a unique insight into the future of VR. The company able to offer the correct form factor, at a reasonable price can gain market share quickly. Others who try to pioneer too much at a time (cough, magic leap), will struggle.
How to know you’re onto something. Facebook didn’t know. On November 30, 2004, Facebook surpassed one million users after being live for only ten months. This incredible growth was truly remarkable, but Mark Zuckerberg still didn’t know facebook was a special company. Sean Parker, the founder of Napster, had been mentoring Zuckerberg the prior summer: “What was so bizarre about the way Facebook was unfolding at that point, is that Mark just didn’t totally believe in it and wanted to go and do all these other things.” Zuckerberg even showed up to a meeting at Sequoia Capital still dressed in his pajamas with a powerpoint entitled: “The Top Ten Reasons You Should Not Invest.” While this was partially a joke because Sequoia has spurned investing in Parker’s latest company, it represented how immature the whole facebook operation was, in the face of rapid growth. Facebook went on to release key features like groups, photos, and friending, but most importantly, they developed their revenue model: advertising. The quick user growth and increasing ad revenue growth got the attention of big corporations - Viacom offered $2B in cash and stock, and Yahoo offered $1B all cash. By this time, Zuckerberg realized what he had, and famously spurned several offers from Yahoo, even after users reacted negatively to the most important feature that facebook would ever release, the News Feed. In today’s world, we often see entrepreneur’s overhyping their companies, which is why Silicon Valley was in-love with dropout founders for a time, their naivite and creativity could be harnessed to create something huge in a short amount of time.
Channel Partnerships: Why apple was reluctant to launch a phone. Channel partnerships often go un-discussed at startups, but they can be incredibly useful in growing distribution. Some industries, such as the Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) market thrives on channel partnership arrangements. Companies like Crowdstrike engage partners (mostly IT services firms) to sell on their behalf, lowering Crowdstrike’s customer acquisition and sales spend. This can lead to attractive unit economics, but on the flip side, partners must get paid and educated on the selling motion which takes time and money. Other channel relationships are just overly complex. In the mid 2000’s, mobile computing was a complicated industry, and companies hated dealing with old, legacy carriers and simple clunky handset providers. Apple tried the approach of working with a handset provider, Motorola, but they produced the terrible ROKR which barely worked. The ROKR was built to run on the struggling Cingular (would become AT&T) network, who was eager to do a deal with Apple in hopes of boosting usage on their network. After the failure of the ROKR, Cingular executives begged Jobs to build a phone for the network. Normally, the carriers had specifications for how phones were built for their networks, but Jobs ironed out a contract which exchanged network exclusivity for complete design control, thus Apple entered into mobile phones. The most important computing device of the 2000’s and 2010’s was built on a channel relationship.

Business Themes

AOL-Time Warner: the merger destined to fail. To fully understand the AOL-Time Warner merger, you must first understand what AOL was, what it was becoming, and why it was operating on borrowed time. AOL started as an ISP, charging customers $9.95 for five hours of dial-up internet access, with each additional hour costing $2.95. McCullough describes AOL: “AOL has often been described as training wheels for the Internet. For millions of Americans, their aol.com address was their first experience with email, and thus their first introduction to the myriad ways that networked computing could change their lives.” AOL grew through one of the first viral marketing campaigns ever; AOL put CDs into newspapers which allowed users to download AOL software and get online. The Company went public in March of 1992 and by 1996 the Company had 2.1 million subscribers, however subscribers were starting to flee to cheaper internet access. It turned out that building an ISP was relatively cheap, and the high margin cash flow business that AOL had built was suddenly threatened by a number of competitors. AOL persisted with its viral marketing strategy, and luckily many americans still had not tried the internet yet and defaulted to AOL as being the most popular. AOL continued to add subscribers and its stock price started to balloon; in 1998 alone the stock went up 593%. AOL was also inking ridiculous, heavily VC funded deals with new internet startups. Newly public Drkoop, which raised $85M in an IPO, signed a four year $89M deal to be AOL’s default provider of health content. Barnes and Noble paid $40M to be AOL’s bookselling partner. Tel-save, a long distance phone provider signed a deal worth $100M. As the internet bubble continued to grow, AOL’s CEO, Steve Case realized that many of these new startups would be unable to fufill their contractual obligations. Early web traffic reporting systems could easily be gamed, and companies frequently had no business model other than attract a certain demographic of traffic. By 1999, AOL had a market cap of $149.8B and was added to the S&P 500 index; it was bigger than both Disney and IBM. At this time, the world was shifting away from dial-up internet to modern broadband connections provided by cable companies. One AOL executive lamented: “We all knew we were living on borrowed time and had to buy something of substance by using that huge currency [AOL’s stock].” Time Warner was a massive media company, with movie studios, TV channels, magazines and online properties. On Jan 10, 2000, AOL merged with Time Warner in one of the biggest mergers in history. AOL owned 56% of the combined company. Four days later, the Dow peaked and began a downturn which would decimate hundreds of internet businesses built on foggy fundamentals. Acquisitions happen for a number of reasons, but imminent death is not normally considered by analysts or pundits. When you see acquisitions, read the press release and understand why (at least from a marketing perspective), the two companies made a deal. Was the price just astronomical (i.e. Instagram) or was their something very strategic (i.e. Microsoft-Github)? When you read the press release years later, it should indicate whether the combination actually was proved out by the market.
Acquisitions in the internet bubble: why acquisitions are really just guessing. AOL-Time Warner shows the interesting conundrum in acquisitions. HP founder David Packard coined this idea somewhat in Packard’s law: “No company can consistently grow revenues faster than its ability to get enough of the right people to implement that growth and still become a great company. If a company consistently grows revenue faster than its ability to get enough of the right people to implement that growth, it will not simply stagnate; it will fall.” Author of Good to Great, Jim Collins, clarified this idea: “Great companies are more likely to die of ingestion of too much opportunity, than starvation from too little.” Acquisitions can be a significant cause of this outpacing of growth. Look no further than Yahoo, who acquired twelve companies between September 1997 and June 1999 including Mark Cuban’s Broadcast.com for $5.7B (Kara Swisher at WSJ in 1999), GeoCities for $3.6B, and Y Combinator founder Paul Graham’s Viaweb for $48M. They spent billions in stock and cash to acquire these companies! Its only fitting that two internet darlings would eventually end up in the hands of big-telecom Verizon, who would acquire AOL for $4.4B in 2015, and Yahoo for $4.5B in 2017, only to write down the combined value by $4.6B in 2018. In 2013, Yahoo would acquire Tumblr for $1.1B, only to sell it off this past year for $3M. Acquisitions can really be overwhelming for companies, and frequently they don’t work out as planned. In essence, acquisitions are guesses about future value to customers and rarely are they as clean and smart as technology executives make them seem. Some large organizations have gotten good at acquisitions - Google, Microsoft, Cisco, and Salesforce have all made meaningful acquisitions (Android, Github, AppDynamics, ExactTarget, respectively).
Google and Excite: the acquisition that never happened. McCullough has an incredible quote nestled into the start of chapter six: “Pioneers of new technologies are rarely the ones who survive long enough to dominate their categories; often it is the copycat or follow-on names that are still with us to this day: Google, not AltaVista, in search; Facebook, not Friendster, in social networks.” Amazon obviously bucked this trend (he mentions that), but in search he is absolutely right! In 1996, several internet search companies went public including Excite, Lycos, Infoseek, and Yahoo. As the internet bubble grew bigger, Yahoo was the darling of the day, and by 1998, it had amassed a $100B market cap. There were tons of companies in the market including the players mentioned above and AltaVista, AskJeeves, MSN, and others. The world did not need another search engine. However, in 1998, Google founders Larry Page and Sergey Brin found a better way to do search (the PageRank algorithm) and published their famous paper: “The Anatomy of a Large-Scale Hypertextual Web Search Engine.” They then went out to these massive search engines and tried to license their technology, but no one was interested. Imagine passing on Goolge’s search engine technology. In an over-ingestion of too much opportunity, all of the search engines were trying to be like AOL and become a portal to the internet, providing various services from their homepages. From an interview in 1998, “More than a "portal" (the term analysts employ to describe Yahoo! and its rivals, which are most users' gateway to the rest of the Internet), Yahoo! is looking increasingly like an online service--like America Online (AOL) or even CompuServe before the Web.” Small companies trying to do too much (cough, uber self-driving cars, cough). Excite showed the most interest in Google’s technology and Page offered it to the Company for $1.6M in cash and stock but Excite countered at $750,000. Excite had honest interest in the technology and a deal was still on the table until it became clear that Larry wanted Excite to rip out its search technology and use Google’s instead. Unfortunately that was too big of a risk for the mature Excite company. The two companies parted ways and Google eventually became the dominant player in the industry. Google’s focus was clear from the get-go, build a great search engine. Only when it was big enough did it plunge into acquisitions and development of adjacent technologies.

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August 2019 - How Google Works by Eric Schmidt and Jonathan Rosenberg

While at times it reads as a piece of Google propaganda, this book offers insight into the management techniques that Larry, Sergey and Eric employed to grow the Company to massive scale. Its hard to read this book and expect that all of these practices were actually implemented – it reads like a “How to build a utopia work culture” - but some of the principles are interesting, and more importantly it gives us insight into what Google values in their products and operations.

Tech Themes

Smart Creatives. Perhaps the most important emphasis in the book is placed on the recruiting and hiring of what Eric Schmidt and Jonathan Rosenberg have termed: Smart Creatives – “people who combine technical & business knowledge, creativity and always-learning attitude.” While these seem like the desired platitudes of every silicon valley employee, it gives a window into what Google finds important in its employees. For example, unlike Amazon, which has both business product managers and technical product managers, Google prefers its PMs to be both business focused and highly technical. Smart Creatives are mentioned hundreds of times in the book and continually underpin the success of new product launches. The book almost harps on it too much, to the point where it feels like Eric Schmidt was trying to convince all Googlers that they were truly unique.
Meetings, Q&A, Data and Information Management. Google is one of the many Silicon Valley companies that hosts company wide all-hands Q&A sessions on Friday where anyone can ask a question of Google’s leadership. Information transparency is critically important to Google, and they try to allow data to be accessible throughout the organization at all times. This trickles into other aspects of Google’s management philosophy including meetings and information management. At Google, meetings have a single owner, and while laptops largely remain closed, it’s the owner’s job to present the relevant data and derive the correct insights for the team. To that end, Google makes its information transparently available for all to access – this process is designed to avoid information asymmetry at management levels. One key issue faced by poor management teams is only receiving the best information at the top – this is countered by Amazon through incredibly blunt and aggressive communication; Google, on the other hand, maintains its intense focus on data and results to direct product strategy, so much so that it even studies its own teams productivity using internal data. Google’s laser focus on data makes sense given its main advertising products harvest the world’s internet user data for their benefit, so understanding how to leverage data is always a priority at Google.
80/20 Time. As part of Google’s product innovation strategy, employees can spend 20% of their work time on creative projects separate from their current role. While the idea sounds like an awesome to keep employees interested and motivated, in practice, its much more structured. Ideas have to be approved by managers and they are only allowed if they can directly impact Google’s business. Some great innovations were spawned out of this policy including Gmail and Google Maps but Google employees have joked that it should be called “120%” time rather than 80%.

Business Themes

Google’s Cloud Strategy. “You should spend 80% of your time on 80% of your revenue.” This quote speaks volumes when it comes to Google’s business strategy. Google clearly is the leader in Search and search advertising. Not only is it the default search engine preferred by most users, it also owns the browser market that directs searches to Google, and the most used operating system. It has certainly created a dominant position in the market and even done illegal things to maintain that advantage. Google also maintains and mines your data, and as Stratechery has pointed out, they are not hiding it anywhere. But what happens when the next wave of computing comes, and you are so focused on your core business that you end up light years behind competition from Amazon (Web Services) and Microsoft (Azure)? That’s where Google finds itself today, and recent outages and issues haven’t helped. So what is Google’s “Cloud Strategy?” The answer is lower priced, open source alternatives. Google famously developed and open sourced, Kubernetes, the container orchestration platform, which has become an increasingly important technology as developers opt for light weight alternatives to traditional virtual machines. They have followed this open sourcing with a, “We are going to open source everything” mentality that is also being employed, a bit more defensively at Microsoft. Google seeks to be an open source layer, either through Kubernetes (which runs in Azure and AWS) or through other open source platforms (Anthos) and just touch some of your company’s low churn cloud spend. Their issue is scale and support. With their knowledge of data centers and parallel computing, cloud capabilities seemed like an obvious place where Google could win, but they fumbled on building a great product because they were so focused on protecting their core business. They are in a catch up position and new CEO of Google Cloud, Thomas Kurian (formerly at Oracle), isn’t afraid to make acquisitions to build out missing product capabilities, which is why it bought Looker earlier this year. It makes sense why a company as focused as Google is on data, would want a cloud focused data analysis tool. Now they are betting on M&A and a highly open-sourced multi-public cloud future as the only way they can win.
“Objective” Key Results. As mentioned previously, the way Google combats potential information asymmetries by empowering individuals throughout the organization with data. This extends to famous venture capitalist (who invested in both Google and Amazon) John Doerr’s favorite data to examine – OKRs – Objective key results. Each Googler has a specific set of OKRs that they are responsible for maintaining on a quarterly basis. Every person’s OKRs are readily available for anyone to see throughout the Company i.e. full transparency. OKRs are public, measurable, and ambitious. This keeps engineers focused and accountable, as long as the OKRs are set correctly and actually measure outcomes. These fit so perfectly with Google’s focus on mining and monitoring data at all times: their products and their employees need to be data driven at all times.