February 2023 - Anatomy of the Swipe by Ahmed Siddiqui

This month we dive back into the world of payments and take a refreshed look at how payments companies work.

Tech Themes

Authorization. How do credit card’s even work? What is on the magnetic stripe? It turns out that each stripe has an alternating set of tiny magnets on it that produce a magnetic field around the card. The card reader on a POS system is a solinoid; when the magnets swipe through the solinoid it creates a change in the magnetic field also known as magnetic flux. The POS processes the changes in current as its swiped through the Solinoid, and is able to understand the credit card via common card standards, created by ISO. The challenge that existed with the internet, is how to ensure safe transactions when you are paying someone you clearly don’t know. The card companies created something called the card verification value (CVV), an extra number directly intended NOT to be written anywhere except for the back of your credit card. CVV codes were originally created by an Equifax employee in the UK, and initially rolled out by NatWest bank, eventually expanding to Mastercard (1997), Amex (1999), and Visa (2001). However, the early internet still had a massive fraud problem, as Roelof Botha discussed about Paypal in his Tim Ferris podcast appearance. In addition, card authorization was still quite difficult in Europe, where you would frequently have to call to provide authentication for cross-border purchases. In 1993, Europay, Mastercard, and Visa formed EMVco, to add additional fraud protection to cards. They were subsequently joined by other key members including American Express, Discover, JCB International, China UnionPay. Europay eventually merged with Mastercard in 2002 prior to Mastercard’s IPO. EMVco creates a standard for EMV chips, which embed small integrated circuits that produce a single-use cryptographic key for a merchant to decrypt and authorize a transaction. It is also incredibly difficult to clone a chip card, whereas magnetic stripes are fairly easy to copy. The increase in fraud protection was so great that it caused a liability shift, whereby the merchant (rather than the issuer) could become liable for fraud if a EMV chip card was not used, and a swipe was used instead. The latest innovation in card security is 3D Secure 2, which “allows businesses and their payment provider to send more data elements on each transaction to the cardholder’s bank. This includes payment-specific data like the shipping address, as well as contextual data, such as the customer’s device ID or previous transaction history.” The 3D Secure 2 also improves the UX of its “challenge flow,” which is an instance when a frictionless authentication wasn’t possible, for whatever reason. The challenge flow forces the user to authenticate the transaction through their banking application of choice, which is much more secure than just approving every transaction the network sees. Every day payments become more at risk and more secure!
Zelle and banks Funded Payments. Similar to Visa and Mastercard, Zelle is a cash transfer system originally created by a consortium of banks. In 2011, Bank of America, JP Morgan, Wells Fargo, and several other banks built a Paypal competitor called clearXchange. The new company would charge financial institutions to use the service, with most banks assuming the charges on behalf of their consumers. At the time, Venmo was beginning to take off with consumers utilizing its simple Peer-to-peer payments service. In 2012, Braintree acquired Venmo for just $26m. The low purchase price was the result of a lack of coherent business model, given Venmo’s founding by college roommates who were looking to send money easily. Later, in 2013, Braintree was acquired by Paypal for $800m. Braintree is an acquirer processor and introduced a business model to Venmo, namely investing the float of customer funds held in the Venmo ecosystem. In 2016, clearXchange was acquired by another bank run service called Early Warning Service, which provides risk management services to many financial institutions. Early Warning was itself created in 1990 by Bank of America, BB&T, Capital One, JP Morgan, and Wells Fargo. Early Warning launched Zelle in 2017, utilizing clearXchange’s underlying technology. Zelle is now massive, processing over $1m in volume a minute, which is more than competitors Venmo and Cash App. Zelle’s most recent stats are mind-blowing: 2.3B payments with $629B in volume. Look at creation of zelle and other examples of banks creating new companies (like visa/mastercard)
Money for Nothing, SaaS for Free. A new brand of payments companies are popping up that seek to turn a traditional SaaS model on its head. Divvy, the spend management platform, gives its SaaS software away for free, instead monetizing just the payments processed through its product. Its quite wild to see a company build complex software just to give it away, right? This strategy has been copied many times over, as we talked about when discussing Netscape and Slack. Whether its open source or just free commercial software, the free-ness of it makes it attractive. However, if everyone is free, then you still have to compete on merit. Ramp, a competitor to Divvy, raised $750m at an $8.1B valuation in 2022, and processed over $5B in payment volume in 2021. Divvy was acquired by Bill.com in 2021 for $2.5B in a mix of cash and stock. At the time of acquisition Divvy was doing just over $100m of annualized revenue, and about $4B of TPV, suggesting a take rate of ~2.5%. Ramp allegedly did about $100m in annualized revenue in 2022. While Divvy was able to find a successful exit through a willing buyer (a buyer who’s stock has declined 65% from all time highs), I’m not sure Ramp will find an easy buyer at $8.1B, but it may find the public markets if it can market itself as a cost-saving, AI, finance play. I’m just not sure that you can build a really big business by only processing payments and giving away complex software for free. We will see in time!

Business Themes

Issuer, Issuer Processor, Acquirer, Acquirer Processor. The arc of an individual payment can be broken into its constituent parts. The Issuer is normally a bank that issues credit cards to its banking customers. A bank may use an issuer processor to manage a connection to the card networks (like Visa and Mastercard) and accept/decline transactions. Examples of issuer processors include Marqeta, TSYS, and Galileo. Global Payments and TSYS merged in 2019, in an absolutely massive $21.5B deal, after Fiserv acquired FirstData for $22B and Fidelity National Services acquired WorldPay for $34B. 2019 was definitely a banner year for payments mergers, but signs of strain are already happening, with FIS announcing they’d be spinning out WorldPay in 2023. Back to our transaction - the merchant will have a payment terminal of some sort, and will use an acquirer processor like Chase Paymentech, Tabapay, or Fiserv, that will also have a fast connection to the card networks to request approval for a transaction. Lastly, we have the acquiring bank, the merchant’s bank account. When we look back at these big deals, its clear that each player was trying to round out its processing capabilities - TSYS (issuer processor) with Global Payments (a merchant acquirer), Fiserv (merchant acquirer) with First Data (issuer processor), and FIS (issuer processor) with WorldPay (merchant acquirer). FIS, Fiserv, and Global Payments have struggled to win over investors over the last five years, following these big deals.
Chargebacks. When a consumer doesn’t want to pay for an item, it can request a chargeback. The reasons for a chargeback can be numerous and valid, including fraud, item not as described, duplicate transactions, and more. In the event of fraud, a cardholder would dispute the charge with their bank. The bank would freeze their card and file a chargeback with the card network (Visa as an example). Visa would send a provisional credit to the customers card and take the money back from the merchant, then it would send the chargeback request detail to the merchant. If the merchant doesn’t dispute the chargeback, it will be assessed a $25-35 chargeback fee by Visa. However, if it does dispute the chargeback, and correctly can identify that the card actually did purchase the goods, then the issuer, the bank that is “underwriting” credit to the consumer, can be put on the hook for the funds used for the purchase. I never knew that both the merchant and issuer can be on the hook for chargebacks, but not the network! Another way in which Visa and Mastercard make money through the ecosystem!
Marqeta’s confusion. For our first payments book, we took a look at several of the new players in the credit card ecosystem, including Marqeta, Adyen, and Stripe. Its been quite a two years! Marqeta went public in June 2021, valuing the company at $15B. Stripe raised additional funds at a $95B valuation, and Adyen’s valuation hit $98B! But oh how the times change! Just two years later, and Stripe’s valuation is back at $50B, including a massively dilutive $6.5B raise to pay for employee taxes in option conversion. Adyen’s valuation sits at $53B today, a close to 50% decline, despite growing EBITDA 16% to 728M in 2022.. Marqeta may have had the worst time of all, which is said because Ahmed Siddiqui, worked at Marqeta for a number of years. Marqeta’s stock fell 85%, its CEO/Founder left the company, its gross margins have compressed from high 40’s back to down to low 40s, and its main customer Block has become an even larger customer, now driving 77% of its revenue. Marqeta went from next generation issuer processor and Stripe wannabe to an outsourced custom development shop for Block. My guess is its actual reputation sits somewhere in between the two. Expectations for Marqeta have fallen off a cliff, and its market cap sits at a tiny $2.6B. I’m not sure Block would be an immediate acquirer, because the market for issuer processing is incredibly competitive and Block has had its own stock price troubles. A spun out WorldPay could make sense as an acquirer. Visa would have made sense as acquirer, because it owns about 2.5% of Marqeta and has for many years, but their recent acquisition of Pismo, believed to be a LATAM focused and better version of Marqeta. It’s unlikely Marqeta will exist long as a small solo issuer processor!
Dig Deeper

February 2022 - Cable Cowboy by Mark Robichaux

This month we jump into the history of the cable industry in the US with Cable Cowboy. The book follows cable’s main character for over 30 years, John Malone, the intense, deal-addicted CEO of Telecommunications International (TCI).

Tech Themes

Repurposed Infrastructure. Repurposed infrastructure is one of the incredible drivers of technological change covered in Carlota Perez’s Technology Revolutions and Financial Capital. When a new technology wave comes along, it builds on the backs of existing infrastructure to reach a massive scale. Railroads laid the foundation for oil transport pipelines. Later, telecommunications companies used the miles and miles of cleared railroad land to hang wires to provide phone service through the US. Cable systems were initially used to pull down broadcast signals and bring them to remote places. Over time, more and more content providers like CNN, TBS, BET started to produce shows with cable distribution in mind. Cable became a bigger and bigger presence, so when the internet began to gain steam in the early 1990s, Cable was ready to play a role. It just so happened that Cable was best positioned to provide internet service to individual homes because, unlike the phone companies’ copper wiring, Cable had made extensive use of coaxial fiber which provided much faster speeds. In 1997, after an extended period of underperformance for the Cable industry, Microsoft announced a $1B investment in Comcast. The size of the deal showed the importance of cable providers in the growth of the internet.
Pipes + Content. One of the major issues surrounding TCI as they faced anti-trust scrutiny was their ownership of multiple TV channels. Malone realized that the content companies could make significant profits, especially when content was shown across multiple cable systems. TCI enjoyed the same Scale Economies Power as Netflix. Once the cable channel produces content, any way to spread the content cost over more subscribers is a no-brainer. However, these content deals were worrisome given TCI’s massive cable presence (>8,000,000 subscribers). TCI would frequently demand that channels take an equity investment to access TCI’s cable system. “In exchange for getting on TCI systems, TCI drove a tough bargain. He demanded that cable networks either allow TCI to invest in them directly, or they had to give TCI discounts on price, since TCI bought in bulk. In return for most-favored-nation-status on price, TCI gave any programmer immediate access to nearly one-fifth of all US subscribers in a single stroke.” TCI would impose its dominant position - we can either carry your channel and make an investment, or you can miss out on 8 million subscribers. Channels would frequently choose the former. Malone tried to avoid anti-trust by creating Liberty Media. This spinoff featured all of TCI’s investments in cable providers, offering a pseudo-separation from the telecom giant (although John Malone would completely control liberty).
Early, Not Wrong. Several times in history, companies or people were early to an idea before it was feasible. Webvan formed the concept of an online grocery store that could deliver fresh groceries to your house. It raised $800M before flaming out in the public markets. Later, Instacart came along and is now worth over $30B. There are many examples: Napster/Spotify, MySpace/Facebook, Pets.com/Chewy, Go Corporation/iPad, and Loudcloud/AWS. The early idea in the telecom industry was the information superhighway. We’ve discussed this before, but the idea is that you would use your tv to access the outside world, including ordering Pizza, accessing bank info, video calling friends, watching shows, and on-demand movies. The first instantiation of this idea was the QUBE, an expensive set-top box that gave users a plethora of additional interactive services. The QUBE was the launch project of a joint venture between American Express and Warner Communications to launch a cable system in the late 1970s. The QUBE was introduced in 1982 but cost way too much money to produce. With steep losses and mounting debt, Warner Amex Cable “abandoned the QUBE because it was financially infeasible.” In 1992, Malone delivered a now-famous speech on the future of the television industry, predicting that TVs would offer 500 channels to subscribers, with movies, communications, and shopping. 10 years after the QUBE’s failure, Time Warner tried to fulfill Malone’s promise by launching the Full-Service Network (FSN) with the same idea - offering a ton of services to users through a specialized hardware + software approach. This box was still insanely expensive (>$1,000 per box) because the company had to develop all hardware and software. After significant losses, the project was closed. It wasn’t until recently that TV’s evolved to what so many people thought they might become during those exciting internet boom years of the late 1990s. In this example and several above, sometimes the idea is correct, but the medium or user experience is wrong. It turned out that people used a computer and the internet to access shop, order food, or chat with friends, not the TV. In 2015, Domino’s announced that you could now order Pizza from your TV.

Business Themes

Complicated Transactions. Perhaps the craziest deal in John Malone’s years of experience in complex deal-making was his spinoff of Liberty Media. Liberty represented the content arm of TCI and held positions in famous channels like CNN and BET. Malone was intrigued at structuring a deal that would evade taxes and give himself the most potential upside. To create this “artificial” upside, Malone engineered a rights offering, whereby existing TCI shareholders could purchase the right to swap 16 shares of TCI for 1 share of Liberty. Malone set the price to swap at a ridiculously high value of TCI shares - ~valuing Liberty at $300 per share. “It seemed like such a lopsided offer: 16 shares of TCI for just 1 share of Liberty? That valued Liberty at $3000 a share, for a total market value of more than $600M by Malone’s reckoning. How could that be, analysts asked, given that Liberty posed a loss on revenue fo a mere $52M for the pro-forma nine months? No one on Wall Street expected the stock to trade up to $300 anytime soon.” The complexity of the rights offering + spinoff made the transaction opaque enough that even seasoned investors were confused about how it all worked and declined to buy the rights. This deal meant Malone would have more control of the newly separate Liberty Media. At the same time, the stock spin had such low participation that shares were initially thinly traded. Once people realized the quality of the company’s assets, the stock price shot up, along with Malone’s net worth. Even crazier, Malone took a loan from the new Liberty Media to buy shares of the company, meaning he had just created a massive amount of value by putting up hardly any capital. For a man that loved complex deals, this deal is one of his most complex and most lucrative.
Deal Maker Extraordinaire / Levered Rollups. John Malone and TCI loved deals and hated taxes. When TCI was building out cable networks, they acquired a new cable system almost every two weeks. Malone popularized using EBITDA (earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization) as a proxy for real cash flow relative to net income, which incorporates tax and interest payments. To Malone, debt could be used for acquisitions to limit paying taxes and build scale. Once banks got comfortable with EBITDA, Malone went on an acquisition tear. “From 1984 to 1987, Malone had spent nearly $3B for more than 150 cable companies, placing TCI wires into one out of nearly every five with cable in the country, a penetration that was twice that of its next largest rival.” Throughout his career, he rallied many different cable leaders to find a deal that worked for everyone. In 1986, when fellow industry titan Ted Turner ran into financial trouble, Malone reached out to Viacom leader Sumner Redstone, to avoid letting Time Inc (owner of HBO) buy Turner’s CNN. After a quick negotiation, 31 cable operators agreed to rescue Turner Broadcasting with a $550M investment, allowing Turner to maintain control and avoid a takeover. Later, Malone led an industry consortium that included TCI, Comcast, and Cox to create a high speed internet service called, At Home, in 1996. “At Home was responsible for designing the high-speed network and providing services such as e-mail, and a home page featuring news, entertainment, sports, and chat groups. Cable operators were required to upgrade their local systems to accommodate two-way transmission, as well as handle marketing, billing, and customer complaints, for which they would get 65% of the revenue.” At Home ended up buying early internet search company Excite in a famous $7.5B deal, that diluted cable owners and eventually led to bankruptcy for the combined companies. Malone’s instinct was always to try his best to work with a counterparty because he genuinely believed a deal between two competitors provided better outcomes to everyone.
Tracking Stocks. Malone popularized the use of tracking stocks, which are publicly traded companies that mirror the operating performance of the underlying asset owned by a company. John Malone loved tracking stocks because they could be used to issue equity to finance operations and give investors access to specific divisions of a conglomerate while allowing the parent to maintain full control. While tracking stocks have been out of favor (except for Liberty Media, LOL), they were once highly regarded and even featured in the original planning of AT&T’s $48B purchase of TCI in 1998. AT&T financed its TCI acquisition with debt and new AT&T stock, diluting existing shareholders. AT&T CEO Michael Armstrong had initially agreed to use tracking stocks to separate TCI’s business from the declining but cash-flowing telephone business but changed his mind after AT&T’s stock rocketed following the TCI deal announcement. Malone was angry with Armstrong’s actions, and the book includes an explanation: “heres why you should mess with it, Mike: You’ve just issued more than 400 million new shares of AT&T to buy a business that produces no earnings. It will be a huge money-loser for years, given how much you’ll spend on broadband. That’s going to sharply dilute your earnings per share, and your old shareholders like earnings. That will hurt your stock price, and then you can’t use stock to make more acquisitions, then you’re stuck. If you create a tracking stock to the performance of cable, you separate out the losses we produce and show better earnings for your main shareholders; and you can use the tracker to buy more cable interests in tax-free deals.” Tracking stocks all but faded from existence following the internet bubble and early 2000s due to their difficulty of implementation and complexity, which can confuse shareholders and cause the businesses to trade at a large discount. This all begs the question, though - which companies could use tracking stock today? Imagine an AWS tracker, a Youtube tracker, an Instagram tracker, or an Xbox tracker - all of these could allow cloud companies to attract new shareholders, do more specific tax-free mergers, and raise additional capital specific to a business unit.

Dig Deeper

March 2021 - Payments Systems in the U.S. by Carol Coye Benson, Scott Loftesness, and Russ Jones

This month we dive into the fintech space for the first time! Glenbrook Partners is a famous payments consulting company. This classic book describes the history and current state of the many financial systems we use every day. While the book is a bit dated and reads like a textbook, it throws in some great real-world observations and provides a great foundation for any payments novice!

Tech Themes

Mapping Open-Loop and Closed-Loop Networks. The major credit and debit card providers (Visa, Mastercard, American Express, China UnionPay, and Discover) all compete for the same spots in customer wallets but have unique and differing backgrounds and mechanics. The first credit card on the scene was the BankAmericard in the late 1950’s. As it took off, Bank of America started licensing the technology all across the US and created National BankAmericard Inc. (NBI) to facilitate its card program. NBI merged with its international counterpart (IBANCO) to form Visa in the mid-1970’s. Another group of California banks had created the Interbank Card Association (ICA) to compete with Visa and in 1979 renamed itself Mastercard. Both organizations remained owned by the banks until their IPO’s in 2006 (Mastercard) and 2008 (Visa). Both of these companies are known as open-loop networks, that is they work with any bank and require banks to sign up customers and merchants. As the bank points out, “This structure allows the two end parties to transact with each other without having direct relationships with each other’s banks.” This convenient feature of open-loop payments systems means that they can scale incredibly quickly. Any time a bank signs up a new customer or merchant, they immediately have access to the network of all other banks on the Mastercard / Visa network. In contrast to open-loop systems, American Express and Discover operate largely closed-loop systems, where they enroll each merchant and customer individually. Because of this onerous task of finding and signing up every single consumer/merchant, Amex and Discover cannot scale to nearly the size of Visa/Mastercard. However, there is no bank intermediation and the networks get total access to all transaction data, making them a go-to solution for things like loyalty programs, where a merchant may want to leverage data to target specific brand benefits at a customer. Open-loop systems like Apple Pay (its tied to your bank account) and closed-loop systems like Starbuck’s purchasing app (funds are pre-loaded and can only be redeemed at Starbucks) can be found everywhere. Even Snowflake, the data warehouse provider and subject of last month’s TBOTM is a closed-loop payments network. Customers buy Snowflake credits up-front, which can only be used to redeem Snowflake compute services. In contrast, AWS and other cloud’s are beginning to offer more open-loop style networks, where AWS credits can be redeemed against non-AWS software. Side note - these credit systems and odd-pricing structures deliberately mislead customers and obfuscate actual costs, allowing the cloud companies to better control gross margins and revenue growth. It’s fascinating to view the world through this open-loop / closed-loop dynamic.
New Kids on the Block - What are Stripe, Adyen, and Marqeta? Stripe recently raised at a minuscule valuation of $95B, making it the highest valued private startup (ever?!). Marqeta, its API/card-issuing counterpart, is prepping a 2021 IPO that may value it at $10B. Adyen, a Dutch public company is worth close to $60B (Visa is worth $440B for comparison). Stripe and Marqeta are API-based payment service providers, which allow businesses to easily accept online payments and issue debit and credit cards for a variety of use cases. Adyen is a merchant account provider, which means it actually maintains the merchant account used to run a company’s business - this often comes with enormous scale benefits and reduced costs, which is why large customers like Nike have opted for Adyen. This merchant account clearing process can take quite a while which is why Stripe is focused on SMB’s - a business can sign up as a Stripe customer and almost immediately begin accepting online payments on the internet. Stripe and Marqeta’s API’s allow a seamless integration into payment checkout flows. On top of this basic but highly now simplified use case, Stripe and Marqeta (and Adyen) allow companies to issue debit and credit cards for all sorts of use cases. This is creating an absolute BOOM in fintech, as companies seek to try new and innovative ways of issuing credit/debit cards - such as expense management, banking-as-a-service, and buy-now-pay-later. Why is this now such a big thing when Stripe, Adyen, and Marqeta were all created before 2011? In 2016, Visa launched its first developer API’s which allowed companies like Stripe, Adyen, and Marqeta to become licensed Visa card issuers - now any merchant could issue their own branded Visa card. That is why Andreessen Horowitz’s fintech partner Angela Strange proclaimed: “Every company will be a fintech company.” (this is also clearly some VC marketing)! Mastercard followed suit in 2019, launching its open API called the Mastercard Innovation Engine. The big networks decided to support innovation - Visa is an investor in Stripe and Marqeta, AmEx is an investor in Stripe, and Mastercard is an investor in Marqeta. Surprisingly, no network providers are investors in Adyen. Fintech innovation has always seen that the upstarts re-write the incumbents (Visa and Mastercard are bigger than the banks with much better business models) - will the same happen here?
Building a High Availability System. Do Mastercard and Visa have the highest availability needs of any system? Obviously, people are angry when Slack or Google Cloud goes down, but think about how many people are affected when Visa or Mastercard goes down? In 2018, a UK hardware failure prompted a five-hour outage at Visa: “Disgruntled customers at supermarkets, petrol stations and abroad vented their frustrations on social media when there was little information from the financial services firm. Bank transactions were also hit.” High availability is a measure of system uptime: “Availability is often expressed as a percentage indicating how much uptime is expected from a particular system or component in a given period of time, where a value of 100% would indicate that the system never fails. For instance, a system that guarantees 99% of availability in a period of one year can have up to 3.65 days of downtime (1%).” According to Statista, Visa handles ~185B transactions per year (a cool 6,000 per second), while UnionPay comes in second with 131B and Mastercard in third with 108B. For the last twelve months end June 30, 2020, Visa processed $8.7T in payments volume which means that the average transaction was ~$47. At 6,000 transactions per second, Visa loses $282,000 in payment volume every second it’s down. Mastercard and Visa have always been historically very cagey about disclosing data center operations (the only article I could find is from 2013) though they control their own operations much like other technology giants. “One of the keys to the [Visa] network's performance, Quinlan says, is capacity. And Visa has lots of it. Its two data centers--which are mirror images of each other and can operate interchangeably--are configured to process as many as 30,000 simultaneous transactions, or nearly three times as much as they've ever been asked to handle. Inside the pods, 376 servers, 277 switches, 85 routers, and 42 firewalls--all connected by 3,000 miles of cable--hum around the clock, enabling transactions around the globe in near real-time and keeping Visa's business running.” The data infrastructure challenges that payments systems are subjected to are massive and yet they all seem to perform very well. I’d love to learn more about how they do it!

Business Themes

What is interchange and why does it exist? BigCommerce has a great simple definition for interchange: “Interchange fees are transaction fees that the merchant's bank account must pay whenever a customer uses a credit/debit card to make a purchase from their store. The fees are paid to the card-issuing bank to cover handling costs, fraud and bad debt costs and the risk involved in approving the payment.” What is crazy about interchange is that it is not the banks, but the networks (Mastercard, Visa, China UnionPay) that set interchange rates. On top of that, the networks set the rates but receive no revenue from interchange itself. As the book points out: “Since the card netork’s issuing customers are the recipients of interchange fees, the level of interchange that a network sets is an important element in the network’s competitive position. A higher level of interchange on one network’s card products naturally makes that network’s card products more attractive to card issuers.” The incentives here are wild - the card issuers (banks) want higher interchange because they receive the interchange from the merchant’s bank in a transaction, the card networks want more card issuing customers and offering higher interchange rates better positions them in competitive battles. The merchant is left worse off by higher interchange rates, as the merchant bank almost always passes this fee on to the merchant itself ($100 received via credit card turns out to only be $97 when it gets to their bank account because of fees). Visa and Mastercard have different interchange rates for every type of transaction and acceptance method - making it a complicated nightmare to actually understand their fees. The networks and their issuers may claim that increased interchange fees allow banks to invest more in fraud protection, risk management, and handling costs, but there is no way to verify this claim. This has caused a crazy war between merchants, the card networks, and the card issuers.
Why is Jamie Dimon so pissed about fintechs? In a recent interview, Jamie Dimon, CEO of JP Morgan Chase, recently called fintechs “examples of unfair competition.” Dimon is angry about the famous (or infamous) Durbin Amendment, which was a last-minute addition included in the landmark Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010. The Durbin amendment attempted to cap the interchange amount that could be charged by banks and tier the interchange rates based on the assets of the bank. In theory, capping the rates would mean that merchants paid less in fees, and the merchant would pass these lower fees onto the consumer by giving them lower prices thus spurring demand. The tiering would mean banks with >$10B in assets under management would make less in interchange fees, leveling the playing field for smaller banks and credit unions. “The regulated [bank with >$10B in assets] debit fee is 0.05% + $0.21, while the unregulated is 1.60% + $0.05. Before the Durbin Amendment the fee was 1.190% + $0.10.” While this did lower debit card interchange, a few unintended consequences resulted: 1. Regulators expected that banks would make substantially less revenue, however, they failed to recognize that banks might increase other fees to offset this lost revenue stream: “Banks have cut back on offering rewards for their debit cards. Banks have also started charging more for their checking accounts or they require a larger monthly balance.” In addition, many smaller banks couldn’t recoup the lost revenue amount, leading to many bankruptcies and consolidation. 2. Because a flat rate fee was introduced regardless of transaction size, smaller merchants were charged more in interchange than the prior system (which was pro-rated based on $ amount). “One problem with the Durbin Amendment is that it didn’t take small transactions into account,” said Ellen Cunningham, processing expert at CardFellow.com. “On a small transaction, 22 cents is a bigger bite than on a larger transaction. Convenience stores, coffee shops and others with smaller sales benefited from the original system, with a lower per-transaction fee even if it came with a higher percentage.” These small retailers ended up raising prices in some instances to combat these additional fees - causing the law to have the opposite effect of lowering costs to consumers. Dimon is angry that this law has allowed fintech companies to start charging higher prices for debit card transactions. As shown above, smaller banks earn a substantial amount more in interchange fees. These smaller banks are moving quickly to partner with fintechs, which now power hundreds of millions of dollars in account balances and Dimon believes they are not spending enough attention on anti-money laundering and fraud practices. In addition, fintech’s are making money in suspect ways - Chime makes 21% of its revenue through high out-of-network ATM fees, and cash advance companies like Dave, Branch, and Earnin’ are offering what amount to pay-day loans to customers.
Mastercard and Visa: A history of regulation. Visa and Mastercard have been the subject of many regulatory battles over the years. The US Justice Department announced in March that it would be investigating Visa over online debit-card practices. In 1996, Visa and Mastercard were sued by merchants and settled for $3B. In 1998, the Department of Justice won a case against Visa and Mastercard for not allowing issuing banks to work with other card networks like AmEx and Discover. In 2009, Mastercard and Visa were sued by the European Union and forced to reduce debit card swipe fees by 0.2%. In 2012, Mastercard and Visa were sued for price-fixing fees and were forced to pay $6.25B in a settlement. The networks have been sued by the US, Europe, Australia, New Zealand, ATM Operators, Intuit, Starbucks, Amazon, Walmart, and many more. Each time they have been forced to modify fees and practices to ensure competition. However, this has also re-inforced their dominance as the biggest payment networks which is why no competitors have been established since the creation of the networks in the 1970’s. Also, leave it to the banks to establish a revenue source that is so good that it is almost entirely undefeatable by legislation. When, if ever, will Visa and Mastercard not be dominant payments companies?